

Recommended for the B. A. Examination by Agra University.

A MANUAL
OF
ETHICS

BY

Dr. JADUNATH SINHA, M.A., P.R.S., Ph.D.

Professor of Philosophy, Meerut College, Meerut ; Author of 'A Manual of Psychology', 'Text-Book of Deductive Logic', 'Text-Book of Inductive Logic', 'Indian Psychology : Perception,' 'Indian Realism' 'Introduction to Indian Philosophy' etc. ; Member, Faculty of Arts, Academic Board, Board of Studies in Philosophy, Agra University.

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PREFACE

This MANUAL OF ETHICS has developed out of lecture notes. Its aim is to give, in a brief compass, an outline of the fundamental principles of Ethics. It is intended for the use of the candidates for the B. A. examination of the Indian Universities. It is especially adapted to the syllabuses of Calcutta University and Agra University. It is written in simple and easy language.

The material has been drawn from standard text-books. Apt quotations and references have been given to stimulate the reader to study them at the first hand and master the subject.

Nietzsche's Ethics of Power and Mahatma Gandhi's Ethics of Ahimsa are of topical interest. The Standard as Value is an achievement of modern ethical thought. The Problems of Social Ethics and Political Ethics will be of great help to students in answering practical questions. For their benefit model University questions have been inserted at the end.

I acknowledge my indebtedness to Mackenzie, Seth, Muirhead, Dewey and Tufts, Wright, Urban, and Rashdall whose works I have freely used in writing this book. If it can initiate the beginner into the fundamentals of Ethics, I shall consider my labour amply rewarded.

Meerut,
23rd September,
1947

JADUNATH SINHA

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A
MANUAL OF ETHICS

CHAPTER I

Definition, Scope and Method of Ethics

1. Moral Faith and Moral Insight.

We live our life, and we live a moral life. We have implicit faith in morality. We believe in right and wrong, good and evil. But we do not reflect upon the nature of right and wrong, and their validity. We assume their validity and act upon them. Ethics converts this moral faith into a rational insight. Ethics is the science of reflective morality. It investigates the nature and validity of rightness and wrongness of human conduct with reference to the ideal of the Highest Good. "That life is worth living, is the postulate of life itself; why it is worth living, is the question of Ethics as a science" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, p. 10). Ethics converts moral faith into a rational insight. The faith in a Supreme Good must remain as long as life continues. So the scientific effort to convert this faith into the rational insight must also continue. Ethics is theory of morality.

2. Definition of Ethics.

The word '*Ethics*' is derived from the Greek adjective '*ethica*' which comes from the substantive '*ethos*'. '*Ethos*' means customs, usages or habits. Ethics is also called 'Moral Philosophy'. The word 'moral' is derived from the Latin substantive '*mores*' which also means customs or habits. Customs are not merely habitual ways of acting. They are ways approved by the group.

Thus literally 'Ethics' means the science of customs or habits of men. It is the science of the habitual conduct of men. Habits are the expression of settled dispositions of the mind or character. Character is the permanent habit of willing. It is the inner bent of the mind. It is expressed in habitual conduct. Thus Ethics is the science of habit or character. "Ethicis discusses men's habits and customs, or in other words, their characters, the principles on which they habitually act, and considers what it is that constitutes the rightness or wrongness of those principles, the good or evil of those habits" (Mackenzie : *Manual of Ethics*, 1929, p. 1).

Ethics is the science of rightness and wrongness of conduct. It is the science of morality. Conduct is purposive action. It involves choice and will. It contains the element of purpose. Conduct is the expression of character. Character is a settled habit of will. The will is the self in action. Thus Ethics is the science of human character as expressed in right or wrong conduct. But rightness and wrongness refer to the Good which is the ideal of human life. Thus Ethics is the science of the Highest Good.

Ethics is not concerned with the origin and growth of conduct like psychology. It is concerned with *evaluation* of conduct with reference to an *ideal* or *standard.* It seeks to determine the supreme ideal involved in human conduct. It seeks to teach us how we can pass correct moral judgments upon the habits or characters of men, and consider them as right or wrong, good or evil, with reference to the supreme ideal of human life. Ethics is the science of the ideal involved in human life. It is the science of the Highest Good of man.

The terms 'right' and 'good' require a little explanation.

Right.—The term 'right' is derived from the Latin '*rectus*'. It means *straight* or *according to rule.* When an action is said to be *right*, it means that it conforms to a *law* or rule. Every law or rule presupposes an *end* which is realised by it. The end

which is subserved by a law is called the *good*. Thus 'right' is subordinate to 'good'. It is a means to good.

Good.—The term 'good' is connected with the German '*gut*'. "A thing is generally said to be good when *it is valuable for some end*. Thus, particular kinds of medicine are said to be good for this or that complaint. Similarly, when we speak of conduct as good, we may mean that it is serviceable for the end or ideal that we have in view" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 2).

Thus an action is *right* if it conforms to a *law* or *rule*. A law is a means to an *end* or *good*. But there is a hierarchy of ends or goods. Ethics is not concerned with relative or subordinate goods but with the absolute or supreme good. It seeks to determine the Highest Good or *Summum Bonum* of human life.

Ethics may, therefore, be defined as the science of the *Highest Good*. It may also be defined as "the *science of the ideal involved in human life*" (*Mackenzie*). "Or we may say, with Aristotle, that Ethics is the investigation of the final end or purpose of human life. The good is the end,—that end to which all other so-called 'ends' are really means. Ethical thinkers have always sought for this one end to which all other so-called 'ends' are merely means, and which they have called the Good" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, pp. 12-13).

3. The Nature of Ethics.

Ethics is a Normative Science.—Ethics is a science. It deals with the *whole* of human experience from the point of view of *activity* or pursuit of an *end* or *ideal*. It deals especially with human conduct or *actions* together with the inner *volitions* and their motives. Ethics is a science in so far as it depends upon *observation*, and *explanation* of human conduct with reference to an *ideal* or standard.

But Ethics is not a *natural or positive science*. It is not concerned with the nature, origin and growth of human conduct.

It does not explain human actions by means of certain *laws*. "Ethics is not primarily concerned with *conduct as a fact in space and time*,—something done here and now,—following from circumstances in the past, and succeeded by certain results in the future. It is concerned with the *judgment upon conduct*, the judgment that such and such conduct is right or wrong" (Muirhead : *The Elements of Ethics*, p. 19). Ethics is not concerned with human conduct as it *is* but as it *ought* to be. It passes *judgments of value* upon human actions with reference to the *moral ideal*. It is not concerned with judgments of *fact* but with judgments of *value*. *Judgments of fact* are judgments of what *is*. *Judgments of value* are judgments of what *ought to be*. The former are called *factual judgments*. The latter are called *critical judgments*. "Ethics is concerned with the *judgment upon conduct*, the judgment that such and such conduct is right or wrong" (*Muirhead*). Thus Ethics is not a natural or positive science but a *normative* or *regulative* science.

Natural or positive sciences are concerned with facts or phenomena, and investigate certain *uniformities* or *laws* which govern the phenomena of nature. They describe the ways in which certain classes of objects are found to exist, or the ways in which certain classes of events are found to occur in nature. They have no direct reference to any *end* or *ideal* by reference to which facts are judged. But normative sciences are not concerned with actual facts or their laws but with norms or *ideals* which *regulate* human life.

Normative sciences seek to determine *Norms*, *Ideals*, *Standards*, or *Values*. There are three Ideals of human life, *viz.*, Truth, Beauty and Good. These are the supreme values in human experience. They correspond to the three aspects of our conscious life—knowing, feeling and willing. Logic is concerned with the general conditions involved in the pursuit of Truth. Æsthetics is concerned with the creation and appreciation of Beauty. Ethics is concerned with what is right in human action

in the pursuit of Good. Thus Logic, Æsthetics and Ethics are normative sciences as they are concerned with the Ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Good respectively. "They are concerned with standards of value, rather than with the simple apprehension and analysis of what exists or occurs" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 5).

"These three sciences deal with our *critical* judgments, as distinguished from our *factual* judgments ; they endeavour to systematise these judgments by deducing them from a common standard of value, a final criterion of appreciation" (*Seth*). Logic interprets and explains our judgments of intellectual value. Æsthetics interprets and explains our judgments of æsthetic value. Similarly Ethics interprets and explains our judgments of moral value.

Ethics is not a Practical Science.—A *science* teaches us to *know*, and an art to *do*. But a *practical science* teaches us to know *how to do*. It lies midway between science and art. A practical science is concerned with the *means* for the realisation of a definite end or result. Thus medical science is a practical science, since it does not seek to determine the ideal of health but points out the *means* by which health may be best produced. But Ethics cannot be regarded as a practical science. It merely tries to ascertain the *moral ideal* but does not lay down rules or means for the attainment of the moral ideal. It does not teach us how to live a moral life. It is the business of a normative science to define an *ideal*,—not to lay down *rules* for its attainment. Æsthetics is a normative science. It is concerned with the *Ideal* of Beauty ; but it is no part of its business to enquire how Beauty is produced. So Ethics, as a normative science, discusses the ideal of goodness or rightness, and is not directly concerned with the means by which this ideal may be realised. It gives us a knowledge of guiding principles of life, but does not tell us how to apply them. Thus Ethics, though a normative science, is not a practical science. But the study of Ethics or theory of morality has a bearing on our moral

life. It does influence our practice. But this does not make Ethics a practical science.

Ethics is not an Art.—If Ethics cannot be regarded as a practical science, still less can it be regarded as an Art. We cannot speak of an Art of conduct at all. There is no branch of study which can teach us the art of moral life. Even if it teaches us the moral precepts or rules of moral conduct, it cannot teach us how to realize them in practice. Even if we know the moral precepts, we may not be able to realize them owing to infirmity of character and lack of strength of will. For teaching the art of moral life "example is better than precept", and experience is better than either; so that even if it were the busieness of Ethics to lay down precepts as a practical science, they would still not suffice for instruction in the art of moral life. Thus Ethics is neither a Practical Science nor an Art. It is simply a *Normative* Science.

Is there any Art of Conduct?—It is not at all proper to speak of an Art of Conduct. The term 'art' is used in somewhat different senses. The Industrial Arts are not quite of the same nature as the Fine Arts. The former are directed to the production of objects useful for some *ulterior end*, whereas the latter aim at the production of objects which are *ends in themselves*. The former produce objects which have utility. The latter produce objects which are intrinsic goods. But in both cases there is a definite *product* which it is the object of the Art to bring forth. But in the case of morality this is not true. There is *no product* in this case but only an *activity*. Of course, it may be said that the activity is valued with reference to an ultimate end, *i. e.*, the *summum bonum*. The difference between an Art and Morality consists in the following :—

"*Virtue exists only in activity.*—A good painter is one who *can* paint beautifully : a good man is not one who *can*, but

one who *does*, act rightly. Goodness is not a capacity or potentiality, but an *activity*" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 8-9). A truthful person is not one who *can* speak the truth, but one who habitually *does* so. Virtue does not consist in capacity or potentiality but in activity. A virtuous person is one who cultivates the habit of performing duties. Therefore virtue consists in activity.

"*The Essence of Virtue lies in the Will.*"—Art consists in the possession of a skill. Morality consists in an attitute of *will*. Even if there is no overt action, there is an attitude of will—motive, intention, purpose, choice. Morality may lie in this inner mental process, though there is no external action. "The man who is a bungler in any of the particular arts may be a very worthy and well-meaning person ; but the best intentions in the world will not make him a good artist. In the case of virtuous action, on the other hand, as Kant says, 'a good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition'" (*Ibid*, p. 10). The morality of an action depends upon the inner motive or intention rather than upon its outer consequence. A beggar comes to you for help. You have no means to help him. You cannot do anything to relieve his distress. Yet your heart goes out in sympathy to him and you have the will to help him. Your attitude of the will is right. When there is no scope for overt action, the right attitude of the will constitutes morality.

4. Is Ethics a Science or a part of Philosophy ?

A science deals with a particular department of phenomena. It deals with a *limited* portion of our experience. But Ethics deals "with the *whole* of our experience from one particular point of view, *viz.*, from the point of view of activity—*i. e.*, from the point of view of the pursuit of ends or ideals." There-

fore, Mackenzie holds that "in a sense, Ethics is not a science at all, if by a science we understand the study of some *limited* department of human experience. It is rather a part of philosophy, *i. e.*, a part of the study of experience as a whole. It is, indeed, only a *part* of philosophy ; because it considers the experience of life only from the point of view of will or activity. It does not, except indirectly, consider man as *knowing* or *enjoying*, but as *doing*, *i. e.*, pursuing an end. But it considers man's *whole* activity, the entire nature of the good which he seeks, and the whole significance of his activity in seeking it" (*Ibid*, p. 11).

But Ethics should be treated as a *normative science* rather than as a part of philosophy. It is a *science* in so far as it deals with *moral* phenomena as distinguished from other kinds of phenomena. It *observes* and *classifies* moral phenomena and *explains* them by the moral ideal. It distinguishes moral judgments from logical and æsthetic judgments and reduces them into a system. Therefore its method is scientific. Of the three parts of the universe—God, world, and man—Ethics is particularly concerned with man. It is the business of Ethics to determine what is *human* good, and not what is *cosmic* good. But Metaphysics investigates the nature of the Universe and the cosmic good or the goal of the universe. So Ethics is not a part of Metaphysics.

But Ethics, as a normative science, closely appproaches philosophy. In determining the moral ideal or the highest good of man Ethics has to transcend observation. In order to enquire into the validity of the moral ideal, Ethics has to enter into philosophical investigation. The question of the *validity* of the moral ideal leads us on to the discussion of the ultimate nature of reality. But philosophical or metaphysical problems involved in ethical investigations are only assumptions taken for granted and Ethics does not enquire into their ultimate nature and validity. The existence of God,

the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will are the postulates of morality. But these postulates are not proved by Ethics. Hence Ethics should be regarded as the normative science of conduct and not as a part of philosophy.

Ethics should not be identified with Metaphysics for three reasons. First, it assumes the validity of moral judgments, and seeks to reduce them to a system. Secondly, it abstracts the moral value from the logical value, and the æsthetic value. Thirdly, it abstracts the judgments of value from the judgments of fact. Metaphysics investigates the ultimate validity of the judgments of value as well as the judgments of fact. It investigates the relation of values to reality or existence. The Good or the moral value is probably the supreme value, superior to Truth and Beauty ; and the true metaphysics is probably a metaphysic of ethics. Therefore Ethics should not be regarded as a part of metaphysics.

The main points may be summed up in this way :—

(1) Ethics is the science which deals with the *Ideal* involved in human conduct. It deals with the standard of rightness and wrongness, good and evil, involved in conduct.

(2) Ethics is a *normative* or *regulative science* as distinguished from a natural or positive science.

(3) Ethics should *not* properly be described as a *practical science*, though it has a close bearing upon practical life.

(4) Still less is Ethics to be described as an *art.*

(5) It is hardly correct to speak of an *art of conduct* at all.

(6) Ethics is not a part of philosophy. But as a normative science it approaches philosophy more closely than a positive sci ence.

5. Ethics and Natural Science.

There is a difference between a *normative* science and a *natural* science. The former deals with jndgments of *value* while the latter with judgments of *fact*. The former deals with

what *ought* to be while the latter with what *is*. A natural science is concerned with the simple apprehension and analysis of what exists or occurs. But a normative science deals with a standard of value. Firstly, a natural science observes accurately the phenomena with which it deals. Secondly, it distinguishes the different kinds of phenomena thus observed, and *classifies* them according to their most significant differences. Thirdly, it must not only accurately observe and classify, but it must also *explain*. To explain a phenomenon is to find the cause which produced it. A phenomenon is said to be properly explained when it is seen necessarily to follow from the sum of conditions which the science in question takes into account. A phenomenon is explained when it is referred to other antecedent phenomena within a particular system. Explanation in science is partial or limited. It contents itself with a perceived coherence of its data relatively to a limited sphere, spatial, mechanical, chemical, or biological. Explanation in science means the process by which a phenomenon is related to the other phenomena within a system, and apprehended as a coherent member of the system. Philosophy goes beyond the partial explanation of a science. It seeks to relate the different systems to one another and to the reality as a whole.

Can Ethics be said to be *explanatory* in any similar sense? Herbert Spencer and others hold that Ethics is a natural science. It differs from other natural sciences only in that its explanation is more thorough-going. It seeks to explain the moral phenomena by referring them to the known conditions of the individual and social life of man. Herbert Spencer tries to trace them to even the biological phenomena of animal life. He treats moral phenomena as a product of the social, mental, and biological evolution.

But this view is entirely erroneous. "Ethics is the science of the Good. As distinguished from natural sciences, or the sciences of the actual, it is a normative or regulative science, a

science of the ideal. The question of ethical science is not, What is? But, What ought to be? As the science of the Good, it is the science *par excellence* of the ideal and the ought. Its problem is the interpretation and explanation of our judgments of ethical value. This task ethics seeks to accomplish by investigating the ultimate criterion of moral value, the true norm or standard of ethical appreciation. What, it asks, is the ultimate Good in human life?" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, p. 37).

Ethics differs from the natural sciences in the following points as pointed out by Muirhead :—

"It starts from the assumption of the existence of a *rule or standard* of judgment, not from physical events and the causes which determine them" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 29). Natural sciences seek to explain the phenomena under investigation by other antecedent phenomena within a particular system or sphere of experience. Ethics, as a normative science, seeks to explain or *evaluate* moral phenomena by reference to the *Ideal* of the Highest Good. It assumes that moral facts cannot be accounted for by prior physical, physiological, or mental phenomena. They can be explained by the moral ideal. The ideal transcends the actual facts.

Ethics deals with moral judgments *consciously* passed by man upon himself and others. Thus "it rests upon the assumption that man is not merely a part of nature and the blind servant of her purposes, but is *conscious* of being a part, and of being subject to her laws. He not only behaves in a certain way in presence of particular circumstances, but he is *conscious* of his behaviour in its relation to himself and others. It is on the ground of this consciousness that he passes judgment upon it. Hence any attempt to treat the science of human conduct and character as merely a branch of material science is doomed to failure. The 'explanations' in the field of ethics cannot be in terms of the laws and hypotheses that are applicable in the field of physical science" (*Ibid*, pp. 29-30). Ethics seeks to

explain rightness or wrongness of human conduct by reference to the Ideal of the Highest Good. Natural sciences treat man as organically related to his environment in nature and society. But Ethics treats of him as *conscious* of that relation. This makes a vast difference between Ethics and natural sciences. Man is a conscious being. He is not only conscious, but he is also self-conscious. He is conscious of his relation to nature and society. Therefore he cannot be regarded as a part of nature. He cannot spring out of nature. Nor can he merge in nature. He is a spiritual being seeking to realize ideals. So human conduct and character, involving the moral ideal cannot be accounted for by prior physical, physiological, or mental events.

"The explanations of particular sciences are, after all, *relative*. No fact or phenomenon is fully explained till its relations to all the world beside are clearly known and defined. But all the world, or the whole system of things, is not the subject-matter of any particular science. So far as it can be made a subject of investigation at all, it is the subject of philosophy or metaphysics. But while philosophy alone deals with the question of ultimate explanations, yet relatively, and in their own field, the explanations of the particular sciences are regarded as valid" (*Ibid*, pp. 31-32). Natural sciences are not intimately connected with metaphysics, which deals with the nature and reality of the world as a whole. But ethics, as a normative science, is closely connected with metaphysics.

6. Ethics and Metaphysics.

Ethics has to do with moral judgments. These judgments are judgments of value. Moral judgments are judgments of *absolute*, not merely of relative value. "Conduct is good or bad, not merely relatively, but *absolutely*, *i. e.*, without relation to our individual views of what is desirable or not desirable in particular circumstances. This apparently is the meaning of

duty and right as contrasted with pleasure or utility. In other words, *morality is commonly thought to be required by the nature of things as a whole, not merely by the circumstances in which we live*" (*Ibid*, p. 33). What is right is right by its very nature. It is right from the standpoint of the whole universe or *reality*. It is absolutely right. If rightness and wrongness are considered as relative, they lose their significance. They are absolute. Thus Ethics is closely connected with metaphysics which investigates the nature of the Highest Good and its relation to the universe.

"This intimate connection with metaphysics may further be illustrated from the fact that in Ethics we have to do, not only with man as related to his material and social environment, but with man as *conscious* of this relationship. For this consciousness involves a reference to the *whole world* besides, as a cosmos or order in which he has a place. In being conscious of himself as a citizen of a particular state, or as a member of the human brotherhood, he is also conscious of himself as a citizen of the world, and as a member of a cosmos of related beings" (*Ibid*, p. 33). Man is conscious of his relation to nature as society. Thus he is conscious of himself as organically related to the Reality which is a system of interconnected parts. And the nature of the ultimate reality is investigated by Metaphysics. Thus Ethics closely approaches Metaphysics since it treats of man not only as related to his natural and social environment but as *conscious* of such a relationship. But natural sciences are not at all concerned with the whole universe. They content themselves with explanations of phenomena within a particular system of experience. Thus Ethics is more closely connected with metaphysics than natural sciences.

7. The Province or Scope of Ethics.

The Province or Scope of Ethics is the range of its subject-matter. Ethics, as a normative science, seeks to define the

moral ideal. It is not concerned with the nature, origin, or development of human conduct. It is concerned with the *ideal* or *standard* to which our conduct should conform. But in order to enquire into the ideal of conduct, it must know the *nature* of conduct. Conduct is the expression of character. Character is the settled habit of will. It is the inner bent of the mind or permanent disposition produced by habitual actions. Ethics is sometimes said to be the science of character. But in order to enquire into the nature of character, Ethics must enquire into the nature of the springs of actions, motives, intentions, voluntary actions and non-voluntary actions and so on. *Thus Ethics must be founded on a psychological basis.*

But Ethics enquires into the nature of springs of action, motives, intentions, voluntary actions, non-voluntary actions and so on, only to pass moral judgments upon them. The fundamental problem of Ethics is the nature of the moral ideal or standard with reference to which we pass moral judgments. It answers the question : What is the Good or the Moral Ideal ? What is the *summum bonum*, or the Chief Good ? What is the Good in all good acts ? But though Ethics investigates the nature of the moral ideal, or the Good, it does not formulate *rules* or moral precepts for the realisation of the moral ideal.

When an action conforms to the moral ideal, it is said to be *right* ; when it does not conform to the moral ideal, it is said to be *wrong*. Right actions are said to be *duties*. The end which is subserved by the moral laws is said to be *good*. There is a hierarchy of ends and means. So there are *relative goods* and the *absolute good*. Ethics is concerned with the highest or absolute good. Thus, the fundamental notions of Ethics are *right*, *duty* and *good*, the nature of which it investigates.

Ethics is concerned with the *nature*, *object*, *faculty*, and *standard* of *moral judgment*. Moral judgments are accompanied by *moral sentiments*, *e.g.*, the feelings of approval and disapproval, remorse, and the like. Ethics has to discuss the nature of

moral sentiments and the relation of moral sentiments to moral judgments. Moral judgments are also accompanied by the sense of duty, 'oughtness', or *moral obligation.* When we perceive something to be right, we feel under moral obligation to do it ; when we perceive something to be wrong, we feel under moral obligation not to do it. Ethics has to account for this sense of duty or moral obligation. What is the *nature* of moral obligation ? What is the *origin* of moral obligation ? What is the *source* of moral obligation ? To whom are we responsible for our conduct ?

Our right actions have *merit* ; our wrong actions have *demerit.* Ethics enquires into the criterion of merit and demerit. It tries to find out what makes an action meritorious. Merit and demerit are called *deserts.* They are investigated by Ethics.

Ethics assumes the *freedom of the will.* It discusses the nature of human freedom. We are responsible for our actions. Ethics enquires into the nature of *responsibility.* Criminals are responsible for their crimes. So they ought to be punished. Ethics gives the moral justification for punishment.

Ethics gives us a list of *duties* and *virtues* determined by the ultimate moral standard. Virtue and vice come within the scope of Ethics.

Though Ethics has a province of its own, yet it is not entirely divorced from all other departments of study. It has indirectly to treat of several problems which are psychological, philosophical, sociological, and political in nature. The *psychological* problems with which Ethics is concerned are those of the nature of voluntary actions, classification of the springs of actions, and the relation between desire and pleasure. The *philosophical* or metaphysical problems are those of the essential nature of human personality, freedom of the will, immortality of the soul, existence and perfection of God, and the moral government of the universe. The *sociological* problem is that of the relation of the individual to the society. The *political* problem is that

of the relation of the individual to the state, the ethical basis and moral functions of the state.

8. Methods of Ethics.

Different schools of moralists adopt different methods to investigate moral phenomena. The physical and biological method, the historical or genetic method, the psychological method, and the metaphysical method have been adopted by different schools of ethical thinkers.

The Physical and Biological Method.—Herbert Spencer traces morality to the conduct of savages, and ultimately to the conduct of animals which seek pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure is a sign of increase of vitality, and pain is a sign of decrease of vitality. Vital force is ultimately a form of matter and motion. Thus Spencer deduces moral laws from sociological laws, sociological laws from psychological laws, psychological laws from biological laws, and biological laws from physical or cosmological laws. He treats Ethics as a *natural* or positive science.

Ethics is a *normative* science. It is a science of the *Ought* or *Ideal*. The *Ought* cannot be evolved from the *Is*,—the *Ideal* from the *Actual*. The *history* of moral phenomena cannot account for their *validity*. By following the methods of natural sciences, Ethics can never comprehend the Highest Good of man. Ethics is a normative science, and therefore its method can never be the *physical* or the *biological* method. Morality is *unique* in its nature. It cannot be regarded as a physical, biological, or social phenomenon.

The Historical or Genetic Method.—Herbert Spencer, Leslie Stephen and other evolutionists hold that moral notions and institutions have gradually *evolved* from the crude customs and usages of primitive people. Morality is a product of *social evolution*. The business of Ethics is to account for the *genesis* and *evolution*, origin and development of the moral ideas and institutions. Ethics is a department of Sociology. Its method is the *sociological*, *historical*, or *genetic method*.

Ethics is a normative science as distinguished from natural sciences. Its business is not to trace the *origin* and *growth* of moral ideas and institutions but to *evaluate* them with reference to the *moral ideal.* Morality cannot be evolved from non-moral elements. The moral *ideal* cannot be evolved from *actual* facts. "It is not in the historical facts themselves, but in their *eternal meaning* and ultimate explanation, that the ethical interest centres. Its business is the discovery of the *moral ideal* or criterion and *appreciation of actual morality in terms of this ideal*" (*Seth*). Ethics can never investigate the *moral ideal* by adopting the *historical* or *genetic* method.

The Psychological Method.—Hume, Bentham, Mill, Bain and others hold that moral phenomena are phenomena of consciousness and they admit of psychological treatment. Ethics should adopt the *psychological method* and try to determine the Highest Good of man by analysing the motives of human actions, tracing the origin of sympathy and conscience and the like. Their ethical doctrine of Hedonism that pleasure is the supreme good is based upon the actual fact that men naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain.

This view also is wrong. Psychology deals with mental phenomena as they *actually* happen. Ethics is concerned with the *moral ideal* according to which we *ought* to act. The *ideal* cannot be explained by the *actual.* Psychology can investigate the *nature* of moral phenomena and analyse them into their component factors. But it cannot interpret their *meaning and validity* without reference to the *moral ideal.* Psychological origin of moral phenomena cannot account for their moral value. "Psychology is perfectly competent to provide a phenomenology of the moral consciousness, it remains for ethical philosophy to *interpret the meaning* of these phenomena" (*Seth*). The fact that every one *desires* pleasure does not prove that pleasure is *desirable.* One is a statement of *fact.* The other is a statement of the *ideal.* The *actual* cannot explain the *ideal.*

The Metaphysical Method.—Hegel, Green, and other idealists hold that the moral ideal of man can be *deduced* from the nature of the Reality as a whole. The ultimate Reality is the Absolute. It is the Eternal Spirit which manifests itself in Nature and partially reproduces itself in the finite spirits. Thus the human self is above Nature, shares in the nature of the Divine Spirit and gradually realises the moral ideal which is revealed to it by God. The moral ideal in man is an imperfect reflection of God who is the eternal embodiment of moral perfection. It is a revelation of divine perfection to man. Ethics is based on Metaphysics. So the method of Ethics is the metaphysical method.

This view also is wrong. Ethics is a normative science. It is concerned with the *moral ideal.* So its method cannot be the empirical or *scientific method* adopted by the natural sciences. Nor can its method be the *metaphysical* method adopted by philosophy. Ethics is not a branch of Metaphysics, though it is closely connected with it. Ethics is not based on Metaphysics. But Metaphysics is based on Ethics. It enquires into the validity of the moral ideal. Metaphysics is based on natural sciences as well as normative sciences. It reduces facts and ideals into a coherent system.

The True Method of Ethics is both Empirical and Transcendental.—The true method of Ethics is both *scientific* and *metaphysical*, *empirical* as well as *transcendental*. Muirhead holds that Ethics, like any other science, accurately *observes* the moral phenomena, *classifies* them according to their most significant differences, and *explains* them. But it does not explain them by relating them to other antecedent phenomena. This is a lower form of explanation. But Ethics explains the moral phenomena by showing them to be an integral part of the *organic system* of the whole universe. Ethics explains moral phenomena by correlating them not only to other phenomena but to the whole system of the Reality. "It aims at *explaining*

moral judgments by showing their place in a system which cannot exist as a consistent whole without them" (*Muirhead*). This is the higher form of explanation. In other words, the method of Ethics is *scientific* as well as *metaphysical*. It *observes*, and *classifies* moral phenomena, and *explains* them by correlating them to an *organic system*. Ethics seeks to interpret and explain moral phenomena in the light of the *moral ideal* which is organically related to the system of Reality.

Professor James Seth also holds the same view. The method of science is always the same. It reduces judgments of common sense into a system. "Whether these judgments are judgments of fact or judgments of value, makes no difference in the method. The business of ethics is simply to organise the judgments of common sense or ordinary thought" (*Seth*). Just as other sciences systematise judgments of common sense relating to facts, so Ethics systematises judgments of common sense relating to moral value. But this *scientific method* must be supplemented by the *metaphysical method*. Seth says, "Only I would claim for Ethics in addition to the narrower task of *science*, the larger *philosophical* task. The science of Ethics must have for its complement an ethical philosophy or metaphysic of ethics." "A *judgment of value* is speculative—almost *metaphysical*—in a sense in which a judgment of fact is not speculative or metaphysical. Its point of view is *transcendental*, not empirical. It follows that the science which organises such judgments into a system is also *transcendental*, and, in that sense, *metaphysicial*. Yet such a science is not strictly to be identified with metaphysics." Wundt also maintains that the true method of Ethics is both scientific and philosophical,—empirical and transcendental—observational and speculative.

9. The End of Ethics.

The end or aim of Ethics is to define the nature of the Highest Good of man as a member of society. It investigates the nature of the *Summum Bonum* which is the highest

personal good and the highest social good. It is the root of all moral distinctions. The notions of rightness and wrongness of conduct are derived from it. This is the theoretical aim of Ethics. Though Ethics is not a practical science, it deduces concrete duties and virtues from the notion of the Supreme Good, which may guide us in the regulation of our conduct. Ethics is a theoritical science. It is not a practical science. It does not teach us how we can lead a moral life. But the study of duties and virtues deduced by it from the Supreme Good has an indirect bearing upon our practical life and regulates our conduct. Theory is expressed in practice. Ethics is theory of morality. It converts moral faith into a rational insight. It criticizes the common notions of morality and discovers the rational and essential elements in them.

10. Uses of the Sudy of Ethics.

"Ethics has a nagative or destructive and a positive or constructive side ; and in either case it has a theoretical and a practical value" (A. C. Mitra : *Elements of Morals*).

Destructive Value :—

Theoretical Aspect.—A science is a criticism of common sense. So Ethics, as the science of morality, criticizes vague and sometimes inaccurate, popular notions of right and wrong. It exposes the defects and inconsistencies of the social customs and usages, social, political, and religious institutions, and gives us a real insight into the nature of the moral ideal. The result of this criticism is to dispel many erroneous notions and to remove many inconsistencies in popular beliefs.

Practical Aspect.—As a result of the exposure of error, "some familiar distinctions, some effete prohibitions and injunctions, some crude notions of the nature of moral authority and moral sanctions will have to be gradually given up" (*Muirhead*). The removal of incorrect ideas decreases the possibilities of wrong actions.

Constructive Value :—

Theoretical Aspect.—Ethics attacks the basis of popular morality, purges it of errors and inconsistencies, and places on a secure footing all that is valid and essential in morality. By reflective criticism Ethics prepares the way for its constructive function. "In its deeper aspect it is reconstructive. It comes not to destroy, but to fulfil. It does so, by separating the essential from the inessential, the permanent from the transient, the spirit from the form of moral and social institutions, and by leaving only that which is organically connected with human nature, it gives it a value and a sanctity which, as merely traditional, it never could possess" (*The Elements of Ethics*, pp. 15-16).

Practical Aspect.—"A clear knowledge of the primary conditions of morality prepares the way for the proper estimate of moral acts and their due performance". on proper occasions. Moral insight into duties makes their performance possible. Theory inevitably acts on practice. The Socratic doctrine "Knowledge is virtue" is true at least to a certain extent. Theoretical Ethics is the secure foundation of practical or applied Ethics. The concrete duties of life should be determined with reference to the ethical ideal.

Ethics indirectly exerts a paramount influence on all departments of our practical life. The right solution of the vital problems of religion, politics, economics, legislature, education, etc., depends upon the correct notions of right and wrong. Religion must have foundation in Ethics. Divorced from morality, religion degenerates into superstitious belief in blind superhuman power, black magic, and the like. Politics should be moulded by Ethics. Might should be based upon right. Immoral laws should be abolished. Laws should be enacted for the improvement of the moral well-being of the people. Economics should be based on Ethics. Production, distribution and consumption of wealth should be based on justice and

equity. In education Ethics is to decide what impulses and dispositions in children should be strengthened and what are to be suppressed. Ethics should embrace all departments of human action, exert an elevating influence upon them, and raise humanity to a higher level.

CHAPTER II

Relation of Ethics to Other Sciences

1. Relation of Ethics to Physical Sciences.

Physical sciences deal with the physical environment. Ethics deals with morality. But moral life is lived in the midst of Nature. It cannot be divorced from the physical environment. Knowledge of the laws of nature makes us fearless. The ocean, the sky, the mountain, and the desert no longer frighten us. Knowledge is power. Knowledge of the secrets of nature indirectly influences our moral life. Physical sciences help us understand the nature of the physical environment within which moral life is lived. They do not investigate the nature of the moral life itself. Thus Ethics is indirectly related to physical sciences.

2. Relation of Ethics to Biology.

Ethics deals with morality or human conduct. Human life is not only mental life, but also bodily life. The mind is intimately connected with the body. Many duties (*e. g.* temperance) rest on physiological considerations, and are unintelligible and inexplicable without any direct reference to physiological details. Thus moral life is intimately connected with bodily life, and Ethics is indirectly related to Biology.

But Herbert Spencer wrongly holds that the criterion of good or bad conduct is to be found in the tendency to promote

or hinder the development of life. The key of morality cannot be found in the life of the organism. Moral conduct has no meaning without reference to a being who has a rational will. The development of organic life is but a subordinate part of the end of life. Thus Biology has no direct bearing upon Ethics.

3. Relation of Ethics to Psychology.

Ethics is the normative science of conduct. It seeks to determine the nature of the Highest Good or the *Summum Bonum* of human life. It lays down the standard of the Supreme Good which ought to determine our volitions and actions. It teaches us how we *ought* to will. But before we can determine how we *ought* to will, we must know how we *do* will. And Psychology tells us how we *actually* will. Thus Ethics is based upon Psychology. It is based upon the Psychology of will. Psychology is the foundation of Ethics. So Ethics studies the psychological basis of morality.

A correct analysis of the nature of volition and the study of its relation to the spring of action, desire, motive, intention, pleasure, and the like, the distinction between moral and non-moral actions, the nature of conscience or the moral faculty, the relation between reason and volition, the freedom of the will, and the like, are indispensably necessary for the correct evaluation of human conduct and the determination of the nature of the highest good. These are the psychological problems which are dealt with in Ethics also. Defective Psychology will give rise to defective Ethics. Thus Ethics is based on Psychology.

But though Ethics is built upon Psychology, there are important differences between them.

Psychology is *wider* in scope than Ethics. Psychology is the science of *all* mental processes, *viz.*, knowing, feeling, and willing. Ethics deals only with *willing* or volition. It does not study knowing and feeling. Or it studies them with reference to their bearing on volition and action. Ethics considers human experience as *activity* in the pursuit of an end or ideal.

But though Psychology and Ethics both deal with volition, Ethics cannot be identified with the Psychology of will. Psychology is a *positive* science, while Ethics is a *normative* science. Stout says, "Ethics inquires how we *ought* to will, not how we actually do will. Psychology, on the other hand, deals only with the process of volition as it *actually* occurs, without reference to its rightness or wrongness, or to the ultimate conditions which make rightness and wrongness possible" (*Manual of Psychology*, 1910, p. 6). In other words, Psychology is a science of the *actual*, while Ethics is a science of the *ideal*. Psychology, as a positive science, studies all the mental processes for the sake of theoretical knowledge. Ethics, as a normative science, seeks to explain the facts of moral life by reference to an *ideal* or standard according to which we *ought* to live. Moral facts are mental facts, and so they come within the province of Psychology. But Psychology studies them simply as mental phenomena, and not as *moral* facts. It studies them without any reference to their moral significance. But "Ethics is *par excellence* the science of the *ought*" (*Seth*).

Some ethical thinkers (*e. g.* Hedonists) regard Ethics as a branch of Psychology. They overlook the distinction between the *Is* and the *Ought*,—the *actual* and the *ideal*. They miss the distinctive nature of Ethics as a *normative* science. Ethics can never be reduced to a branch of Psychology which is a positive science.

4. Relation of Ethics to Sociology.

Ethics is a normative science of the conduct of man. But man is a social being. He cannot live apart from society. He owes the major portion of his mental and moral equipment to society. An individual imbibes his notions of right and wrong, good and evil, from the customs and manners prevailing in society. A human being apart from society is an abstraction. Again, social progress depends upon the moral insight of individuals. The vision of the moral reformers determines moral

progress of society. Thus the individual and society influence each other. Ethics is the science of morality of the individual. Sociology is the science of the structure, origin, and development of human society. It is the natural history of social groups. It studies the origin, growth and development of social groups through modifications of customs and institutions. Thus Ethics is closely connected with sociology.

Sociology investigates the habits, manners, customs and institutions of human society in all its stages of development from the savage state to the civilized. It tries to discover the origin and development of social institutions through different stages to their present state.

Ethics is closely related to Sociology. Ethics seeks to determine the nature of the Supreme Good of the individual. But the individual is a part and parcel of the society. He cannot be conceived apart from the society. Individuals are interdependent members of the social organism. Thus the Supreme Good of the individual depends upon that of the society. The *personal good* must be in harmony with the *common good* or the *social good*. Ethics is mainly concerned with the conduct of the individual. Sociology is concerned with the conduct of the scoiety, *i. e.*, its habits, manners, customs, and institutions which influence the conduct of the individual. "We only know the individual man as a member of some society ; what we call his virtues are chiefly exhibited in his dealings with his fellows, and his most prominent pleasures are derived from intercourse with them ; thus it is a paradox to maintain that man's highest good is independent of his social relations, or of the constitution and condition of the community of which he forms a part" (*Sidgwick*). Thus, Ethics must depend upon Sociology in determining the nature of the Supreme Good of the individual in his relation to the society.

Society is a positive science. It simply investigates the nature, origin, and development of habits, customs, manners,

and institutions of social groups without reference to any moral standard. It does not consider their moral worth. Sociology depends upon Ethics for the moral estimation of these customs and manners. Sociology simply considers them as natural facts. Ethics considers their moral value and regards them as good or bad.

The intimate relation of Ethics and Sociology has led some ethical thinkers (*e. g.* Evolutionary Hedonists) to regard Ethics as a branch of Sociology. They hold that morality is a product of the evolution of society. They trace the conception of normal good ultimately to the conduct of animals. They try to evolve the *ideal* from the *actual.*

But this view is wrong. The *ideal* can never be evolved from the *actual,*—the *Ought* from the *Is.* Sociology is a *positive* science. It traces the *origin, growth* and development of customs and institutions of human society. But Ethics is a *normative* science. It seeks to determine the nature of the Supreme Good of the individual, and considers the *moral value* of customs and institutions with reference to this end. Therefore Ethics can never be regarded as a part of Sociology.

Though Ethics is closely connected with Sociology, it is not a part of it. There are important differences between them. Ethics differs from Sociology in the following points :—

Sociology is a *positive* science, while Ethics is a *normative* science. Sociology gives us data or *actual* facts about social groups. Ethics pronounces judgments of value upon them, and *interprets* them with reference to the *moral ideal.* It evaluates customs and manners and institutions from the moral point of view and judges them to be moral or immoral.

Sociology is a purely *theoretical* enquiry, while Ethics, as a normative science, has a *practical bearing* upon our lives. It deduces duties aud rights from the Highest Good, seeks to determine our virtues, indicates the ethical functions of the State, determines the moral worth of social customs and manners, and political laws, constitutions and institutions.

Sociology is a purely theoretical *science*, while Ethics, as a normative science, is closely connected with Metaphysics. Ethics is a science of the *Moral Ideal*. Metaphysics investigates the *validity* of the Moral Ideal, or its relation to Reality. Thus Ethics is closely connected with Metaphysics. But Sociology is purely a theoretical science.

Sociology deals with the *social* or *collective mind* as manifested in customs, manners and institutions. Ethics primarily deals with the *individual mind*, not in isolation from the society but as a member of the society.

Sociology is an *objective* mental science. It studies objective mental products, *e. g.*, customs, manners, laws, institutions, etc. Ethics is a *subjective* mental science. It deals with the voluntary conduct of the individual, especially in relation to its inner motives, intentions, desires and volitions. Thus Ethics can never be regarded as a branch of Sociology.

5. Relation of Ethics to Politics.

Politics is the science of government: it describes the structure and functions of government. It is a normative science. It seeks to prescribe laws and organise institutions, and regulate the conduct of individuals with a view to public good or utility. Government is an institution devised by men for their welfare. It enacts laws for the attainment of public good and enforces them on people with threats of punishment. Politics aiming at public good, is intimately connected with Ethics which determines the Supreme Good of the individual. In a narrow sense, Politics aims at the enactment of such laws as will ensure the protection of the person and the property of the individuals in a state. Government should enact laws and set up and maintain institutions in accord with moral principles. "Laws and institutions, not based on moral principles, cannot endure long, for the most potent of all forces is the moral force of the world" (A. C. Mitra : *Elements of Morals*, p. 74). States should be guided by the rules of

morality in their multiform relations and activities. They should not ignore ethical considerations. The moral basis of a state is the general will of the people. Its strength and safety depend upon it, not on arbitrary rule. In a wide sense, Politics aims at an ideal arrangement of society which will be best fitted to enable the individual to realise his highest aims.

Man is a social animal. "The study of conduct leads us inevitably into the study of social life. An entirely solitary human being is inconceivable. A man is always a member of some kind of community. As Aristotle said, he is a political animal. Hence the science of Ethics is very closely related to that of Politics" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 21). Moral life is not lived apart from the State. It is always lived in some sort of political organisation. Moral life though not identical with political life is a part of it. Moral conduct is intimately connected with political life. Rights and duties are maintained by the State. Virtues are relative to the State. So Ethics is related to Politics.

"The connection between Ethics and Politics is obvious. They both deal with human conduct and character. They both treat of these in connection with the end of human good, and therefore as the subject of moral judgment. They both conceive of them as at once determined by and determining social relations" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 39). But Ethics is not a branch of Politics; nor is Politics a branch of Ethics.

There are important differences between Ethics and Politics. Ethics differs from Politics in the following points :—

The standards of Ethics and Politics are different. The standard of Ethics is *moral perfection* while that of Politics is *expediency* or *public utility*. Politics aims at welfare of the public. Ethics aims at the intrinsic moral excellence of the individual. Ethics aims at virtue; Politics aims at expediency.

Political laws are enforced by threats of punishment. The infringement of political laws is met with punishment. But

ethical laws rest upon voluntary submission. The state ultimately resorts to *coercion* or physical compulsion. Morality depends upon *freedom of the will*. Constraint destroys morality. Political laws are *externally imposed* by the State : ethical laws are *self-imposed* or imposed by the self upon itself.

Politics is an *objective* science while Ethics is a *subjective* science. Politics takes into account only the *outward acts* of men in their bearing on public good. But Ethics considers the moral worth of *inner motives and intentions* together with their expressions in actions. "While Law has to do with conduct in its *external consequences*, or if it goes deeper merely takes account of *intention*, Morality takes account of the *inward motive* and disposition as well as the outward effect,—the conduct of the understanding and the imagination as well as conduct as it immediately affects other persons" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 39). Politics cannot affect the inner mental life of persons. "*You cannot make men moral by act of parliament.* The man who abstains merely because owing to the state of the law he cannot get liquor is obviously not moral. Ethics, starting from the *inner* side, concerns itself with the form under which we must conceive of human good ; Politics, starting from the *outer* side, considers forms of social organisation, legal enactments, and distribution of civic rights as the essential conditions under which individuals at once appropriate what is good and communicate to others" (*Ibid*, p. 40).

Politics deals with the *collective mind* as it considers human actions in their bearing upon the *community*. Ethics deals with the *individual mind* having its intrinsic moral worth within itself. Politics aims at *public good*. Ethics aims at the *individual good*. It aims at the Highest Good of man.

Ethics is of *higher authority* than Politics. Political laws are subordinate to moral laws. They are considered as good or bad by Ethics. Ethics claims to sit in judgment upon political laws. Political laws are governed by ethical considerations in

modern civilized states which claim to be based on the general moral will of the people.

There are different opinions as to the relation between Ethics and Politics.

Machiavelli and his followers hold that Politics has no connection with Ethics. The will of the sovereign is law, and he is not bound to obey moral principles. But this view is wrong. A state should be guided by expediency as well as by justice. The ethical basis of a state is the general will of the people.

Hobbes, Bain and others hold that Ethics is but a branch of Politics and the political law is the moral law. This view also is wrong. Political law is of the nature of *must*. Moral law is of the nature of *ought*.

Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza and Hegel hold that Politics is but a branch of Ethics. This view also is wrong. Moral laws are self-imposed. Political laws are externally imposed. All these views are wrong. They overlook the difference between Ethics and Politics.

6. Relation of Ethics to Economics.

Ethics is the science of the *Highest Good.* Economics is the science of "*goods*" which satisfy human wants. Ethics aims at the *absolute good.* Economics aims at *relative goods.* "If we are really to understand the worth of economic goods, we must consider them in close relation to the ethical good" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 22). Economic goods should be considered in relation to the Highest Good. Their ultimate worth is determined by their moral worth. Food, clothing, house, and the like are good because they lead to self-development of persons. Thus Economics is closely connected with Ethics.

Economics is the science of wealth. But wealth is not an end in itself. It is a means to human welfare. Production, distribution and consumption of wealth should be so arranged as to contribute to the realisation of the greatest welfare of

humanity. They should be subordinated to the moral end, *viz.*, the development of personality of each member of the commonwealth of humanity. Economics should not be divorced from Ethics. Carlyle and Ruskin strongly advocate that Ethics and Economics should be brought into closer relationship to each other. At present economists tend to treat Economics as a science of *welfare* rather than of wealth. Economic phenomena should be controlled in such a manner as to contribute to the general social welfare. Thus Economics and Ethics are closely connected with each other.

Though Ethics and Economics are closely connected with each other, they differ in the following respects :—

Economics is a positive science, while Ethics is a normative science. The former deals with facts ; the latter deals with values. Economics studies facts relating to production, distribution and consumption of wealth and generalizes from them the economic laws, with a view to increasing the material prosperity of the people. Ethics investigates the moral ideal which should regulate production, distribution and consumption of wealth.

Economics is concerned with wealth and material prosperity. But Ethics is concerned with spiritual well-being. Economics should be guided by Ethics. Material prosperity should be subordinated to spiritual welfare. Physical enjoyment should be subordinated to virtuous life. Happiness should be subordinated to virtue. "Economics fosters self-acquisition and self-gratification, while Ethics encourages self-renunciation and self-improvement" (*Elements of Morals*, p. 85).

Economics should be guided by Ethics. The rights to property depend on the moral rights of personality. Property is indispensably necessary for the development of personality. Property and personality go together. The rights of exchange and distribution of property also are derived from the moral rights of personality. Thus Economics should be subordinated to Ethics.

7. Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics.

Ethics is a science of the *moral ideal.* But in order to investigate the nature and ultimate validity of the moral ideal, it must consider the ultimate nature, origin, and destiny of the human personality in relation to other persons in society, to the world, and to God. As Ethics is the science of the moral value, it should consider the true character of the moral value in relation to man and the world. This metaphysical consideration is of vital importance for the proper regulation of conduct. "The consideration of validity and *value* leads inevitably to the problem of *reality.* When we ask what constitutes the value or active worth of human life we are soon led into the question of the essential nature of human personality and its place in the universe of actual existence" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 20-21). Metaphysics systematises the judgments of facts dealt with by natural sciences, and the judgments of value dealt with by normative sciences, and co-ordinates them into a unity.

Ethics,* as a normative science, is closely connected with Metaphysics. Ethics seeks to determine the Ideal of the Highest Good. But is the Ideal real ? What is its relation to the Reality ? Is it already realised in God, the most perfect and holy ? Is it realisable by man freely ? Is it realisable in this world ? Does the world afford opportunities for its realisation ? All these are metaphysical problems. Ethics does not investigate these problems thoroughly like Metaphysics. Still it has to discuss incidentally the following philosophical questions :—

The nature of the Self.—Is the self purely sensuous or purely rational or both ? Different conceptions of the self will lead to different types of Ethics. The permanent self is the presupposition of moral life.

Freedom of the Will.—Is the self free in making a choice or determined by circumstances ? Freedom of the will is the foundation of morality. Denial of human freedom saps the very

foundation of morality. Freedom of the will is the primary postulate of morality.

Immortality of the Soul.—Can the self fully realise its moral ideal in this life? Or is there an after-life where the moral ideal will be gradually realised? Moral life consists in gradual approximation to the moral ideal. It cannot be fully realised in this finite life. So there must be an eternal life in which it will be realised. Personal immortality is another postulate of morality.

The relation of the Individual to Soicety.—Is the individual an integral member of the social organism? Or is he a self-contained and self-sufficient unit? The individual is an integral member of the social organism. His ideal self is social self which is realised through society.

The relation of the Self to the World.—Is the world a sphere of moral life? Does it give adequate opportunities to the self to realise its highest good? Is it morally governed? Or is it a theatre of blind physical forces, which has no moral purpose? Morality postulates the rational constitution of the universe. It is the sphere of moral life. It affords opportunities for the realisation of the moral ideal. It is not dead to moral values. It is a moral world with a moral purpose.

The existence and perfection of God.—Can morality be fully explained without reference to God? Is the moral ideal real? Is it subjective or objective? Is it a creation or a yearning of the human heart? Or is it already realised in God who is the eternal embodiment of perfection? Is it a shadow or a reality? All these questions are incidentally discussed by Ethics.

Ethics is closely connected with Metaphysics for the following reasons:—

Ethics is a *normative* science. It deals with the moral ideal. In order to enquire into the *validity* of the moral ideal it must step into Metaphysics.

Ethics deals with moral judgments. Moral judgments are judgments of *absolute* value. They are not relatively true. Morality is required by the nature of things as a whole. So Ethics must step into Metaphysics to enquire into the ultimate foundation of moral judgments.

Ethics treats of man not only as related to his material and social enviroment but as *conscious* of this relationship. Thus Ethics must step into Metaphysics to investigate the relation of man to the world, society, and God.

But though Ethics is closely related to Metaphysics, it differs from it in the following points :—

Metaphysics deals with the nature of the Reality as a whole, —Nature, self, and God. Ethics deals only with human conduct and character. So Metaphysics is wider in scope than Ethics.

Ethics investigates the good of the individual or the *human good.* Metaphysics investigates the *cosmic good* or the purpose which is realised by the whole universe.

Metaphysics is a purely *theoretical* study. Ethics, though a theoretical study, deals with the supreme good of man, which has a bearing on our practical life.

Hegel, Green and others hold that Ethics is based on Metaphysics. Rashdall and others hold that Metaphysics is based on Ethics. This is a controversial question. But no sober philosopher denies a close relation between Ethics and Metaphysics.

8. Relation of Ethics to Religion (Theology).

Freedom of the will, immortality of the soul, and the existence of God are the postulates of morality. Ethics deals with the *moral ideal.* The validity of the moral ideal leads us to the question of the ultimate reality. Is the moral ideal real ? Or is it a mere creation of the human mind ? If it is a mere creation of our fancy, it cannot have any influence on our life. If it is entirely subjective, it cannot inspire and elevate us. "An ideal, with no foothold in the real, would be the most unsub-

stantial of all illusions. The secret of the power of the moral ideal is the conviction which it carries with it that it is no mere ideal, but the expression, more or less perfect, of the supreme Reality. The ideal is not simply the unreal, but the expression and exponent of the real; what on our side of it is the ideal is, on its further side, the real; behind the 'ought' lies the 'is,' behind our insistent 'ought to be' the eternal 'I am' of the divine Righteousness" (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 430-31). The moral ideal is eternally realised in God who is the embodiment of perfection. God maintains and conserves the supreme values to achieve which we constantly make efforts. Thus morality is closely connected with religion.

Again, moral life demands that the soul will not perish along with the body. The moral ideal is infinite; it cannot be completely realised in this finite life. "There is no fruition and fulfilment, no perfect realisation, in this life, of the life's purpose. Life is a preparation, a discipline, an education of the moral being. Is all this elaborate and painful work of moral education to be undone? Is death the consummation of our life?" (*Ibid*, p. 459). Our moral life is real and earnest. The moral ideal is *infinite* and *realisable*. If it cannot be realised completely in this finite life, it must be realised in infinite life. Moral life guarantees the personal immortality of the soul. "The problem of immortality is the problem of the opportunity of the moral life. No finite increase of time would suffice for the accomplishment of an infinite task. And the moral task is an infinite one; the capacity of the self which we are called upon to realise is an infinite capacity. The reality of the moral life implies the possibility of attaining its ideal; a potentiality that cannot be actualised is a contradiction in terms. But the opportunity is not given in this life, however well and wisely this life is used, for the full activity of all man's powers, intellectual, æsthetic, and volitional" (*Ibid* p. 462). Therefore the soul must be immortal.

Existence of God and immortality of the soul are the two fundamental articles of faith in religion. Thus Ethics is closely connected with religion.

There is a controversy as to the question whether religion precedes morality or morality precedes religion.

I. *Religion prior to Morality :—*

Descartes, Locke, Paley and others hold that religion is the source of morality. Morality rises out of religion. What is commanded by God is right ; what is forbidden by God is wrong. The Divine Law is the moral standard. God creates morality by His will.

This view deprives God of moral character. It makes God morally blank. The distinction of right and wrong depends upon His arbitrary will. He creates morality by His will, though He is *above* moral distinctions. This view is wrong. God is not non-moral or supra-moral. He is the eternal embodiment of moral perfection. God commands what is right, and forbids what is wrong. What is right is in harmony with His nature. What is wrong is repugnant to His nature. Moral distinctions do not depend upon His arbitrary will. They depend upon His moral nature. Acts are not right because they are commanded by God ; they are not wrong because they are forbidden by God. On the other hand, God commands or forbids them because they are right or wrong.

II. *Morality prior to Religion :—*

Kant holds that morality necessarily leads to religion. Our idea of the complete good contains in it the idea of the highest good as well as that of the greatest happiness. The highest good is virtue. But the complete good is virtue in harmony with happiness. But the virtuous are seldom found to be happy in the world. How can, then, happiness be the necessary consequence of virtue ? Virtue is at our command, but happiness is not. Virtue depends on our own will ; happiness depends upon external favourable circumstances which are beyond our

control. Thus happiness does not arise *analytically* out of virtue. There is a *synthetic* relation between virtue and hapiness. But who synthesises virtue with happiness? It is an almighty Power who commands and controls both the inner world and the outer world. It is God who can combine and harmonise virtue with happiness. Hence the existence of God is a postulate of morality. Morality, in order to be complete, must merge in religion.

Martineau also holds that morality necessarily leads to religion. Moral obligation implies the existence of God. Moral obligation is a relation between two persons. *I* am under moral obligation. To whom am *I* under moral obligation? I myself cannot be the source of moral obligation.. If I were so, I could annul the sense of moral obligation at my pleasure. Society or the State cannot be the source of moral obligation, because it cannot take cognisance of all my actions, nor can it enter into my motives and intentions. So God must be the source of moral obligation, who knows all our hidden desires and actions. Thus morality completes itself in religion.

III. Morality and Religion interdependent on each other :—

But the true view seems to be that neither morality precedes religion nor religion precedes morality, but they are interdependent on each other. Religion is the *ideal ground* of morality, and morality is the *outward manifestation* of religion in our social relations. Morality emphasises the relation of the individual to the *society* while religion emphasises the relation of the individual to *God.* There are distinct sources of morality and religion in our minds. They develop side by side in the evolution of our experience, and are influenced, to a great extent, by each other. Morality reacts upon religion and refines and purifies it. Religion reacts upon morality and inspires and elevates it. Morality cannot supplant religion. Positivism seeks to substitute morality for religion. It belives in social service as the only religion. But the so-called religion of humanity

is not possible without the religion of God. Religion also can not supplant morality. Religion without morality is blind superstition. Morality and religion must go hand in hand. Morality rests satisfied with relation of man to man. Religion goes beyond the finite to the infinite.

CHAPTER III

The Psychological Basis of Ethics

1. Moral and Non-moral Actions.

Here the word 'moral' is used in a wider sense. It is used in the sense of either right or wrong. The word 'moral' means that in which moral quality (*i. e.* rightness or wrongness) is present. The word 'non-moral' means that which is devoid of moral quality.

All actions are not objects of moral judgment. Only *voluntary* and *habitual* actions of rational persons are objects of moral judgment. We cannot speak of the phenomena of nature, *e. g.*, hurricanes, floods, famines, etc., as either moral or immoral. Inanimate things and events of nature are beyond the pale of moral judgment. The actions of animals also are neither moral nor immoral. Animals are devoid of reason. They cannot discriminate between right and wrong. So their actions are non-moral. Actions of children, insane persons and idiots, who are not capable of reflection and discrimination, are devoid of moral quality. Actions done under coercion or physical compulsion are non-moral, if they cannot be resisted. Actions under hypnotic suggestion which is irresistible, are non-moral. Actions under the pressure of irresistible 'complexes' are non-moral. These are not normal actions and therefore devoid of moral quality. Non-voluntary actions of sane human

adults also are non-moral. The reflex actions, random actions, instinctive actions, ideo-motor actions, spontaneous expressions of emotions, and accidental actions are devoid of moral quality.

Only *voluntary actions* and *habits* of rational persons are objects of moral judgment. Voluntary actions are performed knowingly and intelligently by self-conscious free agents with desire, prevision and choice of ends and means. Therefore they are objects of moral judgment. Habits are the results of repeated voluntary actions. By repetition voluntary actions are fixed as habits. They become automatic and irresistible. They are objects of moral judgment for two reasons. In the first place, habits are voluntarily acquired; they are formed by repeated acts of will; they might be checked before they were ingrained in the organism. In the second place, habitual actions are begun with a volitional impulse. Even when they become firm, they can be overcome by a strong effort of will. Muirhead says: "Habits are dispositions to act in a particular way, which having been formed in the first instance by repeated acts of will are epitomised volitions. So that, while we may not be said to be responsible for the habitual act as an isolated event, seeing that it is involuntary, nevertheless we may be responsible for it as an instance of a habit which has been voluntarily acquired, and which we might have checked before it became inveterate. In other words, what we really judge in such a case is the series of voluntary acts whereby the habit has become irresistible" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 48).

2. Non-voluntary Actions.

Now we shall consider the nature of the different kinds of action, *viz.*, non-voluntary and voluntary. Non-voluntary actions precede voluntary actions. There are several kinds of non-voluntary actions, *viz.*, (1) Automatic Actions, (2) Random or Spontaneous Actions, (3) Reflex Actions, (4) Ideo-motor Actions, and (5) Instinctive Actions.

Automatic Actions.—The new-born baby does not come

into the world in a quite helpless condition. The little stranger can perform some acts at once. Some physiological processes go on within his organism just after birth. Respiration, circulation and digestion are found in the new-born baby. They all involve muscular movements, which are known as automatic acts. The chemical condition of the blood may bring about changes in circulation and respiration; the presence of food in the stomach incites its digestive processes, etc. We are under normal conditions entirely unconscious of these acts. Whenever they are upset, they cause us pain and attract our attention. We become conscious of automatic acts, whenever anything goes wrong with them and they are attended with painful sensations. Thus, we become conscious of hard breathing, indigestion, etc. Some call automatic acts physiological reflexes.

Random or Spontaneous Actions.—Random movements are the spontaneous expressions of energy accumulated in the organism. They are supposed to be due to "the automatic excitation of central substance." The movements of the chick in the egg, and some earlier movements of the infant such as stretching out the arms and the legs, are random or spontaneous actions. These movements are not evoked by external stimuli. They are not actuated by the prevision or anticipation of an end. Random movements are prompted by a feeling of uneasiness produced by an accumulation of unused energy in the motor centres of the brain. The baby stretching out the arms and the legs may be prompted by a feeling of uneasiness due to an accumulation of energy in the motor centres, because he cries if his movements are stopped.

The aimless and irregular movements of the child in response to external stimuli also are sometimes called random movements. They are the expressions of neural excitement. They are uncoordinated responses to external stimuli. When a child sees a coloured toy, he makes many aimless and irregular movements.

Reflex Actions.—A reflex action is a prompt muscular or

glandular response to a sensory stimulus. It is an immediate response to stimulus. Reflex actions are always reactions to sensory stimuli. The stimuli may be either external objects or organic disturbances. We close our eyes at the sight of a dazzling light. Here the reflex act is excited by an external stimulus. We sneeze when something obstructs or irritates the nasal membrane. We cough when something obstructs or irritates the throat. Here the reflex actions are evoked by organic disturbances. All these reflexes are motor or muscular reactions to sensory stimuli, either extra-organic or intra-organic. Some reflexes are glandular reactions to sensory stimuli. If something irritating falls into our eyes, we shed tears. If we taste a sour thing, we have salivation. These reflexes are glandular responses to sensory stimuli.

There are two kinds of reflex actions, *viz.*, physiological reflexes and sensation reflexes. Reflex acts may be performed with or without consciousness. The reflexes of which we are entirely unconscious are called physiological reflexes. The pupillary reflex is a physiological reflex. When there is bright light, the pupil contracts ; when there is dim light, the pupil expands. We are not conscious of the change in the size of the pupil. The reflexes of which we are conscious are called sensation reflexes. We are conscious of winking, sneezing, coughing, etc. So these are sensation-reflexes. Sometimes consciousness may take cognisance of reflex acts, but it does not produce them. We may be conscious that we have winked, but the closing of the eye-lids is a reflex action which is not produced by consciousness. Physiological reflexes are unconscious ; they are independent of conscious control. Sensation reflexes are conscious ; they are preceded and succeeded by consciousness. But generally they cannot be controlled by consciousness. At the approach of a stick to the eyes a person is conscious of the stick, and when he has closed his eye-lids, he is conscious of the winking. But he can seldom control the reflex action.

Ideo-motor Actions.—They are movements which immediately follow upon the ideas of movements. In an ideo-motor action first there is the idea of a movement; then this idea is converted at once into a movement. The idea of the movement is so impulsive that it carries itself out into the actual movement at once. Here the movement is not under the guidance of will. It is not a voluntary action; it is an impulsive act. In an ideo-motor action an idea is immediately followed by an action without the co-operation of the will. It is non-voluntary in nature. It is not deliberate, intentional or purposive. It is different from a sensation-reflex, in which a sensation is immediately followed by a response. In an ideo-motor action, an idea,—not a sensation,—of an action is directly followed by the action.

Suggestive or automatic imitation is an ideo-motor action. If you smile at a child, he smiles at you. A child cries at the sight of another child crying. Mob action is very often an ideo-motor action. The people in a crowd clap their hands and laugh imitating others. They do not know the reason why they do so. The actions of others bring the ideas before their minds so vividly that they cannot but execute the actions.

In abnormal cases also we find ideo-motor actions. In kleptomania the idea of stealing something is suggested to the mind of a kleptomaniac, and it is immediately followed by stealing it. The person cannot inhibit the idea or the action.

In children the whole tendency of ideas is to pass into action. A young child feels like running. And his legs begin to run. In adults a motor idea does not run its course without interference, because many other tendencies and dispositions tend to impede or further its course. In adults ideo-motor actions are generally replaced by voluntary actions, in which a particular action is chosen and executed in preference to many other possible courses of action.

Instinctive Actions.—Instinct may be defined as the innate tendency to perform a complex action pattern adapted to self-preservation or race-preservation, prompted probably by a core of emotional excitement, but without any explicit idea of the ultimate biological end, in response to a total situation. An instinctive act is not a purely biological act. It is a psychic act. It is not simply an inherited arrangement of nervous arcs, but is a mental process with its three-fold aspect. McDougall defines it as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." According to him, an instinct is a complete mental process—cognitive, affective, and conative. Spiders spin their cobwebs, birds build their nests, and bees build their hives instinctively. A young chick is hatched in an incubator. As soon as it is born, it begins to walk about, peck at particles of food, and soon is able to take care of itself without any care or training from the mother. The female wasp of a certain species constructs a certain type of nest and lays eggs in it. It dies before its young ones are hatched from the eggs. And yet this specific type of nest is handed down from generation to generation. All these complex action patterns are neither learned by the individuals nor imitated from the elders. They are innate or instinctive.

Instinctive acts are adapted to a biclogical end. Some instincts are adapted to self-preservation. Instinct of flight, instinct of combat, food-seeking instinct etc., are of this type. Other instincts are adapted to race-preservation. The sex instinct, the maternal instinct etc., are of this type. But the instinctive acts are not consciously adapted to these ends. There is no dim or clear consciousness of these ultimate ends in instinctive acts. But Stout rightly observes that instinctive

acts involve consciousness of proximate ends though not of the ultimate ends[1].

Automatic acts, random acts, reflex acts, ideo-motor actions, and instinctive actions are non-voluntary. They do not involve choice and volition. So they are non-moral actions.

3. Voluntary Actions.

Voluntary actions are actions performed by an agent deliberately and intentionally in order to realise some foreseen ends. They are actions performed by the self with a volition or will. A voluntary action has three stages, *viz*; the mental stage, the bodily stage, and the extra-organic or external stage of consequences.

I. The Mental Stage :—

The Spring of Action.—Every voluntary action is actuated by a spring of action. It is a feeling of want or imperfection, actual or ideal. It is either an instinct or an appetite, or an intellectual, moral, or æsthetic craving. A feeling of want or imperfection is always painful or disagreeable. But it is usually mingled with an agreeable feeling which arises from the anticipation of satisfaction of the want in future. Thus the painful feeling of want is mixed with an agreeable feeling of ideal satisfaction. But the disagreeable feeling predominates over the agreeable feeling.

Desire.—The spring of action or the feeling of want, *e.g.*, an appetite or the like, is converted into a desire. Self-consciousness supervenes upon an appetite and turns it into a desire. It is not blind like an appetite. It is enlightened by self-consciousness. Desire is a craving to satisfy an appetite or a feeling of want by attaining its proper object. In desire there is the idea of the object or end or motive which will satisfy the feeling of want. There is also the idea of the means for realising the end, whether the means is desirable or undesirable. And there is a craving or yearning for the attainment of the object.

1. J. N. Sinha : *A Manual of Psychology*, Ch. XVI.

In the case of a simple action in which there is no conflict of motives, a choice s made at once and it is followed by action. But in the case of a complex action the desire is not immediately followed by choice.

Conflict of Motives or Desires.--In a complex action sometimes the self is confronted with different motives competing with one another. Many wants demand satisfaction. They suggest many ends, motives or objects of desire simultaneously to the mind. Thus many desires pull the mind in different directions. All ends or objects of desire cannot be attained at the same time ; all desires cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Sometimes they are inconsistent with one another. If one is satisfied, the other has to be rejected altogether. Thus there arises in the mind a competition, rivalry, or conflict of motives or desires.

But this expression is a misnomer. Motives are not external forces acting on the self from without. They are the states of the self. "Motives are not mere impulses. They come before consciousness as reasons why *I* should act in this or that way. They are not independent forces fighting out a battle among themselves, while the Ego remains a mere spectator. On the contrary, the motivas are motives only in so far as they arise from the nature of the self" (*Stout*). "It is a strife or conflict which goes on in the man himself ; it is a conflict of himself with himself. He is the opposing contestant as well as the battlefield" (*Dewey*). In this state the self arrests action and is pulled this way and that way by different motives which are its own states and depend for their existence on it. Some hold that a motive is a chosen desire. So we cannot speak of a 'conflict of motives', but only of a 'conflict of desircs'.

Deliberation.—When there is a conflict of motives, the self arrests action and deliberates upon the merits and demerits of the different courses of action suggested by different motives.

The self weighs them in the balance, as it were, and considers the pros and cons. This is called deliberation. It does not mean the trial of strength among desires apart from the self. They are the states of the self. Deliberation is the mental process of considering the merits and demerits of the different courses of action suggested by different desires on the part of the self in order to choose one and reject the rest.

Decision or Choice.—After deliberation the self chooses a particular motive and identifies itself with it. It chooses a particular course of action and rejects the rest. This act of selection of one motive to the exclusion of others is called choice or decision. In this state the self decides to carry out a definite course of action—to realise a definite end or motive through the chosen means. The state of decision consists in the choice of a particular end or motive and a particular means or course of action.* Decision does not mean the triumph of the strongest motive over weaker motives apart from the self. The motive chosen by the self becomes the actual motive for action. The chosen motive becomes the strongest motive. The rejected motives sink into the subconscious level. During deliberation the conflicting motives are regarded as possible motives for action; when the decision is formed, the chosen motive becomes the actual motive for action.

Resolution or Determination.—Sometimes decision is at once carried out. In that case there is no scope for resolution. But sometimes the action is postponed and so there is a scope for resolution. Resolution means the power of sticking to the decision already made. It is determination to carry out the decision and fight indecision and vacillation.

II. The Bodily Stage:—

When choice or resolution has been made and kept up by resolution, it is converted into bodily action. What is the relation between volition and bodily action? In volition we have a clear representation or idea of the nature of the bodily

movement which will execute the volition. This clear idea of the movement which dominates the field of consciousness is automatically followed by muscular action. The idea of movement carries itself out into actual movement by its impulsive nature. The muscular action is due to the impulsive character of the idea of movement. This explanation is offered by William James.

III. The External Stage of Consequences :—

The bodily action produces changes in the external world. These are called consequences. They include the following: realisation of the chosen end or motive; realisation of the chosen or intended means, desirable or undesirable; certain foreseen consequences; and certain unforeseen, unintended, accidental consequences.

4. Desire.

Desire is a craving of an agent for the attainment of an object to relieve some want. Desire is a state of tension between the actual state of the self and the idea of a future state not yet realised. It is a complex mental state consisting of cognitive, affective, and conative elements.

The cognitive elements are the following: the idea of the end which will remove the feeling of want; the idea of the means, either desirable or undesirable, which will lead to the attainment of the end; the consciousness of the distinction between the actual and the ideal, or comparison of the present state of want with the anticipated state of realisation. The greater is the consciousness of disparity between the actual and the ideal, the more intense is the desire. These are the elements of cognition in desire.

The affective elements are the following: a painful feeling of want which is the spring of action; an agreeable feeling arising from the anticipation of satisfaction. These are the elements of feeling or affection in desire.

1. J. N. Sinha: *A Manual of Psychology*, Ch. XVII.

The conative elements are the following : a yearning for the attainment of the end to remove a feeling of want ; an active impulse to action to realise the end. These are the elements of conation in desire.

5. Want, Appetite and Desire.

Plants are unconscious ; animals are conscious ; men are rational and self-conscious. Plants have organic wants ; they have a blind tendency to strike their roots into the soil to draw in sap or to spread out their branches to catch light. They do not feel the organic needs because they are unconscious. The organic wants of plants are blind and unconscious impulses.

But animal appetites are blind but conscious tendencies. Animals are conscious ; they feel pleasure and pain. Therefore, an appetite is felt by an animal : it is not a merely blind tendency towards a particular object ; but it is to a certain extent present to consciousness. There may be a definite idea of the kind of the object that will satisfy a want. In the higher animals there is a dim consciousness of the object but the element of feeling is predominant. A hungry dog, for example, may be more or less clearly conscious of the nature of the object that it wants. But in lower animals the consciousness of the object is somewhat dim and vague. The feeling of pleasure or pain is the prominent element in their consciousness rather than any definite idea of an object.

In a desire there is not merely the consciousness of an object with an accompanying feeling of pleasure and pain, but also a recognition of the object as good. There is a merely organic want of nutriment in plants. There is an appetite of hunger in animals. But in men it is converted into a desire for food. In it there is a definite recognition of food as an end or good. Thus desires can belong only to human beings who are rational agents.

6. Relation of Desire to the Self and Character.

Desires belong to rational agents. They are not blind appetites. They are not unconscious impulses. They are enlightened by self-consciousness. They are conscious cravings of the self for the realisation of an object which it recognizes as its good. The self chooses to realise a definite object or end which it recognizes as its good and which it feels to be in harmony with its character.

Muirhead says, "Desires are always for objects, and these objects are always relative to a self for whom they have value. It is owing to their having a value for self that they become 'objects of desire', whose character, even whose existence, may be said to be dependent upon the character of the self to whom they appeal" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 53). For instance, a philosopher feels a strong desire for reading books on philosophy. This desire for reading is organically related to his self and character. Reading philosophical works has value for his self, because it is in harmony with the philosophical bent of his mind or his settled disposition or character.

Muirhead makes the following observations on the relation of desires to the self and its character :—

First, human desires are not mere blind forces propelling a man this way or that way. They are always enlightened by dim or clear ideas of objects. Therefore they are to be distinguished from mere appetites.

Secondly, these objects are related to a self in two ways. They are organically related to character of the self. Desires are created by a self for the attainment of objects which appeal to it because they fit in with its character. They are related the self, in that it is the attainment of them for a self that is desired. A person desires an object. It means that he desires to fulfil his self in the object. All desires are desires of the self. They aim at same form of self-fulfilment.

7. Universe of Desire.

Mackenzie says: "Each desire belongs to a particular universe, and loses its meaning if we pass out of that universe into another. This universe to which a desire belongs is the universe that is constituted by the totality of what we call a man's character, as that character presents itself at the time at which the desire is felt. It is, in short, the universe of the man's ethical point of view at the moment in question" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 34). Every person lives habitually in a particular universe of desire. This universe is constituted by his permanent character. Thus his desires are not isolated phenomena in his mind. They belong to a universe of desire constituted by his character or dominant disposition. But the same person does not live constantly in the same universe of desire. Different desires dominate our minds in different moods, in different conditions, in different states of health. These differences constitute a difference of universe; and to each such universe a different set of desires belongs. A person may pass from one universe to another universe of desire. But his desires are never isolated phenomena; they always belong to a universe of desire.

8. Desire, Wish and Will.

Desire is a factor in the act of volition. First, there is a feeling of want; it is converted into a desire by the self; when a desire is chosen by the self after deliberation, there is choice. Thus there can be no volition without desire.

In a complex action there is a "conflict of desires." In such a state the self arrests or inhibits action and deliberates on the merits and demerits of the different desires and chooses one to the exclusion of others, which thus becomes dominant and effective. Mackenzie calls such a dominant desire a wish. "When conflicts occur, certain desires predominate over others; some are subordinated or sink into abeyance. It may be convenient to limit the term *wish* to those desires that pre-

dominate or continue to be effective. A desire which has become ineffective is not to be described as a wish" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 38).

An ineffective desire is simply called a *desire*. A dominant desire is called a *wish*. But a dominant desire may not be in harmony with the universe of desire in which a person lives. Therefore it may be rejected by him. But when it fits in with his universe of desire, it is chosen by him and converted into an act of *will*. A poor apothecary sells poison. He does not like to sell poison. But his extreme poverty compels him to do so. His dominant single desire is opposed to the sale of poison. But the dominant universe of desire which is constituted by his poverty compels him to *will* the sale of poison. Thus "a *wish* is a dominant single desire ; whereas the *will* depends on the dominance of a universe of desire" (*Ibid*, p. 41).

9. Motive.

The word *motive* literally means what moves us to act in a particular way. "A motive may mean either that which impels or that which induces us to act in a particular way" (*Ibid*, p. 50). In the former sense, a motive is a *spring of action*. It is a feeling of want. It is a "feeling which incites, or urges us to action." In this sense, a person's motive may be said to be a feeling of pleasure or pain, or an emotion of anger, jealously, fear or pity. Hedonists like Hume, Bentham, Mill and Bain hold that feelings of pleasure and pain only are motives of actions. They are the only determinants of voluntary actions. Men always seek pleasure and avoid pain. Feelings and emotions are the springs of action. Bentham says, "A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner." J. S. Mill defines a motive as "the feeling which makes him (the agent) will to do."

But man is a rational being. Mere feelings and emotions which are blind can never move him to action. They must be converted into desires by the self which reflects upon them.

If a man is entirely carried away by blind feelings or emotions, he cannot properly be said to will or act at all. A voluntary action implies deliberation, choice, and resolution. These are rational acts. The idea of the end should properly be called a motive. It is chosen by the self as its good. It induces it to act. Feeling may be said to be the efficient cause of action. The idea of the end may be said to be the final cause of action. Muirhead says : "Feeling cannot by itself be the motive of an action. For whatever else a motive is, it is agreed by all that it implies an end or aim representing something that is to be realised. While feeling as an element in desire may be said to be the efficient cause of action, a motive is generally admitted to imply a reference to a final cause or the idea of an end." (*The Elements of Ethics*, pp. 60-61).

Green, Mackenzie and others hold that the idea of the end to be realised is the true motive of an action. Green defines motive as "an idea of an end, which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise." Mackenzie observes : "Moral activity or conduct is proposeful action ; and action with a purpose is not simply moved by feeling : it is moved rather by the thought of some end to be attained. The feeling itself is not a sufficient inducement to action. When a man is moved to action, he must have, besides the mere feeling, the conception of an end to be attained. The motive, that which induces us to act, is the thought of a desirable end" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 51-52).

Muirhead takes *motive* in the sense of the idea of the end chosen by the self which is in harmony with its character. Motive is the chosen desire or end. Sometimes there is a conflict of desires. In such a case, many ends present themselves to the self which deliberates upon their merits and demerits and chooses one of them and rejects the rest. This chosen end is the true motive of action. Muirhead observes : "While the motive cannot be the feeling alone, neither can it be the thought

or idea of the object alone. Thought itself cannot move to action. In voluntary action proper, what gives motive power to an idea is not its mere presence in the mind, but its congruence with some preformed disposition or universe of desire." Thus the motive is the idea of the end which is chosen by the self and felt to be in harmony with the universe of desire in which it lives at the time. This seems to be the correct view. This view does not really conflict with Mackenzie's view. It simply restricts his meaning of 'motive.'

10. Pleasure and Motive.

Psychological hedonists (*e.g.*, Benthan and Mill) hold that the motive or object of desire is always pleasure. The motive is always pleasure. Man by nature seeks pleasure and avoids pain. Pleasure is the normal object of desire. It is the only motive of action.

This view is wrong. Desire springs out of a feeling of want. When this want is satisfied, pleasure follows. Pleasure is a consequence of the fulfilment of desire. When our desire is fulfilled we get pleasure. Desire is directed towards an object. We get hungry. We have desire for food. When the object (*e.g.*, food) is attained, we get pleasure. Therefore desire is not directed towards pleasure. But pleasure is the consequence of the attainment of the object of desire. But in some cases, pleasure may be an object of desire. A greedy person, even when he is full, feels a desire for a delicious food for the sake of pleasure only. Thus pleasure is not normally the object of desire. This will be discussed fully in connection with psychological hedonism.

11. Reason and Motive.

Hume holds that reason is the hand-maid of passion. He says "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Passions are impulses. Particular impulses give the ends of actions. Reason can simply indicate the means by which

these ends of impulses can be realised. The ends of actions are dictated by particular passions or impulses; the means are indicated by reason, by which the ends can best be realised. Thus reason is subordinate to passion. Reason cannot form any new motive for us; it can only indicate the means by which the existing motive can be realised to the best advantage.

This view is wrong. It proceeds on the assumption that the mind consists of many isolated and independent desires, among which reason works as a separate faculty. This assumption is wrong. The mind is an organic unity in which reason not only controls and regulates the impulses and desires, but also determines their nature. Reason converts blind impulses into desires for particular objects which are conceived by it to be good. An animal has mere instincts, appetites and impulses. But a person converts them into desires by enlightening them with self-consciousness and a conception of the good. Thus reason can provide us with motives to action. The motives of rational agents are partly constituted by impulses and desires, and partly by reason.

Man is partly sentient and partly rational. So his motives are partly determined by feelings, impulses and desires, and partly by reason. We should not think that *all* motives are rational motives because man is not entirely a rational being. If man were an entirely rational agent, all his motives would be rational. But man is a creature of instincts, appetites and impulses. Hence very often though he knows what is the supreme good, he does not pursue it. He knows what is right under particular circumstances, but he does what is wrong. Therefore reason is not the only motive of action.

12. How Motives are constituted.

Motives are neither purely irrational nor entirely rational. They are partly constituted by feelings, impulses and desires, and partly by reason. The objects or ends of desires are partly determined by the feelings of want which they seek to relieve,

and partly determined by the rational conception of the good which ought be pursued. Thus feeling and reason both determine the nature of motives.

13. Motive and Intention.

Bentham and J. S. Mill take the term 'motive' in the sense of 'spring of action' or feelings and emotions, and the term 'intention' in the sense of the aim, object, or end of action. Motive is the efficient cause of action. Intention is the final cause of action. But this is wrong. Motive and intention both are the final causes of action. Only intention is wider than motive. Motive is a part of intention. The motive of a voluntary action is the chosen end which is realised by it. It induces the self to act. But in order to realise an end, we have to employ means. The end may be pleasant. But it may be realised through an unpleasant means. Or the end may be realised through means which are partly pleasant and partly unpleasant. Motive is the idea of the chosen end. Intention is the idea of the end and the idea of the means pleasant or unpleasant, chosen by the self. Thus intention is wider than motive. It includes motive. It consists of the idea of the chosen means, agreeable or disagreeable, and also the foreseen consequences of the action.

Bentham formulated the distinction by defining *motive* as that *for the sake* of which an action is done ; whereas the *intention* includes both that *for the sake of* which, and that *in spite of* which, anything is done. Thus intention includes *persuasives* as well as *dissuasives*, the *motive* as well as the *deterrent*. The father punishes his child for his good. The good of the child is his motive. But he also intends to punish the child. The punishment of the child is part of his intention. But it cannot be said to be his motive. Thus intention includes the idea of the end or motive and the idea of the means.

The motive of an action is the idea of the end that induces a person to perform it. This must be included in the intention,

but is not identical with the whole of it. Intention includes the idea of the means which may dissuade the agent from performing the action. When Brutus joined the conspiracy to kill Cæsar for the good of his country, he certainly intended to kill him, but the killing of Cæsar was not his motive. Achievement of freedom of the country was the motive of Brutus ; the killing of Cæsar was no part of his motive or end. But this unpleasant means was intended by Brutus to achieve his end. So it was a part of his intention. Thus intention is wider than motive. It includes the idea of the chosen end, the idea of the chosen means and the idea of the foreseen consequences.

14. Habit.

A habit is the product of repeated voluntary actions. Voluntary actions involve at first an effort of will ; but when they are repeated, they become habitual, and come to be performed without the guidance of consciousness or the effort of will. When a habitual action becomes thoroughly ingrained, it seems to become almost wholly automatic and dispense wholly with conscious guidance. They are characterized by facility, uniformity, promptness, precision, freedom from conscious guidance, and resistance to modification. Habits have a great ethical significance. They are results of a series of voluntary actions. Therefore they are objects of moral judgment. We are morally responsible not only for our voluntary actions, but also for our habitual actions, which are the results of voluntary actions. The slaves of bad habits cannot be excused from their moral guilt. They are responsible for their habits. Habits imply settled mental dispositions or character. Character is an object of moral judgment. Conduct is an expression of character. It comprises voluntary and habitual actions.

15. Virtue, Knowledge and Habit.

Socrates holds that virtue is knowledge. Knowledge of duty in a particular situation is essential for virtue. Moral insight

into our concrete duties in complex circumstances is absolutely necessary for moral life.

Aristotle holds that virtue is habit. Moral insight into duties is essential to virtue. But very often we know what is right, but do what is wrong under the influence of passions or due to the weakness of the will. Therefore habitual performance of duties is essential to virtue. Duties habitually performed lead to the formation of a virtuous character. Thus habit is more important for virtue than knowledge which is very often present.

Mackenzie rightly observes: "Virtue is both a kind of knowledge and a kind of habit. Habit is a habit of willing. Habits which have a moral significance are habits of deliberate choice. Now deliberate choice depends on thought or reason. In order to choose the right, we must know the right. Right willing, therefore, depends on true insight" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 71-72).

Virtue, therefore, is the excellence of character brought about by the habitual performance of duties which are known through moral insight. Aristotle says, "A man is not good at all unless he takes pleasure in noble deeds." A virtuous person habitually perfoms duties and takes pleasure in performing them. One who does not take pleasure in habitually doing his duties can hardly be said to be a truly virtuous person. Thus habit has a great significance in moral life. (Chapter XXI).

16. Conduct.

Conduct covers voluntary and habitual actions. It does not include non-voluntary actions because they do not imply deliberation, choice, resolution, or purpose. They are non-purposive actions and as such devoid of moral quality. Conduct does not include actions which are performed under constraint or external compulsion. Conduct is willed action involving choice and purpose.

Conduct is purposive activity, or, more strictly, consciously purposive activity. It is the element of purpose, the choice of ends and of the means, that constitute conduct. "Choice is an act of will. Since, however, each choice is not an isolated act of will, but the several choices constitute a continuous and connected series, and all together form, and in turn result from, a certain settled habit or trend of will, a certain type of character, we may say that conduct is the expression of character. Conduct, therefore, points to character, or settled habit of will" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, pp. 4-5).

Herbert Spencer uses the word *conduct* in a wider sense. He defines conduct as adjustment of acts to ends, conscious or unconscious, purposive or non-purposive. Conduct, in this sense, includes all vital activities which are directed to an end. Herbert Spencer defines conduct as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.' It includes all vital activities which adjust the organism to the environment.

This is an improper extension of the meaning of conduct. From the ethical point of view, conduct is the expression of character. It includes only voluntary or purposive actions and habits which result from their repetition. The term conduct should be confined to those acts that are not merely adjusted to ends, but also definitely willed. A person's conduct is the expression of his character. Conduct is free and conscious adjustment of acts to ends deliberately chosen by the self.

17. Character.

Character is the permanent bent of the mind, constituted by "settled habits of will." Novalis defines character as "a completely fashioned will." It is a system of permanent tendencies or dispositions to actions voluntarily acquired, It is different from nature. Character is acquired by a person by his voluntary actions. Nature is innate but character is acquired. Nature is the original endowment. It is the given raw material of moral life. It consists in the innate impulses, instincts,

propensities and dispositions. Character is acquired. It is the fruit of toil and labour. It is the effect of volition and effort. Character is built up by a person out of his natural tendencies and dispositions by controlling and regulating them by reason. Thus character is built out of innate nature. It is expressed in overt actions which constitute conduct. Character and conduct are inseparable from each other. Character is the inner side of conduct. Conduct is the outer expression of character.

Morality is the formation of a character out of the raw material of nature. Natural tendencies are the raw material of character. When they are controlled and regulated by the self with the help of reason and will, they form fixed and permanent dispositions which we call character. Natural tendencies are the given elements which supply the self with raw material for the formation of character. "Character is the acquired habit of regulating these tendencies in a certain manner in relation to consciously conceived ends. In other words, character is not something separate from will and acting upon it from without, but is the habitual mode in which will regulates the system of impulses and desires, which is the field of its excercise" (*Muirhead*).

Character is expressed in conduct. Conduct is the outer expression of character. They act upon each other. External acts of will are partly determined by character already formed. But they are not wholly determined by past character. They involve freedom of the will. They are free acts of choice on the part of the self, though they are influenced by past character. Character also is not absolutely fixed and permanent. It grows and develops. Free acts of will alter the character already formed. Thus character and conduct mould and determine each other. A stable character, though it is built up by free acts of will, is expressed in uniform conduct which can, to a great extent, be predicted. An unstable character is expressed in

unstable and vacillating conduct, which cannot be predicted. Conduct is the outward expression of character. Character is the inner spring of conduct. They are objects of moral judgment because they involve choice, purpose, or volition. So Ethics is said to be the science of morality of conduct or the science of goodness or badness of character.

18. Circumstance.

A person's conduct partly depends upon his character, and partly upon the conditions and circumstances in the physical and social environment. External circumstances partly determine conduct. Even a person of strong character cannot avoid the influence of circumstances.

What, then, is the ethical signifance of circumstances? Circumstances are not simply the external environment in which a person lives. The position of the planets, the strata of the earth in the locality, the mountains, and the sea, the wind and the tides are not to be regarded as circumstances, if they do not influence the conduct of a person. But the climate, the fertility of the soil, the presence of coal or iron, and the like, are regarded as circumstances, because they influence the conduct of a person. Teachers, friends, companions, customs and manners, literature and religion, are more important circumstances, because they mould the conduct of a person considerably.

Circumstances are not mere external conditions. They are the external conditions in so far as they enter into a person's life. Circumstances depend upon a person's character. He takes note of, and responds to, those circumstances only, which fit in with his character. The other conditions in the environment he ignores altogether and does not take into account. They do not enter into his life. They are not, in any way, circumstances to him. Thus circumstances depend upon character; they are not entirely foreign to character. Character and circumstance are not two co-ordinate factors in human life; since it depends largely on character whether any condition

in the environment is to be reckoned a circumstance or not. The same physical or social condition may stimulate one and depress another. So though it is the same condition, to all intents, it is a different circumstance. An air-raid scares away many people in fright, but encourages thieves to stay and steal unprotected goods.

CHAPTER IV

MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1 Nature of Moral Consciousness.

Moral consciousness is the consciousness of right and wrong. It is the consciousness of moral distinctions. It is the awareness of the moral worth of acts and agents. It is the self's awareness of the character of an action as right or wrong. It is the apprehension of the moral quality of voluntary and habitual actions of rational agents or persons, and of the moral worth of their character.

2. Characteristics of Moral Consciousness.

Moral consciousness is that special kind of awareness which reveals the moral worth of acts and agents. It has the following characteristics :—

Moral consciousness is reflective in character. Voluntary actions of rational agents, which involve deliberation, choice, and resolution have the moral quality of rightness or wrongness. They are considered to be right or wrong with reference to the moral standard. They are right if they are in conformity with it. They are wrong if they are in conflict with it. Thus, moral consciousness involves comparison of voluntary acts with the moral standard. Therefore moral consciousness is reflective in character.

Moral consciousness is essentially active in character. Voluntary acts are primarily the objects of moral judgment. Habitual acts also have moral quality because they are the results of repeated voluntary acts. We pass moral judgments upon voluntary and habitual acts of persons, and not upon their passive experiences. So moral consciousness is active in nature.

Moral consciousness is primarily social. Voluntary acts of persons are right or wrong because they affect the interests of others, more or less. An estimate of duties of persons involves a reference to the rights of other persons in society. Rights and duties are correlative to each other. Man is a social being. His rights and duties rise out of his relation to other persons in society. Morality is inconceivable apart from society. So moral consciousness is social in character.

Moral consciousness is essentially authoritative or obligatory in character. Whenever we are conscious of an action as right, we feel moral obligation to do it ; and whenever we are conscious of an action as wrong, we feel moral obligation to refrain from it. Moral consciousness is always accompanied by the sense of duty or moral obligation. And this moral obligation is essentially self-imposed ; it is not due to an external authority of the society, the State, Nature, or God. It is an obligation which is imposed by the self upon itself. Moral obligation is of the nature of '*ought*', and not of the nature of '*must*'. Hence moral consciousness is authoritative or obligatory in character.

3. Elements of Moral Consciousness.

Moral consciousness is the awarness of the moral quality of voluntary actions of persons. It involves (1) cognitive or intellectual, (2) affective or emotional, and (3) conative or volitional factors.

The Cognitive factors :—Moral judgment is the main cognitive factor in moral consciousness. It involves intuition of the moral standard by reason and comparison of a voluntary

action with it and evaluation of it as right or wrong. It consists in the apprehension of the moral quality of an action with reference to the moral standard. The consciousness of rights and duties, virtues and vices, merit and demerit, responsibility or accountability is also involved in moral consciousness. These are the cognitive factors in moral consciousness.

The Emotional factors :—The emotional factors include the moral sentiments. They are the feelings of approval and disapproval which accompany moral judgments. When we apprehend that an action is right, it excites a feeling of approbation in our minds. When we apprehend that an action is wrong, it excites a feeling of disapprobation in our minds. When we have done a right action, we feel self-complacence. When we have committed a wrong action, we feel remorse. We have a feeling of reverence for the moral ideal. These moral sentiments accompany moral judgments. Maral judgments are followed by moral sentiments. Their existence is no criterion of the validity of moral judgments. Moral sentiments are not followed by moral judgments. They are the emotional factors in moral consciousness.

The Conative or Volitional factors :—Moral consciousness involves regulation of the impulses by reason according to its conception of the highest good. Thus it involves choice of an action by the self. And it also involves the moral impulse to do the right action. Moral judgment involves moral obligation or the sense of duty or oughtness. And we feel that we are under moral obligation to do what is right and not to do what is wrong, and we feel an active impulse to do what is right and avoid what is wrong. All these are the active factors in moral consciousness.

Thus, moral judgment, moral sentiment, and moral obligation are the main cognitive, emotional, and active factors in moral consciousness respectively. We have already considered the nature of moral judgment. Let us consider here the nature of

moral sentiments and their relation to moral judgment. The nature of moral obligation will be considered later.

4. Characteristics of Moral Sentiments.

Moral sentiments are excited by the ideal of Good. They are produced by the recognition of right and wrong. They are the emotions of approbation and disapprobation, remorse, self-complacence, reverence for the moral ideal, etc. Moral sentiments have the following characteristics :—

Moral sentiments are disinterested. They do not serve our self-interest. They are free from all reference to self-interest. They are not tainted by prudential considerations.

Moral sentiments are pre-eminently practical. They prompt us to action. Intellectual sentiments are concerned with the pursuit of knowledge. Æsthetic sentiments consist in the passive enjoyment of the beautiful or the sublime. But moral sentiments are concerned with human actions. They prompt us to do what is right and avoid what is wrong.

Moral sentiments are regulative or imperative. They are obligatory in character. When there is the emotion of moral approbation following upon the moral judgment of an action to be right, we feel under moral obligation to do it. When there is the emotion of moral disapprobation consequent upon the moral judgment of an action to be wrong, we feel under moral obligation to avoid it.

Moral sentiments are pre-eminently social. Moral actions are social ; they are actions of persons living in society in relation to one another. Rightness and wrongness of actions of persons depend upon their relations to one another. "The social consciousness, the feeling of solidarity of the self and the community, is still more distinct and prominent in moral approbation than in æsthetic admiration or intellectual gratification. To feel the claims of duty is to realise in a peculiarly clear manner our relations to the community" (Sully : *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 369).

5. Relation of Moral Sentiments to Moral Judgments.

Moralists differ among themselves as to the exact relation of the moral sentiments to the moral judgments. The advocates of the Moral Sense theory hold that moral sentiments precede and determine moral judgments. The advocates of the Rationalist theory hold that moral judgments precede and determine moral sentiments.

The Moral Sense Theory :—According to this theory, conscience immediately apprehends the moral quality of actions. If an action excites the feeling of approval in conscience, it is judged to be right. If an action excites the feeling of disapproval in conscience, it is judged to be wrong. An action directly produces a feeling of approbation or a feeling of disapprobation in conscience, and this feeling is the ground of the subsequent moral judgment that the action is right or wrong. Thus, moral sentiments are prior to moral judgments which are determined by them.

Moral judgments cannot depend upon moral sentiments. Moral sentiments are emotions and as such subjective and variable. They are the most unreliable of all mental functions. They vary according to moods, temperaments, and circumstances. They cannot be the basis of moral judgments which are comparatively uniform.

Moral sentiments are altered by the correction of moral judgments. Feeling of approbation is excited by animal sacrifice, bull fight, etc., in some persons because they erroneously judge them to be right according to the prevailing customs in a society. But when their conscience is enlightened and their moral judgment is corrected, these actions produce the feelings of disapprobation, repulsion, and horror. Hence moral judgments cannot depend upon moral sentiments.

Reason has the supreme place in the human constitution. So it should be the basis of moral judgments of actions as right or wrong. Moral judgments are not blind, but enlightened.

They *involve the rational apprehension of the moral ideal and comparison of actions with it.* They involve discrimination and comparison.

Hence moral sentiments can never be the basis of moral judgments. Moral sentiments are determined by moral judgments. We have the feeling of approbation or disapprobation according as we judge an action to be right or wrong. Moral sentiments follow and depend upon moral judgments. If moral judgments are found to be erroneous and corrected by rational reflection, moral sentiments also are altered. This clearly shows that moral judgments are prior to and determine moral sentiments.

The Rationalist Theory :—According to it, an action produces in us the agreeable feeling of approbation or the disagreeable feeling of disapprobation, because it is judged by reason to be right or wrong. Moral sentiment depends on, and is the result of moral judgment. Moral sentiments cannot be the criterion of the validity of moral judgments.

6. Function of Moral Sentiments.

The moral sentiments are not the criterion of the validity of the moral judgments. But yet they perform an important function. They have stimulating as well as restraining power. The agreeable moral sentiments urge us to do what we judge to be right, while the disagreeable moral sentiments restrain us from doing what we judge to be wrong. The former act as stimulants ; the latter act as deterrents.

Moral sentiments influence moral judgments in the customary and unreflective stage of morality. For instance, the unreflective Hindus do not feel repulsion at child marriage, untouchability, polygamy, etc., because they are approved by customs. But moral sentiments cannot influence moral judgments at the reflective stage of personal morality. They are, on the contrary, influenced and determined by moral judgments which depend upon rational reflection.

Moral sentiments are changed by habit. Continuance in moral actions quickens the moral sentiments which may serve as a healthy guide. But continuance in immoral actions blunts the moral sentiments and stifles the voice of conscience.

In persons of healthy moral nature, moral sentiments preserve the purity of the moral constitution. They are said to be the 'voice of conscience'. They cheer us when we follow the path of duty and torment us when we go astray. So we should cultivate healthy moral sentiments and enlighten them by rational reflection, because if moral judgments be erroneous moral sentiments become misleading.

CHAPTER V

MORAL JUDGMENT

1. The Nature of Moral Judgment.

Moral judgment is a judgment of value as distinguished rom a judgment of fact. A judgment of fact is a judgment of what *is*. A judgment of value is a judgment of what *ought to be*. The former is a descriptive judgment, while the latter is an appreciative or critical judgment. Moral judgment is the mental act of discerning and pronouncing a particular action to be right or wrong.

Mackenzie says, "The moral judgment is not simply of the nature of what is called a judgment in Logic. It is not merely a judgment *about*, but a judgment *upon*. It does not merely state the nature of some object, but compares it with a standard, and by means of this standard pronounces it to be good or evil, right or wrong. This is what is meant by saying that the moral point of view is normative" (*Manual of Ethics*,

p. 103). Thus moral judgment is not a judgment about an action, but judgment upon an action with reference to the moral ideal.

Ethics is a normative science. Muirhead says, "It is concerned with the judgment *upon* conduct, the judgment that such and such conduct is right or wrong. There is a distinction between a judgment of fact and a judgment *upon* fact, corresponding to the distinction between 'judgment' in its logical sense of 'proposition' and 'judgment' in the judicial sense of 'sentence'. It is with judgment in the latter sense that ethics has to do. It deals with conduct as the subject of *judicial* judgment, not with conduct merely as predicated in time" (*The Elements of Ethics*' pp. 19-20). Thus moral judgment consists in judging what our actions *ought to be.* Moral judgment is obligatory.

The moral quality of an action is recognised in this way. When we perceive a voluntary action, we compare it with the moral standard, and thus judge whether the action is in conformity with it or not. In other words, moral judgment involves the application of a standard to a particular action. Thus it is clear that moral judgment is inferential in nature, involving the application of a standard to a particular action. But we must not suppose that our ordinary moral judgments always involve explicit reasoning or inference. The element of reasoning is implicit in most cases of moral judgments. It is only in complex and doubtful cases or in reflective examination that the whole process becomes explicit. In such cases the moral standard is explicitly held before the mind and applied to the cases under consideration. But ordinarily moral judgments are intuitive and immediate ; they are not reflective. They are 'intuitive subsumptions' in the language of Bradley. We intuitively bring an action under a moral rule recognized by the community, and judge it to be right or wrong. It is only in difficult or doubtful cases that we reflect on the concrete situation, and consciously compare

an action with the moral ideal, and judge it to be right or wrong. Thus the inferential character of moral judgments is brought to clear consciousness in complicated circumstances.

A moral judgment presupposes a subject who judges, an object that is judged, a standard according to which an action is judged, a faculty of judging or moral faculty.

2. Moral Judgment distinguished from Logical and Æsthetic Judgments.

Ethics, Logic and Æsthetics are normative sciences. They determine the nature of three supreme norms or ideals of life. Ethics is concerned with the ideal of the Highest Good. Logic is concerned with the ideal of Truth. Æsthetics is concerned with the ideal of Beauty. Thus logical judgments refer to the ideal of Truth. Æsthetic judgments refer to the ideal of Beauty. But moral judgments refer to the ideal of supreme Good. All of them are appreciative or critical judgments. But moral judgments are always accompanied by moral obligation and moral sentiments which do not accompany logical and æsthetic judgments. When we judge an action to be right, we feel under moral obligation to perform it and have a feeling of approval. When we judge an action to be wrong, we feel under moral obligation not to perform it, and have a feeling of disapproval. The feelings of approval, disapproval, complacence, remorse, etc., are called moral sentiments. Moral obligation is the sense of duty or oughtness. Moral judgments are obligatory in character and are accompanied by moral sentiments. Therefore they cannot be reduced to logical or æsthetic judgments which are lacking in moral obligation and moral sentiments.

3. The Object of Moral Judgment.

We have learnt that voluntary actions and habitual actions are objects of moral judgment. Non-voluntary actions are excluded from the scope of moral judgment. Habitual actions

are objects of moral judgment, because they are results of repeated voluntary actions. Thus ultimately only voluntary actions are judged to be right or wrong. Whatever is not willed, has no moral worth.

But a voluntary action consists of three main steps : (1) the mental stage of spring of action, motive, intention, desire, deliberation, choice, and resolution ; (2) the organic stage of bodily action ; (3) the external stage of consequences. Now, the question arises :—

I. Do we judge an Act by its Motives or its Consequences ?

Moral judgments are not passed upon all kinds of actions, but only upon conduct. But conduct or willed action has two aspects : it is will, and it is action ; it involves an internal factor and an external factor.

There is a hot controversy between Hedonists and Intuitionists. The Hedonists maintain that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends upon the consequences, while the Intuitionists maintain that it depends upon the motive. If motives are good or bad, says Bentham, "it is on account of their effects." Similarly, J. S. Mill says, "The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the act." Bentham and J. S. mill, who are Hedonists, take the term 'motive' in the sense of 'springs of action'. Feelings of pleasure and pain are the springs of action. This is wrong. The idea of the end is the real motive. It induces the self to act. It is the end of action. On the other hand, Kant says, "the effect of our actions cannot give them moral worth." Butler says, "the rightness or wrongness of an act depends very much upon the motive for which it is done." Kant and Butler are Intuitionists and Rationalists.

Is, then, the motive or the consequence of a voluntary action the object of moral judgment ? Which of them determines its moral quality ? When there is a harmony between the inner motive and the outer consequence, both

are objects of moral judgment. Motive and consequence are not really opposed to each other. The motive is the outer consequence as foreseen and desired. The consequence is the outer manifestation of the inner motive. The motive or the idea of the end aimed at is undoubtedly the object of moral judgment. The consequence also is the object of moral judgment in so far as it realises the inner motive.

But sometimes it is found that the motive is good, but the consequence turns out to be bad. For example, a skilful surgeon performs an operation most carefully in order to cure a patient; but in spite of his best efforts the patient dies. The consequence, here, is bad, but the motive is good. The action of the surgeon cannot be regarded as bad, because his motive is good. Again, sometimes the motive is bad, but the consequence turns out to be good. "The morality of an action", said Dr. Johnson, "depends on the motive from which we act. If I fling half-a-crown to a beggar with intention to break his head, and he picks it up and buys victuals with it, the physical effect is good, but, with respect to me, the action is very wrong." Here, evidently the action is wrong, because the motive is bad. Thus when there is a conflict between the inner motive and the outer consequence, the moral quality of an action is determined by the inner motive and not by the consequence.

II. Is Motive alone or Intention the object of Moral Judgment?

Bentham takes motive in the sense of pleasure and pain which are springs of action. He says, "A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner." Bentham takes intention in the sense of the end or aim of action, which persuades the agent to act or dissudes him to act. Therefore he regards intention as the object of moral judgment. He says explicitly that all motives are morally colourless, because they are all of the same kind,—

all pleasure-seeking and pain-shunning. Similarly J. S. Mill also holds that motive, in the sense of the spring of action or feelings of pleasure and pain, is not the object of moral judgment, but intention, or the end or aim of action is the object of moral judgment. He says, "The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention, that is, upon what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality."

This view is wrong. The spring of action, or the feeling of pleasure and pain, is not the motive. It is blind. It cannot move a rational agent to act. The motive is the end or aim of action. It is the final cause of action. It is not the efficient cause. It does not move the self to act from behind. It induces the self to act. Therefore motive, in this sense, is the object of moral judgment. But the feelings of pleasure and pain, which are the springs of action, are never the objects of moral judgment. They are morally colourless, as Bentham says. So far Bentham is right. But Bentham and Mill take the word 'motive' in a wrong sense.

The motive is the idea of the end chosen by the self. It is a part of intention. Intention includes the ideas of the end and the means chosen by the self. Is motive alone the object of moral judgment ? Or is intention the object of moral judgment ? Is an action right if its motive is good ? Or is an action right if its intention is good ? Sometimes the end chosen is good, but the means employed for the attainment of the end are bad. Should such an action as realises a good end through bad means be regarded as right ? Does the end justify the means ? It is said that St. Crispin used to steal leather from the rich to make shoes for the poor. Can his action be justified ? Evidently we cannot regard his conduct as right, because though his motive was good, he employed immoral means. A merchant adopts unfair means to gain

wealth. His motive is gain which is not wrong. But he adopts wrong means. This makes his action wrong. Thus we come to the conclusion that intention is the object of moral judgment. It includes the motive or the idea of the end as well as the idea of the means. An action is good if its intention is good—in other words—if the end as well as the means adopted is good. The end never justifies the means. Thus the motive alone does not determine the moral quality of an action. It is intention including motive that determines the moral quality of an action. An action is right when the intention of the agent is good. An action is wrong when the intention is bad. In other words, an action is right if both the motive or the end and the means are good; an action is wrong if either of them is bad.

Mackenzie distinguishes different kinds of intention from each other.

First, we may distinguish between the immediate and remote intentions of an action. The immediate intention of two persons may be the same, *e. g.*, saving a criminal from drowning. But their remote intentions may be different. One intends to preserve his life. The other intends to hand him over to the police and get him hanged. The remote intention is sometimes wrongly called the motive. Both immediate intention and remote intention are objects of moral judgment.

Secondly, we may distinguish between the outer and the inner intention of an action. If a beggar comes to you, and you help him in order to remove the painful feeling from your mind, which is excited by the sight of his distress, your outer intention is to help the man in distress, but your inner intention is to remove your own painful feeling. The inner intention of an action is an object of moral judgment.

Thirdly, we may distinguish between the direct and the indirect intention of an action. When a nihilist threw a bomb at a Railway train to kill the Czar, his direct intention was the

death of the Czar, but his indirect intention was the death of many other persons in the train. Both direct intention and indirect intention are objects of moral judgment.

Fourthly, we may distinguish between the conscious and the unconscious intention of an action. An unconscious intention is an intention which lies in the subconscious level of mind and yet influnces an action. But the agent does not avow it to himself. A minister may adopt a measure really for his self-aggrandisement and self-interest, but he does not acknowledge it and puts forth the well-being of the country as his real intention. Conscious intention is the object of moral judgment. Unconscious intention also, when it is unearthed by the agent and known by him, though not definitely avowed by him, is an object of moral judgment.

Fifthly, we may distinguish between the formal intention and the material intention of an action. The material intention is the particular result of an action aimed at; the formal intention is the principle embodied in the action. The conservatives as well as the socialists may aim at the overthrow of a liberal government in England. Their material intentions are the same. But their formal intentions are different. The conservatives think the liberal government too progressive, while the socialists think it too conservative. The formal intention and the material intention both are objects of moral judgment.

An intention is the end that is definitely adopted as an object of will together with the means which are consented to by the agent as necessary for the realisation of the end. The intention as a whole, rather than the motive or the idea of the mere end, is the object of moral judgment.

III. *Is Intention or Character the object of Moral Judgment?*

Intention is not an isolated mental phenomenon. It is the expression of character. It is always influenced by the permanent bent or disposition of the mind or character acquired

by repeated voluntary actions. Therefore, some hold that character is ultimately the object of moral judgment. Mackenzie says, "It is only in a somewhat strained sense that the (moral) judgment can be said to be passed either on the intention or on the motive alone. The truth seems to be rather that the fully developed moral judgment is always pronounced, directly or indirectly, on the character of the agent. It is never simply on a *thing* done, but always on a *person* doing, that we pass moral judgment" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 111).

This view is open to an objection. We pass moral judgments on the character of a person when we want to determine his moral worth. But we do not determine the moral quality of an action by considering the character of the agent, because a person of good character has not always a good intention, and similarly a person of bad character may not have necessarily a bad intention always. So it is better to hold that intention is the object of moral judgment. Intention of the agent determines the moral quality of an action.

Summary :—

A voluntary action or an action for the realisation of a chosen end is the object of moral judgment.

The external consequence which is the expression of the inner motive or intention is the object of moral judgment. Foreseen and intended consequence determines the moral quality of an action.

When the outer consequence does not tally with the inner motive, it is the motive—and not the consequence—that is the object of moral judgment.

But the motive alone does not determine the moral quality of an action. Intention which includes motive determines its moral quality. The end and the means both must be good in order to make an action right. The end does not justify the means. If the end is good but the means adopted is bad, the action should be regarded as wrong.

It is wrong to hold that character is the object of moral judgment. It determines the moral worth of a person, but not of his particular actions. The moral quality of an action is always determined by the intention of the agent.

4. The Subject of Moral Judgment.

Who passes moral judgment ? It is the rational self or the ideal self that passes moral judgment. It passes moral judgments on its own motives, intentions, and actions. And it passes moral judgments upon the motives, intentions and actions of others.

Mackenzie means by the subject of moral judgment the point of view from which an action is judged to be good or bad. A person judges an action to be right or wrong from the standpoint of an ideal standard.

Shaftesbury, an advocate of the Moral Sense theory, holds that a work of art is judged to be good or bad by the connoisseur. The artist appeals to the judgment of the connoisseur for appreciation of beauty. Similarly, when we deal with conduct, we appeal to the judgment of the moral connoisseur.

Art aims at the production of a certain result. The connoisseur is the only judge whether such a result is beautiful or ugly. But in morality it is the action rather than its result that is judged. Now this action has been already judged by the person who acts. He has deliberately chosen the action. If his action is wrong, it is judged to be wrong not merely by the moral connoisseur, but by himself when he reflects upon it. Thus the subject of moral judgment is not the moral connoisseur, but the person himself who does the action. The ideal or rational self is the subject of moral judgment.

Adam Smith holds a view similar to that of Shaftesbury. He holds that a person passes moral judgments on his own actions and those of others from the standpoint of an impartial spectator. We pass moral judgments upon the conduct and

character of other people. Then we find that they also pass moral judgments upon our conduct and character. Thus we come to reflect upon our own motives, intentions, and actions, and become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause. Thus we become spectators of our own behaviour. "When I endeavour," says Adam Smith, "to examine my own conduct, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons. I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into, and judged of. The first is the spectator. The second is the agent. The first is the judge ; the second the person judged of." Thus Adam Smith was led to the idea of the "impartial spectator" from whose point of view our moral judgments are pronounced. In passing moral judgments we must appeal from the opinions of mankind to the higher tribunal of our own conscience—to that of the "impartial spectator".

This view contains a core of truth. The point of view of moral judgment is that of unbiased reason. We ought to view our own actions as impartial spectators, as we view others' actions. The spectator or the judge in a person is the ideal self. The person judged of is the actual self. Then, it is true that moral consciousness is evolved through intercourse with society. But it is not necessarily true that we judge others' actions first, and then our own actions. First, we become clearly conscious of our own motives and intentions and judge them to be right and wrong, then we infer the motives and intentions of other persons from their actons in the light of our own experience. However, Adam Smith clearly brings out the fact that moral judgments involve a reference to a point of view higher than that of the individual. The point of view to which an appeal is made is that of the Ideal Self.

CHAPTER VI

MORAL CONCEPTS

1. Moral Concepts.

Ethics is the science of morality of conduct. It deals with rightness and wrongness of actions. It deals with moral good and evil. It deals with merit and demerit of moral agents doing right and wrong actions. It deals with rights, duties and virtues of persons in society. It deals with freedom and responsibility of persons. It deals with these fundamental moral concepts involved in moral consciousness. The notions of right and good are the most fundamental of all moral concepts.

2. Right and Wrong.

The term '*right*' comes from the Latin word *rectus*. It means straight or according to rule. When an action conforms to a moral rule or law of conduct, it is said to be right. The term '*wrong*' is connected with the verb '*wring*'. A wrong action implies a twist of a rule of conduct. It violates a law of conduct. Every law or rule presupposes an end which is realised by it. The end which is realised by a law is called the good. The notions of right and wrong are connected with the moral laws which are subservient to the Highest Good.

3. The Right and the Good.

The '*right*' is a means to the realisation of the '*good*'. An action is right, if it tends to bring about what is good. An action is wrong, if it tends to bring about what is evil. The conception of right is subordinate to the conception of good. The right is subservient to the good. The good is an ideal which a person ought to realise in order to realise his deeper self. It is an ideal which satisfies his rational nature. It is an ideal that fulfils the demands of his sentient nature in conformity with the higher law of reason. It is an ideal that satisfies his total self—sentient as well as rational. The concept

of right is derived from that of a moral law or law of duty. A moral law is not a law of nature. It is not a statement of what always happens. A moral law is that which ought to be. The right is the fundamental category of jural ethics. The good is the fundamental category of teleological ethics.

4. The Good and the Highest Good.

What fulfils a need or satisfies a desire is good. Health, wealth, knowledge, culture, etc., are good. Certain things satisfy our biological needs. They are bodily goods. Certain things satisfy our economic needs. They are economic goods. Certain things satisfy our social needs. They are social goods. Certain things satisfy our intellectual, moral, and æsthetic needs. They are Truth, Good and Beauty. There is a hierarchy of goods at the top of which there is the Highest Good. It is the Supreme Good. It is the *summum bonum* of human life. It is good in itself. It is not a means to any other higher good.

5. Right and Duty.

Man is a social being. He is a member of society. He realises his highest good only through society. Society concedes to its members certain moral rights for the common good. The individual members enjoy these rights which are protected by society. Their rights cannot be infringed by others. Their rights ought to be respected by others. Society punishes those who choose to violate the rights of others. Thus *A* has rights to certain things, *e.g.*, property. *B*, *C*, and others in society have moral duties to respect *A*'s rights. Corresponding to the moral rights of *A* there are moral duties of *B*, *C*, and others. Rights and duties are correlative to each other. They are meaningless apart from each other. They derive their being and authority from society. Society concedes rights to individuals and enforces duties upon them. Society creates, sustains, maintains and enforces rights and duties.

The word 'right' is used in another sense. An action is right, if it conforms to the moral standard. It is right, if it

is conducive to the highest good. If an action is right for an individual in a particular situation, it is his duty to do it. If he judges it to be right, he is under moral obligation to do it. In this sense, whatever is right is a duty. 'Right' here is a predicate of an action. It is its moral quality. 'Wrong' is opposed to 'right'. If an action is repugnant to the good, it is wrong. 'Right' and 'good' are the fundamental concepts of morality. 'Right' is a means to the 'good'.

6. Duty and Virtue.

When we judge an action to be right, we feel it our duty to do it. When we judge an action to be wrong, we feel it our duty not to do it. We ought to do what is right. We ought not to do what is wrong. It is our duty to do what is right. It is our duty to avoid what is wrong.

If we habitually perform our duties, we acquire virtue. If we habitually commit wrong actions, we acquire vice. Virtue is the excellence of character. Vice is the taint of character. Duties refer to overt or external actions. Virtues refer to the inner character. Duties refer to particular actions. Virtues refer to the permanent acquired dispositions or character. Habitual performance of duties leads to the formation of a virtuous character.* Habitual violation of duties leads to the formation of a vicious character. Duty leads to virtue through habit.

7. Desert, Merit and Demerit.

Desert is merit or demerit. It is the genus of merit and demerit. Merit is positive desert. Demerit is negative desert. Both of them are called desert. The term 'desert' is generic, implying either a virtuous or vicious will, while the term 'merit' is specific, implying only an excellence of character expressed in a right action. 'Demerit' implies a flaw of character expressed in a wrong action.

8. Merit and Demerit.

Merit implies the moral elevation of character. Demerit implies the moral degradation of character. Merit implies

increase in the moral excellence of a person's character due to his voluntary performance of a duty, while demerit implies decrease in the moral value of a person's character due to his voluntary violation of the moral standard. Merit is a positive desert. It implies an increase in the moral value of a person's character. Demerit is a negative desert. It implies a decrease in the moral worth of a person's character. When a person performs a duty, he rises in the scale of moral perfection and acquires merit. When he commits a sin, he falls in the scale of moral perfection and acquires demerit. Thus merit and demerit are traits of character.

But though merit and demerit are qualities of character, sometimes a right action is said to have merit, and a wrong action is said to have a demerit. If we perform a duty, we feel satisfaction. If we commit a wrong action, we feel remorse. When our action is in conformity with the moral standard, it has merit. When it is in conflict with the moral standard, it has demerit.

9. Merit and Demerit as distinguished from Right and Wrong.

An action is right, if it is in harmony with the moral standard. It is wrong, if it violates the moral standard. Thus the terms 'right' and 'wrong' are applicable to actions. But the terms 'merit' and 'demerit' are applicable to character. Merit implies moral elevation of character acquired by performing a right action. Demerit implies moral degradation of character acquired by performing a wrong action. Sometimes we talk of meritorious acts by transfer of epithet, as expressing the merit of an agent. Thus, merit and demerit should not be confused with right and wrong to which they are related.

Right and wrong do not admit of degrees, while merit and demerit admit of degrees. An action is either right or wrong under certain circumstances. We cannot speak of an action as more right than another. Nor can we speak of an action

as more wrong than another. But merit or demerit belongs to a person. It is the trait of his character which he achieves by performing a duty or committing a sin. A person rises and falls in the scale of moral perfection by his right and wrong actions. His rise or fall, merit or demerit, may be of different degrees. There may be a greater or less rise or fall. Thus, merit and demerit are different degrees. The terms 'right' and 'wrong' belong to judgments of quality, while the terms 'merit' and 'demerit' belong to judgments of quantity or intensity.

10. Degrees of Merit and Demerit.

Kant and Martineau hold that the greater is the strain on the will, the greater is the merit of an agent. The greater is the temptation overcome, the greater is the strain on the will. Thus merit is directly proportionate to the strength of the temptation overcome. Merit consists in the resistance to the solicitations of sense. Kant holds that there is a perpetual conflict between desire and duty. The greater is the intensity of desire or inclination overcome by reason from the sense of duty, the greater is the merit of the agent. And the less is the intensity of desire or passion overcome by reason from the sense of duty, the less is the merit of the agent.

This view is partially true. A person who overcomes a strong passion is certainly more meritorious than another who yields to it. But a person who does not feel a strong passion owing to his moral elevation of character attained by constantly regulating his passions voluntarily, is no less meritorious for his not feeling the urge of strong passions. The true view seems to be that the greater is the virtue, the greater is the merit of an agent. The greater is the moral excellence of character achieved by regulating the lower impulses, the greater is the merit of a person.

Kant makes a distinction between duties of perfect obligation and duties of imperfect obligation. The former are called

determinate duties, while the latter are called indeterminate duties. Determinate duties are enforced by external laws. Corresponding to them there are rights residing in some persons. Indeterminate duties are not enforced by external laws. Their violation is not punished by the State. They are not obligatory. Corresponding to them there are no rights residing in other persons. Payment of a debt due to a legal contract is obligatory and enforced by the State. It does not increase the merit of the person performing the action to such an extent as his saving the life of a person at the risk of his own life. The latter act is an indeterminate duty or duty of imperfect obligation. It is not enforced by the State. So it is more meritorious than the performance of a determinate duty. Determinate duties are enforced by external laws. So we cannot make sure whether a person performs them out of prudence or the sense of duty. But when a person performs an indeterminate duty which cannot be enforced by external laws, he shows intrinsic moral elevation of his character. Thus the performance of indeterminate duties is more meritorious than that of determinate duties ; the former increases the moral worth of an agent to a greater extent than the latter. Generally we attach greater demerit to the non-performance of determinate duties than to the non-observance of indeterminate duties. If a person does not pay off his legal debt but spends his spare money on charity, he is judged to be morally guilty. A person has no right to be generous, if he cannot fulfil the claims of justice. This view is right from the popular point of view.

But the distinction between determinate and indeterminate duties, or duties of perfect obligation and duties of imperfect obligation, is legal or juristic rather than moral. Under particular circumstances our duties are always definite and determinate. Our duties are always duties of perfect obligation. We can, under no circumstances, do more than our duties. So, from the moral point of view, the distinction between

determinate and indeterminate duties has nothing to do with the degrees of merit and demerit.

If a person performs a duty at a great sacrifice of his self-interest, his merit is great. But if he performs a duty which does not necessitate a great sacrifice of his self-interest, his merit is not so great. Again, if a person commits a wrong action in order to gain a great amount of self-interest, his demerit is not great. But if a person commits a wrong action in order to gain some petty self-interest, his demerit is greater. If a person performs a right action without sacrificing any self-interest, he hardly acquires any merit or moral excellence of character. But if a person performs a duty even at the sacrifice of his best self-interest, he exhibits a great moral excellence of character. A person who sacrifices his life for the freedom of his country has greater merit than another who only contributes a small sum to the war fund. Again, if a person commits a wrong action in order to achieve the greatest self-interest, his demerit is less than that of another who commits a wrong action in order to achieve a petty end. One who steals food to save himself from starvation has less demerit than another who robs a person of all his treasure in order to enrich himself. Thus, the greater is the sacrifice of self-interest for the sake of right, the greater is the merit of the agent, and the greater is the self-interest achieved through a wrong action, the less is the demerit of the agent.

11. Merit and Virtue.

Virtue is the permanent disposition or the inner bent of the will, which is achieved by habitual performance of duties. Martineau holds that merit implies the moral elevation of character revealed in overcoming the lower impulses, while virtue is gradually acquired by many meritorious acts which contribute to the formation of a stable character. Merit implies the struggle of an earnest soul bent on moral progress, while virtue indicates the result of this effort. "Virtue", says

Martineau, "is harmony won; Merit is the winning of it: the former is ratified peace; the latter, the conflict whence it results" (*Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II*, p. 496). Thus, merit varies directly, while virtue inversely, with the intensity of the passions.

But merit does not necessarily depend upon the intensity of passions overcome. The greater is the moral elevation of character, the greater is the merit of the agent. And the greater is the moral elevation of character, the greater is the virtue. Thus, the degrees of merit and virtue vary in direct ratio. And the degrees of demerit and vice vary in direct ratio. The concepts of merit and virtue, demerit and vice are closely allied to each other.

12. Freedom and Responsibility.

Morality implies freedom of the will. It is the fundamental basis of morality. "Thou *oughtst*, therefore, thou *canst*. If you ought to do what is right, you are free to do it. If you ought not to do what is wrong, you are free not to do it. Oughtness implies freedom. Man freely chooses what is right or wrong. He is not determined by circumstances to do right or wrong. Man is free in his voluntary actions. Therefore he is responsible for his actions. Man is responsible for his voluntary and habitual actions which constitute his conduct. He is responsible for his virtuous or vicious character which is the result of his repeated voluntary actions. Thus freedom and responsibility are important ethical concepts. Denial of freedom saps the very foundation of morality, and cuts at the root of responsibility.

It is a fundamental assumption of Ethics that men are morally responsible for their actions. If this were not true, moral judgments would have no justification. We do not judge the motions of plants or inanimate objects to be moral or immoral, because they are rigidly determined by physical causes. We do not judge the actions of children and insane persons

also to be moral or immoral, because their actions are not free. We hold adult human beings morally responsible for their actions, if they are sane and are under no coercion. We hold them responsible for what they do, because they are free in doing their actions. Thus, moral responsibility presupposes freedom of the will. Rashdall says, "What does responsibility really mean? Etymologically the word signifies the liablity to be called upon to answer for an act, with the implication that, if the agent cannot make a satisfactory defence of it he may justly be punished. A man is said to be responsible for an act for which he might justly be punished. We hold that a sane man is responsible for a crime, because it is just to punish him for it. The suggestion that Determinism undermines the idea of responsibility means at bottom that on the determinist view punishment would be unjust."

If men were entirely determined by heredity and the environment without any power of initiative, they could not be held responsible for their actions; they could not be praised for their right actions or blamed for their wrong actions; their actions would be on the same footing with physical events. But men are free to choose their ends and actions according to their idea of the highest good, and therefore responsible for their actions, though they are partly influenced by heredity and circumstances, If men are regarded as devoid of freedom, their actions cease to be moral or immoral. If men are creatures of circumstances, merit and demerit, right and wrong, virtue and vice, responsibility and punishability lose all their significance, and morality becomes a myth.

Men are free; they are conscious of an ideal, and freely realise it. They determine their own actions. They are not helpless creatures of circumstances. They are partly determined by circumstances, but they freely respond to them according to their characters. Circumstances are moulded by character. Two persons living in the same environment have not the

same circumstances. They take cognisance of those circumstances in the environment, which fit in with their character and respond to them. Other circumstances do not influence their volitions and actions. Men are responsible for their free voluntary actions. Responsibility implies freedom of the will.

13. The Nature of Freedom presupposed by Responsibility.

Freedom of the will means self-determinism. It does not mean indeterminism or liberty of indifference. Indeterminism holds that the self has the mysterious power of arbitrarily choosing between alternative possibilities or motives without any reason ; the self has the power of undetermined choice. Indeterminism implies a power of absolutely undetermined choice in the self—a power of originating acts which have absolutely no connection with or relation to the self as it was before the act. Rashdall rightly observes, "Not only is Determinism not inconsistent with responsibility, but it may even be maintained with much force that it is Indeterminism which really undermines responsibility. A free act is, according to the Indeterminist, an absolutely new beginning, not springing from, or having any necessary connection with, the past. The question may be raised : What is the meaning of holding me responsible for some past act of mine, if that act did not really proceed from and reveal the true nature of the Self which I still am ? If the act sprang up to itself (so to speak) without having any root in my previous being, no goodness of my previous self could possibly have prevented its perpetration. And, as it revealed nothing of my past self, so it would be unwarrantable to regard it as reflecting upon my present character ; since the present self is, in so far as free, simply the momentary new beginnings which from time to time intervene in the series of my actions without springing from those actions, or from the permanent self revealed in them" (*Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II*, pp. 335-36).

Freedom of the will which is implied by responsibility is not undetermined choice but self-determined choice. The self chooses a motive to the exclusion of others in order to realise its own good. The act of choice is determined by the self which is influenced by the consideration of its own good. Freedom means self-determinism. It does not mean indeterminism. Indeterminism implies arbitrary will, unmotived choice or pure chance. "Pure chance is as irrational and unthinkable an idea as Fate ; and to admit that our acts are—whether wholly or partially—determined by pure chance is surely as fatal to the idea of responsibility as to ascribe them to an external, overruling Fate. And if there were such things as human acts determined by pure chance, they could not with any reasonableness be regarded as acts for which any particular person is responsible" (*Ibid*, p. 337). If moral resposibility has any meaning, it implies freedom in the sense of self-determination. My free acts are determined by myself ; they spring from my nature ; they are determined by me or myself. Therefore I am responsible for my actions. If they sprang from mysterious and incalculable forces of unmotived choice in myself over which I have no control, I could not be held responsible for my actions. Thus, men are responsible for their actions because they freely determine their own actions, and are not mechanically determined by internal and external forces such as inherited physiological and mental tendencies and the physical and social environment. Men's actions are not determined from without by external circumstances, but determined from within by the self and its conception of the good. Men's actions are self-determined, and therefore have moral value. "A person's actions are determined by his self and his purposes—by the kind of character he has, and the plans and ideals that actuate his life. It is just because he is a person, and his actions are determined by his personality, that they are praise-worthy or blame-worthy" (Wright : *General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 276).

This view of freedom is called self-determinism or teleological determinism.

Indeterminism undermines responsibility. If our volitions and actions are absolutely undetermined or free, and not determined by the self to realise its good, it cannot be held responsible for them. They involve decision. Decision involves reason. The self chooses a particular end or motive and rejects the rest, because it thinks that it is conducive to its good. In deciding the self acts, the act of decision is free, because it is determined by the self. It is determined by the character of the self. It is the self that chooses a particular motive in conformity with its character. The whole personality is expressed in the choice and action. Welton observes, "We are responsible for our acts in exact proportion as they express our personalities. In so far as they do not express what we are, we are not responsible foı them" (*Groundwork of Ethics*, p. 44).

Thus determinism and indeterminism both undermine responsibility. Self-determinism is compatible with responsibility. Freedom of the will, in the sense of self-determination, can account for responsibility or accountability. Physical compulsion, lack of reflection, subconscious compulsion under complexes, mental derangement or insanity, are incompatible with responsibility.

14. Freedom and Necessity are essential to Morals.

Mackenzie rightly observes that both freedom and necessity are essential to morality. Kant said, "Thou *oughtst*, therefore, thou *canst*." A man ought to control his lower impulses. It implies that he can control them. A man ought to do what is right. This implies that he is free to do what is right. If a man's will were absolutely determined by circumstances, he would have no 'ought' or moral imperative. If there is any meaning in the moral imperative, a persons's will must be free, and not absolutely determined by circumstances. Freedom means self-determination. "To be free means that one is

determined by nothing but oneself" (*Mackenzie*). A man's acts are his own only when he is himself in doing them, when they flow from the centre of his habitual universe. His actions are free when they spring from his whole self or personality. Freedom in the sense of self-determination, is the fundamental postulate of morality. Without freedom, man would be a conscious automaton devoid of morality and responsibility.

In a sense, necessity also is essential to morality. By free acts of choice a person builds up his character. The more stable is his character, the more uniform is his behaviour. Unformity of conduct or necessity follows from stability of character. If a man continually shifts from one universe to another, we cannot predict his conduct in future. But if he lives constantly in the same universe of desire and possesses fixity of character, we can, with a fair degree of certainty, predict his future conduct. Predictability of future conduct is not necessarily inconsistent with freedom of the will. Mackenzie says, "The moral life consists in the formation of character. Now to have a character is to live habitually in a certain universe. And in any given universe desires have a definite position with reference to one another; so that there can be no doubt which is to give place to another. Hence the more decidedly a character is formed, the more uniform will be its choice and its action. ...The moral life means the building up of character, *i. e.*, it means the forming of definite habits of action. And if a habit of action be definite, it is uniform and predictable. Now necessity is often understood to mean nothing more than uniformity. In this sense, then, necessity is required for the moral life. The neccessity means simply the uniform activity of a given character" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 74-75). It does not mean complete determination of volition and action by external circumstances. Necessity, in that sense, is subversive of morality.

Thus, freedom and necessity both are essential to morals. Freedom means self-determination. Necessity means uniformity

of choice and action following from a stable or fixed character. Character is built up by free acts of will. And fixed character is expressed in uniform conduct. Formation of a fixed character by free acts of will as well as uniformity of conduct following from a fixed character is required for the moral life.

15. Subjective and Objective Rightness.

An action chosen and performed by an individual is right, if it brings about what is really good. A right action is always chosen and voluntarily performed by an individual, and it tends to bring about what is really good so far as we know. In judging whether an action is right, we think primarily of the end to be realised by the action, rather than of the attitude of the individual in choosing it. The individual choosing the action may have an imperfect knowledge of the content of the good which he seeks to realise by it. Hence the question arises whether what is known to be good by an individual is really good, *i. e.*, is known to be good by others also at the same time. We regard those actions as right which are generally known by persons at the time to be conductive to the realisation of the good. Hence sometimes a distinction is drawn between what is subjectively right and what is objectively right.

Subjective rightness is determined by personal conviction. Objective rightness is determined by actual moral consequences. Subjective rightness depends upon the knowledge and attitude of the person who chooses the right action. Objective rightness depends upon the real good that is brought about by the right action. What appears right to the individual who is acting is said to be subjectively right. What actually tends to bring about the good is said to be objectively right. The individual may have an imperfect knowledge of what will bring about the good or of the content of the good. So he may not be sure whether what appears to him right is also objectively right. It is extremely difficult for him to decide whether the action

which appears right to him is the best that could be chosen from the point of view of the universe.

"Rightness is never wholly subjective: it is not a matter of mere arbitrary opinion or conviction; it is the revelation in consciousness of the superior moral worth of one of two competing impulses. But for the presence of moral quality, there would be no moral estimate; and superior moral worth always carries with it authority or command, which is objective and not merely subjective. And 'objective rightness' is also misleading. There is no rightness in an act *per se* or its result, apart from the motive of the agent" (A. C. Mitra: *Elements of Morals*, p. 105). Morality is not concerned with purely objective rightness apart from the motive of a person or unrelated to a person's choice. Morality is concerned with rightness as chosen by a person with the conviction that it will really bring about the good. So rightness is neither purely subjective nor purely objective. If there is any entirely objective rightness, it is the subject-matter of Metaphysics, and not of Ethics.

Some hold that what is subjectively right is always objectively right. Others hold that all actions are subjectively right. Others hold that all actions are objectively right.

16. Is the Subjectively Right always Objectively Right?

Green holds that the good or evil in the motive is exactly measured by the good or evil in its consequences. Thus, what is subjectively right is always objectively right. Mackenzie rightly points out that this statement is almost tautological. "It may be said that the motive of an action means the consequences that are directly aimed at in it; and that it is only these consequences that can properly be said to be brought about by it" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 229). But sometimes there is a disharmony between motives and consequences. The motive may be good, but the consequence happens to be bad. Or, the motive may be bad, but the consequence happens to be good. Green would urge that a consequence which is not directly aimed at in the motive should

not be regarded as proper consequence. But it would be taking a very narrow view of consequence. It is, indeed, true that the opposition between the subjectively right and the objectively right is not as great as is often imagined. But still there is some distinction between them. Kant rightly says that very often the best motives are frustrated by the provisions of a step-motherly nature. So what is subjectively right is not always objectively right.

17. Are all Actions Subjectively Right ?

Socrates holds that no person willingly chooses the evil ; every person always chooses what appears good to him at the time. According to him, all actions are subjectively right : no actions are subjectively wrong.

This view seems to be an exaggeration. It is a common fact of experience that sometimes we know what is right, but choose and do what is wrong. Socrates would urge that at the moment when we choose what is wrong, we are under a temporary illusion that it is right and will bring about the good. But this is wrong. Socrates wrongly holds that the essence of virtue consists in knowledge. Aristotle rightly points out that the essence of virtue consists in habit. In fact, virtue consists in knowledge and habit both. We should have an insight into what is right under certain circumstances, and cultivate the habit of doing it. Very often we know definitely what is right, but owing to the infirmity of the will or the strength of a passion do what is wrong. Therefore, it is wrong to hold that all actions are subjectively right.

Mackenzie rightly observes, "To think of a thing as right is to view it, not merely from our individual point of view, but from a point of view that at least aims at being universal. We could not call a thing even subjectively right unless there is at least a genuine effort to reach such a universal standpoint" (*Ibid*, p. 230). Thus, when I choose what appears right to me, I try to make sure that what appears right to me appears right

also to others—that it is not only right from my purely individual point of view but also from the universal point of view. Therefore we cannot hold that all actions are subjectively right.

But morality may be said to be essentially subjective in the sense that it has meaning only with reference to the choice of a person. "Apart from mental determinations, morality loses its import: mere objective processes or their results are as devoid of moral significance as the passage of a meteor in the sky or the conversion of a desert into a fertile tract by earthquake" (*Elements of Morals*, pp. 105-106). Morality cannot be said to be entirely objective.

18. Are all Actions Objectively Right ?

Pantheism holds that God is the only reality, and the human souls and the world are the modes or appearances of God; every physical event in the world and every action of man is a mode of the divine substance ; it follows necessarily from the nature of God. Therefore, every action is objectively right ; all things work for good. This is an optimistic view of the world. Good alone is real, and evil is an appearance.

We cannot adopt this standpoint from the moral point of view. This view leads to the subversion of morality. Morality postulates human freedom and the reality of evil. It presupposes a real distinction between good and evil, right and wrong. It assumes that man has freedom of the will to fight out evil of the world and make it better and better. Man has personality. The human self is not a mode of the Divine Self. Therefore, all actions of men cannot be said to be objectively right. The objectively right, from the ethical point of view, should be taken to mean what leads to the realisation of the good so far as human knowledge enables us to judge. The distinction between subjective rightness and objective rightness is not absolute.

CHAPTER VII

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1. The Evolution of Conduct : Development of Moral Consciousness.

Mackenzie gives a beautiful sketch of the development of moral consciousness among mankind. Conduct of man undergoes a process of development in the individual and in the race. Man acquires the power of reflection slowly in course of intercourse with society. Reason is a product of social intercourse. Man first lives as a member of a group. His actions are governed by imitation and suggestion. He unconsciously imbibes the modes of others' behaviour. He unconsciously imitates the customs and manners, the language and religion of the group. His conduct is influenced by the praise and blame of the group. He accepts the group code of morality without criticism. He accepts custom as the standard of morality. He lives first at the stage of group morality. Gradually he passes to the higher stage of personal morality.

Animals are conscious but not self-conscious. They are creatures of instincts. They are led instinctively to their ends. They are not clearly conscious of their ends. But their instinctive actions are moulded by experience. Sometimes the young animals imitate the actions of the old ones. Especially the gregarious animals, who live in groups, imitate the actions of leaders. In this manner certain habitual forms of activity grow up. Animals are devoid of reason and moral consciousness.

Savages have moral consciousness only in germ. Their actions are impulsive. They are not guided by forethought and regard for consequences. But they are not capricious. The savage is a member of a tribe. There are customs and group ways of behaviour. They unconsciously mould his conduct. The savage also consciously imitates the actions of others in the group to

avoid censure. Suggestion and imitation play a large part in the conduct of savages.

The people, at first, lived in groups. Their conduct was governed by custom. Custom is the group code of morality. It is not only the group way of behaviour. It is also approved by the group. .Group morality is governed by custom. Customary morality precedes reflective morality. Group morality precedes personal morality.

Gradually custom is enforced, and becomes a positive law. Customary observances are made more definite. They are turned into positive laws. Their violation is severely punished. When customs are made into positive laws, a distinction is made between essential and unessential customs, and only the former, which are necessary for the existence and welfare of the group, are enforced.

When positive laws are made and enforced, reflection begins. Laws often come into conflict with one another and with customs. So men are led to reflect on the principles underlying the laws. The spirit of the law is preferred to the letter of the law. When people reflect upon the principles that underlie the rules, they pass beyond the stage of unreflective customary morality to the stage of reflective morality. Their actions are no longer governed by suggestion and imitation, but by moral ideas.

People live more by moral faith than by rational insight. The actions of even thoughtful persons are governed, to a large extent, by faith, and partly by well-thought-out moral principles. The moral ideas which regulate their conduct are partly formed by reflection, but mostly derived from the experience of the race. Even thoughtful persons cannot escape the influence of the *ethos* of the people. Their actions are moulded by the customs and manners, folk-ways and group codes of morality. Hence they also are under the influence of suggestion and imitation. But they gradually subject them to the law of reason,—the principles of morality.

Bosanquet makes a distinction between *moral ideas* and *ideas about morality*. A man may be guided by moral ideas though he is not clearly conscious of the moral principles involved in them. In such a case, he is guided by moral ideas which are unreflective. When he reflects upon morality, clearly defines an end, and consciously strives for the achievement of it, he is guided by ideas about morality. In such a case he is guided by an *Ethical Idea* or by an *Idea about Morality*. People are first guided by moral ideas imbibed from the society. Then they reflect upon them and are guided by the moral principles involved in them. First they are guided by moral ideas. Then they are guided by ethical ideas. Thus the distinction between moral ideas and ethical ideas is not ultimate. Mackenzie rightly observes, "Every *moral idea* is capable of reflective analysis, and may thus be said to imply an *ethical idea*, and, similarly, every ethical idea naturally becomes a source of moral ideas" (*Ibid*, p. 90).

Thus there is a gradual development of morality from group morality to personal morality. The moral life of a person develops from customary action, founded on suggestion and imitation, to the stage of personal morality based on reflection.

2. The Early Group Life.

Man is a gregarious animal. Men always live in groups. The primitive groups were kinship and family groups. The members of a kinship group are descended from the common ancestor. One blood runs in their veins. Sometimes they are not real descendants of one ancestor. But they regard themselves as of one stock. Sometimes they regard their common ancestor as an animal or a god.

The members of a kinship group feel that they are members of a group, rather than individuals. They have common interests, common welfare, and common danger. They are inseparable members of their groups. Their lives are indis-

solubly linked with one another. Their actions are governed by the group code of conduct.

There are two kinds of families. In the maternal family the mother remains among her own kin, and the children are regarded as belonging to the mother's kin. The husband and father are regarded more or less as guests or outsiders. In the paternal family the wife leaves her kinsmen to live in the husband's family and among his kin. In the paternal family clan and household ties strengthen each other.

In these family and kinship groups every person feels that he is a member of some family group, and shares the group sympathy and group tradition. And he thinks, feels, and acts accordingly. In this way he comes to have sympathy, fellow-feeling and co-operation.

The kinship and family groups are also economic groups. Land belongs to the group. It does not belong to any member of it. Individual ownership is not recognized. The group possesses land. There is group ownership.

The movable goods are partly possessed by the individual, and partly by the group. When tools, weapons, etc., are the product of the individual's own skill or strength, they belong to him. But when something is acquired by the group, it belongs to it. A large game hunted by the group belongs to it.

The kinship and family groups are political groups. In early group life there is a family which is itself a sort of political State, though there may be no political body over and above the clan or family. In primitive times many families form a clan. This primitive group is after all a State, not a mere family; for it is more or less a permanently organised body; it exercises control over its members who look upon it as a rightful authority; it is not limited by any higher authority and acts for the welfare of the whole group. Legal rights of individuals are largely due to membership of a group.

The kinship groups are also religious groups. Each group

has a common religion. Kinship with unseen powers or persons is the essence of the religion. Fear of dreadful spirits is not the essence of this religion. But kinship with kindred spirits, who are not dreaded but revered and loved, is the essential feature of the group religion. The kinship group as a religious unit simply extends the kin to include invisible as well visible powers. The kinship makes gods and worshippers members of one group. They become kindred to one another.

The kinship groups, which are also economic, political, and religious units, are governed by group codes of morality rather than by individual conscience. Their actions are regulated by custom and habit rather than by reason and will. The group codes of morality are set by a group, and are enforced by it. Conduct is praised or blamed, rewarded or punished by the group. Property belongs to the group. Industry is carried on by the group. Wars and feuds are prosecuted for the common good. The individual acts as a member of the group. He shares common interests, common emotions, and common actions. Thus he develops sympathy, co-operation, and self-control, and acquires a conception of the common good. These are the germs of moral consciousness in early group life.

3. Biological factors in the evolution of Moral Consciousness.

Morality implies self-control and co-operation. Self-control means regulation of impulses by reason and will. This presupposes the development of intelligence. Co-operation means getting on well with our fellow-men in the community. Intelligence and corporate life are necessary factors in choosing and doing what is right. Certain biological factors are operative in the development of intelligence, self-control, sympathy and co-operation. Certain rationalizing agencies actively promote the development of reason and intelligence. Certain socializing agencies further the development of sympathy and co-operation.

These agencies are responsible for the development of moral consciousness.

The most important biological factor is the prolonged period of human infancy. Many young insects shift for themselves almost after birth. Young birds are taken care of by the parents for a brief period, then leave the nest, find food, and protect themselves. But the human infant has to be taken care of for a long period by the parents.

During this period of infancy and childhood children learn chiefly from mothers, the language, the ways of behaviour, the customs and manners, the codes of morality, and the religion of the group. They unconsciously imbibe the group ways of behaviour, and also consciously imitate them. Their actions are influenced by suggestion and imitation. They feel the affections of the parents, and develop their own emotional life in response. They learn sympathy, fellow-feeling, love and co-operation in the family.

Care of children enlarges the affection of the parents, teaches them prudence and self-sacrifice, fore-thought and self-control.

But children do not remain children for a long time. They learn to get a living, to make tools, to protect themselves. Some of these activities are considered here under rationalizing and socializing agencies.

4. Rationalizing factors in the growth of moral consciousness.

The rationalizing agencies develop the intelligence of men and women. Earlier forms of occupation, hunting and fishing, require quickness of perception, alertness of mind and body, fore-thought and preparation. Thus they call forth active intelligence. Later, with the beginning of agriculture and commerce, success depends upon foresight and steadfastness of purpose, self-control and prudence. Control of impulses by reason is the condition of success.

The division of labour increases the range of mental life and furthers the development of intelligence. Different individuals take up different kinds of work. Women do the house-keeping and work near the dwelling. Men go about hunting and fishing, tending the flocks and tilling the soil. Different individuals and classes are engaged in different occupations, and apply their intelligence to them and acquire different kinds of skill.

Arts and crafts also tend to develop intelligence, and indirectly help the power of self-control. The products of arts and crafts presuppose designs, adaptation of materials to them and the power of overcoming obstacles. They are visible embodiments of form and order. The textiles, pottery, wooden and metallic works, tools and weapons, huts and houses are products of intelligence and workmanship. They develop intelligence and motor skill. They indirectly help self-control, because in them intractable materials such as stone or wood or metals are subjected to a preconceived plan or form, while in morality impulses are subjected to the law of reason.

A child explores and manipulates things. He looks, listens, handles, and thus acquires knowledge of things. He acts upon them and thus acquires control over them. He meets obstacles, thinks of the novel situations, and tries to master them. All new problems call for thinking. Thus intelligence is developed. Thinking is necessary for the control of impulses by reason. Fore-thought, prudence, and wisdom are indispensable for self-control. And these are acquired by a child in course of experience of things and persons.

Thus earlier forms of occupation, hunting and fishing, agriculture and commerce, the division of labour, and arts and crafts, tend to develop intelligence. The experience of the child by exploration and manipulation of things also develops his power of thinking. These are the rationalizing agencies.

5. Socializing factors in the growth of moral Consciousness.

Besides the biological and rationalizing agencies, there are certain socializing agencies which fit men and women to live in society in harmony. Language is both a rationalizing and socializing agency. Language is the expression of thought, and also evokes and stimulates thought. Thinking or reason is a product of social intercourse. The child is not born with the power of thinking. It is acquired by the child in course of social intercourse. And social intercourse is carried on through language. Language is the means of communication of thoughts, feelings and emotions. It develops the individual's power of sharing other's ideas and emotions. It furthers sympathy fellow-feeling, and co-operation. It is a great socializing agency.

Corporate life depends on co-operation. Industry, art, and war require co-operation. They also are great rationalizing and socializing agencies. Mutual aid or co-operation is the foundation of success. Those clans or tribes can thrive, which can work together. They are stronger than those who fail to work in harmony. The tribes which work in co-operation can successfully struggle against nature and enemy. Co-operation implies a common end. This common end must be sought by all members of the tribe. They must have sympathy or community of interests. Thus co-operation is a great socializing agency.

In primitive life there was much concerted work in fishing and hunting, tending cattle, and growing crops. In the hunting stage large games were hunted by many persons together, and shared by them equally. In the pastoral stage the protection of flocks of sheep, and herds of cattle from the attacks of wild beasts and human robbers required some sort of co-operation and concerted action. In the agricultural stage also co-operation among the members of a tribe was necessary for the growing of crops and protection of them against attacks by men and beasts. Thus earlier occupations required co-operation as a condition of success. War and the blood feud also were great

socializing agencies. They were powerful, uniting factors within the several groups. The tribal blood had been shed, or the women of a tribe had been insulted. So the tribe as a whole must take revenge on the offending tribe. The resentment of the tribe was "sympathetic resentment". The action of the tribe was concerted action. The group was more closely knit together in a blood feud against another tribe. Thus war was a great socializing agency.

The activities of art also foster sympathy and co-operation. The hunting dance, the war dance, and songs in chorus effected emotional contagion, cemented unity among the members of the group, and ensured concerted action. There is a unity of rhythm in dance and songs. It is a great unifying force. The recital of the history of the tribe, in rhythmic dance and songs, thrills the group with pride, and strengthens the group. Thus art also is a great socializing agency.

The biological agencies lay the foundation of morality. The rationalizing agencies further the growth of intelligence. The socializing agencies promote sympathy and co-operation. These agencies make for morality. They give the germs of morality. Intelligence, sympathy, co-operation and self-control are the pre-requisites of morality.

6. Custom as the Standard of Group Morality.

In early group life custom is the standard of morality. Custom consists in group ways of acting. Folkways constitute custom. Customary conduct is largely instinctive. It is unconscious imitation of others' behaviour. But it is partly reflective. The members of a group behave according to custom which is approved by the group. "There are approved ways of acting, common to a group, and handed down from generation to generation. Such approved ways of doing and acting are customs. They are habits—but they are more. They imply the judgment of the group that they are to be followed. The welfare of the group is regarded as in some sense imbedded in

them" (Dewey & Tufts : *Ethics*, p. 45). If any one violates them, he is punished.

The old men, the old women, the priests, and the chiefs are the custodians of these customs. They train the young to observe them. They punish those who violate them. They modify details of customary observances or add new customs. But the group as a whole, including living as well as dead members and the kindred ancestral gods, is the custodian of customs. Thus customs acquire superhuman authority.

The origin of customs is to be sought in several factors. In the first place, every member of a group is intimately connected with other members of the group, and with the group as a whole. They have to act on the principle of give and take. In a family father, mother and children have their special parts in earning livelihood. They have their rights and duties. When the group goes fishing or hunting, every man has his place and part. He has a right to the fruit of his labour. He has a duty to do his part well. A man makes a gift to his chief and gets some favour in return. A man gives a present to another, and he expects some present in return. These group ways of acting, which become regular and fixed, are turned into customs.

In the second place, some group ways of action succeed, and others fail. Men connect successful actions with good luck, and unsuccessful actions with bad luck. They approve the former and condemn the latter. Successful ways are approved and repeated, and turned into customs. Unsuccessful ways are condemned and discarded. The former are regarded as lucky, while the latter are regarded as unlucky. Both good and bad luck are ascribed to the unseen powers. They are not ascribed to mere chance. The conception of group welfare makes individual conformity a matter of group concern at this stage.

In the third place, individuals react to certain ways of

acting immediately. They applaud an act of daring, whether useful or not. Thus individual opinions about certain actions mould custom. Individual opinions and social tradition both give rise to custom.

Dewey and Tufts mention the following means of enforcing customs :—

Public approval and disapproval, praise of some actions and blame of others, are the means of enforcing customs. The public praise is emphasized by songs, dance, decorations, and the like. The public contempt is expressed in ridicule, calumny, boycott, ex-communication, and the like.

Taboos are not a means of enforcing customs. But they are themselves customs invested with peculiar sanctity. They ban any contact with certain persons or objects under penalty of danger from unseen powers. Any events connected with birth and death and supposed to be due to the activity of spirits are sanctified by taboos. A new-born baby should not be touched. A dead body should not be touched. A priest, a deity, or an altar should not be touched. The taboos are based on dread of the unseen powers.

But sometimes they are used with conscious purpose. In order to have adequate supply of ripe cocoanuts the head men may place taboo upon green cocoanuts to prevent them from being consumed before they are quite ripe. Taboo is a powerful agency to compel respect for the authority of the group.

Ritual is a means of enforcing customs. Taboo is the great negative guardian of customs. It prohibits certain actions. Ritual is the great positive agent. It helps the members of a group to form certain habits. They perform a certain act or ritual in association with one another, unconsciously and consciously imitating one another, and sharing the emotions of one another. They are aided in this corporate action by the charm of music, orderly procession, rhythm of movement, and the awe of mystery, which contribute to stamp in the meaning and value of

the action. Public praise encourages an action. Public condemnation inhibits an action. Taboo prohibits an action under penalty of danger from unseen powers. Ritual secures the actual performance of an action and gives a value to it.

Physical force is the surest means of enforcing customs. When neither group opinion, nor taboo, nor ritual secures conformity, physical force ensures it. The chiefs are strong men whose commands must be obeyed. The individual who dares violate a custom is coerced by the chief or the elders into submission. But physical coercion is not the rule but the exception. In primitive groups the majority support the authority of the group. Where there is a clash among different clans, the blood feud is the accepted method of enforcing custom. Thus public approval, taboo, ritual, and physical force are the means of enforcing customs.

Customary morality has merits as well as defects. Customs furnish the germs of morality. They embody vague conceptions of 'right', 'good', and 'virtue'. In so far as they are based on recognition of mutual interdependence of the members of a group, they are setting standards of 'right' behaviour. In so far as they are based on rational conceptions of group welfare, they are pointing out what should be regarded as 'good'. In so far as they furnish approvals and disapprovals by the group, they are laying the foundation of the conception of 'virtue'.

Customary morality fosters sympathy and co-operation, encourges concerted action, and discourages selfishness and isolation. It makes for peace and harmony, strength and solidarity, fellowship and security.

But customary morality is not without defects. The moral standards of custom are only partly rational. Many customs are irrational ; some are injurious. Customs are partly rational ; they contribute to the welfare of the group. They are partly irrational ; they emphasize the inessential and

ignore the essential. But morality requires men to estimate the value of acts correctly. It requires them to distinguish the essential from the inessential, the spirit from the letter. It gradually liberates men from the burden of trivial customary observances, and helps them to form habits of obedience to the moral principles underlying them. Moreover, customs come into conflict with one another. Old customs are discarded because they become obsolete and useless ; new customs are formed because they are supposed to have social utility. Some customs are thought to be injurious to the group by certain individuals wielding authority. They are looked upon with disfavour and gradually given up. Thus customary morality cannot satisfy the demands of human nature for a long time. It inevitably and imperceptibly gives the way to reflective and personal morality.

Customary morality makes use of two main motives, fear in avoiding taboos and resentment in blood feuds. This fear is rooted in ignorance, and resentment is opposed to fellow-feeling which ought to prevail between man and man. Resentment in the primitive groups is a sympathetic resentment. An individual feels resentment in sympathy with the group. Besides fear and resentment, filial and parental affection, affection of husband and wife, respect for the aged, and loyalty to fellow clansmen are fostered by the primitive group. But reverence for duty or respect for the Moral Law can never be the motive of customary morality. It requires a growth in individuality, a power of reflection, and a definite conception of the supreme Good. Individuality grows out of conflicts and collisions between authority and liberty.

"In the organization of stable character the morality of custom is strong on one side. The group trains its members to act in the ways it approves and afterwards holds them by all the agencies in its power. It forms habits and enforces them. Its weakness is that the element of habit is so large, that of freedom

so small. It holds up the average man ; in holds back the man who might forge ahead. It is an anchor, and a drag" (*Ibid*, p. 64).

7. Transition from Group Morality to Personal Morality.

Group morality is customary morality. It sets up custom as the standard of morality. Custom is the group ways of acting. It is constituted by folkways. Customary morality is corporate rather than personal. It does not involve conscious choice and rational conception of the good on the part of the individual, though it does involve some vague notion of group welfare and public approval and disapproval of certain acts. Customary morality is not personal morality. It does not involve the individual's conscious pursuit of the good as the personal good. It depends upon habit and unconscious or conscious imitation. It depends upon social pressure to maintain social order. It does not allow the individual's initiative and personal moral progress. It inhibits reflective and personal morality. It is unreflective group morality.

Moral progress inevitably demands transition from group morality to personal morality. It demands transition from unreflective morality to reflective morality. "Advance must (1) substitute some rational method of setting up standards and forming values, in place of habitual passive acceptance ; (2) secure voluntary and personal choice and interest, instead of unconscious identification with the group welfare, or instinctive and habitual response to group needs ; (3) encourage at the same time individual development and the demand that all shall share in this development—the worth and happiness of the person and of every person."

"Such an advance brings to consciousness two collisions. The oppositions were there before, but they were not felt as oppositions. So long as the man was fully with his group, or satisfied with the custom, he would make no revolt. When

the movement begins the collisions are felt. These collisions are :

(1) The collision between the authority and interests of the group, and the independence and private interests of the individual.

(2) The collision between order and progress, between habit and reconstruction or reformation" (*Ibid*, p.p. 66-67).

The social and the individual both are rooted in human nature. The individual unconsciously identifies himself with the group, shares in the common emotion, and acts in habitual obedience to custom. And yet he has self-assertive impulses and desires, and revolts against the group and asserts his independence. Thus the collision between the group authority and the individual's independence, and the collision between social order and the individual's progress bring about profound changes in morality, and prepare the way for reflective personal morality.

The transition from group morality to personal morality is promoted by certain sociological agencies and psychological agencies. The sociological agencies are the following :—

Economic forces brought about a disruption of the group or joint family among many peoples. The clan flourished in primitive times so long as it adopted hunting and simple agriculture as avocations. But with the advance of agriculture and the introduction of industry and commerce the joint family broke up and a certain amount of individualism appeared, because the advantage for the individual lay in private ownership. The farmer had to work hard and would not share the fruits of his labour with the lazy. Industry called forth intelligence and promoted skill. The intelligent and the skilful would not share the fruits of their special skill with the dull and the unskilled. Commerce also demanded and promoted individual shrewdness. The shrewd would not share the fruits of their keen insight with the unbusinesslike. In this way the individual revolted against the group and asserted his rights.

The progress of science and arts tend to disintegrate group morality and make for personal morality. The customs of one people conflict with those of another people. Hence rational persons think of the reasons underlying the differences. They find the essential factors from the accidental factors and seek to eliminate the latter. They condemn and discard many taboos and rituals because of their increasing knowledge of the causes of natural events, such as disease and death, rich harvest and failure of crops, hurricanes and floods. The progress of science increases knowledge and introduces rationality into morality.

Various industrial and fine arts also tend to disintegrate group morality and promote personal morality. They flourish with great division of labour. They thrive on individual workmanship. Craftsmen and artists develop greater and greater individuality as they go on acquiring greater and greater skill in their crafts and arts. They are not satisfied with the valuation of the group. They set up their own standards of valuation. They want their own good in their own way. Thus arts and crafts make for personal morality.

The kinship group has to fight with rival groups. It must have a higher organisation in order to fight successfully. Organization implies authority. A strong leader asserts his authority and compels obedience of the group. He gets an opportunity to assert himself in war. Very often the tyrant uses the whole machinery of society for his own advantage. Still his centralised authority breaks custom and group unity for all. Thus centralised authority of a king or a tyrant makes for personal morality.

A new religion also disintegrates group morality and contributes to personal morality. Religion is closely bound up with morality. New religion brings in new conception of morality. Judaism emphasized outward conformity to external law. Christianity emphasized purity of inner motives and intentions. The collision between old and new compels people to think for

themselves the merits and defects of both. Conflicts among religions lead to reflection on their claims. Thus religion is a potent force in introducing personal morality.

The psychological agencies in the transition from group morality to personal morality are the following four tendencies towards self-assertion :—

The sex instinct brings the sexes together and lays the foundation for the family. The sex is a great socializing agency. Yet it constantly revolts against the restrictions put upon it by the social group. The individual asserts himself and chooses his helpmate according to his desire. The sex instinct sometimes revolts against social, legal and religious sanctions. Thus it is an individualizing agency.

Desire for private property breaks group morality and introduces personal moralily. In the hunting stage, big games were hunted by the group and shared alike by the members ; small games were hunted by individuals and belonged to them. In the early agricultural stage, the land was cultivated by the group, and the crops were shared alike by the group. But with the advance of agriculture, the industrious and provident did not like to share the fruits of their labour with the lazy and improvident. With the growth of industry and commerce, the individual acquired special skill and workmanship and power of bargaining, and did not like to share the fruits of their industry with the unskilled and unwise. In this way private property became an established institution.

Struggles for liberty and mastery throw out strong individuals. They assert their views, impose them on their followers, and compel them to act upon their directions for their welfare. These struggles may be for economic freedom or intellectual liberty—freedom of thought and speech. They undermine authority of the group and foster personal reflection and intellectual criticism of group standards. Thus they promote rationalism and individualism.

Desire for honour and social esteem promotes the development of the individual. He thinks of his motives and actions, and tries to live an honest and upright life. He forms for himself an ideal standard. He seeks public approval and admiration. Thus desire for social recognition is a potent factor in promoting personal morality.

Thus the sociological agencies such as economic forces, progress of science and arts, higher organisation under central authority, a new departure in religion, and the psychological agencies such as the sex impulse, the desire for private property, struggles for mastery or liberty, and the desire for social esteem break group morality and usher in personal morality (*Ibid*, pp. 66-81).

8. Transition from Custom to Conscience.

Custom is the standard of group morality. Custom conflicts with custom. So reflection begins, and separates the essential from the inessential elements. Sometimes essential customs are enforced as positive laws. Individuals are compelled to obey these external laws. But laws also conflict with one another. These conflicts force the individual to reflect on the fundamental moral principles underlying the conflicting external laws. Gradually the individual deduces the moral principles from one supreme Moral Law of Conscience and regards it as the standard of morality. Thus the individual passes from group morality to personal morality, from custom to conscience, from external view of morality to internal view of morality.

CHAPTER VIII

External Law as the Moral Standard

1. Three Stages in Reflective Analysis.

Muirhead speaks of three stages in the evolution of moral consciousness. At first, the conduct of the individual and the nation is determined, to a large extent, by external laws. This is the unreflective stage of mankind. At a later period, when the power of reflection is developed the external laws are replaced by the internal law of conscience. At this reflective stage the individual becomes comparatively free from bondage to an external authority and is guided by the internal law of his conscience. At a later stage the two forms of 'legal' morality are considered to be inadequate, and are replaced by a new conception of the moral standard, whereby the law is seen to be subservient to an end which is regarded as intrinsically desirable.

There are two types of Ethics, *viz.*, Legal or Jural Ethics, and Teleological Ethics. The former lays stress on the conception of right or the moral law ; the latter, on that of good or some end of the self. 'Right' is connected with Latin *rectus* meaning 'straight' or 'according to rule'. 'Good' is connected with German *gut* meaning serviceable or valuable for an end.

2. Different theories of the Moral Standard.

There are different theories as regards the question of the ultimate moral standard. The moral theories may mainly be divided into legal or juristic theories and teleological theories. According to the legal theories, a law, either external or internal, is the ultimate moral standard. According to the teleological theories, some end or good of the self is the ultimate moral standard. The teleological theories may be of different

types according as the conceptions of the self differ. Hedonism regards pleasure or gratification of the sensuous self as the ultimate moral standard. Rationalism or Rigorism regards the realisation of the purely rational self by suppressing the sensuous self as the ultimate moral standard. Perfectionism or Eudæmonism regards the perfection of the self or realisation of the complete or total self by regulating the sensuous impulses and desires with the help of reason as the ultimate moral standard.

3. External Law as the Moral Standard.

According to some, External Law or command is the ultimate moral standard. An action is not right or wrong in itself. It is made right or wrong by an external command or the will of some higher power. An action is called right if it agrees with the law. It is called wrong if it violates the law. No action is intrinsically or inherently right or wrong. The External Law which determines the rightness or wrongness of an action may be either the law of the society, or the law of the state, or the law of God. In any case, the external law is a command imposed upon us by a superior power and enforced by it through a system of punishment and sometimes through promises of reward.

But morality which is imposed upon us from without or constrained morality is no morality at all. Freedom of the will is the fundamental postulate of morality. An external command of a superior power creates a *must* or physical compulsion, but never an *ought* or moral obligation.

The external law is always enforced by promises of reward and threats of punishment. But if hope of reward and fear of punishment are the motive forces of morality, morality is reduced to self-interest, virtue to prudence. If an action is done under threats of punishment or in the hope of reward, it cannot have any positive moral merit. Constrained morality is no morality at all. Morality for the achievement of a selfish motive ceases to be morality.

The moral standard, according to this theory, is an external law or command which is arbitrary. But the true moral standard cannot be arbitrary. It must be rational; it must commend itself to reason. It should be the rational end of the self.

Laws in themselves are meaningless. They are means to higher ends which are realised by them. Thus the higher ends served by external laws rather than the laws themselves, should be regarded as the ultimate standard of morality.

4. (A) The Law of the Tribe.

In primitive times people lived in a tribe, and the command of the chief of the tribe was obligatory on all its members. It was a moral law to them. The law of the tribe was considered as the moral law.

But the command of the tribal chief is soon felt not to be categorical or unconditional. Sometimes the chief of the tribe gives commands which conflict with one another. They are felt to be inadequate to the reflective consciousness which demands something more consistent. They are of the nature of *must*, rather than an *ought*. The free spirit of man revolts against such coercion.

5. (B) The Law of the Society.

According to some thinkers, the law or command of the society is the standard of right and wrong. An action is right if it conforms to the social law. It is wrong if it violates the social law. 'Right' is what is commanded by the society. 'Wrong' is what is forbidden by the society. Thus the opinions, customs and manners of the society constitute the ultimate standard of morality. The laws of the society are enforced by public sentiments of approval and disapproval; boycott and excommunication are the extreme penalties inflicted by the society upon an individual. "Morality is an institution of Society, maintained by the authority and punishments of Society." "A moral act is an act prescribed by the social

authority, and rendered obligatory upon every citizen. Its morality is constituted by its authoritative prescription, and not by fulfilling the primary ends of the social institution" (*Bain*).

But social laws are not uniform ; they are variable ; they change from age to age. Social laws which are praised in one age are condemned in another age. Social laws differ in different societies. Hence they cannot be regarded as the ultimate moral standard which must be uniform. Social laws sometimes come into conflict with one another. Therefore they cannot supply the moral standard which is uniform and consistent.

The manners and customs of the society are made objects of moral criticism. Some of them are regarded as moral and others as immoral by reference to a higher standard of morality. Thus what is customary is not necessarily moral.

The society cannot take cognizance of all our overt actions,—not to speak of our inner motives and intentions. But all conduct as expressing inner motives and intentions is the object of moral judgment.

The general criticism of the External Law as the moral standard equally holds good against the social law as the moral standard.

6. (C) The Law of the State.

Hobbes, Bain, and others hold that the law or command of the State or Political Law is the standard of right and wrong. The State enacts laws and enforces them on the people by threats of punishment. What is commanded by the State is right, and what is forbidden by it is wrong. "The Civil Law alone is the Supreme Court of appeal in all cases of right and wrong" (*Hobbes*). "Morality is in every respect analogous to Civil Government, or the Law of the Land. Nay, further, it squares, to a very great extent, with Political Authority" (*Bain*). Morality consists in obedience to the laws of the State.

But political laws are means to an end, *viz.*, welfare of the people. Therefore they cannot constitute the ultimate moral standard.

Political laws are variable ; they differ in different countries, or, in the same country in different times. These variable laws can never constitute the ultimate moral standard which must be uniform and consistent.

Political laws cannot be formulated to cover all possible circumstances. They can govern, after all, only a fraction of our conduct. They cannot take cognizance of all our overt actions. They cannot touch the fringe of our mental life. They cannot probe into our motives and intentions which are objects of moral judgment.

Political laws are made objects of moral judgment. Some of them are regarded as moral, and others as immoral. So they must yield to a higher end which may better be regarded as the ultimate moral standard.

The general criticism of the External Law as the moral standard equally holds good against the political law as the moral standard.

7. (D) The Law of God.

Descartes, Locke, Paley and others hold that the Divine Law is the ultimate moral standard. Whatever is commanded by God is right, and whatever is forbidden by God is wrong. The absolute will of God is the standard of morality. The distinction between right and wrong depends upon the arbitrary will of God. He does not command what is right, because it is right. He does not forbid what is wrong because it is wrong. He can convert right into wrong, wrong into right. God communicates His will to the inspired seers or prophets who record their revelations in the scriptures. Others know the will of God through the scriptures.

Descartes regards God as the creator of all truths—mathematical, logical, and moral. The distinction between right and

wrong depends upon his arbitrary will. Locke says, "The true ground of morality can only be the will and law of God."

This theory makes God an arbitrary power above the distinction of right and wrong, good and evil, and hence makes him morally blank and colourless. But, in truth, God is the eternal embodiment of moral perfection. Righteousness constitutes His essential nature. It is not true that whatever is commanded by God is right, but that what is right is, for that reason, commanded by God ; rightness flows from the very nature of God, which is essentially moral. What is right is in harmony with the divine nature ; what is wrong is repugnant to it. The distinction of right and wrong does not depend on the arbitrary will of God but on His eternal and immutable nature. Descartes also speaks of divine perfection. Locke also speaks of goodness and wisdom of God.

To obey a moral law because it is a command of God is to show prudence but not virtue. Hope of reward in heaven and fear of punishment in hell become motives of morality. Hence morality becomes prudence.

We shall consider the Internal Law of conscience as the moral standard later in connection with Intuitionism and Kant's doctrine of Rationalism.

CHAPTER IX

HEDONISM

1. Hedonism.

According to Hedonism, *hedone* or pleasure is the ultimate standard of morality. It is the highest good. It is the supreme end of life. It is based on two assumptions,—a metaphysical assumption and a psychological assumption.

Hedonism is based upon the metaphysical assumption that the self is purely sensuous in nature. It is a series of sensa-

tions, feelings, appetites, and instincts. We have reason, no doubt; but it is not supreme in human nature; it is a mere hand-maid of passion. According to most Hedonists, reason simply points out the best means for the realisation of the ends of passions. Hume regards reason as a hand-maid of passion. Gratification of the lower self is the supreme good according to Hedonism.

Many Hedonists (*e. g.*, Bentham, J. S. Mill and others) assume that we naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain. Desire is primarily directed towards pleasure. We desire pleasure as the ultimate end. We desire everything else as a means to pleasure. Pleasure is the normal object of desire.

2. Psychological Hedonism and Ethical Hedonism.

Hedonism assumes many forms. It may be either psychological or ethical. Psychological Hedonism holds that pleasure is the natural and normal object of desire; we always seek pleasure and avoid pain. Ethical Hedonism holds that pleasure is the proper object of desire; we do not always seek pleasure but ought to seek pleasure. According to the former, we *do* seek pleasure. According to the latter, we *ought* to seek pleasure. One is a statement of an actual fact. The other is a statement of an ideal or end.

3. Psychological Hedonism.

It is the theory that the ultimate object of desire is pleasure. Pleasure is the natural end and motive of human action. We always seek pleasure and avoid pain. Everyone desires what he thinks will be pleasurable, and for the sake of pleasure which he expects that it will give him. Things are desired not for their own sake, but only for the sake of pleasure they will give us. Pleasure is the natural object of desire.

Cyrenaics were the advocates of this view. Bentham and J. S. Mill are also the advocates of this theory. Bentham says, "Nature has placed man under the empire of pleasure and pain. His only object is to seek pleasure and to shun pain.

The principle of utility subjects everything to these two motives." "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as what we shall do." Thus, according to Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only possible motives to action, the only ends at which we can aim.

Similarly, J. S. Mill says, "Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, rather two parts of the same phenomenon; to think of an object as desirable, and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility." From this J. S. Mill concludes that we always desire pleasure or that pleasure is the only object of our desire.

Psychological Hedonism is not sound. It is open to the following objections :—

This view is unpsychological in character. Pleasure is the result of the satisfaction of a desire which is directed to an object. Normally, we desire some object, and when the object is attained, pleasure follows as a consequence. But this feeling of pleasure is not sought beforehand. The psychological order of the mental processes is as follows :—(*a*) want, (*b*) desire of an object, (*c*) attainment of the object, (*d*) the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction. First of all, we have a feeling of want, *e. g.*, hunger; when hungry, we have the desire for food (object); when the food is taken or the object is attained, we have the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction. Thus when hungry we naturally desire food, and not the feeling of pleasure.

Rashdall rightly observes : "The fact that a thing is desired no doubt implies that the satisfaction of the desire will necessarily bring pleasure. There is undoubtedly pleasure in the satisfaction of all desire. But that is a very different thing

from asserting that the object is desired because it is thought of as pleasant, and in proportion as it is thought of as pleasant. The hedonistic psychology involves a *hysteron proteron*; it puts the cart before the horse. In reality the imagined pleasantness is created by the desire, and not the desire by the imagined pleasantness" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 15).

Seth likewise observes : "Hedonism rests upon a psychological confusion between the dynamical and the teleological aspects of choice. The choice of the Good, is, like all choices (including the choice of the bad), *pleasant*. In other words, the Good is pleasant. But it does not follow that it is *pleasure*" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 116).

Psychological Hedonism makes a confusion between the *idea of pleasure* and a *pleasant idea*. The idea of the object or end chosen must be pleasant. But it is not pleasure. Pleasure is the efficient cause of choice. But it is not the final cause of choice. A pleasant choice is not necessarily the choice of pleasure. The object of choice is always *pleasant*; but it is not necessarily *pleasure*. We desire an *object*; when the object is attained, the desire is fulfilled, and we get pleasure.

Wants prior to satisfaction.—This will be more clear from the fact that wants are always prior to satisfaction. Butler truly pointed out that many kinds of pleasures would not exist at all if they were not preceded by certain desires for objects. No one could possibly feel pleasures of benevolence, unless he first had benevolence or a desire for the welfare of others. Thus desire is directed towards something other than pleasure, *e. g.*, the welfare of others. "Pleasure ensues upon the satisfaction of certain wants, and the wants must be prior to the satisfaction" (*Mackenzie*). Thus at least there are some desires which are not desires for pleasure.

Ambiguity of the word 'pleasure'.—The word *pleasure* is ambiguous. It may mean (*a*) *agreeable feeling* or the feeling of satisfaction after the attainment of an object, or (*b*) the *object*

that gives pleasure or satisfaction. In the latter sense we speak of 'a pleasure' or 'pleasures' in the concrete. When we speak of '*pleasures* of the English prose', we mean objects which give us pleasure. But when we speak of *pleasure* in the abstract, we generally mean by it the *feeling* of pleasure or satisfaction which these objects bring with them.

Thus when it is said that what we desire is always a pleasure, it means that what we desire is always some object, the attainment of which is accompanied by an agreeable feeling. We desire objects, the attainment of which gives us pleasure. It is true that we desire objects ; but it is not true that we desire pleasure. "The fact that we desire *pleasures* (objects) is no evidence that we desire *pleasure* (feeling)" (*Mackenzie*).

The word '*please*' sometimes means '*choose*'. The word '*pleasure*' likewise means '*choice*'. 'Do as you *please*' means 'Do as you *choose*'. 'Do according to your *pleasure*' means 'Do according to your *choice*'. In this sense, 'we always choose *pleasure*' means 'we always choose *choice*'. This is tautologous and meaningless.

Paradox of Hedonism.—Psychological Hedonism is vitiated by a serious defect which has been pointed out by Sidgwick. He says, "The impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim." The more we seek pleasure, the less we get it. "Even when we do desire pleasure the best way to *get* it is often to *forget* it. If we think about the pleasure itself, we are almost sure to miss it ; whereas if we direct our desires towards objective ends the pleasure comes of itself" (*Mackenzie*). This is the fundamental *Paradox of Hedonism.* This is not true of all pleasures. It is true chiefly of the pleasures of pursuit. We require a certain degree of disinterestedness in order to obtain full enjoyment. When we witness a drama, we should fix our mind on the drama, and not on the pleasure that we derive from it. If we consciously aim at pleasure, we are sure to miss it.

Rashdall urges that the 'paradox of hedonism' has some truth in it, but is often exaggerated. Hedonistic calculus is not

our *sole* guide in personal conduct. But still it is possible, to a certain extent, to aim at pleasure and get it. "I do not find that I fail to enjoy a holiday because I have carefully considered which of various tours, equally expensive or inexpensive and equally recuperative, I should enjoy most. I should no doubt begin to lose pleasure, if I were always calculating whether the enjoyment had realized my expectations. It is not a matter of experience that pleasure is diminished by being provided and contrived for beforehand. I do not find that the dinner which I have ordered myself always gives me less pleasure than the dinner which has been ordered by somebody else. In certain circumstances the previous contrivance may even become a positive enhancement of the delight" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, pp. 37-38). Thus the calculation of pleasure beforehand does not always diminish the pleasure ; sometimes it positively enhances the pleasure. There is an element of truth in the 'paradox of hedonism'. But it is often much exaggerated.

There is no necessary connection between Psychological Hedonism and Ethical Hedonism. Even if we suppose that Psychological Hedonism is a sound doctrine, there is no necessary connection between it and Ethical Hedonism. It is possible to maintain the one without maintaining the other. Mackenzie truly points out that Ethical Hedonism is hardly compatible with Psychological Hedonism, at least in its most extreme form. If we naturally and always *do* seek our own pleasure, what meaning is there in the precept that we *ought* to do so ? "If we always *did* seek our own *greatest pleasure*, there would be no point in saying that we *ought* to seek it ; while, on the other hand, it would be absurd to say that we *ought* to seek the pleasure of others, except in so far as this could be shown to coincide with our own. Of course, if Psychological Hedonism be merely interpreted as meaning that we always do seek *pleasure of some sort*, then Ethical Hedonism may be

understood as teaching that we ought to seek the *greatest* pleasure, whether our own or that of others. But, in any case, there is no necessary connection between the two doctrines" (Mackenzie : *Manual of Ethics*, p. 168).

Psychological Hedonism may be reconciled with Ethical Egoistic Hedonism in this way. Psychological Hedonism should mean that we do seek our own pleasure of *some sort*, and Ethical Egoistic Hedonism should mean that we ought to seek our own *greatest* pleasure. Psychological Hedonism may be reconciled with Ethical Altruistic Hedonism only under the condition that in seeking the pleasure of others we get our own pleasure.

Thus Psychological Hedonism is unpsychological. Pleasure is not the object of desire. It is the result of the satisfaction of desire which is directed to an object. Desire is primarily directed to an *object*, the attainment of which gives us pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, is not the object of desire ; it is the consequence of the fulfilment of desire.

The word 'pleasure' is ambiguous. It may mean (*a*) *agreeable feeling* after the attainment of an object or (*b*) the *object* that gives satisfaction. In the latter sense, we speak of 'a pleasure' or 'pleasures'.

Even if we *do* desire pleasure, it is best obtained when least sought. A direct pursuit of pleasure is suicidal. The more directly we seek pleasure, the less pleasure do we obtain. This is called by Sidgwick the fundamental *paradox of hedonism*.

Even if we naturally *do* seek pleasure, it does not prove that we *ought* to seek pleasure. There is no necessary connection between psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. If we always *do* seek pleasure, then there is no point in saying that we *ought* to do so.

4. Egoistic Hedonism.

According to Ethical Hedonism, we *ought* to seek pleasure ; pleasure is the proper object of pursuit. But it may assume two forms, *viz.*, Egoistic and Altruistic.

According to Egoistic Hedonism, the pleasure of the individual is the moral standard. According to Altruistic Hedonism, the greatest happiness of the greatest number or general happiness is the moral standard.

Egoistic hedonism again, may be of two types, gross and refined.

(A) Gross Egoistic Hedonism.—Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school, was an advocate of gross or sensualistic egoistic hedonism. According to him, all pleasures are alike in kind ; they differ only in intensity or degree and duration ; there is no qualitative difference among them. The pleasures of the body are preferable to those of the soul because the former are more intense than the latter. "To sacrifice the present to the future, is unwarranted and perilous ; the present is ours, the future may never be. To look before and after were to defeat the end of life, to miss that pleasure which is essentially a thing of the present. A life of feeling, pure and simple, heedless and unthinking, undisturbed by reason—such is the Cyrenaic ideal" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, p. 84). The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful. The present is all that we have. Let us make the most of it. Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we may die. Let not a moment fly without packing it with the most intense pleasure. Therefore a careless surrender to present momentary pleasures of the senses is the true rule of life.

The Charvakas in India are also advocates of this view. Hobbes reduces all virtues to self-love. Mandeville and Helvetius also hold substantially the same doctrine. According to them, happiness means the highest possible amount of physical or sensuous pleasure, which is the highest good.

(B) Refined Egoistic Hedonism.—According to Epicurus, reason has an important place in our moral life. Reason is the proper guide for the attainment of true happiness. "The end of life is not the pleasure of the moment, but happiness, or a

pleasant life. A truly happy life must be also a rational, reflective and well-considered life. Epicurus fully recognizes the indispensableness of reason in the conduct of life. The end is pleasure, but this end cannot be attained except under the guidance of reason. Reason is the hand-maid of sensibility, and without the aid of the former the latter would be reduced to impotency. The task of life is discovered by sensibility ; but the execution of the task is the work of reason. For it is reason alone that makes possible the most perfect gratification of feeling, eliminating the pain as far as possible. Atomic moments of pleasure cannot, therefore, be the good of man ; that good must be a life of pleasure" (*Ibid*, pp. 89-90).

By pleasure the Epicureans mean the absence of pain from the body and of trouble from the soul ; pleasure is the negation of pain. The great maxim of Epicurean life is that we should cultivate a temper of indifference to pleasure and pain, a tranquillity of the soul which cannot be disturbed by the assaults of fortune. The end of life is rather a state of indifference, of neutral feeling, of insensibility, than a positive state of feeling or enjoyment.

Epicurus gives pre-eminence to the intellectual pleasures over the physical pleasures because of their comparative freedom from pain and greater durability, though he does not distinctly recognize the qualitative superiority of the former over the latter.

Egoistic Hedonism is based on psychological hedonism ; hence it is vitiated by its defects.

Hobbes holds that man is naturally egoistic and all the higher emotions and springs of action are modes of self-love. But we live more for the sake of others than for our own. Self-sacrifice is no less primordial than self-preservation. Altruistic emotions can never be resolved into or evolved from egoistic feelings. Egoism and altruism both are rooted in human nature. Egoism is based on egoistic instincts. Altruism is based on altruistic instincts.

Egoistic Hedonism can never supply us with a uniform standard of morality. What is pleasurable to one may be painful to another. If pleasure constitutes rightness, and pain constitutes wrongness, then the moral standard is not uniform. Thus morality which is regarded by all as uniform is abolished.

Egoistic Hedonism requires us to calculate the comparative values of pleasures. But this is extremely difficult. Subjective feelings cannot be quantitatively measured. Moreover, they depend on variation in mood, temperament and circumstances, and thus make the hedonistic calculus impracticable.

Gross or Sensualistic Egoism is properly speaking no moral theory at all. It shamelessly parades the gratification of the appetites and passions as the moral life. It substitutes licence for morality. It disparages rational self-restraint which constitutes morality.

The Refined Egoism of Epicurus is undoubtedly more reflective than the sensualistic egoism of Aristippus. It recognizes the function of reason in moral life. It does not regard momentary pleasures but happy life as the highest good. But according to it, felicity consists not so much in positive pleasure as in freedom from pain. It regards pleasure as absence of pain. It regards pleasure as a negative feeling. Hence it does not encourage active life but rather an inactive life, free from pain. It forgets that morality consists in activity rather than in painless inactive life. It lays too much stress on the calm of mind, due to reduction of desires and indifference to pleasures and pains, than on the active pursuit of the good. Moreover, egoistic happiness cannot be the highest good of man. Egoism cannot satisfy the altruistic instincts.

5. Difference between Ancient Hedonism and Modern Hedonism.

Seth mentions the following three points of difference between ancient Hedonism and modern Hedonism. Firstly, "ancient Hedonism, whether of the Cyrenaic or of the Epicurean

type, was apt to be pessimistic; modern Hedonism is, on the whole, optimistic" (*Seth*). The Epicureans conceived the end of life rather as an escape from pain than as positive pleasure; the modern Hedonists accept the original Cyrenaic conception of end as real enjoyment, as not merely the absence of pain, but the presence of pleasure.

Secondly, "while ancient Hedonism was egoistic, the modern is altruistic or universalistic. The greatest happiness of the greatest number has taken the place of the greatest happiness of the individual" (*Seth*). Hume, Bentham, and J. S. Mill substitute the general happiness or the greatest happiness of the greatest number for that of the individual, as the end of life. "The utilitarian standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator" (*Mill*).

Thirdly, the modern Hedonism of J. S. Mill recognizes the qualitative difference or the gradation of pleasures. Mill introduces a distinction of quality, in addition to the old distinction of quantity. The Epicureans preferred the pleasures of the mind to those of the body on the ground of their greater durability and their comparative freedom from painful consequences, but they had not maintained the intrinsic preferableness of the mental pleasures. To Paley and Bentham, as well as to the Epicureans, all pleasures are still essentially, or in kind, the same. Mill holds that the distinction of quality is independent of that of quantity, and that the qualitative distinction is as real and legitimate as the quantitative.

6. Altruistic Hedonism.—(A) Gross Utilitarianism (Bentham).

According to Altruistic Hedonism, universal or general happiness, *i. e.*, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the ultimate moral standard. Bentham and Mill both

advocate this view.) (But they differ in that Bentham recognizes only quantitative distinction of pleasures, whereas J. S. Mill admits their qualitative distinction as well. This theory is called *Utilitarianism*, because it judges all actions according to their *utility* as means for the promotion of general happiness or prevention of general pain. Bentham holds that the only standard of valuation of pleasures is quantitative. But quantity takes different forms. It has seven *dimensions* of value, *viz.*, (1) *intensity*, (2) *duration*, (3) *proximity*, (4) *certainty*, (5) *purity* (freedom from pain), (6) *fecundity* (*fruitfulness*), and over and above these (7) *extent*, *i. e.*, the number of persons affected. One pleasure is more intense than another. Of pleasures otherwise equal, the more intense pleasure is preferable to a less intense pleasure. One pleasure is more durable than another. Of pleasures otherwise equal, the more durable pleasure is preferable to a less durable pleasure. An immediate pleasure is preferable to a remote pleasure. A certain pleasure is preferable to an uncertain pleasure. A pleasure is pure when it is free fram pain. It is impure when it is mixed with pain. A pure pleasure is preferable to an impure pleasure. A pleasure is said to have fecundity when it gives rise to a number of other pleasures. It is preferable to a barren pleasure which does not give rise to other pleasures. A pleasure may be enjoyed by a small number of persons or a large number of persons. A pleasure of greater extent is preferable to one of less extent. These are intensity, duration, proximity, certainty, purity, fecundity, and extent of pleasures.

Bentham is an advocate of Psychological Hedonism. He says, "Nature has placed man under the empire of pleasure and pain. We owe to them all our ideas ; we refer to them all our judgments and all our determinations of life. His object is to seek pleasure and shun pain. The principle of utility subjects everything to these two motives." "Nature has placed mankind

under the governance of these two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point what we ought to do as well as what we shall do."

Bentham believes in hedonistic calculus. He says, "Weigh pleasures and weigh pains, and as the balance stands, will stand the question of right and wrong." An action is right if it gives pleasure or excess of pleasure over pain. An action is wrong if it gives pain or excess of pain over pleasure. Thus Bentham gives a purely hedonistic criterion of right and wrong. Rightness consists in pleasurableness ; wrongness consists in painfulness.

Bentham's Utilitarianism may be called gross or sensualistic, because he does not admit qualitative differences among pleasures. He says, on the contrary, that any one pleasure is as good as another provided they are equal in quantity. "Quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry" (*Bentham*). We must bear in mind that Bentham does not mean by purity any superior quality but merely freedom from pain. A pleasure is pure, according to Bentham, when it is unmixed with pain.

Bentham's Hedonism is altruistic in tendency, because he takes into account the extent of pleasures, *i. e.*, the number of persons affected by them. If a pleasure is shared by many persons, it has a greater extent and as such it is to be preferred to a pleasure that can be enjoyed by only one person. Thus Bentham by introducing extent as a dimension of pleasure introduces altruism into his doctrine. The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the moral standard.

Though Bentham is an advocate of altruistic Hedonism, he clearly recognizes the natural egoism of man. He says, "To obtain the greatest portion of happiness for himself is the object of every rational being. Every man is nearer to himself than he can be to any other man ; and no other man can weigh for him his pleasures and pains. Himself must necessarily be his own concern. His interest must, to himself, be the primary interest." That man is naturally egoistic is repeatedly asserted

by Bentham and most emphatically in the following passage. "Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you, unless their own advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so and never will, while human nature is made of the present materials. But they will desire to serve you, when by so doing they can serve themselves." Thus Bentham clearly admits that man is *egoistic* by nature, but still he is an advocate of altruistic hedonism as shown above. He says, "*Each is to count for one, and no one for more than one.*" This is the democratic principle of justice. The moral standard is not the greatest pleasure of the individual, but the 'greatest pleasure of the greatest number' calculated upon the basis of the quality of the claims of all.

How, then, does Bentham pass from Egoism to Altruism? If man is egoistic by nature, why should he seek the happiness of others? Why is he bound to promote the general happiness? Why should he sacrifice his own happiness for the happiness of others? What is the binding force of morality? How does Bentham account for the transition from egoism to altruism? He explains it by means of four external sanctions, physical or natural sanction, political sanction, social sanction, and religious or divine sanction. The physical sanction is constituted by the physical pains, which result from the disregard of natural laws such as the laws of health. It is a law of nature that we should satisfy the appetites moderately; if we violate it by their over-indulgence the violation is followed by diseases and pains. The political sanction consists of those pains which follow upon the penalties inflicted by the authority of the State. The idea of these pains prevents the individual from violating political laws, and the hope of reward from the State prompts him to perform actions that are beneficial to the society. The social sanction consists of those pains, which follow upon the penalties inflicted by the society upon the individual (*e. g.*, excommunication). The idea of the pains

dissuades the individual from acting selfishly. The religious sanction includes the fear of punishment in hell and the hope of reward in heaven. Thus the external sanctions are merely external pressures brought to bear upon the individual so as to compel him to sacrifice his own interests to the interests of society. Thus, according to Bentham, the individual passes from egoism to altruism under the pressure of the external sanctions.

Bentham's Gross Utilitarianism is open to the following objections :—

Bentham is an advocate of Psychological Hedonism. So his doctrine suffers from all the defects of Psychological Hedonism. Our desire is primarily directed towards some object, the attainment of which is followed by pleasure. If we desire a pleasant object, it does not follow that we desire pleasure. Moreover, very often the more we seek pleasure, the less we get it. This is the fundamental Paradox of Hedonism. Moreover, even if we do seek pleasure, it does not follow that we ought to seek pleasure. In fact, if we naturally seek pleasure, there is no point in saying that we ought to seek pleasure. Thus Psychological Hedonism does not necessarily lead to Ethical Hedonism. There is no necessary connection between the two. In fact, the ideal cannot be evolved from the actual.

When Bentham recognizes several dimensions of value among pleasures and holds that the surplus of pleasure over pain determines the rightness of an action, and the surplus of pain over pleasure determines the wrongness of an action, he looks upon pleasure and pain as an emotional currency which can be added and subtracted and thus quantitatively measured. But feelings of pleasure and pain are purely subjective states of the mind, which cannot be measured like coins. They are highly variable in character. They depend upon variation in mood, temperament and circumstances. Thus hedonistic calculus proposed by Bentham is impracticable.

Bentham clearly recognizes the egoistic nature of man ; but still he advocates Altruistic Hedonism. He does not offer any argument for altruism. He does not give any reason for our pursuit of general happiness. He thinks the nature of man to be essentially egoistic. "To obtain the greatest portion of happiness for himself," says Bentham, "is the object of every rational being. Every man is nearer to himself than he can be to any other man." From this pure egoism, Bentham can never evolve altruism ; but still he recognizes the extent of pleasure, and thus introduces altruism into his doctrine.

Bentham introduces altruism into his doctrine by taking into account the extent of pleasures, *i. e.*, the number of persons affected by them. But he gives no reason why the pleasures of greater extent are preferable to those of smaller extent. In fact, intellectual pleasure and æsthetic pleasure can be shared by a large number of persons. But sensual pleasures of eating and drinking cannot be shared by a large number of persons. The former are higher pleasures, since they satisfy reason. The latter are lower pleasures, since they satisfy sensibility. But Bentham does not recognize qualitative difference among pleasures. The extent of pleasure covertly refers to its quality.

The external sanctions can never explain the transition from egoism to altruism. We choose to obey the laws of Nature, Society, State and God not for their sake, but for our own good. We are compelled by these external sanctions to sacrifice our own pleasures and interests to those of others by prudential considerations. These external sanctions can create a *must* or physical compulsion, but never an *ought* or moral obligation.

Bentham's altruism is gross or sensualistic, because he does not recognize the qualitative differences of pleasures. Though he recognizes purity as a dimension of value in pleasures, he does not mean by 'purity' qualitative superiority or intrinsic excellence. All pleasures are equally alike in kind or quality.

But this is a distinction of psychological facts. Intellectual pleasures, artistic enjoyment, and spiritual bliss are decidedly higher in quality than the pleasures of eating and drinking.

Bentham by recognizing the extent of pleasures, makes hedonistic calculation extremely difficult. How can we weigh the pleasures of others ? Should we give preference to others' pleasures to our own ? From the hedonistic standpoint, it is not justifiable. To give weight to others' pleasures independently of our own is to pass to a new standard of value altogether. Why should others' pleasures be preferable to our own ? Moreover, we cannot calculate the pleasures of all mankind.

7. (B) Refined Altruistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism (J. S. Mill).

Hedonism.—J. S. Mill is a Hedonist. He says, "actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness ; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and absence of pain." "Happiness is the sole end of human action." "Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends." Thus Mill holds that pleasure is the only good as an end and for its own sake. He says, "Happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end ; all other things being only desirable as means to that end." "Happiness is pleasure and the absence of pain." Mill uses 'pleasure' and 'happiness' as synonymous. He does not distinguish them from each other. He regards virtue, health, love of honour and the like as means to happiness. He does not regard them as intrinsic values.

Mill gives a hedonistic criterion of right and wrong. An action is right if it yields pleasure or excess of pleasure over pain. An action is wrong if it gives pain or excess of pain over pleasure. This is hedonism pure and simple. Rightness consists in conduciveness to pleasure. Wrongness consists in conduciveness to pain. Bentham also gives a purely hedonistic criterion of right and wrong.

Psychological Hedonism.—Mill bases his Hedonism, as we have already seen, on Psychological Hedonism. He offers the following proof of Psychological Hedonism. "Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are, in strictness of language, two modes of naming the same psychological fact: to think of an object as desirable, and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing; and to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility." In plain language, it means that we always desire what is pleasant, therefore we desire pleasure.

Ethical Hedonism.—Mill is an advocate of Ethical Hedonism. His Ethical Hedonism is based upon Psychological Hedonism. He offers the following proof for Ethical Hedonism. We always *desire* pleasure; therefore pleasure is *desirable*. He says, "The only proof capable of being given that an object is *visible* is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is *audible* is that people hear it; the sole evidence that anything is *desirable* is that people do actually *desire* it." All persons desire pleasure; so pleasure is desirable.

Kinds of Pleasure: Quality.—Mill recognizes the qualitative difference of pleasures. Mill, for the first time, introduces the distinction of quality, in addition to the distinction of quantity. Epicurus emphasized the distinction between the pleasures of our body and those of the mind and gave superiority to the latter on account of their greater durability and their comparative freedom from painful consequences. But he did not recognize the qualitative superiority of the mental pleasures. To Bentham also all pleasures are essentially or in kind the same. Though Bentham recognizes purity of pleasure, he does not mean by it qualitative superiority, but freedom from pain. Mill, for the first time, holds that the distinction of quality is independent of quantity, and the qualitative distinction is as real as the quantitative.

Mill says, "It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some *kinds* of pleasures are more desirable and valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." Hence Mill's argument is called Refined Utilitarianism as contrasted with Bentham's Gross Utilitarianism.

Test of quality.—What, then, according to Mill, is the test of quality? He appeals to the verdict of competent judges. "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all who have experience of both, give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the desirable pleasure......Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures." Competent judges always prefer intellectual pleasures to bodily and sensual pleasures. From this verdict of competent judges there can be no appeal. If there is a conflict of opinion among the competent judges, we should abide by the verdict of the majority of them. Mill says, "From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal......If they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted to be final."

The Sense of Dignity.—When Mill is pressed hard to give us the ultimate reason of the preference felt by the competent judges, he refers us to the "sense of dignity" which is natural to man. It is on account of the existence of this sense of dignity in man that he would not consent to be changed into any of the lower animals capable of sensual

pleasures only. "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides" (*Mill*).

Mill's proof of Altruism.—Mill's Hedonism is altruistic. Bentham also advocated Altruistic Hedonism, but did not offer any argument for his altruism. Mill advocates refined utilitarianism and offers a few arguments. "The utilitarian standard is not the agent's greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether." "As between his own happiness, and that of others, Utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested, benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality" (*Mill*).

Mill offers the following logical argument for altruism. "No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons" (*Mill*).

Origin of Sympathy.—Mill offers a psychological explanation of the transition from egoism to altruism. Altruism grows out of egoism—sympathy or fellow-feeling, out of self-love in the life time of an individual, according to the law of association and transference of interest from the end to the means. At first we were egoists and relieved the miseries of others in order to relieve our own pain. Then by repetition, our own interest was transferred from the end to the means; we forgot our own pleasure, and came to take delight in relieving the miseries of others, and thus acquired sympathy. Thus sympathy is acquired by the individual in his own life time.

Moral Sanctions (External and Internal).—What, according to Mill, is the binding force of morality? Why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that my preference? Mill assumes that there are two kinds of sanctions for altruistic conduct, external and internal. Bentham recognizes four external sanctions, physical, social, religious, and political. But an appeal to these external sanctions means ultimately an appeal to the self-interest of the individual. Therefore, Mill adds to these external sanctions the internal sanction of conscience. "This internal sanction is a feeling for the happiness of mankind, a feeling of regard for the feelings and pains of others—the social feelings of mankind,—the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures which if not innate are none the less natural" (*Mill*). Mill defines it also as a "feeling of pain attendant on the violation of duty." It is the remorse of conscience.

Mill's Refined Utilitarianism is open to the following objections :—

Hedonism.—Mill's doctrine is Hedonistic. So it is open to all the objections against Hedonism. "The hedonistic theory of life is based upon a one-sided theory of human nature. Man is regarded as, fundamentally and essentially, a sentient being, a creature of sensibility ; and therefore, the end of his life is conceived in terms of sensibility, or as sentient satisfaction" (*Seth*). But the true end of life must be the satisfaction of the complete total self, rational as well as sentient.

Moreover, *happiness* is not the same thing as *pleasure*. Dewey says, "Pleasure is transitory and relative, enduring while some specific activity endures, and having reference only to that activity. Happiness is permanent and universal. It results only when the act is such a one as will satisfy all the interests of the self concerned, or will lead to no conflict, either present or remote. Happiness is the feeling of the whole self, as opposed to the feeling of some one aspect of self" (*Psychology*, p. 293).

Happiness lies in the harmony of pleasures. Pleasure arises from the gratification of a single isolated desire. Happiness is the feeling that accompanies the systematisation of desires. Pleasure is transient; happiness is abiding. Muirhead says, "Pleasure is the feeling which accompanies the satisfaction of particular desires; happiness is the feeling which accompanies the sense that, apart from the satisfaction of momentary desires, and even in spite of the pain of refusal or failure to satisfy them, the self as a whole is being realized" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 109). Bentham and Mill fail to recognize this obvious distinction between pleasure and happiness.

Psychological Hedonism.—Mill bases his Utilitarianism on Psychological Hedonism. So his doctrine suffers from all the defects of Psychological Hedonism. Pleasure is not the direct object of desire. It is the consequence of the fulfilment of desire. The more we seek pleasure, the less we get it. This is the Paradox of Hedonism. Mill's admission that virtue, wealth, and the like, are desired as means to pleasure, in the beginning, and then, in the long run, are desired in themselves owing to the transference of interest from the end to the means, is fatal to psychological hedonism. Mill, then, admits that desire is directed to objects other than pleasure. But psychological hedonism insists that desire is always directed towards pleasure. Moreover, even if we do desire pleasure, it does not prove that pleasure is desirable. Psychological Hedonism does not necessarily lead to Ethical Hedonism.

Ethical Hedonism.—Mill offers the following proof of Ethical Hedonism. An object is visible if people actually see it. An object is audible if people actually hear it. Likewise, an object is desirable if people actually desire it. In fact, we actually desire pleasure; therefore, pleasure is desirable. Here Mill commits the fallacy of figure of speech. He confounds the word 'desirable' with the words, 'capable of being desired'. That is *desirable*, which *ought to be desired*, not that which is

capable of being desired. The 'desirable' is not the normal object of desire, but the proper or reasonable object of desire. Mackenzie rightly observes, "When we say that anything is desirable, we do not usually mean merely that it is able to be desired. There is scarcely anything that is not able to be desired. What we mean is rather that it is *reasonably* to be desired, or that it *ought* to be desired" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 169). Dewey and Tufts make it more clear. "The ending '*able*' has two meanings in different words. It signifies '*capable* of being seen', when it occurs in the word 'visible'. But in other words, it signifies that which is fit, proper, as in the words 'enjoyable'. '*Desirable*' signifies not that which is capable of being desired (experience shows that about everything has been desired by some one at some time) but that which in the eye of impartial thought *should* be desired" (*Ethics*, p. 206). What is *desirable* is, indeed, capable of being desired. But that does not make it desirable. Mere examination of what men do desire does not tell us what is desirable. We can say what is desirable only after a critical examination of the *reasonableness* of things desired. Moore remarks, "The fact is that desirable does not mean 'able to be desired' as 'visible' means 'able to be seen'. The desirable means simply what *ought* to be desired or *deserves* to be desired ; just as the detestable means not what can be but what ought to be detested and the damnable what deserves to be damned" (*Principia Ethica*, p. 67).

Quality of Pleasure.—Mill recognizes a distinction of quality in pleasures, in addition to their quantity. The pleasures of the higher faculties are intrinsically superior to those derived from the sense. The quality of pleasures, therefore, is derived from the higher nature of man. Seth rightly observes, "Quality is an extra-hedonistic criterion ; the only hedonistic criterion is quantity (*i. e.*, the intensity of pleasure). The so-called difference of quality will be found to resolve

itself so far as pleasure is concerned into a difference of quantity *for the higher nature*" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 125).

The quality of pleasure is no other than the moral quality in disguise. Those pleasures are qualitatively superior which are approved by our higher or moral nature. But this admission amounts to an abandonment of the hedonistic position. Mill introduces an element of rationalism into his doctrine by recognizing the qualitative distinction of pleasures. Mill says, "Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures." He admits therefore that men sometimes desire something *other* than pleasure. What makes them think the pleasures of the intellect superior to those of a beast is not their intensity as pleasures but their *superior nobleness* or moral elevation. If some pleasures are preferable to others on account of their quality as distinct from their quantity or intensity, then the Hedonistic theory must be abandoned. "One pleasure is, on this view, more desirable than another, not on account of its nature as pleasure, but on account of some other quality that it possesses *beyond* its mere pleasantness" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 179). Thus quality being an extra-hedonistic criterion undermines hedonism and introduces rationalism into it.

Moreover, Mill's recognition of quality of pleasures undermines his psychological hedonism. If we desire a *superior quality* in pleasure, we do not desire pleasure. Rashdall rightly observes, "A desire for superior quality of pleasure is not really a desire for pleasure."

Test of Quality.—What is the test of quality? When Mill appeals to the verdict of competent judges to explain the test of quality, he makes it an arbitrary affair. If the verdict be not arbitrary, it must commend itself to reason. Thus the outer verdict of competent judges is but an echo of the inner voice of conscience.

The Sense of Dignity.—When pressed hard to give a real test of quality, Mill refers us to the sense of dignity. Is it the dignity of sense or the dignity of reason? It cannot be resolved into desire for pleasure. Seth rightly remarks, "It is the utterance of the *rational self* behind the self of sensibility, demanding a satisfaction worthy of it. Not the attainment of pleasures as such, but the finding of our pleasures in activities which are worthy of this higher and rational nature,—such is the end set before us by our peculiar human sense of dignity" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 126). The sense of dignity natural to man is the dignity of reason, not of sensibility. Here again Mill introduces an element of rationalism into his doctrine.

Altruism.—Mill's Hedonism is altruistic. He offers the following logical argument for it. "Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, is a good to the aggregate of all persons." And because general happiness is good to the aggregate of all persons, it is a good to each person. Here Mill commits two fallacies, *viz.*, the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division.

There are two arguments here :—

(1) Each person's happiness is a good to him.

∴ The general happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons.

This argument involves the fallacy of composition. Here we pass from the distributive to the collective use of a term. "Because my pleasures are a good to me, yours to you, his to him, and so on, therefore my pleasures + your pleasures + his pleasures are a good to me + you + him. It is forgotten that neigher the pleasures nor the persons are capable of being made into an aggregate. A sum of pleasures is not pleasure, any more than a sum of men is a man" (*Mackenzie*). The aggregate of pleasures is no pleasure. The aggregate of persons is no person. Pleasures cannot be added to one another. The minds of persons also cannot be rolled into one and made into an aggregate.

(2) The general happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons.

∴ The general happiness is a good to each person.

This argument involves the fallacy of division. This argument is not explicitly stated by Mill.

Hedonism cannot be altruistic.—Hedonism consistently carried out cannot account for altruism. There is no earthly reason from the hedonistic standpoint why an individual should forego his own pleasures for the sake of others. If by seeking the pleasures of others we do not seek our own pleasures, then we are not Hedonists. Hedonism consistently carried out must be egoistic. Martineau says rightly, "There is no road from each for himself to each for all." Mill is an advocate of psychological hedonism. According to him, we always desire pleasure. If so, we always desire our own pleasure. We cannot desire anybody else's pleasure, because we do not feel it as our own pleasure. Hence psychological hedonism is inconsistent with altruistic hedonism.

Sympathy.—Sympathy or fellow-feeling which is purely an altruistic feeling can never be derived from pure egoism or self-love. What the laws of transference of interest and association would do is to convert egoism to ego-altruism, but not to pure altruism. There are egoistic instincts as well as altruistic instincts in human nature. There are self-preserving instincts as well as race-preserving instincts even in lower animals, not to speak of men. The mother courts danger and death for the good of the infant. "Man and animals have always had both race-preserving and self-preserving instincts. Altruism in the developed human beings is evolved out of social and race-preserving instincts: Egoism out of self-preserving instincts" (Rashdall: *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 23). Hence it is absurd to hold that altruism is developed out of egoism in the life time of the individual under the influence of psychological laws.

Sanctions (external or internal).—Mill cannot offer a reasonable explanation of moral obligation or sense of duty. The external sanctions cannot account for the sense of duty or *oughtness* ; they can create a *must* but never an *ought*. They can account for physical compulsion, but not for moral obligation.

Mill adds to these external sanctions the internal sanction of conscience. But when he appeals to the internal sanction of conscience, he undermines his own hedonistic position and introduces an element of rationalism into his doctrine. The internal sanction, according to Mill, is the subjective feeling of 'sympathy', 'fellow-feeling', or 'feeling of unity with mankind'. But the merely subjective feeling cannot be the source of moral obligation. It cannot be the source of the sense of moral authority. Sometimes Mill speaks of the internal sanction as "the feeling of pain attendant on the violation of duty." This feeling of pain or remorse is the consequence of the violation of duty. The violation of duty is the infringement of the moral law of reason. Therefore Mill covertly appeals to reason as the moral authority and introduces rationalism into his doctrine. The internal sanction is the authority of reason, not of the feeling of pleasure or pain.

Hedonistic Calculus.—Mill makes the hedonistic calculus extremely impracticable. Subjective pleasures and pains which are highly variable and capricious cannot be exactly estimated. It is all the more difficult to apply the hedonistic calculus to "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Bentham admits, "Every man is nearer to himself than he can be to any other man, and no other man can weigh for him his pleasures and pains." If so, how can we calculate the greatest happiness of the greatest number? Then, again, what is pleasant to me, may be painful to another, and what makes us happy at one time may make us unhappy at another time. How can we say then, that hedonistic calculus is practi-

cable? And the difficulty of hedonistic calculation is all the more increased by Mill's introduction of the differences of quality among pleasures. We cannot set a *plus* of quality or quantity against *minus* of quantity or quality. "If we admit differences of quality, it becomes impossible to place pleasures, and sums of pleasure, in any precise order of desirability. *Qualities* cannot be estimated againt *quantities*, unless in some way they can be reduced to quantities—and this, on Mill's supposition, is not the case" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 179). Thus Mill's recognition of quantities of pleasure makes hedonistic calculus extremely impracticable.

8. The Service of Utilitarianism.

Bentham, J. S. Mill and others did inestimable service to legal and political reform in the present century by laying stress on the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But how far they were inspired by the hedonistic element in their theory, and how far by the democratic element in their theory, cannot be rightly ascertained.

Bentham and his followers effected great reforms in the interest of social justice. The slogans of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" and "each to count for one and none for more than one" helped them in reforming established social abuses. But the utilitarians identified social progress too much with material and bodily comforts. They identified happiness with material happiness. They put insufficient emphasis on the intellectual, aesthetic and religious values, the intrinsic worth of character, love, friendship, and the like goods. They neglected the higher cultural interests. Economic goods occupied too much of their thought and attention. Pleasures and pains are viewed by Mill as a kind of emotional currency, which can be added, subtracted, and multiplied. But this is wrong.

CHAPTER X

Evolutionary Hedonism

(A) Herbert Spencer's Evolutionary Hedonism.

Evolution applied to Morals.—The Hedonism of Bentham and Mill is called Empirical Hedonism. The Hedonism of Herbert Spencer, Leslie Stephen and Alexander is called Evolutionary Hedonism. Herbert Spencer applied, for the first time, the doctrine of Evolution to morals. Morality has evolved from non-moral conduct of animals. It is subject to growth and development. The starting point and the goal of evolution are concealed from us. We see the existing forms of animal life. The lowest forms of animal life are hidden from our view. Nor do we know what forms animal life will assume in future. Both the beginning and the end of racial evolution are hidden from our view. So the earliest beginnings of the moral consciousness are hidden in obscurity: and also we cannot form a clear conception of perfectly developed moral life. We know the present state of moral development. We cannot understand it without reference to its beginning.

The Evolutionists explain it by reference to its beginning, and hence they apply the historical method. The Idealists (Hegel, Green and others), on the other hand, explain it by reference to the end or ideal. They apply the teleological method. Herbert Spencer traces the origin of morality to the conduct of animals.

Herbert Spencer deduces moral laws from biological laws. Bentham and Mill derive moral laws from inductions from experience of pleasure and pain. They are advocates of empirical hedonism. But Herbert Spencer deduces hedonism

from the law of biological evolution. His hedonism is called evolutionary or deductive hedonism. "The business of Moral Science," says Herbert Spencer, "is to deduce from the *laws of life* what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds tend to produce unhappiness. Its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery." Spencer's hedonism is said to be scientific. Morality is a product of evolution. It cannot be understood except in the light of evolution. Green calls evolutionary hedonism a 'natural science of morals'. It resolves the ethical process into the cosmical process. It regards morality as the last phase in the evolution of 'universal conduct'.

Conduct : Good or Bad.—Herbert Spencer traces the origin of morality to the conduct of animals. He defines conduct as the adjustment of acts to ends. Conduct means the activities which adjust the organism to the environment. The essence of life consists in 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations', *i. e.*, the constant effort of the organism to adapt itself to its environment. All conduct tends either to promote or to hinder such adaptation. In so far as it tends to promote it, it is good ; in so far as it tends to hinder it, it is bad.

Good conduct produces pleasure, because it brings the organism into harmony with its environment. Bad conduct produces pain because it fails to adapt the organism to the environment. Nearly all conduct is partly good and partly bad. Perfectly good conduct is an action which produces only pleasure with no pain. But conduct is relatively good when it produces a surplus of pleasure over pain or produces a more perfect adjustment of the organism to the environment. Conduct is relatively bad when it produces a surplus of pain over pleasure or produces a more imperfect adjustment of the organism to the environment. Thus good

conduct promotes life, and bad conduct hinders life. Conduct is good or bad according as it promotes or hinders life.

Biological Significance of Pleasure and Pain.—Herbert Spencer based Hedonism on a biological basis. Pleasure, according to him, is an index of increase of life ; pain is an index of decrease of life : "It is an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of Evolution," says Spencer, "that pains are correlatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare. Races of sentient creatures could have come into existence under no other conditions. Those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and habitually avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life." Pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining ; pain-giving acts are life-destroying. Sentient existence depends on this law. Animals naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain. Now, if pleasure had decreased life and pain increased life,—if pleasure had been devitalizing and pain vitalizing, then animals would long ago have brought about their own destruction, inasmuch as they naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain. But animal life does continue. So Herbert Spencer concludes that pleasure is a correlate of furtherance of life and pain, of hindrance of life.

The Supreme End : Happiness ; Proximate Ends : Length and Breadth of Life.—Actions are good or bad, according as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends. Ultimately their goodness or badness is determined by the measure in which all minor ends are merged in the grand end of self-preservation and race-preservation. Herbert Spencer is a Hedonist. "The ultimate end of life is Happiness ; but the proximate end of life is the length and breadth of life." The proximate goal of life is the increase of life both in length and breadth. Length is duration of life. Breadth is volume

or complexity of life. "Evolution," says Spencer, "tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its limit when individual life is the greatest, both in length and breadth ; and we regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction. Evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring and in fellow-men." Self-preservation and race-preservation are the ultimate ends of biological evolution. And these are the proximate ends of morality. The increase of the totality of life, in the individual and the race, in length and breadth, is the proximate end of morality. The supreme end is happiness but that is best attained, by keeping it in the background and fixing attention upon its conditions. Spencer agrees with the Utilitarians in regarding pleasure as the ultimate end of human life. He says, "Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception" of a desirable state of feeling. Therefore he holds that "pleasure is the good and the whole good, and that there is no other good than pleasure" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 379). Spencer says, "It becomes undeniable that the good is universally the pleasurable." Thus the supreme end is Happiness, while the proximate end is the preservation and development of life.

The Genesis of the Moral Consciousness.—In seeking to trace 'the genesis of the moral consciousness', Spencer finds that the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings. Spencer holds that for the better preservation of life, some external form of pressure must be brought to bear upon human nature. The external pressures are called by him, political, religious and social control (*cf.* external sanctions of Bentham). He mentions another control which is internal and called by him moral control. The truly moral deterrent is the

feeling of moral obligation or the sentiment of duty (*cf.* Mill's internal sanction).

The Sentiment of Duty or Feeling of Moral Obligation.—The sentiment of duty or feeling of moral obligation consists of two elements, *viz.*, (1) the element of authoritativeness and (2) the element of coerciveness. It is found that the later evolved, more compound, and more representative feelings (*e. g.*, sympathy) serving to adjust the conduct to more distant and general ends have all along had an authority over the earlier and simpler presentative feelings (*e. g.*, self-interest). The idea of authoritativeness has therefore come to be connected with these higher feelings.

There is another element involved in the abstract consciousness of duty, *viz.*, the element of coerciveness. This originates from experience of the pre-moral restraints, *viz.*, the political, the social and the religious. The sense of duty or moral obligation is mainly due to the incomplete adaptation of the individual to the society. Spencer holds that the sense of moral consciousness is not a permanent trait of moral consciousness. He says, "the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases... While at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform it. Thus the doing of work, originally under the consciousness that it *ought* to be done, may eventually cease to have any such accompanying consciousness." Since the consciousness of the obligation arises from the incomplete adaptation of the individual to the social environment of his life, with complete adaptation of the social state, the element of coerciveness or obligation in the moral consciousness will disappear altogether ; and the right action will be done as a matter of habit, with the simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it.

Egoism and Altruism.—The conflict between the interests

of society and those of the individual, which gives rise to the feeling of moral obligation, is not absolute and permanent. Egoism and Altruism both have their rights. Self-preservation and self-sacrifice are equally innate in human nature. In the evolution of the race altruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism. "From the dawn of life, egoism has been dependent upon altruism, as altruism has been dependent upon egoism ; and in the course of evolution, the reciprocal services of the two have been increasing. Thus pure egoism and pure altruism are both illegitimate" (*Spencer*). If the maxim 'life for self' is wrong, so also is the maxim 'life for others'. Hence the compromise is the only good. "A compromise between altruism and egoism has been slowly establishing itself" (*Spencer*). The people are generally realizing that general happiness is to be achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own happiness by individuals and the happiness of the individuals is to be partly achieved by their pursuit of the general happiness. Extreme selfishness and extreme selflessness are equally suicidal.

Absolute Ethics.—Herbert Spencer distinguishes between Absolute Ethics and Relative Ethics. "Absolute Ethics prescribe the conduct which is conducive to life in circumstances of perfect adaptation—perfect adaptation of the individual to his environment. Relative Ethics deal with the conduct which is suitable to such and such an individual in a society at a given stage of imperfect adaptation. Nothing is absolutely right but what promotes pleasure pure and simple without any admixture whatever of pain. Relative Ethics often prescribe what is really only the less of two evils. It is only a perfect society that can observe the counsels of perfection enjoined by Absolute Ethics" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 385).

Herbert Spencer believes that time will come when there will be a complete adaptation of the individuals to the society, and the interests of the individuals will be identical with those

of the society. At that time sympathy will not contain any painful element, the sense of moral obligation will be completely transcended, and all virtues will become spontaneous. At that time the dream of Utopia will be completely realized. The advent of the social millenium will bring in an era of perpetual peace and harmony.

Herbert Spencer applies, for the first time, the idea of evolution to morals. He traces the germs of morality to the conduct of animals. Life, according to him, consists in the continuous adjustment of the vital forces to the environment. Conduct is any vital act or adjustment of the organism to the environment. That conduct is good which promotes effective adjustment of the organism to the environment and produces pleasure. That conduct is bad which hinders such adjustment and produces pain. Pleasure is an index of increase of life; pain of decrease of life. That conduct is absolutely good which yields pleasure unmixed with pain. That conduct is relatively good which gives a surplus of pleasure over pain. The proximate end of life is length and breadth of life. The ultimate end of life is happiness. In order to ensure happiness we should keep it in the background and directly aim at the proximate end, *i. e.*, length and breadth of life. Moral consciousness is, to a great extent, due to the political, the social, the religious, and the moral control. Moral obligation is transitory. It is due to incomplete adaptation of the individual to the society. When the adaptation will be complete, there will be no sense of duty or moral obligation. It will completely disappear. Virtues will become spontaneous. Thus Herbert Spencer believes in Utopia. He believes that it will be established on earth, in which there will be no clash between egoism and altruism.

Herbert Spencer's Evolutionary Hedonism is open to the following objections :—

The doctrine of evolution can account for the growth of morality, but not for its origin. By applying the idea of

evolution to morality Herbert Spencer seeks to evolve the ideal from the actual,—the *Ought* from the *Is*. But this is impossible. Evolution cannot create anything new, it can only gradually unfold what was latent or implicit before. Morality can never be evolved from non-moral elements,—conscience from non-moral instincts. Moral value cannot be evolved from biological facts. In Ethics the evolutionary or historical method is not adequate to its task; it must be replaced by the teleological method. Moral life is governed by the ideal and therefore cannot be explained by the actual. The primary task of Ethics, as a normative science, is to determine the moral ideal, and not to discover the stages of development of moral ideas.

Mackenzie points out that Spencer's theory involves a kind of *hysteron proteron* or putting the cart before the horse. What is meant by saying that development of our lives means a continuous process of adjustment to our environment? How can we account for the *adjustment* of the individual to his environment? "What exactly is implied in this adjustment? Does it not imply that we have certain *ends* that we set before ourselves to be attained? When we say that two things are not adjusted to one another, we imply that we have some idea of a relation in which the two things *ought* to stand and in which at present they do not stand......Adjustment seems to have no meaning unless we presuppose some *ideal* form of adjustment, some *end* that is consciously or unconsciously sought" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 199-200). Thus adjustment implies an end or ideal. The individual seeks to adjust both himself and his environment to an ideal which explains the process of adjustment. Thus the process of adjustment which lies at the root of morality according to Spencer, can be explained by the ideal,—and not the ideal by the process of adjustment. In moral life the environment, physical and social, is adapted by man to his own moral ideal. In morality the outer is adapted to the inner—not the inner to the outer.

"The main (ethical) problem is not to adapt the inward to the outward, but the outward to the inward, not to mould the self to conformity with nature, but to mould nature to increasing conformity with moral and æsthetic ideals" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 161). In moral life the physical and social environment is moulded in conformity with the moral ideal, and instincts and appetites also are controlled by reason in accordance with the moral ideal.

The principle of biological evolution, *viz.*, natural selection or the survival of the fittest cannot be applied to morality. In morality might is not right, but right is might. In the kingdom of animals "survival of the fittest" means the victory of the strongest ; in morality it means the ascendancy of the "morally best", which includes the protection of the weakest. In morality ruthless self-assertion is replaced by rational self-restraint, cut-throat competition by loving co-operation. This is admitted by Alexander, another advocate of evolutionary hedonism. According to him, natural selection in morals is carried on not against weaker individuals but against lower ideals of life.

Moral evolution cannot be a part of biological evolution. Biological evolution implies physical necessity. The organism is moulded by heredity and environment. There is no scope for freedom of the will in biological evolution. But moral evolution implies freedom of the will. Moral progress partly depends upon the social environment, but mainly upon the moral insight and free actions of persons. Hence moral evolution cannot be regarded as a part and parcel of biological evolution.

Herbert Spencer's biological interpretation of pleasure and pain is untenable. Pleasure is not an increase of life but an expenditure of vitality. Aristotle holds that pleasure arises from moderate functioning of vital energy, and pain arises from over-functioning or under-functioning of vital energy. Pleasure is not the motive force of activity, but rather the resultant of activity. A painful feeling of want is the spring of action. Again, what is

pleasure-giving is not necessarily health-promoting, for health is the state of equilibrium between supply and want, pleasure and pain. Several useful acts (*e. g.*, digestion, respiration, etc.) are not accompanied by pleasure ; some of them (*e.g.*, labour, pain) are accompanied by pain. Hence pleasure cannot be said to be an index of increase of life, and pain, of decrease of life.

The proximate end of life cannot be the increase of life in length and breadth (or complexity). Mere longevity of life cannot be the moral ideal. Breadth or complexity of life also by itself may not be desirable. Complexity of structure or constitution implies a greater risk of disturbance and suffering. Life rich in variety must necessarily be a life full of struggle and pain. So increase of breadth of life may not be quite consistent with increase of length. Moreover, length and breadth of life may, after all, constitute the supreme biological end , but it can never be regarded as the supreme moral ideal.

The so-called political, social, religious control stated by Spencer cannot create moral consciousness. They can create a *must* but not an *ought*. They can account for physical compulsion, but not for moral obligation. Even the so-called moral control presupposes moral consciousness. Mere subjective feelings produced by these factors cannot adequately account for the genesis of moral consciousness.

Herbert Spencer cannot account for the sense of duty or moral obligation. It is a transitory element in moral consciousness according to him. But this view is grossly erroneous. Moral obligation is an essential and permanent factor in moral consciousness. It can never be transcended. The greater is the moral progress, the higher is the moral ideal. The feeling of moral obligation is deepened by moral progress. It is never weakened by it. Moreover, moral obligation cannot be due to mal-adaptation of the individual to the society. It can account for the sense of constraint,—but not for moral obligation. Individual is a part ; society is a whole. The part may be, after all, com-

pelled by the whole. Moral obligation can be explained only by the moral ideal. The moral ideal is infinite.* It can never be completely realized in life. Therefore moral obligation is a permanent factor of moral consciousness.

Herbert Spencer's conception of Absolute Ethics saps the very foundation of morality. We have seen just now that moral obligation can never be transcended. Just as morality cannot be evolved out of nature, so it can never become a part of nature. Morality cannot become non-moral. The conflict between the actual and the ideal can never be overcome in course of moral evolution.

So Spencer's ideal of Absolute Ethics is a Utopia which can never be realized in the world. Muirhead truly points out that the ideal of evolution can never be a state of equilibrium. Whenever a comparative state of equilibrium is reached by the society, it will, again, be disturbed by new forces. Spencer's conception of final equilibrium,—absolute harmony between the individual and society,—from which all conflict and pain is excluded,—is analogous to death. Where there is life, there is conflict, struggle and change. When a harmony is established, it must be disturbed by new forces, and again a harmony will be established. This will continue for ever. Man, with his divine discontent, can never be satisfied with an actual social order. His ideal will for ever remain a "far off divine event". Spencer's evolutionary Paradise is impracticable and unrealisable. His Absolute Ethics do not throw a single ray of light upon the path by which the millenium is to be reached.

2. (B) Leslie Stephen.

The Conception of Society as an Organism.—The Utilitarians (Bentham, J. S. Mill, etc.) regard the society as a mere aggregate of independent individuals, mechanically cohering like atoms in inorganic matter. They are individualists, though they speak of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Even Herbert Spencer regards the individual as the unit of the society. To him the individuals are still

independent units, and thus the supreme end of life is directly self-preservation, and only indirectly race-preservation. Spencer is an individualist. Leslie Stephen, for the first time, conceived the society as an organism of which the individuals are inter-dependent members. The individuals cannot live apart from society. The society, being an organism, grows and develops by reaction upon its environment. There is a constant adaptation of the individual to the society. The connection between the individual and the society is not something external and mechanical, but internal and organic.

"Society may be regarded as an organism, implying a social tissue, modified in various ways so as to form the organs adapted to various specific purposes" (*Leslie Stephen*). "The social organism and the underlying social tissue are regarded as evolving. The social tissue is being gradually modified so as to form organs even more perfectly adapted to fulfil the various functions of the organism as a whole ; and the goal of the movement is the evolution of the social type—that is, of that form of society which represents maximum efficiency of the given means to the given end of social life. The problem which is receiving its gradual solution in the evolution of society is the production of a '*social tissue*', or fundamental structure, the most vitally efficient" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, p. 105).

Health of the Social Organism is the Supreme End.—According to Leslie Stephen, the supreme end of life is not the greatest happiness of the greatest number, as Bentham and Mill suppose, nor the length and breadth of life as Herbert Spencer holds, but the health or efficiency of the social organism. The scientific criterion is not happiness, but health. That action is good which is conducive to the health of the society. That action is bad which is harmful to the health of the society. Health and happiness are not really divergent. They tend to coincide. The pernicious are generally painful ; the beneficial are generally pleasurable. Moral laws are conditions

of social vitality. They bring about the health of the social organism. Conscience is an echo of the voice of the public in the individual. Sympathy is an innate social instinct. As a member of the society, and not as a mere individual, man cannot but be sympathetic. The evolution of society implies, as its correlate, the evolution of the social sentiment of sympathy in its members. It is extremely useful to the social organism. In the course of evolution not merely a type of conduct, but a type of character is evolved. We pass from the external to the internal form of morality—from the law 'Do this' to the law 'Be this'.

Leslie Stephen repudiates the Absolute Ethics of Herbert Spencer. He does not recognize any ultimate end to which society is moving. He simply takes society as he finds it and regards its health, equilibrium, or efficiency as the end to be aimed at. He regards virtue as efficiency of the individual for the maintenance of social equilibrium.

Herbert Spencer is an individualist, though he regards altruism as primordial as egoism, equally innate and instinctive. He says, "Evolution tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its limit when individual life is the greatest, both in length and breadth." But Leslie Stephen recognizes the interdependence of individuals in society which he regards as social organism. He says, "A moral rule is a statement of a condition of social welfare." "The moral law defines a property of the social tissue."

Leslie Stephen's Evolutionary Hedonism is open to the following objections :—

Society is an organisation of self-conscious spirits freely controlling their actions. Society is not a mechanical aggregate of atomic individuals. It is more like an organism of inter-dependent organs. But this analogy should not be pushed too far. The organs of an organism do not live independent lives. They live in and through the life of the organism. But 'social organism' is only a metaphor. It is not the social organism, but the individual, after all, that feels pleasure and pain. The individuals are centres of

consciousness. The society has not its own independent centre of consciousness. The society lives, as it were, in the individual as his social or rational self.

Just as 'social organism' is a metaphorical expression, so the health of the social organism also is a metaphorical expression. From the point of view of pleasure, society is not an organism, but an aggregate of individuals, because it is the individuals who feel pleasure and not the society. "If we speak of the 'health' of the society, we cannot mean *its* happiness, but simply the general conditions of the happiness of its individual members. It does not feel, they alone do. The several centres of feeling cannot be resolved into a single common centre. The true altruism is not reached by the negation of egoism, or only by the negation of the lower egoism. There is a higher egoism which contains altruism in itself. I have not indeed discovered my own true end, or my own true self, until I find it to be not exclusive but inclusive of the ends of other selves. I am not called, therefore, to transcend egoism, and exchange it for altruism, but to discover and realize that true egoism which includes altruism in itself. Since each is an ego—the others as well as I—to eliminate egoism would be to uproot the moral life itself. The centre of the moral life must be found within the life of the ego, not outside it. The moral ego refuses to merge its proper personal life in that of society" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, pp. 134-35). Hence the metaphor of social organism is extremely misleading.

When Leslie Stephen regards the health of the social organism as the moral standard, he practically undermines his doctrine of hedonism. Social health does not necessarily mean the happiness of the individual, though it is a necessary condition of it. To appeal to the health of the society is to fall back upon Perfectionism, according to which self-realisation is possible only through the society. The conflict between the individual and the society cannot be reconciled from the point of view of

pleasure but from that of perfection or self-realisation. Self-realisation means realisation of the ideal self. The ideal self is the social self or the rational self, which can be realized only through the society. The personal good is also the common or social good. The highest good is personal as well as common good.

3. (C) Alexander.

Equilibrium of the Social Order is the Highest Good.—The ultimate good is a perfectly adjusted order of conduct or equilibrium of the social organism. An act is measured by the moral ideal. "This moral ideal is an adjusted order of conduct, which is based upon contending inclinations and establishes an equilibrium between them. Goodness is nothing but this adjustment in the equilibrated whole" (*Alexander*).

Natural Selection in Morals.—In the animal world natural selection means survival of the fittest or the strongest. But in morality it means the extermination of the weaker ideals by the more perfect ideals,—not by brute force but by persuasion. Alexander holds that in the moral life of mankind there is a process of natural selection in which the most efficient, or the most perfectly equilibrated type of conduct is preserved. He calls it 'natural selection in morals'. Here there is no extermination of weaker individuals by stronger individuals. But there is the supplanting of lower ideal of imperfectly adjusted conduct by higher ideals of more perfectly adjusted conduct, not by brute force, but by moral persuasion. 'The war of natural selection is carried on in human affairs not against weaker or incompatible individuals, but against their ideals or modes of life. It does not suffer any mode of life to prevail or persist but one which is compatible with social welfare" (*Alexander*). In biological evolution there is extermination of weaker individuals by brute force. In moral evolution there is supplanting of lower ideals by higher ideals by persuasion and education. "Persuasion corresponds to the extermination of the rivals", for "the victory of mind over mind consists in persuasion"

(*Alexander*). Thus Alexander explains the origin of moral ideals by a process of natural selection.

Alexander's Evolutionary Hedonism is open to the following objections :—

Alexander's view is substantially the same as that of Leslie Stephen. Why should we regard the equilibrium of the social order as the highest good ? Why should we seek to establish equilibrium of the society ? Why is it valuable to us ? Why should we promote the equilibrium of society ? Why should we not disturb it ? The answer to these questions consists in showing that social equilibrium is a good.

The natural process of evolution does not explain anything. In fact, the process of development is explained by the end or ideal. It cannot account for the ideal. Social development can be explained by an end or ideal. It cannot be explained by the beginning. The ideal explains the process ; the process cannot explain the end or the ideal. The end, and not the beginning is the principle of explanation.

Alexander's application of the principle of Natural Selection to morals is arbitrary. He himself admits that in morality it does not mean survival of the fittest (strongest) or extermination of the weakest. It means the triumph of higher ideals over lower ideals through persuasion. But this can hardly be called natural selection. This is a frank confession of the failure of biological concepts to explain moral values.

4. Merits of Hedonism.

Hedonism rightly emphasizes the claim of sensibility in human life. But it wrongly asserts this to be the exclusive claim, or wrongly subordinates to it the more fundamental claim of reason. Sensibility is a part and parcel of human nature. It constitutes the material of morality. Morality consists in regulating instincts, impulses and feelings. Sensibility is an integral part of the moral life. Hedonism has done well to emphasize its importance. The moral life is not a

merely rational life, devoid of sensibility. The moral life is for man a life of sensibility rationalized, or regulated by reason. His total rational well-being must be accompanied by the feeling of happiness. This is the permanent truth in Hedonism. Extinction or total suppression of sensibility is a false and inadequate ideal of moral life.

Pleasure is not itself the Good. But it is a normal index and expression of the Good. Pain is not itself an evil. But it is a normal index and expression of evil. Pleasure is the sense of positive value. Pain is the sense of negative value. But pleasure itself is not a value. Objects are values, which are desired.

Egoistic Hedonism holds that happiness of the individual is the supreme good. There is an element of truth in this. The end must be a form of personal good. The good must be realized by a person in his life. The good is not an impersonal good but a personal good.

Altruistic Hedonism holds that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the supreme good. This contains an element of truth. The good is not only a form of personal good, but also a common good. The highest good is a personal good as well as a common good, so that the individual, in order to realize his highest good, must aim not so much at his personal good as at the common good.

Evolutionary Hedonism advocates the conception of society as an organism. This conception contains an important element of truth. It emphasizes the reciprocity of the personal good and the common or social good.

The demerit of Hedonism mainly lies in ignoring the claim of reason in supplying the principle of organisation among feelings. Sensibility is the mattter of the moral life. Reason gives the form of the moral life. Morality consists in the regulation of sensibility by reason according to the moral ideal.

CHAPTER XI

RATIONAL UTILITARIANISM

1. Sidgwick's Rational Utilitarianism.

Hedonism.—Sidgwick holds that pleasure is the only intrinsic value; it is good in itself. Pleasure is ultimately desirable. It is the only rational object of desire. Pleasure is the only reasonable object of desire. It is a deliverance of reason. Reason dictates that pleasure is the true end, the end that ought to be pursued. Knowledge, beauty, virtue, etc., are means to pleasure. They have extrinsic or instrumental value. He does not distinguish between pleasure and happiness. The ultimate good is pleasure or happiness. "The ultimate standard of moral valuation," he says, "is the productivity of desirable consciousness and the ultimate good or end in itself must be goodness or excellence of conscious life, and the goodness of conscious life must ultimately consist in happiness or pleasantness, and all other things called good are only means to the end of making conscious life more desirable—which is, in fact, to say that they are means to happiness." "Pleasure or happiness is the ultimate good. Knowledge, beauty and other objects which are considered by some to have intrinsic value are only means to happiness." They have no value apart from happiness produced by them. "Several cultivated people do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc., are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them." "Yet if we ask for a final criterion of the comparative value of the different objects of men's enthusiastic pursuit, we shall none the less conceive it to depend on the degree in which they respectively conduce to happiness" (*Sidgwick*). So far Sidgwick agrees with J. S. Mill.

Ethical Hedonism.—Bentham and J. S. Mill are advocates of psychological hedonism. They hold that men always seek pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure is the normal object of their desire. But Sidgwick urges that this doctrine involves paradox of hedonism. "The impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim" (*Sidgwick*). He points out that even when we do desire pleasure, the best way to get it is often to forget it. This is especially true of 'the pleasures of pursuit.' So Sidgwick rejects phychological hedonism and advocates ethical hedonism. Pleasure is not the normal object of desire. But it is the proper object of desire. It is the ultimate good. It is the only thing that has intrinsic value. All other goods are subordinate to it. "When we sit down in a cool hour we perceive that there is nothing which it is reasonable to seek—*i. e.*, nothing which is desirable in itself—except pleasure." Sidgwick does not argue, like J. S. Mill, that pleasure is desirable because it is desired by men. He argues that reason tells us that pleasure is the highest good which is desirable in itself. It is an intuition of reason.

Rational Utilitarianism—Sidgwick holds that it is an intuition of conscience or practical reason that pleasure or happiness is the highest good. It is a deliverance of practical reason. This is an element of Intuitionism or Rationalism in Sidgwick's doctrine. Conscience gives us intuition not only of the ultimate good, but also supplies us with the principles of its distribution, *viz.*, prudence, benevolence, and justice. These are the principles of distribution of happiness. The highest good, according to Sidgwick, is sentient in nature ; it consists in a desirable state of consciousness called pleasure or happiness. But the knowledge of it is given by rational intuition, and not by experience. And the principles of its organisation also are supplied by reason. Thus Sidgwick advocates Rational Utilitarianism as distinguished from Bentham and J. S. Mill's empirical utilitarianism.

"Sidgwick gives up altogether the attempt to find the ultimate end of action by 'induction'; he sees that no accumulation of observed sequences, no experience of what *is*, no prediction of what *will be*, can possibly prove what *ought to be* ......He recognizes that Morality is based upon rational and *a priori* judgments of value. In so far as the motive of moral action in the individual is concerned, Sidgwick is in fact an '*Intuitionist*' or '*Rationalist*'. He is a *Hedonist* only in his view of the nature of ultimate or universal Good, and consequently in his view of the moral criterion" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 53). He gives a rationalistic theory of duty and a hedonistic conception of the true good of man.

Prudence, Benevolence, and Justice are the three rational principles of the distribution of happiness in our individual and social life.

Prudence or Rational Self-love—Mere self-love dictates the pursuit of momentary pleasures. But reason educates and enlightens the instinctive self-love, and enjoins the pursuit of a happy life. We should be impartial in the treatment of all the moments of our lives; and in choosing our own pleasures, we should give equal consideration to the future as well as the present. We should not prefer a smaller present good to a greater future good. We should sacrifice the present pleasure in order to obtain greater pleasure in future. We ought to aim at our happiness on the whole—total happiness rather than momentary pleasures. Rational self-love dictates "an impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life". "A smaller present good is not to be preferred to a greater future good" (*Sidgwick*). Our good is not the pleasure of the moment, but of our total life. This is the principle of rational self-love or prudence which helps us to distribute happiness in our own individual life.

Benevolence.—Benevolence tells us that the pleasures of others ought to be regarded as of equal weight with our own. Experience cannot bridge the gulf between egoism and altruism,

—the individual's happiness and the general happiness. Reason supplies the link between them. Pleasure or happiness is the only thing that has intrinsic value. It is the ultimate rational good. Therefore, happiness of others is as valuable as our own. We should be impartial to the happiness of all persons. We should not prefer our own smaller happiness to the greater happiness of others. As to the eye of reason, every moment of the individual life has its equal right to satisfaction, so each individual, each sentient being, has an equal right to consideration. "Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own." "I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good of another" (*Sidgwick*). Reason dictates that each individual should aim at the greatest pleasure on the whole, and that he should sacrifice his private pleasure to procure a greater pleasure for the whole. "The greater pleasure must always be preferable to the less pleasure, even though the promotion of the greatest pleasure on the whole should demand that this or that individual should sacrifice some of his private pleasure" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 45). Reason cannot dictate that each should pursue his private pleasure even if loss of pleasure on the whole is involved. This is the principle of Benevolence which helps us to distribute happiness between ourselves and others.

Justice.—Justice or Equity supplements the principles of Rational Self-love or Prudence and Benevolence in order to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of happiness among the competing moments of the individual life and among competing individuals. We are not equally capable of enjoyment at all moments of our life. And all persons are not equally capable of enjoyment. So we should discriminate among different moments of our life. And we should discriminate among different persons. Justice or equity does not exclude inequality. It takes into consideration the capacities

and merits of competing persons. Those who have greater capacities for enjoyment, *e. g.*, intellectuals, artists, mechanics, etc., should be given greater opportunities for attaining happiness. "Whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances." "Similar cases should be treated similarly" (*Sidgwick*). Some moments in our individual life are more important than others, because they have a larger capacity for pleasure. Some individuals are capable of greater enjoyment than others. All persons are not absolutely equal. So justice directs us to aim at the greatest total happiness or the greatest happiness on the whole in the life of the individual or in that of the race. We should give preference to some moments in the individual life which are capable of greater enjoyment. We should give preference to some persons who are capable of greater enjoyment in order to ensure the greatest total happiness.

Thus Prudence enjoins the happiness of one's whole life, and not of the passing moments. Benevolence dictates the happiness of mankind, and not of the individuals only. Justice inculcates the greater happiness of the more worthy to ensure the greatest happiness on the whole.

Dualism of Practical Reason.—Sidgwick cannot reconcile the claims of egoism with those of altruism. Prudence dictates the pursuit of our own greatest happiness on the whole. Benevolence dictates the pursuit of the greatest happiness of mankind as a whole. Thus, the two rational principles give us conflicting recommendations. Sidgwick himself admits that there is a conflict between two different commands of reason. He calls it "*the Dualism of Practical Reason.*" "What is primarily our good is our own pleasure ; and it is only in a secondary way that we discover that the pleasure of others ought to be equally regarded. Now, this secondary discovery cannot overthrow the first primary truth. Hence we are

bound still to regard our own pleasure as a supreme good. For this reason, Sidgwick considered that there is a certain contradiction or dualism in the final recommendations of reason. We are bound to seek our own greatest pleasure, and yet we are bound also to seek the greatest pleasure of the aggregate of sentient beings" (*Mackenzie*). Sidgwick cannot remove this contradiction between the two recommendations of reason.

Thus, Sidgwick blends Utilitarianism with Rationalism or Intuitionism, and hence his doctrine is called Rational Utilitarianism.

2. Criticism of Rational Utilitarianism.

Sidgwick wrongly holds that pleasure or happiness is the ultimate good,—pleasure alone has intrinsic value, everything else being subsidiary to it. The ultimate good cannot be pleasure or the sentient good. It cannot satisfy the self which is both sentient and rational. Sidgwick wrongly regards feeling as the essential element in human nature. Reason and will are the essential elements. "The Man is Reason, Feeling, Will ; and the ideal state for man is an ideal state of all three elements in his nature in their ideal relation to one another" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 78). Sidgwick means by pleasure "desirable conciousness". But a rational being cannot regard pleasure as what should be desired, since pleasure cannot satisfy reason. It is self-contradictory to hold that reason prescribes the good to itself, which is non-rational or irrational. The supreme good is not pleasure but perfection which satisfies sensibility as well as reason. Pleasure is the *sense* of value ; it is not value itself ; an object is a value, which is evaluated, and evaluation is accompanied by pleasure.

We ought not to aim at happiness for its own sake. We ought to pursue knowledge, culture, beauty, virtue or moral excellence which have intrinsic value and satisfy the spiritual

cravings of the self. Happiness is an index of self-realisation or self-fulfilment. It is a sign of the realisation of the intrinsic values. Sidgwick emphasizes the importance of feeling at the cost of knowing and willing. But, in fact, knowing and willing are as important as feeling. Knowledge and Virtue are intrinsic values. They are not mere means to Happiness.

Sidgwick cannot reconcile egoism with altruism. He himself admits it. He thinks that there is a contradiction between the recommendations of the principles of prudence and benevolence. He calls it '*the dualism of practical reason*'. He cannot reconcile egoism with altruism because he regards the sentient good or happiness as the highest good. From the standpoint of happiness we cannot reconcile egoism with altruism. From the hedonistic standpoint, "there is no road from *each* for himself to each for *all*", as Martineau says. Eudæmonism can reconcile egoism with altruism effectively. Self-realisation is possible only through self-sacrifice. The more a person negates his merely private and particular self and identifies himself with the wider life of the community, nation, and humanity, the more he realizes his truer, higher, rational or social self. From the standpoint of the higher self, every person or ego finds in every other his *alter ego*, his own counterpart.

Sidgwick's three principles treat chiefly of the quantitative side of ethics. "They do not state what is *good* in specific instances. They merely teach that a *greater* amount of good, whenever, or wherever, or to whomever it is available, is always morally preferable to a *lesser* amount ; persons, places, and times are to be viewed impartially" (Wright : *General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 292). As quantitative principles, the three axioms may be accepted as true in the distribution of the various kinds of goods.

Sidgwick's "Rational Utilitarianism" is an incoherent blending of Hedonism with Rationalism, Utilitarianism with

Intuitionism. Conscience or Practical Reason gives us the ultimate good, and yet it is pleasure or happiness which does not necessarily satisfy reason. Reason gives us the ultimate good which is non-rational or irrational in character. Sidgwick wrongly holds that Knowledge and Virtue are instrumental values ; they are means to Happiness which is the only intrinsic good. Knowledge and Virtue are intrinsic values. He fails to recognize them as intrinsic goods, because he wrongly assumes that there are no other elements in consciousness besides feelings, or that knowing and willing do not possess ultimate value. *Virtue* is an end in itself. It consists in the regulation of desires by reason according to a rational ideal of life. Character is an end in itself. It depends upon the habitual direction of the will. It includes knowing and feeling too. But the will is the most important factor in character. Character is the result of repeated free volitions. Good character is an intrinsic good. In other words, Virtue is a good or end in itself. It is excellence of character.

Sidgwick fails to reconcile a hedonistic conception of the 'good' and consequently a hedonistic criterion of morality with an 'intuitional' or rational basis or ultimate ground of morality. The 'dualism of Practical Reason' cannot be bridged over without the admission of Virtue or character as an element and the highest element of the 'good' which it is right to promote for the whole human race.

Sidgwick regards pleasure or happiness as the only good, and yet he maintains that there are ends of action other than pleasure. He sometimes speaks of 'pleasurableness' of objects and sometimes of their 'reasonableness'. But he himself admits that these are two different standards. In fact, Sidgwick undermines hedonism when he tries to establish it on the foundation of reason. "Rational Utilitarianism" seems to be self-contradictory. The contradictions in Hedonism or Utilita-

rianism can be removed from the standpoint of Eudæmonism which recognizes the claims of sensibility as well as reason. The inherent contradictions in empirical Hedonism or Utilitarianism cannot be removed by Sidgwick's Rational Utilitarianism which is an ill-assorted jumble of incoherent ideas.

CHAPTER XII

INTUITIONISM

1. Unphilosophical Intuitionism.

Intuitionism is the theory that conscience immediately and intuitively perceives the rightness or wrongness of particular actions without reference to their ends and consequences. Sidgwick calls this form of intuitionism unphilosophical intuitionism. Actions are right or wrong in themselves according to their own intrinsic nature, not in virtue of any *ends* outside themselves, which they seek to realize. Conscience immediately perceives their rightness or wrongness without considering their relations to any *ends* outside them. Conscience is the moral faculty ; it immediately apprehends rightness or wrongness of particular actions irrespective of any ends and their consequences. The moral quality is unique and *sui generis.* It is not reducible to truth, beauty, pleasureableness, or social utility. It is original and underived. It is apprehended intuitively by conscience. "Conscience is an over-present dictator issuing detailed injunctions to meet particular cases as they arise" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 80). This is the doctrine of unphilosophical or dogmatic intuitionism.

Intuitionism refers moral judgments to the tribunal of conscience, which admits of no question or appeal. Conscience is the *universal* faculty in all persons. It is not the conscience

of this or that individual. "The conscience of any particular individual is simply the consciousness of the harmony or disharmony of his action with his own standard of right : and if his standard is defective, the same defect will appear in the conscience. His conscience may be, in Ruskin's phrase, 'the conscience of an ass'. The man who does not act conscientiously certainly acts wrongly : he does not conform even to his own standard of rightness. But a man may act conscientiously and yet act wrongly, on account of some imperfection in his standard" (Mackenzie : *Manual of Ethics*, p. 149). Therefore, conscience, which is the standard of moral judgment, is the *universal conscience* in the individual.

Muirhead mentions the following common elements in intuitional theories. (1) "Conscience is something ultimately *simple* and underived. (2) Its judgments are *intuitive*. Acts of fraud and cowardice are condemned, acts of truthfulness, courage, self-restraint are approved, without reason sought or assigned. (3) Hence its peculiar *authority*, commanding our allegiance irrespective of all secondary considerations of pleasure or utility. (4) Hence, too, its *universality*. It is found among all races, the lowest as well as the highest, and in all moral individuals" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 79). But this does not mean that it is found everywhere in equally developed form, in every individual.

2. Criticism of Unphilosophical Intuitionism.

If certain acts are right and others are wrong without any reason,—if the injunctions of the moral faculty are wholly arbitrary and do not follow from any general or rational principle, then moral judgments are reduced to an arbitrary caprice which is not compatible with the belief in any objective standard of duty.

If conscience is supposed to vary its judgment in accordance with the circumstances of the case, and if all persons' consciences are supposed to pronounce the same judgments under similar

circumstances in proportion to their enlightenment, then there must be some *rule* or *principle* by which we may distinguish between circumstances which do and circumstances which do not alter our duty, however little this rule or principle may be present in an abstract form to the moral consciousness of the individual. It must be possible to discover the *general principles* upon which particular moral judgments are based, by analysis of these judgments. Unphilosophical intuitionism tends to pass into philosophical intuitionism, since it appeals to general principles of morality.

Granted that conscience intuitively apprehends rightness or wrongness of particular actions, we may still ask why we should trust to blind unreasoning impulses which refuse to give any rational account of themselves. Even if such moral judgments exist, whence comes their validity? If they are said to be deliverances of moral reason, is it really rational to act without consideration of ends and consequences? Rational action is action with a clear conception of our ultimate *end* or purpose and consideration of the means which seem best adapted to attain that end. Moral judgments without reference to ends and consequences are arbitrary and irrational, and therefore untrustworthy.

"The moral notions which have seemed equally innate, self-evident and authoritative to those who held them have varied enormously with different races, different ages, different individuals—even with the same individuals at different periods of life" (*Rashdall*). We honour fathers and mothers. But there were races which deemed it sacred duty to eat them. Pious Puritans did not think it wrong to kidnap Negroes or shoot Irishmen. Stealing cattle from neighbouring city states was not considered a crime in ancient Greece. Intuitionism cannot account for the diversity of moral judgments in regard to the same acts.

Even if some moral judgments are found to be common to all or most men of a certain race or age, the *moral rules*

which they enjoin are found to be incapable of exact definition. "All, or nearly all, detailed moral rules have some exceptions." For example, "thou shalt not kill" except in self-defence, lawful war, and judicial execution. Apparently clear intuitions of conscience must give way before clearly foreseen evil consequences. For example, speaking the truth to a murderer about the whereabouts of his intended victim is evidently wrong, because it leads to a disastrous consequence.

The above considerations lead to the recognition of the truth that every rule must have some reference to *consequences*. We cannot distinguish an act from its present or foreseeable consequences. "The consequences, in so far as they can be foreseen are actually part of the act. You cannot carry out any rule whatever without *some* consideration of consequences" (*Rashdall*). You cannot obey the rule of Benevolence without asking whether giving money to a beggar in the street will ultimately do him good.

Where there are contradictory moral intuitions we are bound to appeal to *ends* and *consequences*. In the presence of conflicting moral judgments, we must appeal to a rational end which will resolve the conflict, and consider the consequences conducive or injurious to the welfare of mankind. Thus particular actions cannot be regarded as right or wrong in themselves irrespective of ends and consequences.

Lastly, "the Intuitionist pronounces intuitive judgment upon *acts*; our intuitions relate to *ends*; his take the form 'this is *right*'; ours always the form 'this is *good*'" (*Rashdall*). Intuitionism regards right as the supreme moral category; it regards a certain act as right in its own right irrespective of any other considerations. But this is wrong. 'Right' is a means to 'Good'. What is right is right because it is a means to the realisation of the good. The good is the supreme moral category. (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I. pp. 80-91). Thus unphilosophical intuitionism is dogmatic and unreflective.

It is the uncritical assertion of the validity of current popular notions of morality.

Dogmatic or unphilosophical intuitionism regards conscience as *sensuous* and moral judgments as intuitive and *perceptual.*

This theory takes two forms, *viz.*, (*a*) the Moral Sense Theory and (*b*) the Æsthetic Sense Theory.

3. (A) The Moral Sense Theory.

According to this theory we perceive the moral quality of an action immediately through conscience or *moral sense.* The rightness of an action is perceived immediately through the agreeable feeling of approval produced by it in conscience. The wrongness of an action is perceived through the disagreeable feeling of disapproval produced by it in conscience. Thus rightness and wrongness of actions are immediately perceived through moral feelings or sentiments awakened by them in conscience. Conscience is a faculty of internal perception, which immediately recognizes the moral qualities of acts. Just as we perceive the sensible qualities of external things immediately through the external senses, so we perceive the moral qualities of actions immediately through the internal moral sense. We perceive the sensible qualities of external things through sensations produced by them in the mind ; likewise we perceive the moral qualities of actions through moral feelings produced by them in the mind. Moral sentiments precede moral judgments. Moral judgments depend upon moral sentiments. Feeling of approval is an index of rightness of an action. Feeling of disapproval is an index of wrongness of an action. This doctrine is called the Moral Sense Theory.

The Moral Sense Theory is open to the following objections :—

This theory represents conscience as wholly *sui generis*—distinct alike from intellectual judgment and æsthetic judgment. It regards it as the *moral sense* which is a special sense apprehending rightness or wrongness of actions. It makes morality

depend upon a kind of feeling,—a specific feeling. Moral approbation is a feeling wholly *sui generis*, arising from the apprehension of right actions ; moral disapprobation is a feeling, arising from the apprehension of wrong actions.

"If moral approbation is a mere feeling, how can it claim any superiority over other feelings ?" (*Rashdall*). If it is a feeling superior in kind, to sensuous feelings, and therefore ought to be obeyed, then it is something more than mere feeling,—it embodies a judgment of *value*, a dictate of *Reason*. "It is not the feeling which claims obedience, but the judgment which assigns a value to that feeling" (*Rashdall*).

If morality depends upon feeling, moral perceptions cannot have *universal validity*. "Inconsistent or contradictory feelings, *qua* feelings are equally true and valid for those who feel them" (*Rashdall*). Feelings as feelings are not 'true' or 'false' at all ; but judgments based upon them are true or false. Now, if a right act simply means an act which excites in me a particular kind of feeling which I call moral approbation, it is undeniable that feeling of approbation is excited in different men by different, and even opposite, kinds of action. "A Spanish bull-fight excites feelings of enthusiastic approval in the minds of most Spaniards and feelings of lively disapproval in most Englishmen" (*Rashdall*). Different men pass different moral judgments on the same acts. If the conscience of the individual is infallible, how can there be diversity of moral judgments ? And if there is diversity of moral judgments in regard to the same acts, how can moral judgments have objective validity ? If moral judgments have objective validity, they do not depend upon mere feelings of approbation and disapprobation. They depend upon moral evaluation by *reason*.

"Just as knowledge implies more than feeling, so, if Morality is to possess any universal truth or validity, moral perceptions must be regarded as judgments. The specific moral feeling can be at most merely the occasion or index by which we are

enabled to make the judgment, it cannot be its soul source. The essential idea of '*good*' cannot come from *feeling*, though feeling may sometimes be psychologically the cause or occasion of my pronouncing this or that particular act to be right or good" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 146). Moral perceptions involve moral judgments. Moral judgments are passed by conscience or *moral reason* with reference to the end or good of the self. Morality, therefore, cannot depend upon mere feeling. Moreover, 'right' is a means to 'good'. *Reason* gives us the idea of the *good* which satisfies the demands of all elements in the self.

Moral judgments cannot depend upon moral sentiments. Moral sentiments are feelings and as such subjective and variable. They are most unreliable of all mental functions. Therefore they cannot be the basis of moral judgments which are comparatively uniform.

Moreover, moral sentiments are altered by the correction of moral judgments. Hence moral judgments cannot depend upon moral sentiments. The moral sense theory is incompatible with the detection of error in moral judgments.

The moral sense theory cannot adequately account for the sense of duty or feeling of moral obligation. The mere fact that an action excites in us a feeling of approval does not explain why we should be under obligation to perform it. Feeling by itself is blind ; it does not bind anyone to do anything.

The theory cannot account for penitence and conversion which express a change wrought in the soul by rational conviction. Thus the moral sense theory is not tenable.

4. (B) The Æsthetic Sense Theory.

According to the Æsthetic Sense Theory, Beauty is the ultimate standard of morality. It reduces rightness to beauty, and wrongness to deformity. These moral qualities are apprehended immediately by the æsthetic sense. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Herbart, Ruskin and others are advocates of this

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theory. "What is beautiful, is harmonious and proportionable ; what is harmonious and proportionable is true ; and what is beautiful and true is agreeable and good." "Beauty and good are one and the same" (*Shaftesbury*). Hutcheson also speaks of "the moral beauty and deformity of actions". Similarly Ruskin says : "Taste is not only the index of morality ; it is the only morality. Tell me what you like, and I will tell you what you are." Herbart also insisted strongly on the identity of goodness with beauty. The moral faculty or conscience is the *æsthetic sense* which immediately apprehends the beauty and deformity of actions.

"Æstheticism assumes either (*a*) an *individualistic* type, as in Herbart and Ruskin, or *universalistic* form, as in Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. In the one case the moral estimate is essentially connected with the personal experience of an individual, while in the other it is connected with universal benevolence or general well-being" (A. C. Mitra : *Elements of Morals*, p. 384). Æsthetic taste is a matter of feeling. The æsthetic taste of some persons is good, while that of others is defective. Different persons have different æsthetic tastes. So Shaftesbury and Hutcheson did not think the æsthetic sense to be a sufficient basis for morality. "They both sought to explain it as due to the nature of man as a *social* being. They both thought that what a cultivated moral taste approves is that which is beneficial to *society* as a whole, what tends to bring about '*the greatest happiness of the greatest number*'. All that they urged was that it is not necessary to reflect upon this principle, since it is naturally embodied in any cultivated taste" (Mackenzie : *Manual of Ethics*, pp. 146-47).

The Æsthetic Sense Theory is open to the following objections :—

Æsthetic and moral sentiments are disinterested and agreeable. We love the beautiful and the good for their own sake. But still goodness and rightness cannot be identified with

beauty. "Beauty may fascinate but cannot command." It cannot lay us under any obligation to appreciate it. The essence of moral consciousness is *moral obligation*. It is lacking in the æsthetic sentiment of beauty. Again, performance of duty often involves an element of pain—to control a hostile desire and overcome a temptation. But appreciation of beauty is agreeable, and does not involve an element of pain.

The estimate of beauty primarily rests on feeling which is subjective and variable. Therefore it is not uniform. But the moral standard is comparatively uniform and constant. So Beauty is not identical with Good.

What can excite æsthetic sentiments may not be able to excite moral sentiments. Harmony and proportion may excite æsthetic sentiments. Therefore, beauty and virtue are not the same.

Beauty is not identical with goodness. The beautiful are not necessarily the right. Vulgar songs, indecent dances, obscene pictures, and immoral dramas may be beautiful ; but they are not morally justifiable.

Moral experience has certain peculiarities which are lacking in æsthetic experience, *e. g.*, the feelings of approval and disapproval, consciousness of merit and demerit, etc. We never attribute merit or demerit to a person for appreciating the beauty of objects or failing to appreciate it. We do not feel compunction if we fail to appreciate beauty. We do not feel disapprobation when we fail to appreciate beauty. A person who is devoid of, or deficient in, the æsthetic sense may be a respectable member of society. But a person who is devoid of the moral sense is condemned by all who have it. Therefore Beauty and Good are not the same (A. C. Mitra : *Elements of Morals*, pp. 383-87).

The moral sense cannot be reduced to the æsthetic sense. The authoritativeness of the moral sense is not sufficiently brought out when it is reduced to the æsthetic sense. The

estimate of *duty* cannot be reduced to mere '*relish*' (*Price*). Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were alive to this defect of the æsthetic sense. Hence they sought to connect it with general well-being or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. They supported *æstheticism* by *altruistic hedonism.* Hence their doctrine is open to all the objections to altruistic hedonism.

Æsthetic judgments and moral judgments are judgments of value. Both are *objective.* Beauty and ugliness exist in external objects and acts of persons, as rightness and wrongness exist in voluntary actions of persons. But æsthetic judgments are more *subjective* than moral judgments. "For they seem to be more closely connected with the variable physiological organisation of individuals than ethical judgments" (*Rashdall*). For instance, the restful feeling of green for human beings is due to its effects on the human eyes and nerves of its frequency in Nature, while the disturbing effect of red is due to its infrequency in Nature. "Æsthetic judgments do seem to be more intimately connected with, and inseparable from, sensations which presuppose a particular physiological organisation than the most fundamental moral judgments" (*Rashdall*).

Moral judgments are passed on all spheres of human activity. Their sphere is all-embracing. "There can be no department of human life, no kind of human consciousness or experience, upon which the moral reason may not pronounce its judgments of value" (*Rashdall*). But æsthetic judgments cover only a part of human activity. They are confined to appreciation of beauty and ugliness of objects in Nature and acts of persons. Moral judgments are *higher* than æsthetic judgments. They are passed on æsthetic creations. Art ought to be subservient to Morality. The interests of Art ought to give way to the claims of social duty. There are plays which are not devoid of æsthetic value. But they are immoral, and are therefore prohibited by the State in the interests of public morality.

What kinds of art is it good to produce? Within what limits the æsthetic indulgence should be restrained in the interests of wholesome moral feeling? These are moral questions. Therefore Morality is superior to Art. It deals with ultimate ends or elements in the end. No æsthetic indulgence repugnant to the true ultimate end can be justified.

What is the relation between the moral judgment and the æsthetic judgment? The æsthetic judgment tells us 'this is beautiful'. The moral judgment tells us 'this particular kind of Beauty has an intrinsic worth, and consequently ought to be pursued'. The æsthetic judgment is concerned with a particular kind of beauty. The moral judgment is concerned with its intrinsic worth for the welfare of the self. It is concerned with moral evaluation of a particular kind of beauty.

When there is a collision between æsthetic judgments and moral judgments, the former should give way to the latter. Beauty satisfies a part of human nature. Morality satisfies the whole of human nature. What is æsthetically good but morally bad, appeals to and satisfies a part of our nature, which considered apart from the ideal of human nature as a whole we pronounce good. But when we compare it with the welfare of the whole of our nature, we fail to approve of it and pronounce it morally bad. Immoral æsthetic enjoyments cannot be justified, since they are injurious to the welfare of the self. Therefore the moral sense cannot be reduced to the æsthetic sense, and Morality cannot be reduced to Art. Æstheticism makes morality a matter of taste and takes away from its objectivity and universality (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, pp. 177-80).

5. Martineau's Psychological Classification of the Springs of Action.

Martineau advocates a doctrine which is akin to the Moral Sense Theory. He first gives a psychological classification of the springs of action. Then he gives an ethical gradation of the

springs of action, which determines the rightness or wrongness of an action.

Martineau calls springs of action motives. He regards them as impulses to action. First he distinguishes between the Primary and Secondary Springs of Action. The *Primary Springs of Action* are those impulses which are generated by natural instincts and urge us to seek their appropriate objects without reflection. The *Secondary Springs of Action* are the impulses originally generated by natural instincts but subsequently modified by experience and reflection, which urge us to seek their objects for the sake of pleasure afforded by them. In the Primary Springs of Action there is no reflection or preconception of an end. In the Secondary Springs of Action there is reflection or preconception of an end gratifying to some feeling. When a person is urged by instinctive hunger to take food for nourishment, he has a primary spring of action. But when after satisfying his hunger he takes a particular kind of food for the pleasure of the palate, he has a secondary spring of action; his instinctive hunger is transformed into artificial hunger.

I. The *Primary Springs of Action* are of the following four kinds :—

(1) *Primary Propensions.* They are the impulses generated by natural instincts for self-preservation and perpetuation of the race. They include (*i*) the *Organic Appetites* such as hunger, thirst, and sex instinct, and (*ii*) *Animal Spontaneity* or the natural impulse towards physical exercise, alternating with rest. They are excited by agreeable and attractive objects.

(2) *Primary Passions.* They are excited by "painful and uncongenial" objects. They are of the nature of *repulsions*, thrusting away what is hurtful, or withdrawing us from them. They include—(*i*) *Antipathy* or natural revulsion towards a present hurtful object ; (*ii*) *Anger* or natural aversion towards that which has hurt us ; (*iii*) *Fear* or natural aversion towards that which threatens us with future danger or evil.

(3) *Primary Affections.* They are natural *attractions* towards other persons or animals reminding us of our species. They are naturally directed towards persons like ourselves. They are sometimes directed towards animals which are regarded as quasi-personal or kindred to our species. They imply reciprocity of feelings. They include—(*i*) *Parental Affection* or natural sympathy of parents for their children ; (*ii*) *Social Affection* or sympathy for other persons who are regarded as our brethren ; (*iii*) *Compassionate Affection* or sympathy for persons or animals in distress.

(4) *Primary Sentiments.* They are natural aspirations towards the ideals of Truth, Beauty and Good. They include—(*i*) *Wonder, intellectual sentiment,* or the natural impulse to enquire into the nature and causes of events ; (*ii*) *Admiration, æsthetic sentiment,* or the natural impulse to appreciate and enjoy beauty ; (*iii*) *Reverence, moral sentiment,* or the natural impulse to revere the Moral Ideal, or what is good in the character of rational beings. This is at the root of our endeavour to become perfect.

II. The corresponding *Secondary Springs of Action* are the following :—

(1) *Secondary Propensions.* They are due to the transformation of the primary propensions, through experience and association. They include—(*i*) *Gluttony* or tendency to seek palatable food for the sake of the pleasure of the palate, even when we are not pressed by hunger ; (*ii*) *Voluptuousness* or love of sensual delights, even when we are not prompted by the sex instinct ; (*iii*) *Love of play or exercise* (*e. g.*, riding, walking, etc.) for the sake of pleasure, even when we are not prompted by animal spontaneity ; (*iv*) *Love of ease* ; (*v*) *Love of power* ; (*vi*) *Love of money.* Money and power are at first sought as means to pleasure ; but afterwards they are sought for their own sakes according to the law of transference of interest. Gluttony is a modification of instinct for seeking food.

Voluptuousness is a modification of the sex instinct. Love of play and ease is a modification of animal spontaneity.

(2) *Secondary Passions.* They are acquired repulsions. They are due to the transformation of instinctive repulsions through experience and association. They include—(*i*) *Malice* or *Censoriousness*, or tendency to find fault with others ; (*ii*) *Vindictiveness*, *Resentment*, or tendency to cherish anger against persons who have hurt us and to do harm to them ; (*iii*) *Suspiciousness*, *Mistrust*, or tendency to suspect other persons and to apprehend harm or danger from them. Malice is a modification of antipathy. Vindictiveness is a modification of anger. Suspiciousness is a modification of fear.

(3) *Secondary Affections or Sentimentality.* They are perversions of natural or primary affections. When we indulge in affections for children, companions and friends, and persons in distress, not for their good, but for the sake of pleasure we derive from them, we have secondary affections. They include —(*i*) *Love of self-regarding play with children* ; (*ii*) *Love for the delights of social intercourse* ; (*iii*) *Love for exciting and indulging pity.* They are modifications of primary parental affection, social affection, and compassion. These primary affections degenerate into sentimentality.

(4) *Secondary Sentiments.* When we seek the ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Good, not for their own sake, but for the sake of pleasure we derive from them, we have secondary sentiments. They include—(*i*) *Love of Self-culture* or tendency to seek truth or knowledge for the sake of pleasure we derive from our intellectual pursuits ; (*ii*) *Love of Art* or *Æstheticism* or tendency to seek beautiful objects for the sake of pleasure we derive from the exercise of æsthetic taste ; (*iii*) *Interest in Morality and Religion* or fondness for moral and religious discussions for the sake of pleasure we derive from them. Love of self-culture is a modification of wonder or primary intellectual sentiment. Love of Art is a modification of admira-

tion or primary æsthetic sentiment. Interest in Morality and Religion is a modification of reverence or primary moral sentiment. *Compound Springs of Action* spring out of the primary and secondary springs of action by combination according to the laws of association.

Martineau's psychological classification of springs of action is open to the following objections :—

Martineau shows great psychological insight in the exposition of the different kinds of springs of action. But his scheme is not exhaustive. He has not included *filial*, *fraternal*, and *conjugal affections* in his list of primary affections. He has not mentioned *prudential* and *rational* or moral *impulses*. Prudence seeks enjoyment and self-aggrandisement. Reason or conscience seeks self-restraint and self-sacrifice. Prudential impulse is a tendency to seek what is pleasant or useful, regardless of its moral worth. Rational or moral impulse is a tendency to seek what is right, regardless of gain or loss. Martineau regards anger and fear as primary impulses. But they are now regarded as primary emotions. Anger springs out of the instinct to fight. Fear springs out of the instinct to escape. Martineau regards sentiments as *active* impulses. But they are regarded now as *quiet* in their nature. They arise from the contemplation of the ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Good. They generate impulses. But they themselves are not active impulses. An impulse is a tendency to act arising from a feeling of uneasiness due to a feeling of want. An impulse is generated by an emotion and a sentiment also. Martineau calls the springs of action motives. But a motive is not a feeling, an emotion, or a sentiment ; it is an object aimed at, which *induces* us to act. Mere blind feelings, such as fear and anger, do not constitute motives at all ; they are not inducements to action. What induces us to act is the idea of some end to be attained. Martineau's list of springs of action is based on the *Faculty Psychology* which has been

thrown overboard. Modern Psychology regards the human mind as an organic unity of interdependent functions. There are no independent and separate faculties in the mind, such as seem to be implied in Martineau's list. Martineau's classification has considerable merit ; but it is based upon old psychology which is erroneous.

6. Martineau's Ethical Classification of the Springs of Action.

Martineau gives the following list of the springs of action in the ascending order of moral worth from the lowest to the highest.

Lowest

1. Secondary Passions—Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions—Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.
3. Primary Organic Propensions—Appetites for food and sex.
4. Primary Animal Propensions—Spontaneous Activity (unselective).
5. Love of Gain (reflective derivative from Appetite).
6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings).
7. Primary Passions—Antipathy, Fear, Anger.
8. Secondary Animal Propensions—Love of Power or Ambition, Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments—Love of Culture.
10. Primary Sentiments—Wonder and Admiration.
11. Primary Affections—Parental love, Social friendship, Generosity, Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.

Highest

"The springs of action have a fixed and unalterable order of moral worth, and form a hierarchy of rank, rising one above another in a scale of moral worth, from the secondary passions or acquired repulsions (malevolent impulses) at the bottom to the moral sentiment or reverence at the top" (*Martineau*). The secondary passions or malevolent impulses are the lowest in the scale ; they are tendencies to love evil for its own sake. Secondary organic propensions or acquired propensities, such as love of eating and drinking, love of ease etc. for the sake of pleasure they yield, are higher than the secondary passions. Primary organic propensions or natural appetites for food and drink and sex are higher than secondary organic propensions, since they are necessary for self-preservation and preservation of the race. Primary organic propension of animal spontaneity or physical exercise is higher than the natural organic appetites. Higher than these is love of gain because it involves intellectual exercise and wealth is a means to benevolence. Secondary affections or sentimental sympathetic feelings are higher than these, because they involve unselfishness. Primary passions are higher than these, because they are natural repulsions for present, past, or future evils. Higher than these are love of power or ambition and love of liberty, because they involve self-control, prudence, wisdom and self-sacrifice. Higher than these are secondary sentiments such as love of culture or fondness for intellectual exercise, because they involve the exercise of the higher faculty of intellect. Higher than these are the primary sentiments of wonder and admiration because they seek to attain truth and beauty. Higher than these are primary affections, such as parental love and social friendship. Higher than these is the primary affection of compassion for the distressed. Higher than compassion is the primary sentiment of reverence for the Good. Reverence is at the top ; secondary passions are at the bottom.

Martineau holds that "composite impulses can owe their moral worth and rank to nothing else than the constituents of their formation, and that worth must be proportioned to the aggregate value of those constituents" (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 235).

According to Martineau, moral quality is found in voluntary actions only. In every voluntary action there is a conflict of 'motives' or impulses. When there is such a conflict, conscience intuitively apprehends one of the impulses as higher and the other as lower. Our duty lies in choosing the higher and rejecting the lower. "Every action is *right*, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a *higher* ; every action is *wrong*, which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a *lower*" (*Ibid*, p. 270). If there is no conflict of impulses, conscience cannot apprehend their moral worth. "Their moral valuation intuitively results from their simultaneous appearance." Martineau holds that impulses have degrees of moral worth. If we choose a lower impulse in preference to a higher impulse in the moral scale, our action is wrong. But if we choose the same impulse in preference to a still lower impulse, our action is right. The springs of action or impulses are arranged in a hierarchy of moral rank. "Every one of them lying between a lower and a higher, is *right* in competition with the former, *wrong* when resisting the latter, and cannot be judged without reference to its alternative" (*Martineau*). Thus the rightness or wrongness of an action depends upon the position of the impulse in the moral scale as compared with its alternative, which it chooses in preference to the latter. Is it right to be angry ? With what impulse has anger come into conflict ? Suppose it clashes with a secondary social affection, an impulse to cultivate social pleasure with a person of scandalous conduct. Then it is right to be angry. It is wrong to suppress anger for the sake of the pleasure of low company. Suppose anger clashes with compassion, excited by the sight of a repentant sinner. Then it is wrong to be angry.

Martineau's theory of conscience is a modified form of the moral sense theory. Conscience is an innate sensibility to the various gradations of the impulses in the moral scale. It intuitively apprehends the moral worth of an impulse chosen by an action in preference to another conflicting impulse. When we are conscious that one spring of action is superior to another, we feel a moral obligation to choose the higher impulse and reject the lower Thus conscience is a faculty of direct apprehension or intuition of rightness and wrongness of actions. It is not a faculty of inference. Moral judgment is intuitive. It is not inferential. Conscience is also a faculty of moral obligation. It reveals a gradation of moral worth of springs of action, which we ought to accept because it is a revelation of the Divine Will to us. Conscience is the voice of God in man. God is the source of moral obligation. We have discussed Martineau's theory of moral obligation in connection with the relation of morality to religion.

Martineau's Intuitionism is open to the following objections :—

Martineau's ethical theory is a kind of Moral Sense theory. So it shares all the defects of this theory. Martineau wrongly speaks of springs of action as motives. Impulses cannot be regarded as motives. Motives are ideas of ends which induce us to act. Motives, in this sense, have moral worth. But impulses, irrespective of *ends*, have no moral worth.

The gradation of impulses as lower and higher according to their moral worth is said to be intuitively apprehended by conscience. This is far from true. The ethical gradation of the springs of action is not the object of immediate apprehension. It is a product of Martineau's philosophical reflection. Ethics, as a science, cannot be satisfied with a mere catalogue of intuitions. It must explain them by general principles, and deduce them from the moral ideal. Ethics cannot be satisfied with the bare statement that one spring of action is higher than

another. It must give the reason why one is higher and the other is lower. It must assign the ground of moral distinctions.

A fixed scale of moral worth of springs of action is impracticable. There is no *universal* relation of higher and lower between any two impulses. Each is sometimes right and sometimes wrong according to circumstances. There is no *fixed* scale of moral rank among springs of action. If there is a conflict between compassion and resentment, compassion is not always better than resentment. Resentment against wrong is better than weakness of pity or compassion. Wrong should not be condoned or encouraged for the sake of indulgence of pity.

Martineau speaks of *degrees* or moral worth. His ethical scheme gives us gradations of moral value. The same impulse is right in comparison with a lower impulse, and wrong in comparison with a higher impulse. It is more right in comparison with a still lower impulse, and more wrong in comparison with a still higher impulse. This is wrong. We should choose between the 'absolutely right' and the 'absolutely wrong'. It is wrong to speak of degrees of moral worth. "We never characterize our moral acts as more or less good, or greater or smaller evil. In any particular case, there are two courses open to us, which are relatively the best and the worst for the time being" (A. C. Mitra : *Elements of Morals*, p. 253). If the end of an action is consistent with the moral ideal, it is right ; if it conflicts with it, it is wrong.

The impulses, apart from circumstances, are morally colourless. Their moral worth depends upon the *circumstances* which give rise to them. Anger due to grave provocation has not the same moral value as unprovoked anger. Resentment may take the form of righteous indignation or of vile animosity. Compassion may be fitful or reflective. The circumstances give a moral value to a spring of action.

A complete list of impulses with their moral worth is not possible. Martineau does not mention filial, fraternal, and

conjugal love. He does not mention rational and prudential impulses. He himself admits that his table is "merely tentative." "The extreme complexity of the combinations renders the task of drawing up such a table precarious and difficult" (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 129). Even if the list were complete, it would fail to furnish a moral standard. Ethics aims to seek the *Moral Ideal* which is the ground of moral distinctions. In fact, Martineau has graded the springs of action according to certain general principles. For instance, he has given superiority to primary propensions over secondary propensions. If he distinctly recognized the general principles and deduced them from the Moral Ideal, his task would be complete.

7. Philosophical Intuitionism.

Dogmatic or Unphilosophical Intuitionism holds that conscience is of the nature of *sensibility*, which intuitively apprehends the moral quality of particular actions. Philosophical Intuitionism holds that conscience is of the nature of *reason*, which intuitively apprehends the *moral principles*, applies them to particular actions, and judges them to be right or wrong. The former holds moral judgments to be intuitive, while the latter holds them to be inferential. "According to the first view, Conscience is an ever-present dictator issuing detailed injunctions to meet particular cases as they arise: according to the second, Conscience is a legislator, whose enactments have to be applied to particular cases by th same intellectual process as is employed by a judge in administering an act of Parliament" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 80). The Dianœtic theory is a kind of Philosophical Intuitionism.

8. The Dianœtic Theory.

The Dianœtic theory is a variety of Philosophical Intuitionism. It holds that the moral faculty is identical with the *logical* faculty which immediately apprehends immutable

moral principles, applies them to particular actions, and judges them to be right or wrong. Moral judgment is inferential. It consists in applying general moral principles to particular actions. Thus this theory differs from both the moral sense theory and the æsthetic sense theory which hold that moral judgment is intuitive. The moral faculty is *rational* according to the former, while it is sensuous according to the latter.

Cudworth.—Cudworth holds that moral distinctions are independent of mere arbitrary will, human or divine. Human understanding intuitively apprehends the *eternal and immutable moral principles* which are universal, necessary and self-evident. The moral faculty is not of the nature of an internal sense, but rational in nature. Moral judgment consists in the application of the moral principles to particular actions. Thus it is not intuitive, but inferential in character. Right conduct presupposes correct moral judgment, and this implies adequate knowledge of the moral principles. Thus cultivation of intelligence is an essential factor in our moral life.

Clarke.—Clarke also holds that there are certain *eternal and immutable relations* of things and persons, and these constitute the foundation of truth and morality. Human relations are fixed, eternal, and immutable like mathematical relations,—which give rise to duties,—and they are intuitively apprehended by reason. Morality depends upon the *fitness* or *unfitness* of the relations in which we stand to each other and the rest of the universe. Duties arise out of fixed and immutable human relations. When relations are different, duties are different. For instance, the relation of a teacher to his pupil is different from the relation of a pupil to his teacher; so the duty of a pupil towards his teacher is different from the duty of a teacher towards his pupil.

Thus certain forms of actions are necessarily right and wrong in themselves. Even divine will cannot convert right into wrong and wrong into right. To be virtuous we should have

an insight into the true relations of things. Hence cultivation of knowledge is of great importance in moral life.

Wollaston.—He is a disciple of Clarke. He also resolves virtue into knowledge. He holds that rightness consists in truth, and wrongness consists in falsehood (cf. Gandhi). A right action is the affirmation of a truth ; a wrong action is the denial of a truth. To steal is wrong because it is to deny that the thing stolen is another person's property. All sin is lying. It is an intellectual error. According to all these philosophers, the moral faculty is rational, and the moral quality is allied to truth, and knowledge is the ultimate good.

Philosophical Intuitionism is open to the following objections :—

Philosophical Intuitionism does not explain the moral principle and discover their rational warrant. It simply tells us that such and such actions are right, without telling us why. It does not explain the principles, and justify them, but it is necessary that the principles should be examined, explained and justified. What is the *moral ideal* which explains the moral principles must be discovered. Philosophical Intuitionism merely asserts that moral principles or laws are necessary, but it does not explain why they are necessary. It does not investigate the basis of moral principles. "The real question of Ethics is not, as intuitionists have stated and answered it : How do we come to know moral distinctions ? But, what are these distinctions ? What is the *Moral Ideal*—the single criterion which shall yield all such distinctions ?" (*Seth*). Intuitionism is legalistic or formalistic, rather than teleological. Therefore it refuses to deduce the validity of the moral laws from the ultimate Good to which they lead. So intuitionism is dogmatic or uncritical in its attitude to the moral laws.

"The intuitive character of a moral principle does not itself alone prove its rationality or its absolute validity. This

intuitive character may be accounted for by an empirical theory of morality. It may be shown that a principle is *intuitive* only in a secondary sense, and only for the *individual*. A law of conduct which is intuitive or self-evident to the individual may yet be a generalisation from the experience of the race in the adaptation of means to ends or in the adjustment of its conduct to the conditions of its life" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, p. 175). What appears to be axiomatic and self-evident to the individual, does not appear to be so to the race. What is intuitive to the individual is empirical to the race. What is intuitive to common sense is not intuitive to ethical reflection.

The so-called moral principles are too formal and abstract to be of practical guidance in concrete situations. They admit of a large number of exceptions. They have to be modified, temporarily or permanently, according to circumstances. They may serve a useful purpose for common people in common circumstances. But they break down in uncommon circumstances.

Intuitionism cannot resolve the conflict of moral principles. We know that the principles of morality sometimes conflict with one another. Intuitionalism cannot overcome the conflict ; it treats all moral principles as equally authoritative and obligatory.

Moral principles are found to vary considerably in different times and countries ; and even at the same time and place the rules that are laid down are of a very uncertain character. Intuitionism is inconsistent with variation of principles which are all held to be equally obligatory. The conflict of moral principles can be resolved by appealing to the *Highest Good* from which they derive their validity. The so-called "conflict of duties" may be due to the conflict between the intellectual and emotional elements involved in conscience. Our intellect may choose one course of action which may excite remorse. A devout Christian may think that he ought to attend a concert on Sunday, but his choice is followed by a feeling of remorse.

Here his intellect chooses one line of action which outrages his emotion. The reason of this conflict is simple. Intellect or thought is liberal, but emotion is conservative. Here also reason or intellect decides the issue by appealing to the *Moral Ideal.*

If moral laws are held to be imposed by conscience, they are still *external* laws. "Conscience is not explained, as on any true theory it must be, as the whole self judging of its own acts, but as a special faculty. It is the 'faculty of Moral Judgment',—an innate and inexplicable power of moral discrimination, sitting apart from the rest of human consciousness, like the priestess in the oracle at Delphi, and authoritatively imposing its decrees upon the human will" (*The Elements of Ethics*, pp. 87-88). The moral law can be regarded as *internal*, if conscience is regarded as the *whole self*. If it is regarded as only a special faculty, it is a part of the self, and the moral law imposed by a part is external to the self as a whole. The moral law, to be *internal*, must be the law of the whole self, and not merely the law of a part of it. If it is the law of a part, it is still an external law.

Moral Law is unmeaning without reference to the Moral Ideal. It is a means to the *End* or *Good* of the Self. "*Conscience is the whole or true self claiming to legislate for the parts.* Its claim is the claim of the self as a conscious and rational being, to judge any particular manifestation of itself in voluntary action. Its voice is the voice of the true self, or of the self as a whole, which, as addressed to the false or partial self of particular desires and passions, rightfully assumes the tone of command, and has built up the moral law. Morality consists in obeying this voice. Man's freedom just means his power of being moral, *i. e.*, of obeying the imperative of reason or of his true self. But, in making this correction, we have once again passed beyond the conception of the standard as *Law*, and substituted in its place the idea of an *End*. There is indeed

a moral *law* which is authoritative and supreme; but it is now seen to be so by no indefeasible right of its own, but in virtue of its relation to a larger self, as the *End*, which man, *as* rational being, seeks to realize" (*Ibid*, p. 88).

The Dianœtic theory is open to the following objections :—

According to Clarke, morality depends upon the *fitness* of relations. But this is putting the cart before the horse. Morality explains fitness and not conversely. A certain relation or act can be judged as morally fit only by reference to the *moral end* served by it. Apart from it the relation is ethically neutral. Fitness which is the basis of moral distinction must be fitness for *something*—it must involve some reference to an *end* or an *ideal*. The analysis of the "is" can never yield an "ought".

Martineau also observes that it is not fitness that makes an act moral, but it is its morality that makes it fit. When Wollaston says that a bad action is inconsistent he obviously does not mean that it is inconsistent with fact. "A bad action is inconsistent with an *ideal*,—the ideal which is involved in the relationship between man and man" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 153).

To resolve morality into mere knowledge is to miss the distinctive character of moral quality. Knowledge is concerned with what *is*, while morality, with what *ought to be*. In the former we contemplate actions while in the latter we strive after the ideal. Truth carries conviction, but not authority which is implied in duty. Truth, though categorical, is not imperative and obligatory. The authoritative claim of morality is not found in mere knowledge.

The conditions of knowledge are not identical with those of virtue. Truth is quite consistent with a necessary constitution of things; but virtue implies freedom of choice. Necessity explains knowledge. But contingency of freedom is essential to virtue. Knowledge is not virtue. To know is not to do. Very often we know what is right but do what is wrong.

According to all forms of Intellectual Intuitionism, the *knowledge* of the moral principles is essential to morality. Thus knowledge is an essential element in virtuous life. Some identify virtue with knowledge. But it is open to the following objections :—

Knowledge is not accompanied by the sense of *duty* or *moral obligation* which is the essential factor in moral judgments. Knowledge is categorical but not imperative. But the moral law is both categorical and imperative. It is authoritative or obligatory in character.

Knowledge is not accompanied by *moral sentiments* which are the essential characteristics of moral judgments. Moral sentiments always accompany moral judgments.

Knowledge implies *necessity*, while morality implies *contingency* or *freedom of choice.* Knowledge compels assent while morality implies freedom of the will. We know the laws of nature which govern natural phenomena. They are there in the constitution of nature. Knowledge implies necessity. But we freely do what is right or wrong. We freely realize the moral ideal. Morality implies freedom.

Mathematical principles and relations are valid without any reference to the mind. They are based upon the necessary constitution of things. But moral principles are unintelligible and inexplicable without postulating a mind. The former depend upon objective conditions while the latter depend upon subjective conditions. So eternal and immutable fitness of things and persons cannot be regarded as eternal and immutable moral principles. The Moral Law is embodied in the Divine Will. It is followed by the finite selves.

CHAPTER XIII

RATIONALISM

1. Hedonism and Rationalism.

Hedonism emphasises the claim of sensibility and regards pleasure as the highest good. Rationalism is the antithesis of hedonism. It emphasises the claim of reason and regards virtue as the highest good. It regards virtue as the life of reason to the extinction of sensibility. Hedonism regards *self-gratification* as the highest good. Rationalism regards *self-conquest* as the highest good. Self-gratification is the satisfaction of desires. Self-conquest is the reduction or extirpation of desires. Hedonism ignores the claim of reason and regards it as a handmaid of passion. Rationalism ignores the claim of sensibility and regards it as a trap for the soul, which fetters it to the flesh. It advocates the life of pure reason almost to the extinction of sensibility. Rationalism appeared in the forms of Cynicism and Stoicism in ancient Greece, Asceticism in Mediæval Christianity, and Rationalism or Rigorism in Kant's ethics.

2. (A) Cynicism.

The end, according to the Cynics, is virtue. Virtue consists in independence of circumstances and indifference to pleasure and pain. The life of pleasure is the life of folly. The wise man would rather be mad than feel pleasure. "I would rather be mad than feel pleasure" was a saying of the founder of Cynicism. Virtue is sufficient for happiness. Other things may help its attainment. But none of them are necessary. Pleasure is not necessary for happiness. It makes man the slave of fortune. Independence is achieved by indifference to pleasure and pain and by the extirpation of desires which fetter the soul to the life of

the flesh. Virtue is excellence of character, sovereignty of reason over passion, supremacy of the human spirit over circumstances. Our wants should be reduced to a minimum ; our artificial needs should be curtailed ; we should return to the simplicity of nature. We should not care for society and public opinion. We should live a self-contained and self-sufficient life. The moral life is a life of reason or self-denial to the extinction of sensibility. The complete mastery over the assaults of fortune, scorn of public opinion, and contempt for. society sum up the cynic wisdom. Cynicism is ascetic, pessimistic, and individualistic. It is the first expression of the ascetic principle.

3. (B) Stoicism.

As Epicureanism was a deepened form of Cyrenaicism, so Stoicism was of Cynicism. Stoicism, like Cynicism, regarded virtue or the life of reason as the highest good. But it differed from Cynicism in some important points.

The Stoics substitute an *idealistic* view of life for the crude 'naturalism' of the Cynics. They give a new meaning to the cynic phrase 'life according to nature'. 'Live according to *nature*' means 'Live according to *Reason*'. Reason is expressed in outward Nature and human nature. There is *universal reason* in nature and man. It is expressed in established laws and usages of human society. It is man's duty to obey the laws of society. Thus the Stoics advocate the life of nature or reason in harmony with society.

For the sheer individualism of the Cynics, the Stoics substitute *world-citizenship*. The Stoics also are individualists. They hold that the ideal life is self-contained and self-sufficient. But they advocate the life of reason in harmony with an ideal society or spiritual kingdom of humanity. The Stoic *cosmopolitanism* is akin to Kant's belief in a 'kingdom of ends'. The Stoics were discontented with the narrow limits of the Greek city-states and dreamt of a world-commonwealth, in which each citizen lived a life of reason.

The Stoics substitute *optimism* for the pessimism of the Cynics. The Cynics were pessimists. They despised the life of pleasure. They regarded the pursuit of pleasure as madness. The Stoics, on the contrary, are optimists. They are idealists. They maintain that reason pervades the universe. The Stoic ideal is a life of a pure *reason* devoid of sensibility. The maxim, 'Live according to *nature*', means 'Live according to reason' which is the deepest nature of things. Let the Reason which is expressed in the universe reveal itself also in you who are a part of the universe. Eradicate passion and sensibility which are essentially irrational.

4. (C) Christian Asceticism.

The ascetic morality reasserts itself in mediæval Christianity. Divine righteousness is the keynote of Christianity. We should be as perfect as God, our Father in heaven. Christianity emphasizes the righteousness of heart and will, not of external acts. It lays stress on the purity of the inner life, rather than on the purity of the outer conduct. Jesus Christ gave his sanction to the natural joys of life. Yet his own life of suffering, self-denial, and self-sacrifice left a permanent stamp on Christianity. The Christian life is the life of the spirit which symbolizes the spirit of the cross. The spiritual life is born out of the death of the natural man. The sentient life is not in itself evil. But it must be completely mastered by the rational self. If it hinders the life of the spirit it must be sacrificed.

"*Die* to live". *Crucify* the flesh in order to live the life of the spirit. The flesh is antagonistic to the spirit. So the flesh must be tortured and crucified so that the spirit may be resurrected. Crucifixion of the flesh leads to the resurrection of the spirit. Christianity in the form of Monasticism borrowed this doctrine from Neo-Platonism which emphasized the home-sickness of the soul for heaven, its eternal home, which has fallen into the life of sense and time. Even modern Christi-

anity, though not ascetic, is 'other-worldly'; it regards the earthly life as merely a 'pilgrimage' and a preparation for the divine life in heaven.

5. (D) Kant's Rationalism, Rigorism, Moral Purism, or Formal Ethics.

Kant's Rationalism is opposed to Hedonism. Hedonism emphasizes the claim of sensibility. Rationalism emphasizes the claim of reason. Bradley calls Hedonism the theory of "pleasure for pleasure's sake" and Rationalism the theory of "duty for duty's sake". Hedonism advocates self-gratification. Rationalism advocates self-denial and self-conquest. Hedonism seeks to naturalize the moral man. Rationalism seeks to idealize or spiritualize the natural man. Gratification of the lower self or sensibility is the ideal of Hedonism. Fulfilment of the higher self or the life of pure reason is the ideal of Rationalism. Reason differentiates man from all lower animals. It is the characteristic element in human nature. Sensibility, the remnant of animal nature in man, should be extirpated. The life of pure reason should be cultivated. Rationalism is not an explicit theory of the *end* or ideal. It is a vindication of the absoluteness of the *Moral Law* or the Categorical Imperative of the practical reason. It emphasizes the category of *duty* as the supreme ethical category. It considers '*right*' as superior to 'good'.

Kant's Rationalism is akin to Philosophical Intuitionism. Kant regards conscience as the *practical reason.* It imposes the *Moral Law* upon itself. The Moral Law is known intuitively. It is *a priori*—not empirical. It is *self-evident.* Maxims of morality are deduced by Kant from the Moral Law. They also are self-evident. The rightness or wrongness of particular actions is inferred from their agreement or disagreement with the Moral Law. The moral quality of an action is not determined by its consequences, but by the purity of its motive. Intuitionism does not give any philosophical justification of the

moral principles. Kant tries to give a philosophical foundation to the Moral Law. Kant's Rationalism is a kind of Intuitionism. It regards the Moral Law or the internal law of conscience as the moral standard. Kant is an advocate of jural ethics as distinguished from teleological ethics.

Kant holds that *reason* is the essential element in human nature; sensibility is a relic of animal nature in man; it is foreign to his essential nature. Hence the life of pure reason should be cultivated; sensibility should be suppressed. *Virtue* is the supreme good. Virtue consists in the good will. The *good will* is the rational will. The rational will is the will willing the Moral Law which it imposes upon itself. The will is practical reason or reason in action. Practical reason is *self-legislative*. It imposes the Moral Law upon itself. Practical reason is the universal element in human nature. The Moral Law also imposed by it is universal. It is self-evident. Reason knows it intuitively. "It is *Categorical*, since it holds absolutely and without qualification. It is an *Imperative*, since it is a command that ought to be obeyed. The Categorical Imperative is *rational*, since it is apprehended intuitively by the reason and is logically consistent. It is *a priori*, since it can be known in advance to apply to every possible problem that may arise in experience. The moral law is *a priori*; it indicates what *ought* to be done under all circumstances. Other imperatives are *hypothetical*, *empirical*, and *a posteriori*, since they apply only conditionally and are known only posterior to similar experiences that have taken place in the past. To do one's duty is a categorical imperative that is rational and *a priori*; one ought to do one's duty under all circumstances whatsoever; this is intuitively evident to the reason; it is known to be true in advance of any specific situation that may ever come up" (Wright: *General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 301). The Moral Law is a Categorical Imperative. It is an unconditional command. It is not a means to any other end. It is a law

unto itself. It is not a means to happiness or social welfare. It ought to be followed for its own sake. It demands unconditional obedience.

The good will is *autonomous.* The will following the Categorical Imperative is free or self-governed. It is the will which is actuated by pure respect for the Moral Law. The will which is actuated by any desire for an external end, is *heteronomous* ; it is not free, but determined by something other than itself. Feeling or desire is foreign to reason which is the essential element in the self. Therefore the will should not be moved by any feeling or desire. An action done out of love or compassion is pathological and immoral. We ought to do our duty for the sake of duty, irrespective of consequences, regardless of ends, unmoved by any feeling or desire, out of pure respect for the Moral Law. An act may be done *with* inclination ; but it should not be done *from* inclination ; in other words, it should not be determined *by* inclination. An act should not be performed for the satisfaction of an inclination. The Categorical Imperative is a pure form without content. Kant fills it with content by laying down the following maxims of morality :—

(1) 'Act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law.'

(2) 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means.'

(3) 'Act as a member of a kingdom of ends.'

According to Kant, though good will or virtue is the highest good, virtue and happiness constitute the *complete good.* Virtue depends on our own will. Happiness depends upon outward favourable circumstances over which we have no control. There is a synthetic relation between virtue and happiness. Virtue is not rewarded with happiness in this life. God will harmonize virtue with happiness in the life beyond. God is the guarantor of the harmony of virtue and happiness.

Freedom of the will is the fundamental postulate of morality. 'Thou *oughtst*, therefore, thou *canst*'. The sense of duty or moral obligation implies freedom of the will. Immortality of the soul is another postulate of morality. Morality consists in overcoming the conflict between desire and duty. The conflict cannot be overcome in this finite life. So the soul will overcome it in infinite duration of life beyond this life. The existence of God is another postulate of morality. He guarantees the realization of the complete good or the harmony of virtue and happiness. The moral life of practical reason brings us into contact with the ultimate reality from which the pure or theoretical reason shuts us out.

Categorical Imperative.—According to Kant, the internal law of conscience or practical reason is the ultimate moral standard. The moral law which is imposed by conscience or practical reason upon itself is a *categorical imperative*. It is an "imperative" or command as opposed to an assertion of fact. It is "categorical" or unconditional. It is not a "hypothetical imperative". The laws which are means to other ends are of the nature of hypothetical imperatives. The laws of hygiene are conducive to health. So they are hypothetical imperatives. The economic laws are conducive to wealth. So they also are hypothetical imperatives. But the moral law which is imposed by practical reason upon it is a categorical imperative. We ought to obey it not for the sake of any other end ; it demands unconditional obedience ; it is not a means to a higher end ; it is an end in itself. It is an absolute unconditional command which admits of no question. What we *ought* to do we *ought* to do. It cannot be set aside by any higher law. Every external end is empirical ; it is an object of experience. It can give rise only to a hypothetical imperative. It takes such a form : If we seek to realize an end, we must act in a particular way in order to realize it. If we want to succeed in life, we must work hard and make the best use of opportunities. If

we want to enjoy good health, we must observe the laws of hygiene. These are hypothetical imperatives. The categorical imperative or the moral law has no reference to any external ends, but simply to the right direction of the will itself. The Categorical Imperative is the *universal* Moral Law; it applies to all persons; it is common to all mankind.

Autonomy of Will.—Kant holds that the good will is the only good. "There is nothing in the world, or even out of it, that can be called good without qualification, except a good will" (*Kant*). A good will is good without condition. It is, as Kant said, the only jewel that shines by its own light. Good will is good in itself, not with reference to any external facts. It must have its law entirely within itself. The good will is the only good. It is the rational will. It is the will that follows the law of reason or the categorical imperative. Reason is the universal element in human nature. It imposes the categorical imperative upon itself. It is self-legislative. This is the prerogative of a rational being. The will ought to be guided by its own moral law or categorical imperative. It must not be guided by feeling; if it is so guided, it is not *autonomous* (self-governed or free) but *heteronomous* (governed by some thing other than itself). Hence Kant advocates the total extinction of the element of feeling in us. According to him, the will is autonomous or free, when it is a law unto itself—when it acts solely from a sense of duty. The will is heteronomous when it is guided by some end or moved by a desire. "Duty for duty's sake" is the true rule of life.

No Place of Feeling in Moral Life.—The moral life is life of pure reason. Feelings and emotions have no place in it. They ought to be completely suppressed. Even to give way to love or compassion is immoral. They are emotions and as such foreign to the true nature of the self. Life of pure reason undisturbed by feelings and emotions is the ideal of moral life. Kant allows only the feeling of reverence for the moral law in

moral life. But it is hardly a concession. Pure regard for the moral law is quite unlike other emotions and sentiments. Kant would condemn the act of a person who out of love or compassion, nurses a sick man or helps a poor man. Such an action would be called pathological or abnormal. In the opinion of Kant, a right action must satisfy two conditions: (1) It should conform to the moral law revealed by reason. (2) The agent should perform it out of pure regard for the moral law.

Maxims of Morality.—The moral law is a pure form without any matter. It has no particular content. It cannot tell us what we should do or what we should not do, because all particular things have in them an empirical and contingent element, and the moral law can have no reference to any such element. The moral law cannot tell us what is the matter or content of our actions. It simply tells us that they should conform to a form. It is a form of law in general. It simply tells us that our actions must have self-consistency. The categorical imperative is a pure form devoid of content.

Kant tries to make the moral law or categorical imperative more definite by laying down the following maxims :—

(1) "Act only on that maxim (or principle) which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law."

Kant illustrates the maxim by the example of breaking promises. It is wrong to break a promise, because this act cannot be universalized. If it were made a universal rule,—if every one were to break a promise, promises, in fact, would cease to be made. And if they were not made, they could not be broken. Hence it would be impossible for every one to break his promise. A man driven to despair may be tempted to commit suicide. The maxim makes it clear that it is wrong, because it cannot become a universal law. If suicide were committed by all persons, there would soon be no person left to commit suicide. Thus "act in such a way as you could

will that every one else should act under the same general conditions." This is the first maxim of morality.

(2) "So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end, and never as a means."

Man is essentially rational. The rational nature which constitutes humanity should be respected. No one should use himself as a means to anybody else, or use any other person as a means to him. A person is an end-in-himself. He should never be treated as a means. No one should enslave himself or others. To commit suicide is wrong, because it is inconsistent with the ideal of humanity as an end in itself. It would be treating oneself, not as of intrinsic value, but as a mere means of selfish enjoyment. To refuse to develop one's talents is to treat oneself as a means, and not as an end. To make a false promise to a creditor is to use him as a means to one's profit, and not to respect him as a person. We should not allow ourselves to be used as means to others' profit or self-aggrandisement. We should respect our own personality and that of others. This is the second maxim of morality. A corollary from the second maxim is the following :—

"Try always to perfect thyself, and try to conduce to the happiness of others, by bringing about favourable circumstances, as you cannot make others perfect."

A person can make himself perfect, because he can control his will and make it conform to the moral law. But he can never make others perfect, because he cannot control their will. Moral will has to be cultivated by a person himself,—and not to be imposed upon him by any other person. Perfection is to be achieved, and not to be given. So all that a person can do for others is to bring about circumstances that will lead to their happiness.

(3) "Act as a member of a kingdom of ends."

This is the third maxim of morality. It means : "Act in such a way as to treat thyself and every other human being as of equal intrinsic value ; behave as a member of a society in which each regards the good of each other as of equal value with his own, and is so treated by the rest, in which each is both end and means, in which each realizes his own good in promoting that of others" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 133). A 'kingdom of ends' is an ideal society of rational persons following the Moral Law. Each member is a sovereign, because he imposes the Moral Law upon himself, and each member is a subject because he obeys the Moral Law imposed by himself. The Moral Law is universal. So all persons following the Moral Law live in perfect harmony with one another. A 'kingdom of ends' would be an ideal society in which every person would act in a rational way and follow the categorical imperative and thus live in perfect harmony with every body else. In it every person would be both a sovereign and a subject. In the ideal commonwealth of mankind the law would be willed and obeyed by each and all. In all our personal and social relationships, we should have respect for self and others as persons. And the more we cultivate mutual understanding and good will, the more we shall attain our personal freedom and sovereignty—our autonomy.

The Complete Good.—The supreme good, according to Kant, is virtue. Virtue is the good will or doing one's duty for the sake of duty. Virtue is the fulfilment of the Categorical Imperative. But the complete good, according to Kant, includes happiness, in addition to virtue. A virtuous man ought to pursue virtue for its own sake ; he ought not to pursue virtue for the sake of happiness. But yet Kant thinks that the complete well-being of man includes happiness as well as virtue. The moral end, according to Kant, may be said to consist in the promotion of our own perfection and the happiness of others. This is a corollary of the second maxim of morality.

Kant postulates the existence of God to bring about harmony of virtue with happiness.

The Postulates of Morality.—Freedom of the will is the fundamental postulate of morality. Thou oughtst ; therefore thou canst. Free will is implied by morality. If the will is not free, morality becomes impossible. Denial of freedom of the will saps the very foundation of morality. Immortality of the soul is another postulate of morality. Morality consists in overcoming the perpetual conflict of desire with duty. Desire cannot be eliminated in this finite life. It will require infinite life during which sensibility or desire will be gradually eliminated. The existence of God is another postulate of morality. Virtue is the supreme good. But virtue and happiness constitute the complete good. Virtue is within our control. But happiness depends upon favourable circumstances, which are beyond our control. The virtuous are seldom happy. But they should be happy. If they are not happy in this world, they will be rewarded by God with happiness in the next world. God is the controller of the realm of nature and the realm of spirits. God will harmonize virtue with happiness and bring about the complete good. Thus freedom of the will, immortality of the soul, and the existence of God are the postulates of morality.

Kant's ethical doctrine is called *rationalism, moral purism, rigorism*, or *formalism.* It gives us the pure *form* of morality —the Categorical Imperative, but does not recognize the importance of the matter or content of morality which is supplied by feeling and desire.

6. Criticism of Kant's Rigorism or Rationalism.

Psychological dualism.—Kant's view is based on psychological dualism of reason and sensibility. He sets up an antagonism between reason and sensibility or desire. Thus he over-looks the psychological truth that sensibility and reason are essential elements in the self, which cannot be separated from each other. The mind is an organic unity of both the

elements. Sensibility is the matter of moral life. It should be subjected to the form of reason. Sensibility is not necessarily irrational. Feeling gives rise to desire ; desire gives rise to activity. There is no action without sensibility. The moral life is an active life. Action implies feeling and desire. Thus the moral life implies sensibility as a necessary element in it.

Asceticism.—Kant advocates an ascetic view of morality. He errs in holding that sensibility is necessarily irrational and that morality consists in the total extirpation of sensibility, for sensibility has its proper place and function in the nature of the self, and virtue truly consists in the regulation of sensibility by reason. Feelings and desires constitute the matter of moral life. They should be regulated by reason. Therefore we cannot dismiss the entire life of sensibility as irrational. The function of reason is to regulate feelings and desires. If we kill all feelings and desires, reason will have no function ,and will necessarily collapse.

Formalism.—If we dismiss feelings and desires, we lose the entire content of morality, and what is left is only its empty form. Kant's ethical doctrine is formalistic in the sense that it separates the form from the matter of morality. Reason gives the *form* (categorical imperative). But what gives us the *matter* to which the form is applied ? *The will willing itself* is an absurdity ; it leads to sheer formalism ; sensibility is the matter to which the form is applied. In other words, sensibility must be regulated and transformed by reason according to the moral law. Jacobi describes the pure will of Kant, devoid of particular content, as 'a will that wills *nothing*'. The good will is not the will which follows the Categorical Imperative, which is an empty form, but the will that seeks the Good. Virtue does not consist in the right direction of the will, but in the direction of the will to the Good—in the pursuit of the Good. The Good is the perfection of man, which

includes Knowledge, Beauty and Virtue. It is the highest personal and common good.

Kant's first maxim undoubtedly expresses the *universal* character of the moral law. It is true that no action can be right, the principle of which cannot be universalized. But it is a purely formal principle. It has a *negative*, rather than a positive value. It is a negative precept. It indicates what we ought not to do under certain circumstances. It is not a positive rule of conduct. We cannot deduce concrete duties from it. It is a formal principle of self-consistency from which particular matter of conduct cannot be extracted. Again, the application of Kant's moral law to particular acts presupposes the knowledge of rights and duties that are current in the society. We can show that stealing leads to self-contradiction, if we recognize the legitimacy of private property.

Mere self-consistency cannot be an adequate test of rightness. On the first maxim of morality, celibacy would be a crime because universal celibacy would rapidly exterminate the human race and consequently the practice of celibacy. Philanthropy also would be wrong because the universal practice of philanthropy would ultimately leave no poor man on whom to practise the virtue. Thus the first maxim is only a formal principle. Its application to concrete cases involves consideration of consequences, which is opposed to Kant's doctrine.

Kant's second maxim contains an important truth. We should have respect for our own persons and other persons. We should not treat ourselves as means to self-enjoyment or enjoyment of others. We should not treat others as means to our enjoyment. But this maxim also stands in need of some qualification. Firstly, some persons should sacrifice their life for a noble cause, *e. g.*, freedom of their country, advancement of knowledge, or the like. Thus they should, under certain circumstances, treat themselves as means. Secondly, under certain circumstances, we ought to treat other persons as

means. We should isolate a person who is a carrier of typhoid germs for the good of others. But to treat humanity as an end is to appeal to self-realization as the moral standard. The corollary of the second maxim that we ought to seek our own perfection and other persons' happiness evidently appeals to perfectionism and altruistic hedonism. We ought to aim at our own perfection. This is perfectionism. We ought to aim at the happiness of others. This is altruistic hedonism.

The third maxim also fares no better than the first and the second maxims. It also is a formal principle. We cannot deduce from it our duties in concrete situations. We should act in fellowship and harmony with one another and try to bring about an ideal society in which each member would be both sovereign and subject. In this ideal commonwealth each is both end and means, in which each realizes his own good in promoting the good of others. "Such an ideal of human Society must, as far as it goes, be approved by the moral consciousness: but, considered as a guide to the details of conduct, it suffers from the same fatal ambiguity as the preceding formulæ. There is no sufficient definition or explanation of this good of others which we are to promote. We have still got nothing but a 'form' without any content" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 133).

Stringency.—Kant's theory appears to be much too rigorous.

In the first place, no action can be regarded as moral according to Kant, which is actuated by a feeling or emotion. Even noble acts of benevolence or bravery, actuated by love or compassion are not moral. Those actions are right, which are done for the sake of duty out of pure regard for the moral law. But generally people praise those actions which spring from love and compassion more than those which are prompted by the sense of duty. When Kant eliminates feeling altogether from our moral life, he makes the performance of duties forced and artificial. But, in fact, we prefer

spontaneous performance of duties to that for the sake of duty. Those virtues which proceed from the fulness of heart are greater than those which proceed from respect for the moral law.

In the second place, Kant's theory is rigorous for another reason. He permits of no exceptions to his moral laws. But there are no moral laws which have no exceptions under certain circumstances. Kant makes his theory too rigorous by excluding all exceptions to moral laws. Some actions are right simply because they are exceptions. For example, some persons do not marry and devote their lives to a noble cause. Some persons gladly embrace death for a noble cause and become martyrs. Martyrdom and celibacy are moral because they are exceptions.

Paradox of Asceticism.—According to Kant, the greater is the resistance to temptation of desires, the greater is the merit of an action. The more intense is the conflict between desire and duty, the greater is the merit of the act of overcoming the conflict. Thus Kant's system of morality requires the continuance of the conflict for continuation of moral life. Then, again, an action, to be right, must be done out of pure reverence for the moral law. Men are guided by the sense of duty and regard for the moral law on a lower plane of moral life. When they advance in moral life, they do their duty almost spontaneously, and become less conscious of duty. In moral life the conflict does continue in some form or other. But the conflict between desire and duty becomes less keen, though it may not entirely cease. But we must bear in mind that man's moral life never ceases to be *moral* and becomes a natural process as Herbert Spencer wrongly held. The Kantian theory thus leads to this paradox. Virtue and moral merit presuppose the continuity of the conflict between desire and duty, passion and reason. So, if the conflict disappears, virtue will cease to exist. "Virtue, in fact, lives in the life of its

antagonist (*i. e.*, desire). Final and complete victory over it would involve its own destruction along with the destruction of desire" (Muirhead : *The Elements of Ethics*, p. 137). This may be called the *paradox of asceticism*.

Individualism.—Kant's doctrine is individualistic. By excluding feeling which brings us into contact with our fellow-beings he makes his morality individualistic. "Cool reason is not a sufficient bond ; we must feel our unity with our fellows. Though reason is universal, the ethics of pure reason are inevitably individualistic. The bands that unite us with our fellows are bands of love. Kill out sensibility (*i. e.*, feeling), and you separate yourself from your fellows" (Seth : *Ethical Principles*, pp. 166-67). Love has no place in the moral life according to Kant. So his doctrine necessarily becomes individualistic. Kant's ideal of 'kingdom of ends' or fellowship of persons cannot be established through reason. Fellowship is based on love. Reason gives us the conception of the common good. But it cannot unite us with our fellows.

Tacit Recognition of the End.—Kant regards the moral law as inexplicable. The categorical imperative is an absolute unconditional command of which no explanation can be given. But wherever there is a Law, there must be a higher *End* which is subserved by it ; law presupposes an end. Man is a rational being. He cannot slavishly obey the categorical imperative for its own sake. He freely obeys the moral law because it will lead to his self-realization.

Jacobi rightly observes : "The law is made for the sake of man and not man for the sake of the law." Man, as a rational being, cannot act "in blind obedience to the law". The ideas of '*right*' and '*good*' are fundamental concepts in Ethics. "The idea of '*good*' is logically the primary conception. That action is *right* which tends to bring about the good. The good is that which 'ought' to be. The difference between the two terms is this : that the term 'right' is applicable only to volun-

tary actions; the term 'good' is applicable to many things besides acts" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, pp. 135-36). The 'Good' is the end. The 'right' is the means to it. "But Kant always started with the idea of 'right'; and all his difficulties arose from the attempt to give a meaning to, and to find a content for, this idea of 'right' without appealing to the idea of 'good' " (*Ibid*, p. 135). The Moral Law is a means to self-realization. It is inexplicable in itself.

The real significance of Kant's first maxim is not that an action inconsistent with itself is wrong, but that an action inconsistent with the *self* is wrong. An action which is not conductive to self-realization is wrong. The second maxim regards humanity or *personality* as an end in itself. It is not a means to any other end. This is a tacit recognition of *perfection* or realisation of personality as the end. Kant deduces a corollary from the second maxim that we should aim at our own *perfection* and others' *happiness*. Here he clearly recognizes perfection and happiness as moral ends. He introduces *eudæmonism* and *altruistic hedonism* into his formalistic ethics. His third maxim also implies *perfectionism*, since it enjoins respect for one's own *personality* and that of others. His conception of the *complete good* as the harmony of *virtue* with *happiness* implies his clear recognition of them as *ends*. Thus, though a staunch advocate of the Categorical Imperative, Kant recognized moral ends. His formalistic ethics contains elements of teleological ethics.

Complete Good.—Kant rightly conceives the complete good as virtue *and* happiness in harmony with each other. But "Kant makes the complete good too narrow, in restricting it to virtue and happiness. The complete good of man includes *intellectual*, *æsthetic* and *religious values*. Ethics ought to take account of all the values that constitute portions of the well-rounded life that every one should seek to realize" (Wright: *General Introduction to Ethics*, pp. 311-12). The complete

good includes *Happiness*, *Knowledge*, and *Beauty* in due subordination to *Virtue*.

It is curious that morality demands the suppression of desire and elimination of happiness ; and yet God, according to Kant, wants to make the virtuous happy in the next world. Virtue depends on the eradication of desire. Happiness depends on the fulfilment of desires in due subordination to reason. Kant conceives happiness in hedonistic terms. How can God make the virtuous happy, who have eradicated all desires ?

Kant's fundamental mistake is his wrong assumption that sensibility (*i. e.*, feeling or desire) is necessarily irrational and as such should be eliminated. It is the dynamic of moral life. It supplies the material of moral life. Sensibility regulated by reason leads to self-realisation. This constitutes virtue and is accompanied by happiness. The discrepancy in Kant's ethics can be removed by perfectionism or eudæmonism.

Kant's postulates of morality will be examined later in connection with the metaphysical implications of morality.

The Ascetic ideal is false and inadequate.—The highest good consists in self-realization. It consists in the regulation of sensibility by reason, the transformation of the sentient self by the rational self. It does not consist in the total extirpation of feelings and desires. The highest good of man is the realization of the total self, sentient as well as rational. The ascetic ideal is as false and inadequate as the hedonistic ideal. The sentient self is not evil in itself ; it must be harmonized with the rational self.

7. Merits of Rationalism.

Rationalism emphasizes an important truth that reason is the *regulative* principle in the life of a person. But it errs in holding that the life of man must be a life of pure reason devoid of sensibility. Sensibility constitutes the matter of moral life. Reason gives the form or moral law. It regulates sensibility according to the moral law.

It emphasizes the notion of *duty* or *moral obligation*. It asserts the distinction between the 'ought' and the 'is'. It asserts that the ethical end is, in its very nature, an ideal demanding realisation. But it gives us only the form of the moral ideal. The content must come from sensibility. Kant does not give any place to sensibility in moral life.

It emphasizes the dignity and independence of man as a rational being. For man as a rational being has to assert his infinite rational superiority to nature. His good life is the rational life; it cannot be the life of mere nature or self gratification. Man's goodness consists in the subjugation of the sentient nature to reason or spirit.

It is undoubtedly true that *self-sacrifice* is a condition of self-realization. In the first stage of the moral development, both in the individual and the race, the negative or ascetic element in moral life should be made predominant. Moral life begins with self-restraint and self-denial, and this negative element will never totally disappear. But it is only a means to self-realization which consists in transforming (not extirpating) the lower life of sensibility into the higher life,—in harmonizing the sentient self with the rational self.

Kant recognizes *Right* as distinct from expediency. Right, in Kant's theory, stands out clear from the taint of all prudential considerations. Prudence has nothing to do with virtue. The "Rights of man" were deduced from the Kantian assumption of the sacredness of humanity in each person rather than from Bentham's dictum that 'each is to count for one and no one for more than one'.

CHAPTER XIV

PERFECTIONISM : EUDÆMONISM : THE ETHICS OF PERSONALITY

1. Ethics of Self-realization.

According to Perfectionism, perfection or self-realization is the highest good. It is also called Eudæmonism. The term comes from the Greek word *Eudæmonia*, which means well-being or welfare. The well-being of the self arises from the subordination of impulses and desires to reason. Happiness springs from the harmony of desires brought about by reason. This doctrine is also called the ethics of personality. Self-realization consists in full development of personality. It consists in realization of the *ideal*, *rational*, or *social self* in intimate relationship with others in society. The ideal self is the rational self. The rational self can be realized by regulating all feelings, impulses and desires by reason. The ideal self is also the social self. It is not the narrow, individual, or lower self. The social self can be realized by identification with wider and wider social groups. A person can lift himself above his narrow individuality, if he can identify himself with the family, the community, the nation, and humanity, and their interests. Love, co-operation, and social service lead to the realization of his social self. Self-realization is possible only through society. It is not possible in isolation from society. *Self-realization* is possible only through *self-sacrifice*. Lose your narrow, individual, private self in order to find your wider, universal, social self. Love is the essential trait of the ideal self. Love is manifested in living the life of others—giving oneself up to others. Universal love and social service lead to self-realization.

Self-realization means development of personality. It consists in actualization of immense potentialities of the self. There-

are physical, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral potentialities, capacities or powers in the self. Self-realization consists in harmonious development of all these powers, to a certain extent, which is indispensable for a fully developed personality. But self-realization does not mean the most perfect development of all these manifold powers, because it would lead to mediocrity and dilettantism. Moreover, human energy being limited, the perfect development of one power interferes with that of another power. A person cannot become a great athlete, a great scholar, a great poet, a great painter, a great politician, a great social reformer, and the like. So he must know his own *genius* and develop his powers in that direction. "Know what thou canst work at ; and work at it like a Hercules" (*Carlyle*). "Thou shalt labour, within thy particular *province*, with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength and with all thy mind" (*Mackenzie*). Have faith in human progress and contribute your own quota to it. "Work is worship." "All true work is religion" (*Carlyle*). Every person ought to do his duties appropriate to his station in society. Bradley's conception of "My Station and its Duties" makes the meaning of self-realization clear. Men are born with particular aptitudes in a particular social environment, and his duties depend upon them. They should, in their own way, sustain and further the moral world of which they are members. Their duties depend on their special aptitudes. Self-realization means achievement of Health, Knowledge, Beauty and Virtue, the Ideals of human life, and especially achievement of that ideal which fits in with a person's inborn aptitudes, which raises him to the height of his personality, and through which he can make his best contribution to the progress of humanity. Hence self-realization of different persons depends upon development of different aptitudes. But in every case it means realization of the *ideal*, *rational*, or *social self* in co-operation and intimate union with society. *Self-realization* is possible only through *self-sacrifice*.

Self-realization consists in regulation and *transformation* of the sentient self by the rational self. It is accompanied by *happiness* which is an index of perfection. Happiness or bliss is the feeling of self-realizedness. It consists in the systematization of desires.

Concrete view of the Self.—Hedonism regards the self as purely sensuous, and gratification of the sentient self as the highest good. Rationalism regards the self as purely rational, and realization of the purely rational self as the highest good. Perfectionism regards the self as sentient and rational both, and realization of the complete, total self as the highest good. Hedonism regards the self as a series of sensations, feelings and impulses. Rationalism regards the self as entirely rational in nature, sensibility being foreign to the nature of the self. Perfectionism regards the self as an organic unity of sensibility and reason. The self is a permanent spiritual principle in which sensibility is organized and regulated by reason,—both having their proper place and function in the self. Hedonism regards pleasure as the highest good. Rationalism regards the life of pure reason to the suppression or extinction of sensibility as the highest good. Perfectionism regards perfection or realization of the concrete, total self, both sentient and rational, as the highest good. Realization of the higher or rational self by subjugating, regulating or transforming the lower or sentient self (not by extirpating it) is the highest good. Thus perfectionism is based on the concrete view of the self.

The Individual and the Person : Individuality and Personality :—

Man has a higher nature and a lower nature. The former is constituted by reason. The latter is constituted by sensibility. The former is the *rational* self or *personality*. The latter is the *sentient* self or *individuality*. As mere individuals men differ from one another. As persons they share a common life. Their interests clash in so far as they are creatures of

sensibility. They have common interests in so far as they exercise their prerogative of reason. Man is an *individual* in so far as he is a creature of impulses, a subject of direct and immediate wants and instincts which demand their satisfaction and prompt him to struggle with other individuals for his own satisfaction. Man is a *person* in so far as he exercises reason and arrests the stream of impulsive tendencies and subdues the lower, animal, natural self to the higher, human, rational self, and finds in his fellows counterparts of himself.

Reconciliation of Hedonism and Rationalism :—"As the watchword of Hedonism is said to be self-pleasing or self-gratification, and as that of Rationalism is apt to be self-sacrifice or self-denial, so the watchword of Eudæmonism may be said to be self-realization or self-fulfilment" (*Seth*). "Self-realization" may be claimed to be the highest good by every type of ethical theory. "The question is : What is the self ? Which self is to be realized ? Hedonism answers : The *sentient* self ; Rationalism answers : The *rational* self ; Eudæmonism, the total self, rational and sentient" (*Ibid*, p. 192).

Hedonism asserts the claim of sensibility. Rationalism asserts the claim of reason. Perfectionism recognizes the rights of both sensibility and reason. Both are part and parcel of human nature. They have their proper place and function in the economy of human nature. Feelings and desires constitute the matter of moral life. Reason gives the form of moral life. It gives the moral law. Moral life consists in regulating the life of sensibility and transforming it into a vehicle of the life of reason. Perfectionism seeks to harmonize the life of sensibility with the life of reason. Sensibility is not necessarily irrational. It is the material of moral life. The function of reason is to regulate sensibility. Reason regulates feelings, impulses, appetites and desires, and brings about a harmony among them. "Morality or moral life may be described as that solution of the contradiction between man's higher and lower nature which is accom-

plished by the *transformation* of the lower into the organ or expression of the higher" (*John Caird*). Extirpation of sensibility may lead to the collapse of moral life, because it eliminates the material of morality. Reason cannot work in a vacuum. It acts on feelings and desires, regulates and controls them, and harmonizes them with the life of reason. Extinction of feelings and desires impoverishes the life of spirit. Self-realization means that the isolated desires, instead of being allowed to seek their own gratification, are so systematized and harmonized with one another that they become a vehicle of the life of the rational self. Thus Perfectionism reconciles Hedonism with Rationalism.

Pleasure and Happiness :—Hedonism regards *pleasure* as the highest good. Perfectionism regards *self-realization* as the highest good. Self-realization consists in harmonizing sensibility with reason. When feelings and desires are harmonized by reason and reduced to an order, they give rise to *happiness*. *Pleasure* arises from the gratification of momentary impulses and isolated desires. *Happiness* arises from the regulation and ordering of impulses and desires. Pleasure is momentary, while happiness is abiding. Pleasure arises from the gratification of sensibility. Happiness arises from the harmony of sensibility with reason. Pleasure is transitory and sensuous, while happiness is abiding and rational. Happiness does not spring from the gratification of each single desire, or of the greatest possible sum of desires, but from the systematization of desires.

Perfection or realization of the total self—sentient and rational, is the highest good. But self-realization is accompanied by happiness. Happiness as distinguished from pleasure is not the highest good. But it is an *index* of self-realization. It is an invariable accompaniment of self-realization. Thus perfectionism recognizes the importance of happiness in moral life. A truly virtuous life is a happy life. A life of harmony is a life of happiness. When conflicts among contending

elements in human nature are overcome and a harmony is established in the self, it is filled with bliss or happiness. But happiness in itself is not the highest Good.

Reconciliation of Egoism and Altruism.—Self-realization is the highest good. It means realization of the higher or ideal self by regulating the lower self. The *higher* self is the *rational* self. The lower self is the sensuous self or the animal self. The lower self of sensibility constitutes *individuality*. The higher self of reason constitutes *personality*. We should realize our higher self or personality by trasforming our lower self or individuality. The rational self is the universal self : it is the common element in all finite selves. There is a clash between one person and another in so far as they are endowed with sensibility. They differ in their individuality. They do not differ in their personality. Their interests do not clash in so far as they are endowded with reason. The higher self is the rational self ; the rational self is the *social self*. It can be realized only through the society. The more an individual negates his merely private and particular self and identifies himself with the wider life of the community, nation, and humanity, the more he realizes his truer, higher, ideal, rational, or social self. Thus from the standpoint of the higher self or personality, every person or *ego* finds in every other his *alter ego* or his own counterpart and complement.

There is no conflict between egoism and altruism from the standpoint of perfectionism. The highest good of the self is the highest social good. There is perfect harmony between the highest personal good and the highest social good. The hedonistic good is subjective and individual. The common good is the good of personality including and dominating individuality. It is the good of the total self, sentient and rational. It is the harmony of sensibility with reason accompanied by happiness.

Self-realization through Self-sacrifice.—Self-realization is possible through self-sacrifice or self-abnegation. We should sacrifice our *individuality* or animal self in order to realize our *personality* or rational self. We must sacrifice our individual, particular, private self in order to realize our higher and larger self. "*We can realize the true self or the complete good only by realizing social ends.* In order to do this we must negate the merely individual self, which is not the true self. *We must realize ourselves by sacrificing ourselves*" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 273-274). We can realize our higher self not in isolation from our fellow-beings, but in living and active co-operation with others through the family, the community, the church, the state, and humanity. The social institutions are the media through which we can realize our higher self or personality. Thus self-realization means the realization of the human personality through the society. The highest good of the self is a *personal* good as well as a *social* good. We ought to seek neither our own personal good nor the good of society, but the good both of ourselves and of others as members of a whole. The ultimate end is the realization of a rational universe, rather than self-realization.

"That I am capable of a universal life, a life transcending the limits of my own individuality, I learn practically in my relations to other human beings, when I find it possible so to identify myself with them as to make their life my own. The capacity of love and sacrifice is the capacity so to escape from the limits of the particular self that the happiness of others shall become my happiness. Morality, or the moral life, may be described as the renunciation of the private or exclusive self and the identification of our life with an ever-widening sphere of spiritual life beyond us" (*John Caird*). The capacity of a universal life finds its realization when the individual rises above his narrow, private, particular self and identifies himself with the wider and richer life of the family, the

community, the state, and the common brotherhood of humanity.

The Meaning of Conscience.—According to Perfectionism, "conscience is the *whole or true self* claiming to legislate for the parts. Its claim is the claim of the self as a conscious and rational being, to judge any particular manifestation of itself in voluntary action. Its voice is the voice of the true self, or of the self as a whole, which, as addressed to the false or partial self of particular desires and passions, rightfully assumes the tone of command" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 88). Thus conscience is identical with the whole self. The Moral Law is imposed by the self upon itself. It is not an external law. It is an *internal* law of our own being. To be 'internal', the law must be seen to be really the law of the whole self, and not merely the law of some *part* of it. If it is the law of a part only, it is still external to the self, and the self will submit to it as an external law.

The Meaning of Duty or Moral Obligation.—Moral obligation is essentially *self-imposed.* It is imposed by the self upon itself. It is imposed by the *ideal self* upon the actual self—by the *rational self* upon the sentient self. The source of moral obligation is not society or the State or even God external to the self. It is the self itself—the ideal self or the rational self.

Moral obligation is an inexpugnable element in moral consciousness. It can never be transcended. It can never disappear in course of moral progress. Self-realization is the highest good. The ideal self is the *eternal* and *infinite* self. It can never be completely realized. Hence moral obligation is an ever present element in moral consciousness. The ideal self can never be completely realized. It is an infinite ideal demanding realization. There is a perpetual conflict between the ideal and the actual. The greater the moral progress, the deeper the moral ideal. "It is the infinity of the ideal self

that makes it, in its totality, unrealizable, and the life of duty inexhaustible, by a finite being. The ideal is always being realized, it is true, in fuller and richer measure. But 'to have attained it' or 'to be already perfect' would be to have finished the moral life" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 211). Thus the moral law is absolute and permanent.

2. Perfectionists.

(1) Plato.—Plato is an advocate of *rationalism* and *eudæmonism.* Reason is the supreme element in the human soul. The highest life of the soul is the rational life, the life of philosophic contemplation. It is not a passionless life. It is an intensely passionate life. For the supremely true and good is also the supremely beautiful. The highest Good is Beauty, absolute and eternal. The loves of earth, purified and ennobled, culminate in the love of God. This is the element of *rationalism* in Plato's ethics.

Plato's ethics is based upon his psychology. Reason, desire, and spirit are the three elements in the soul. 'Reason' is the one sovereign element. 'Desires' are manifold ; they are kept under and controlled. 'Spirit' enforces the orders of reason in the sphere of desires. It executes the behests of reason and controls desires. The good life is the musical life, the life of a perfect harmony of all the elements of the soul. Justice is the health and well-being of the soul ; it consists in a perfect harmony among all the elements of the soul—the parts being subordinated to the whole. Injustice is the "disease and deformity" of the soul—the parts revolting against the whole—the inferior against the superior principle. A virtuous life is an integrated and harmonious life in which the lower elements in the soul are subordinated to reason. This is the element of *eudæmonism* in Plato's ethics.

(2) Aristotle.—Aristotle also is an advocate of *rationalism* and *eudæmonism.* Aristotle prefers the life of thought to the life of action. Contemplation is superior to activity. The true

self is the rational self. Thought constitutes its essential activity. The activity of thought actualizes the rational self. This is the element of *rationalism* in Aristotle's ethics.

Virtue, according to Aristotle, consists in choosing the *Mean* relative to the individual. Virtue consists in controlling desires according to the common measure of reason. It consists in proper regulation of desires. Vice consists in excess or defect of the fulfilment of desires. Virtue consists in the fulfilment of desires in the appropriate measure. A person has moral virtue, when he has acquired a settled habit of deliberate purpose, by which his impulses and desires are subjected to his reason. This is the element of *eudæmonism* in Aristotle's ethics.

(3) **Butler.**—Butler is an advocate of *intuitionism* and *eudæmonism.* He holds that *conscience* is the ultimate moral standard. It is supreme in the human constitution. It is not the moral sense. It is the moral *reason.* It is reflective and authoritative. "Had it strength, as it has right, had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world" (*Butler*). This is the element of *intuitionism* in Butler's ethics.

Butler thinks of human nature as an organic whole, containing particular impulses which are subordinate to self-love and benevolence, which are subordinate to conscience. *Particular propensions* or impulses seek their objects. They are either egoistic or altruistic. Egoistic impulses mainly benefit the agent. Altruistic impulses mainly benefit other people. The mind has two general principles, *viz.*, self-love and benevolence. *Self-love* regulates egoistic impulses and co-ordinates them with one another and maximizes our own total happiness. *Benevolence* regulates altruistic impulses and maximizes the happiness of other people. Both self-love and benevolence are rational calculating principles. *Conscience* is superior to self-love and benevolence.

Self-love and benevolence are superor to particular impulses ; they determine when and how far each should be gratified. Self-love and benevolence both should be regulated by conscience. The ideal human nature consists of particular impulses duly subordinated to self-love and benevolence, and of these general principles, in their turn, subordinated to the supreme principle of conscience. None of the particular impulses is intrinsically evil. Wrong-doing is always the excessive or inappropriate functioning of some principle of action which is right when it acts in its due degree and in its proper place. Virtue consists in acting in accordance with the ideal nature of man. Vice consists in acting against it. No man's actual nature is the ideal nature of man Virtue includes self-loving and benevolent conduct. It leads inevitably to *happiness*, alike for the individual and for society. This is the element of *eudæmonism* in Butler's ethics.

(4) **Hegel.**—Hegel conceives of the universe as evolution of the Absolute Spirit culminating in the life of man ; and the end at which man aims is the fullest realization of his spiritual nature. Human history is a gradual process towards the realization of the most perfect form of all self-consciousness.

Hegel corrects the formalism of Kant's theory by asserting the rights of sensibility and harmonizing them with those of reason. Kant over-emphasized the rights of reason and ignored the rights of sensibility. Hegel asserts the rights of both and harmonizes them with one another.

Hegel holds that the absolute or universal Mind or Spirit passes through stages of evolution in history, custom, law, morality, and moral institution like the family, civic community, and the state. The individual finds his *freedom* by identifying himself with the life and institutions of his time. Progress is the development of freedom embodied in institutions. The perfect state is the goal of history.

Hegel is an advocate of perfectionism or Ethics of self-realization. He interprets the meaning of the following maxims of morality in his own way :—

(i) *Die to live* :—In mediæval Christianity it meant that flesh should be crucified in order that spirit may be saved. The crucifixion of the flesh is necessary for the resurrection of the spirit. Hegel does not interpret the maxim from the standpoint of asceticism. According to him, it means that the self must die as a narrow, private individual, and live the richer and wider life of the spiritual universe beyond him. He does not advocate extirpation of sensibility for the higher life of the self—but its regulation by reason and its transformation into an organ or expression of the higher life of reason.

(ii) *Be a person* :—Hegel means by it that we should constitute our *personality* out of our *individuality*. We should realize our higher self by subjugating and regulating our lower self. We should realize our rational self by transforming or transmuting our animal self. Personality is an end in itself. It is not a means to any other end. It is the highest end. So we should exert ourselves to the utmost to realize our personality and respect that of others. "Be a person and respect others as persons" (*Hegel*).

(5) **Greens.**—Hegel's doctrine is elaborated by Green, Bradley, Bosanquet and others. Green holds that there is a spiritual principle in nature. It is the principle of eternal and universal consciousness. Finite spirits are finite reproductions of the eternal spirit. Their highest good consists in realizing their infinitude and community with the eternal spirit through identification with the richer and wider life of humanity. Moral life consists in the constant endeavour to make the universal principle in the human self more and more explicit to bring out more and more completely its rational, self-conscious, spiritual nature by transforming the animal life of appetites and desires. To realize the completely rational universe is to realize the true self.

(6) Bradley : "My Station and its Duties".—Bradley holds that each person has a place and function in the human society. He has a definite station in society, and should perform his duties appropriate to it. He is a member of the social whole ; he has a particular place in it ; his duties are appropriate to his station in life. He should perform his own duties appropriate to his station in life. This will lead to his self-realization. Each person is born with particular aptitudes. He has a place and function in society ; his duties relate to his station in life. By performing his duties appropriate to his station in society, he can achieve self-realization. He can attain happiness by fulfilling his proper function in an organised community.

(7) Bosanquet.—He lays stress on the conception of value. Self-realization means, according to him, realization of the supreme values in life, *viz.*, Truth, Beauty and Good. We should realize the comprehensive self ; we should sacrifice the narrow self. We should realize the self that contains the supreme values.

3. Perfectionism and other Moral Standards.

Perfectionism agrees with Hedonism in holding that sensibility is an organic element in human nature. It constitutes the indispensable material of moral life. Hedonism holds pleasure to be the moral standard. Perfectionism holds happiness to be an index of virtue. Pleasure is sensuous and transitory. Happiness is permanent and abiding, and springs out of the harmony of desires. Egoistic Hedonism holds that pleasure of the individual is the highest good. Perfectionism holds that the highest good is a personal good or good of personality ; it is never an impersonal good. Altruistic Hedonism holds that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the highest good. Perfectionism holds that the highest good is not only the personal good but also the social good. It is self-realization or realization of the ideal, rational,

or social self through the sacrifice of the narrow, private, particular self, so that the happiness of a person depends upon the happiness of others. Evolutionary Hedonism regards the society as an organism of interdependent individuals. Perfectionism holds that society is an organisation of self-conscious persons who realize themselves by gradually rising above their narrow individuality and identifying themselves with the richer and wider life of the society. We are not isolated from one another. We are members of a social system. We should not seek our own personal good apart from that of others. But we should realize a rational universe. We should realize the most perfect type of human existence. Perfectionism agrees with Rationalism in giving superiority to reason in human constitution. Perfectionism agrees with Intuitionism in holding that the moral quality is a unique and unanalysable quality of an action, which cannot be reduced to truth or beauty. But it does not regard the moral law as inexplicable. It regards it as a means to self-realization which is the highest good. Thus Perfectionism incorporates the elements of truth in all other theories of the moral standard. The implications of Perfectionism are clearly brought out by the consideration of values.

CHAPTER XV

THE STANDARD AS VALUE

1. The Definition of Value.

Value is commonly regarded as an economic conception. An object is said to have value, if it contributes to the satisfaction of a human need. The simplest notion of value prevailing among the people is this. "Value is that which satisfies human *desire*. All things that satisfy human desire

have value, or are good" (*Urban*). (1) This is the first definition of value. It is simple, clear and intelligible. Food is good; it has value, because it satisfies hunger. Shelter is good, because it saves us from inclement weather and wild animals. But this definition does not go deep enough. It is gradually recognized that there is a relation between the satisfaction of desire and the preservation and furtherance of life. (2) This leads to the second definition of value. Value is anything that furthers or conserves *life*. Food, shelter, etc., preserve and further our life. Therefore they have value. The second definition of value is also clear and intelligible so far as it goes. But, like the first, it also does not go far enough. Value, in this sense, is essentially *survival value*. It is described almost completely in terms of adjustment to the environment. It is an adequate definition for primitive forms of life. But such a conception of value is wholly inadequate when we come to the present complex civilization. Men's wants today are much more complex and numerous; their goals of life are much more comprehensive. Anything is good that conserves or furthers life, but we come soon to distinguish between mere life and "good life", or living as such and living well. Soon we come to realize that life is not necessarily good in itself, but gets its value rather from that which living realizes. (3) Thus, we are led to the third definition of value. That is ultimately and *intrinsically valuable* which leads to *self-realization* or *self-development*. Man is a person or self. So what is conducive to self-realization is intrinsically valuable. Man is not merely a bundle of desires. Nor is he a mere animal. So what satisfies his isolated desires or promotes his life is not intrinsically valuable to him. But what satisfies his personality or contributes to his self-realization, is ultimately valuable to him. In the beginning it appears that whatever satisfies *desire* is a good or value. But we find on closer examination that our wants

and desires must themselves in turn be valued in terms of their relation to the survival and enhancement of *life*. Life itself is, however, not intrinsically valuable, but in turn gets its value from the *kind* of life it is. Value for man must go beyond the concepts of satisfaction of desire and organic welfare. Whatever else men are, they are persons or selves, and no adequate conception of human value can be formed without including the concept of *self-realization*" (Urban : *Fundamentals of Ethics*, p. 18).

2. Desires, Pleasure and Value.

The relation between desire and value is a psychological problem. Does value reside in desire or in the object of desire ? Ward rightly points out that value resides in the *object* of desire. The object that satisfies a desire has value. Desire has no value in itself. When an object satisfies a desire it gives rise to pleasure. The feeling of pleasure is the *sense of value*. It is not value in itself. "Pleasure may fairly be described as a *sense of value*. The feeling of pleasure is the accompaniment of *objects* which have a certain *value* for the consciousness to which they are presented" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 177). When we value an object, we feel pleasure when we get it. "If we value knowledge, it is pleasant to get knowledge ; but still it remains true that it is the knowledge that we value. The pleasantness is the *sign* or accompaniment or subjective aspect of the valuation" (*Ibid*, p. 219).

3. Positive and Negative Value, Good and Evil.

Values may be treated as *positive* and *negative*. Anything that has *positive* value is said to be *good*. Anything that has *negative* value is said to be *evil*. Anything that is conducive to satisfaction of a desire, furtherance of life, or self-realization or self-development is good. Anything that thwarts a desire, hinders life or self-realization is evil.

The term 'good' etymologically means 'conducive to the end'. What is useful as a means to an end is said to be *good*.

What is subversive of an end is said to be *evil*. The end is the satisfaction of desire. There is a hierarchy of desires. So there is a hierarchy of ends and goods.

4. Instrumental Value and Intrinsic Value.

"An *intrinsic* value is of worth *on its own account*; an *instrumental* value *because of its consequence*" (Wright : *General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 338). Some objects, *e. g.*, a good dinner, wealth, fame, etc., are desired as means to some other ends outside them, *e. g.*, pleasure. They are not desired for their own sakes, but for the sake of something else. They are not good in themselves. Therefore, they are said to possess *extrinsic or instrumental value.* But there are certain things, *e. g.*, truth, beauty, culture and virtue, which are desired for their own sakes ; they are good in themselves ; they are not means to the realization of any other ends outside them. Therefore, they are said to possess *intrinsic value.* The highest good must consist of elements having intrinsic value.

5. Classification of Values.

Urban classifies values as follows : (1) Bodily Values ; (2) Economic Values ; (3) Values of Recreation ; (4) Values of Association ; (5) Character Values ; (6) Æsthetic Values ; (7) Intellectual Values ; and (8) Religious Values.

These values include all possible values universally recognized and appreciated by men. The bodily and economic values are absolutely necessary for life. They are basic and fundamental and presupposed by other values. But they are not as significant as the other values. We may call them the lower values, and the others progressively higher and higher values which satisfy the deeper and higher demands of the self or personality. The bodily, economic and recreation values satisfy the wants of what is called the *bodily* self. The values of association and character values satisfy the wants of what is called the *social* self. They arise in relations of the self to

others. The æsthetic, intellectual and religious values satisfy the cravings of the spiritual self for impersonal ideals, *e. g.*, beauty, truth, and the Holy. Though they are related to the bodily and social self, and dependent upon them, they really arise only in some functioning of the self that goes beyond them.

Urban divides values into two kinds : (1) *Organic* values, and (2) *hyper-organic* values. He divides *hyper-organic* values, again into two kinds : (1) Values of *sociality* and (2) *spiritual* values. Bodily, economic, and recreation values are *organic* values. Association values and character values are *social* values. Intellectual, æsthetic, and religious values are *spiritual* values. Values of sociality are higher than organic values. And spiritual values are higher than social values (*Fundamentals of Ethics*, pp. 161-66).

The *bodily* values and the *economic* values are primarily *instrumental* rather than intrinsic. Economic goods are not valuable in themselves. They are valuable only as the means of realizing bodily values, social values, and spiritual values. Wealth is not an end in itself ; but merely a means to the attainment of other goods. Wealth is an extrinsic or instrumental value. It is not an intrinsic value.

The *bodily* values also are *instrumental* to the realization of personal values. A well-developed body with health and vigour enables a person to use it in pursuit of the other values of the good life. *Play* is valuable in itself ; but it is also mainly *instrumental* ; it is a means of recreation of body and spiritual functions. It keeps us fit for the pursuit of higher values. No one would deny some intrinsic value to play. But it is chiefly instrumental to the attainment of higher values. Thus, *bodily* values, *economic* values and *recreation* values, are primarily *instrumental* rather than intrinsic. *Association* values are both *instrumentally* and *intrinsically* of most worth. Association with others, including the values of comradeship, friendship

and love, is good in itself as well as instrumental to self-realization. The values of *character* are the virtues. They are of both *intrinsic* and *instrumental* value. They are good in themselves and also a means to self-realization. Courage, temperance, justice, love, and wisdom are good in themselves, and they are also a means to self-realization.

Æsthetic values, *intellectual* values, and *religious* values are generally regarded as *intrinsic* values. Æsthetic values are of *intrinsic* worth. They are wholly disinterested, and their value lies entirely in themselves. They are free from economic and selfish considerations. *Intellectual* values also are of *intrinsic* worth. All learning is of intrinsic value, interesting for its own sake. The *religious* values also are of *intrinsic* worth. They are of pre-eminent importance in a good life. Prayer and divine communion are intrinsically valuable. They are the highest form of devotion and blessedness. Æsthetic, intellectual, and religious values are said to be *over-individual* values. They satisfy the deeper cravings of the spiritual self for abstract and impersonal ideals.

But these over-individual values may also serve other ends and be regarded as *instrumental*. Æsthetic values such as architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, music, etc., endeavour to accomplish something more than the production of æsthetic pleasure. They interpret life or nature in some way, lead us to a better understanding of ourselves and others, and serve humanity in some instrumental way. *Intellectual* values also may be instrumental. Knowledge has contributed to the increase of material comforts, enrichment of human culture and civilization, and improvement in the conditions of human life. Even *religious* values may be instrumental. Religion is not divorced from life. It consists in the idealisation and sanctification of life. The religious man with firm faith in God and human progress should be an abler and better man in every task that he undertakes. Communion with God

inspires him to love mankind and make this earth a kingdom of God. To make a heaven of earth becomes the mission of his life. Love of God should find expression in loving service of humanity. Thus religious values also may be instrumental. But we must bear in mind that æsthetic, intellectual and religious values are primarily *intrinsic* rather than instrumental. *Moral* value is the supreme value. It is said to comprehend all the values. Specially it is supposed to include the over-individual values which are of intrinsic worth. Moral goodness includes beauty, truth, and holiness. Sometimes moral value is said, to consist in moral excellence or virtue. It satisfies the will of the self. In this sense, it is different from, though related to, the other impersonal values. (Urban : *Fundamentals of Ethics*, pp. 161-70 ; Wright : *General Introduction to Ethics*, pp. 338-43).

6. Laws or Norms of Value : Principles of Organisation.

Urban lays down three principles of organisation of values. These may be regarded as the norms of value. He says, "There are three principles which are generally recognized as present in determining our choice or preference among goods or values. In general, intrinsic values are rated higher than instrumental or extrinsic ; permanent values higher than transient ; productive higher than unproductive" (*Fundamentals of Ethics*, pp. 170-71).

Bodily values, economic values, and recreation values are primarily instrumental. They satisfy the wants of the bodily self. They are instrumental to the realization of personal and impersonal values. They are subordinate to the values of association and character which satisfy the wants of the social self and are both of extrinsic or intrinsic worth. They are also subordinate to spiritual or impersonal values, *e. g.*, truth, beauty, good, and the Holy, which are primarily and essentially intrinsic values. Again, social values of association and

character which are of both extrinsic worth are subordinate to spiritual values which are pre-eminently of intrinsic worth.

The second principle also brings out the subordinate character of the bodily, economic and recreation values more clearly. They afford us transient pleasure, whereas the ideational activities of the self afford us more durable happiness. Sensual enjoyment soon palls upon us. The senses soon weary and cease to respond with pleasure to repeated stimuli. But the ideational activities of the self are capable of more enduring and unwearied exercise. They are capable of yielding more abiding happiness. Values of association and character, and the spiritual values of knowledge, virtue, and beauty are more permanent values which yield permanent happiness.

The bodily values and the economic values are indispensable conditions of life and ultimately of good life. But they cannot be made ends in themselves, or the permanent objects of man's conscious will.

The third principle also brings out the subordinate character of bodily and economic values. The instrumental values are exhausted in the process of being used. This is the law of material things. Bodily values also are of the same nature. But the hyper-organic values are more and more productive, both for the individual and for the society. Especially the spiritual goods of knowledge, art, and religion are not subject to the law inherent in all material things, they multiply in distribution and suffer no loss of division. To share these things with others is not to impoverish one's self, but rather to enrich and expand one's self. These values are not only over-individual but inter-national. The more universal they are, the more productive they become.

Thus, bodily and economic values are subordinate to the higher values of human association and character and to the over-individual values of knowledge, beauty, moral goodness. and religion. Association between man and man, and between

man and woman, friendship, comradeship, love, brotherhood, all these are more intrinsic, more permanent, and more productive of new values than are merely bodily and economic values. And these social values satisfy the social self. But even these have their limitations. The human self is over-social in its interest and seeks permanent satisfaction in the realization of impersonal ideals, *e. g.*, truth, beauty, good, and the Holy. Social values are subordinate to these spiritual values.

7. Intrinsic Values.

Generally, truth, beauty and good or virtue are regarded as intrinsic values. They are good in themselves ; they are not means to any other good. They are pursued for their own sakes. These values are *over-individual* ; they are always independent of individuals, though realized by individuals. They always transcend the limits of individuals. They are realized in some form of spiritual activity. The three ideals satisfy the three aspects of spiritual activity in the self—intellectual, emotional, and volitional. Truth satisfies the intellectual nature of the self. Beauty satisfies the emotional nature of the self. Good, virtue, or moral excellence satisfies the volitional nature of the self. Just as cognition, emotion, and volition are inseparable factors in the self involving one another, so Truth, Beauty, and Good are inseparably connected with one another. But how they are related to one another is yet beyond our comprehension. Welton rightly observes, "As each has value for human personality it may be believed that they are fundamentally one. But to that fundamental agreement we cannot pierce. As known to us they are distinct, though at times they approach very near each other" (*Groundwork of Ethics*, pp. 102-103). We have not yet rational comprehension of the harmony of Truth, Beauty, and Good with one another.

(1) **Truth.**—Truth is the intrinsic value which satisfies the *intellect.* Our attitude towards it is belief. Not the mere existence of truth, but the knowledge of truth has intrinsic value for us. At first, only the instrumental value of knowledge was recognized. Later, knowledge was recognized as an intrinsic value. Now man seeks knowledge for its own sake; he cherishes it on its own account—not as something alien to himself, but as perfecting his own intellectual nature.

(2) **Beauty.**—Beauty is the intrinsic value which satisfies the *emotion.* Our attitude towards it is admiration. Beauty is not relative to individuals. "People differ in tastes, as they differ in opinions; but taste is not beauty but the attempt to appreciate beauty, just as opinion is not truth but the attempt to appreciate truth. In each case the appreciation may be mistaken" (*Welton*). All art embodies ideas in material form. We can appreciate the ideas only through the forms. Valuation of the ideas is both æsthetic and moral, while valuation of the expression is æsthetic only. We appreciate art fully when both idea and expression give us æsthetic pleasure. At first, beauty was recognized as an instrumental value. Later, it was recognized as an intrinsic value. Now man pursues beauty for its own sake.

(3) **Good.**—Moral value is the intrinsic value which satisfies the *volitional* nature of man. It is allied to truth and beauty. But it cannot be reduced to either. Rightness does not consist in truth or beauty. Wrongness does not consist in falsehood or ugliness. Apprehension of moral value carries with it a sense of duty or *moral obligation* which is lacking in the appreciation of truth and beauty. The consciousness of moral value is accompanied by *moral sentiments* which are lacking in the consciousness of truth and beauty.

Moral value is wrongly identified with æsthetic value. We appreciate the beauty of the material embodiment of an idea, though we may not approve of the idea. But we attribute the

moral value of a good act to its motive. Appreciation of beauty has nothing to do with the motive of the artist. But moral evaluation of conduct depends upon the motive of the agent. Moral approval is given to conduct as expressive of personality. But appreciation of beauty has no reference to personality. Moral value is *unique* and *sui generis*.

(4) **Love of God.**—Sometimes Love of God is regarded as a distinct intrinsic value. Prayer and divine communion are the supreme blessedness. They are good in themselves apart from their pragmatic value. Religious value emphasizes love of God. Moral value emphasizes love and service of humanity. Thus they are intimately related to each other. "The mainspring of beneficent action is love, for only through love can one personality influence the will of another. Thus the essence of moral goodness is summed up in love of God and love of our neighbour. Love of God means all that is good" (*Ibid*, p. 107). God is the embodiment of moral perfection. Hence moral value, in a sense, includes religious value. Love of goodness implies love of God and humanity.

8. **Relation of Intrinsic Values.**

Truth, beauty, and goodness are intrinsic values. Truth satisfies the intellect. Beauty satisfies emotions. Goodness satisfies the will. The will is the expression of personality. "Truth and beauty satisfy specific modes of spiritual activity. Goodness satisfies the *whole personality*, for it is the intrinsic value directly related to the will, which is but another name for the personality in definite action' (*Ibid*, p. 106). Thus the voluntary activity of the whole self or personality may specifically seek truth or beauty or utility as immediate ends. But whatever immediate end it may pursue, it must pursue it either in the way of righteousness or in the way of unrighteousness. Moreover, goodness is universal in another way. Pursuit of knowledge depends upon some special endowment of intellect. Appreciation and creation of beauty depend upon the possession

of a special aptitude and skill. Knowledge of truth and appreciation of beauty are within the reach of common people to a very limited extent. But moral goodness is open to everybody at all times. It does not require any special gift. It lies in the right direction of the will. It consists in self-realization. "The highest intrinsic value is moral goodness. That is not simply one value among other co-ordinate values, but includes them all. A man realizes goodness in the daily life by his capacity and circumstances" (*Ibid*, p, 107). He may realize it in the pursuit of truth, beauty, happiness, material goods, etc., as parts of the supreme end, *viz.*, moral goodness. The perfect life has room for many kinds of activities in the pursuit of many subordinate ends. Thus, moral goodness may be said to be the highest intrinsic value.

Truth, beauty, and goodness are inter-related to one another. The essential unity of human nature and inseparability of knowing, feeling, and willing point to it. But we have not yet been able to comprehend the unity of these ideals of life. We believe that somehow they are harmonized in a unity and therefore satisfy our whole spiritual nature.

9. Commensurability of Values.

We have considered the nature of values, instrumental and intrinsic, and their relative position in the hierarchy of values. We have also indicated the relation of the intrinsic values to one another. The highest good is a whole made of elements synthesized in an organic unity. It consists of the intrinsic values such as knowledge or culture, beauty, and virtue or moral goodness in their proper relation to one another. It also consists of the instrumental values such as economic, bodily, and recreation values which are fundamental conditions of the realization of the intrinsic values. It also consists of the social values of association and character which satisfy the cravings of the social self. The highest good, then, consists of a hierarchy of values in their proper relation to one another,—the bodily

values being subordinated to the social values, and the social values being subordinated to the spiritual values, and knowledge and beauty being subordinated to moral goodness or virtue. We have already discussed the principles of comparison and organisation of values. *Intrinsic* values are higher than *extrinsic* or *instrumental* values. *Permanent* values are higher than *transient* values. *Productive* or creative values are higher than *unproductive* values.

From the above it is quite clear that values are *commensurable.* Values can be compared with one another and assigned their proper place in the hierarchy of values. Goods of different kinds are commensurable. It does not mean that a certain amount of one good can be regarded as a sufficient and satisfactory substitute for the other, so that, though virtue is superior to culture, a sufficient amount of culture could be regarded as an entirely satisfactory compensation for the absence of all virtue, or though virtue and culture are superior to sensual pleasure, a sufficient amount of sensual pleasure could be a satisfactory substitute for either virtue or culture. In fact, higher goods are always preferable to lower goods. By commensurability of values we mean that when there is a conflict between heterogeneous goods, we can compare them with one another and measure and evaluate them properly, and assign them a proper place in the scale of values. "When we have to choose between a higher and a lower good—*when we cannot have both*—we can compare them, and pronounce that one possesses more value than the other" (Rashdall : *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 39). Knowledge, Beauty, Happiness, and Virtue or Good are elements in the Highest Good organically related to one another. We pronounce our judgment of value not upon each of the values taken by itself, but upon each of them taken as an element in a whole. We ought to realize them in their organic relation to one another. When they can not be pursued as an organic whole, we can

surely distinguish them from one another, and assign them a proper place in the scale of values. "No amount of one kind of good can compensate for the absence or deficiency of the other. But when circumstances make it impossible for me to secure for myself or for others all these kinds of goods, then I can and must decide which of them I regard as best worth having; and that implies that *for the purpose of choosing between them* they are commensurable" (*Ibid*, p. 39). "It is a clear deliverance of moral consciousness, that no action can be right except in so far as it tends to produce a good, and that, when we have to choose between goods, it is always right to choose the *greater* good. Such a doctrine implies that goods of all kinds can be compared, that we can place goods of all kinds on a single scale, and assign to each its value relatively to the rest" (*Ibid*, p. 38). We should take into account the *quantity* as well as the *quality* of various heterogeneous goods in choosing between them. In this sense, various kinds of goods or values are commensurable. (Rashdall : *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, Ch. III).

10. The Highest Good.

The highest good is the supreme good which would give complete satisfaction to a rational being. It consists of all intrinsic values in their proper relation to one another. It consists of the instrumental values also in due subordination to the intrinsic values. Of the intrinsic values Virtue or moral excellence is the best to which knowledge and beauty should be duly subordinated.

Mackenzie defines "the highest Good as a perfectly ordered universe and chosen as such." It is the duty of a rational being to endeavour to realize this supremely valuable end. It is a realizable ideal. It can be progressively realized by a person. Even if the complete good is an unrealizable ideal in the finite and limited life of a person, it is his moral duty to aim at its realization as far as possible.

The complete good is a perfectly ordered universe. It is the highest Moral Good because it is chosen by rational beings and gradually achieved by their free efforts. The complete good is an object of rational choice and progressively realizable through human effort. If a perfectly ordered universe could be supposed to exist already there without any choice or free effort on the part of rational agents or persons, it would not be regarded as the highest moral good. (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 226-27).

The highest moral good is a *personal* good. It is identical with the highest welfare (*eudæmonia*) of a person. It satisfies all his spiritual cravings. It leads to his complete self-fulfilment, self-realization, and self-development.

The highest moral good is a *universal* good. It is the *common good* of all mankind. It is a personal good as well as a social good. It is the highest *personal* and *social* good.

The highest good has been conceived in various ways. The Hedonists (*e. g.*, Sidgwick) hold that *pleasure* alone is intrinsically valuable ; it is the highest good which ought to be pursued for its own sake. Virtue, knowledge or beauty should be sought as a means to happiness. Thus, virtue, knowledge and beauty are extrinsic and instrumental values. Pleasure or happiness alone is an intrinsic value. This is wrong. Pleasure is the *sense of value* ; it is not a *value* in itself. Value resides in an object or idea,—material goods, health, vigour, wealth, friendship, love, courage, knowledge, beauty, or moral excellence. But evaluation of the object or idea involves pleasure.

The Rationalists (*e. g.*, Kant) hold that *good will* alone is intrinsically valuable ; it is a jewel that shines by its own light. The highest good consists in the right direction of the will. All other goods, health, wealth, knowledge, beauty, etc., are extrinsic values. But this is wrong. A will that wills nothing but itself has no content. If nothing except the good will possesses intrinsic value, we cannot give any reason why

we regard one volition as better than another. A will that wills nothing is a sheer non-entity. The term 'right' is meaningless except in reference to the 'good'. The good will does not consist in the right direction of the will but in willing the good. *The good will is the will that wills the good.* The good has instrumental or intrinsic value. But the will has always an extrinsic or instrumental value because it is a means to the realization of the good. The element of truth in the doctrine is that the highest good must be an object of rational choice or will; it cannot be independent of rational choice and free effort. Rational choice and free effort are important factors in the highest moral good. But the highest moral good cannot be simply conceived as choice and effort apart from the *ends* to which they are directed.

The Eudæmonists (*e. g.*, Green) hold that the highest good consists in self-realization or harmonious development of the faculties of the self in intercourse with the society. It consists in the realization of the rational or social self through ever-increasing identification of a person with the society. It consists in self-realization through self-sacrifice—realization of the higher, rational, or social self through the transformation of the lower, narrow, or individual self.

From the standpoint of Value, as the end, highest good consists in the realization of the intrinsic or spiritual values, *viz.*, Truth, Beauty, and Goodness in their proper relation to one another. It also consists in the realization of the social values of association and character in their due subordination to the spiritual or intrinsic values. It also consists in the realization of economic, bodily, and recreation values subordinated to the pursuit of the social and spiritual values. The highest good consists in the realization of the intrinsic values, and of the instrumental values as basal and fundamental to the achievement of the intrinsic values. And this leads to self-realization or realization of personality. It satisfies the

self completely ; it satisfies the bodily self, the social self, and the spiritual self. *Self-realization* consists in the rational *ordering* of the different values, which gradually leads to the harmonious energizing of the capacities of the self. The nature of the highest good can be envisaged only in a general way in this manner. Wright calls the standard as Value *Eudæmonism.* It brings out the implications of the perfection of the self or self-realization. Self-realization is realization of the values of life in their proper relation to one another. Thus Eudæmonism, in the sense of Value as standard, is closely allied to Perfectionism.

CHAPTER XVI

NIETZSCHE : ETHICS OF WILL-TO-POWER

1. Ethics of Power.

Biological Foundation of the Ethics of Will-to-Power.— Like Herbert Spencer, Nietzsche bases his Ethics on biology. He derives his ethical doctrine of will-to-power from the biological law of Natural Selection and Survival of the Fittest (or the Strongest) and elimination of the weak and degenerate. Nietzsche is an apostle of "will-to-power". Schopenhauer identified life with the will-to-live. Nietzsche finds the essence of life in the *will-to-power*, the desire to grow, expand and appropriate. The will-to-power is the life principle. Not the struggle for existence, but the struggle for might, the "will-to-power", is the primary evolutionary principle." The strongest and highest Will to Life does not find expression in a miserable struggle for existence, but in a Will to War, a Will to Power, a Will to Overpower" (*Nietzsche*). Nietzsche is an

advocate of the ethics of power, self-assertion, domination, self-aggrandisement.

Definition of Good and Evil.—The concepts of good and evil are based on biological or physiological considerations. Good is what enhances the feeling of power, the Will to Power, and real power in man. Evil is what weakens power. It springs from weakness, pity, and revenge. What furthers life is good. What hinders life is evil. All virtues and vices depend on physiological conditions. Nietzsche derived the meaning of "good" and "bad" from the corresponding Greek words ; "good" means *brave, skilful, able* ; "bad" means *vulgar, plebian, cowardly*.

Amorality of the World.—According to Nietzsche the world is *amoral* in nature. It is not a sphere for the realization of the so-called moral goal. It is ruthlessly indifferent to man's moral ends. It does not realize a moral purpose. The world is neither good nor bad. Both these terms have significance only with respect to man. There are only amoral intentions and actions on earth. "There are no moral phenomena,. there is merely a moral interpretation of phenomena" (*Nietzsche*).

Ethical Relativism.—Nietzsche is a relativist. He does not recognize "good" and "evil" as eternal verities. Moral distinctions are not eternal and immutable. They depend upon the geographical and historical conditions of a people. They lose their meaning when they are divorced from their context in the social environment. They change with time. "Good" and "evil" are relative terms. They are in flux. What was regarded as good by one people was condemned as evil by another. What was regarded as evil at one time was considered to be good at a later time, because it proved effective and serviceable.

No Free Will.—Nietzsche denies freedom of the will. Our actions are rigidly determined by their causes. They are

strictly determined by heredity and environment. The belief in freedom of the will is inconsistent with the belief in a continuous stream of physical and physiological causes and effects. Our actions are not isolated acts initiated by mysterious acts of free will. They are embraced in the chain of the causal series. To believe in free acts of the will is to believe in an atomic theory of volitions and actions which are exceptions to the law of causality. Belief in freedom of the will is a remnant of a theological dogma fostered by the extravagant pride of man. "No one is responsible for the fact that he exists at all, that he is constituted as he is, and that he happens to be in certain circumstances and in a particular environment. The fatality of his being cannot be divorced from the fatality of all that which has been and will be" (*Nietzsche* ; *Ibid*, p. 44).

Life is amoral.—Life is not mere struggle for existence. It is will to power, will to over-power. It is will to war. It is domination, exploitation, self-aggrandisement. Life is amoral. Life is not the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations, but *will to power*, which, proceeding from inside, subjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of external phenomena ; is is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, incorporation, and at least putting it mildest, exploitation ; life is essentially *amoral*" (*Nietzsche* ; *Ibid*, p. 70).

Morality of Masters and Slaves.—According to Nietzsche there have been two contradictory and opposed moral estimates ; one he calls the "morality of masters" and the other he calls the "morality of slaves". The former is the ethics of power. The latter is the ethics of utility. The Romans accepted the former ; their virtues were courage, manhood, enterprise and bravery. The Jews, in the days of their political subjection, accepted the latter, and exhibited the morality of gentleness, humility, sacrifice and patience. In the "morality of slaves"

love of danger gave place to love of security and peace ; strength was replaced by cunning, sternness by pity, initiative by imitation, the pride of honour by the whip of conscience. This valuation was brought to perfection by Jesus. With him every man was of equal worth and had equal rights. This teaching of Jesus gave rise to the conceptions of democracy, utilitarianism, socialism. Democracy means equality which degenerates humanity. It makes mankind a race of invertebrates. It means feminism,—equality of man and woman. So it is to be condemned (Durant : *The Story of Philosophy*, pp. 456-57).

Virile Virtues and Autocracy.—All established conventions and institutions must be abolished and a new scheme of values must be set up. There must be a "*transvaluation of values*". All existing institutions and social traditions must be demolished. New institutions should be built upon the will to power, the will to grow, expand, exploit. Life is will to power. So our moral code must be based upon the privileges of the strong and fit. "If life is a struggle in which the fittest survive, then strength is the ultimate virtue, and weakness the only fault. *Good* is that which survives, which wins : *Bad* is that which gives way and fails" (*Ibid*, p. 435). The Christian morality which applauds meekness and gentleness and altruism is the morality of decadence and so must be given up. What is needed in this battle of life is not goodness but *strength*, not humility but pride, not altruism but *resolute intelligence*. Equality and democracy are against the law of Natural Selection and Survival of the Fittest. Not masses but geniuses should be our goal. Not justice but *power* should be the arbiter of destinies (*Ibid*, p. 436). Pity means weakness. It is a paralyzing mental luxury. So it should be discarded. War is a biological necessity. The future men will be characterized by *courage*, *fearlessness*, and *love of war*. Thus Nietzsche was very much influenced by Darwin and Bismark.

The Superman.—The world will not be right and man will not come to his own till the sense of lordship and power, the instinct of mastery and strength have regained their place in the scheme of mankind and ousted such feelings as pity, generosity, sympathy and sacrifice. The real test of man in a group, or a species, is energy, capacity, power. The world should be made to exist for the strong, the great, the few. The goal of human effort should be the development of finer and stronger individuals, and not the elevation of all. The *superman*,—not mankind,—is the goal. It is the height of stupidity to think of mankind or to undertake its improvement ; mankind does not exist ; it is an abstraction. Thus our conscious endeavour should be to bring into existence a new type of men,—the race of supermen. Its mission should be to rule, and not to serve. The dominant mark of a Superman would be love of danger and strife. Energy, intellect, pride, and power,—these constitute the Superman (*Ibid*, pp. 461-65).

Our institutions, moralities, and religions which delay the coming of the mighty race must be abolished. Christianity which worships meekness and pity, and exalts slave morality is the greatest enemy of mankind and most hostile to the birth of the new species. Democracy which means drift, enthronement of mediocrity, and hatred of excellence must go. It makes great men impossible. So democracy must be abolished.

Nietzsche first conceived the Superman as an individual. Later, he meant by a Superman a higher type, a higher species than man. Instead of a Superman, like Napoleon, Nietzsche posited a superior type of men. "The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say : the Superman *shall be* the meaning of the earth !" (*Nietzsche*). The philosophy of Fascism is a new form of Nietsche's philosophy of Superman.

2. Criticism of Nietzsche's Ethics.

Ethics cannot be founded on biology. The biological law of survival of the fittest can never be regarded as a moral law. Will to power cannot be the moral ideal. Man is essentially a spiritual being. The ideal of power cannot satisfy his spiritual cravings. 'Good' and 'evil' are not biological concepts. They are moral concepts. Good is a value. It is a moral end. Good is not power. Evil is not weakness. Moral concepts do change in different ages. But the moral ideal is permanent and constant. Denial of free will and the spiritual nature of man saps the very foundation of morality. The only element of truth in Nietzsche's ethics is the utility of virile virtues. They have a place in our moral life. They should not be altogether supplanted by softer virtues. The conception of the Superman should be spiritualized. The Superman is the person who loves humanity and dedicates his life to the service of humanity. Self-sacrifice is the motto of life—not self-aggrandisement. On the whole, Nietzsche's ethics is the very nagation of morality. Nietzsche's theory inspired the Germans to plunge the world in two devastating world-wars for the German domination of the world. They believed that the Germans were the coming race of supermen.

CHAPTER XVII

GANDHI : ETHICS OF AHIMSA

1. Ethics of Non-violence.

Mahatma Gandhi is not a philosopher. He has not evolved a system of philosophy. He does not give a rational and self-consistent system of ethics. He is a social reformer and political leader. He is a man of saintly character. He has evolved a new out-look on life based on the doctrine of *Ahimsa* and seeks to solve all social, political, and economic problems in the light of this principle. He has given a new orientation to the problems that face humanity to-day, and offered a new solution.

Truth and Social Service.—Mahatma Gandhi is an apostle of *Ahimsa*. This basic principle of life is based on Truth. He says : "I often describe my religion as Religion of *Truth*. Of late, instead of saying God is Truth, I have been saying *Truth is God*, in order more fully to define my religion. We are sparks of Truth. The sum-total of the sparks is indescribable, as-yet-unknown Truth, which is God."

"The bearing of this religion on social life is or has to be seen in one's daily social contact. To be true to such religion one has to lose oneself in continuous and continuing service of our life. Realization of Truth is impossible without a complete merging of oneself in and identification with this limitless ocean of life. Hence, for me, there is no escape from *social service*, there is no happiness on earth beyond or apart from it. Social service must be taken to include every department of life. In this scheme there is nothing low, nothing high. For all is one though we *seem* to be many" (*Contemporary Indian Philosophy*).

Again he says ; "God is Life, Truth, Light. He is love. He is the supreme Good." "To me God is Truth and Love ; God

is ethics and morality. God is fearlessness; God is the source of Light and Life, and yet He is above and beyond all these. God is conscience. He is the most exacting personage in the world. He metes out the same measure to us that we mete out to our neighbours—men and brutes. With Him ignorance is no excuse. And withal He is ever-forgiving, for He always gives us the chance to repent. He is the greatest Democrat the world knows, for He leaves us 'unfettered' to make our own choice between evil and good." Truth (*Satya*) and Harmlessness (*Ahimsa*) constitute the essence of God.

The above passages indicate the philosophical background of Mahatma Gandhi's ethics of *Ahimsa*. According to him God exists; He is Truth and Love. Finite spirits are sparks of God. They are sparks of the infinite Truth or God. They can freely realize perfection by social service,—by identifying themselves with the whole creation—mankind and animals, and realizing the oneness of life.

Ahimsa.—Mahatma Gandhi is an apostle of *Ahimsa*. Buddhism and Jainism preached the cult of *Ahimsa* in India ages ago. "*Ahimsa* is the supreme Religion" says the *Mahabharata*. * It declares that *Ahimsa* is not merely a negative virtue of non-killing or non-injury, but also it is a positive virtue of doing good to others. It declares that *Ahimsa* is supreme kindness and supreme self-sacrifice. Jainism emphasized its negative aspect of non-killing of animal life, even of the smallest insect. Buddhism emphasized both the negative and positive aspects,—non-killing of animal life and compassion for the whole sentient creation, and good-will to all. Mahatma Gandhi takes *Ahimsa* in a very wide sense. *Ahimsa* is non-killing or non-injury. It has come to be synonymous with *Non-violence*. It is non-violence in thought, word, and deed. It is not only abstinence from killing or doing harm. It is also abstinence from causing pain through word or thought and resentment. It is non-violence in every form,—in thought, word, and deed.

But non-violence or non-injury in thought, word, and deed constitutes the negative aspect of *Ahimsa*. It has a positive aspect which is more important than the negative aspect. It is not only complete absence of ill-will towards mankind and sentient creation but involves overflowing *love* and affection for them. *Ahimsa* means non-injury and love. God is Truth and Love. And we can realize Truth by loving the whole animal world including mankind. Mahatma Gandhi says, "*Ahimsa* is the basis of the search of Truth. The search is in vain unless it is founded on *Ahimsa* as the basis. The only means for the realization of Truth is *Ahimsa*. A perfect vision of Truth can only follow a complete realization of *Ahimsa*." Mahatma Gandhi is not for purely literary interpretation of this great truth. He would say, concerning the doctrine of *Ahimsa*, "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."

Ahimsa requires truthfulness and fearlessness. "There is only one whom we have to fear, that is God. When we fear God, we shall fear no man ; and if you want to follow the vow of Truth, then fearlessness is absolutely necessary" (*Gandhi*). This doctrine of fearless pursuit of truth is called *Satyagraha* (firmness in truth). Life should be ruled by the law of Truth regardless of consequences. Prahlad was prepared to die in defence of Truth. He underwent all possible tortures with a smiling face without parrying a single blow, and at last Truth rose triumphant. Truth knows no compromise. Falsehood is an evil. We must non-co-operate with it.

Non-violent Non-co-operation with Evil.—'Hate the sin and not the sinner.' "For we are all tarred with the same brush, and are children of one and the same Creator, and as such the divine powers within us are infinite. To slight a single human being is to slight those divine powers, and thus to harm not only that being but with him the whole world" (*Gandhi*). So we should not try to crush the wrong-doer but try to resist evil by dissociating ourselves from it in all

possible ways. Evil cannot stand by itself. Non-co-operate with evil, and it will die of inanition. "It is quite proper to resist and attack a system but to resist and attack its author is tantamount to resisting and attacking oneself" (*Gandhi*). And we can effectively attack an evil system by non-co-operation with it in a non-violent manner. His moral weapon of *non-violent non-co-operation* is a most potent weapon to fight an evil system with. It has taken the forms of passive resistance and civil disobedience in the field of politics to fight the evil of foreign domination.

Self-purfication.—"To see the universal and all-pervading spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself. And a man who aspires after that cannot afford to keep out of any field of life. That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the field of politics Identification with everything that lives is impossible without *self-purification* ; without self-purification the observance of the law of *Ahimsa* must remain an empty dream ; self-purification must mean purification in all the walks of life. And purification being highly infectious, purification of oneself necessarily leads to the purification of one's surroundings."

Mahatma Gandhi has sometimes resorted to fasting as a means of self-purification, and to purify his social and political environment. The great fast at Delhi for twenty one days to effect Hindu-Moslem unity, the fast at Yarwada Jail to resist 'vivisection' of the Hindu society into Caste Hindus and depressed classes, the Rajkote fast to remedy the Prince's breach of faith and the last fast are cases in point. Whether fasting is a method of moral persuasion or a form of coercion is open to question.

Non-thieving or Non-Possession.—Mahatma Gandhi wants to evolve a new social order on the basis of love and self-sacrifice. He wants to give every opportunity to an individual to rise to the height of his personality. But he does not want

to apply force to devest the privileged classes. He does not believe in class war. He is not a socialist or a communist. He believes in change of heart and voluntary surrender of superfluous possession for the benefit of the poor. There is no place of brute force and violence in his scheme of the new social order. Love and non-violence are the foundations of the social structure he wants to evolve. It is a slow but sure process. It avoids cataclysms and violent revolutions. It avoids bloodshed, chaos and confusion. Love is unifying. Hatred is disintegrating. Love gives unity and harmony, a reign of peace and joy.

"I suggest that we are thieves in a way. If I take anything that I do not need for my own immediate use and keep it, I thieve it from somebody else. It is the fundamental law of Nature, without exception, that Nature produces enough for our wants from day to day ; and if only everybody took enough for himself and nothing more there would be no pauperism in the world, there would be no man dying of starvation. I am no Socialist, and I do not want to dispossess those who have got possessions ; but I do say that personally those of us who want to see light out of darkness have to follow this rule. I do not want to dispossess anybody ; I should then be departing from the rule of Non-violence......You and I have no right to anything that we really have until these many millions are clothed and fed. You and I, who ought to know better, must adjust our wants, and even undergo voluntary privation, in order that they may be nursed, fed, and clothed" (*Gandhi*).

It is questionable whether a new social order can be evolved on the basis of complete transformation of human nature. It is a consummation devoutly wished for by humanity, but it could not be achieved by a Buddha, a Christ ! Perhaps it is a grand ideal which will always inspire the better part of humanity. The ideal will never perish. But it is not completely realizable on earth.

The application of Ahimsa to political, social, economic problems.—Non-violence is a rule of conduct not only in individual life, but also in political, social, and economic life. This is the greatest contribution of Mahatma Gandhi to the world's culture and civilization. Violence may end an evil system but it tends to recoil upon its author. It demoralizes one who adopts it. Violence breeds violence. It brings about a chaos. It poisons the source of social life. Non-violence purifies an evil system from its evils. It changes a human system from within by working a change in its soul, as it were. It can be applied to the social and economic spheres also. It takes the form of non-co-operation with the capitalistic system of industry which is founded on a systematic exploitation of the poor, and promotion of cottage industries and the like. In the social sphere it takes the form of non-co-operation with the privileged classes who deny even elementary rights to some of their fellow-brethren. Mahatma Gandhi does not believe in war. War is mass slaughter of men. It is against the law of human nature, —against the rule of Truth and Non-violence. In the new social order war will be eliminated.

Faith in Moral Government of the Universe.—A votary of *Ahimsa* believes in God and the moral government of the world. The world is the sphere in which the moral ideal can be realized. It is not amoral as Nietzsche holds. It is morally constituted. It affords opportunities for the realization of the moral ideal. Man is a spark of the Divine Being. He is essentially spiritual He is not a part of nature. He cannot be satisfied with the rule of animal life, *viz.*, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest and the strongest. *Ahimsa* is the law of life to him ; self-sacrifice,—not self-assertion,—is his motto of life. Not will to power, but will to service is his ideal. Not ruthless self-assertion, strength, pride, cruelty, but self-abnegation, gentleness, humility, forgiveness, pity, benevolence, sympathy, affection

and love are his virtues. He is a willing servant of humanity, and not its master like the Superman. And the world is the proper sphere for the cultivation of his virtues. It is not hostile to his moral ideal. It is the proper sphere of his moral life, because it is the manifestation of God of whom man is only a spark. Thus Mahatma Gandhi's ethics of *Ahimsa* is the antithesis of Nietzsche's ethics of will to power. The former is altruistic while the latter is individualistic.*

2. Criticism of Gandhi's Ethics.

Mahatma Gandhi is not a philosopher. So he has not evolved a system of ethics on the firm foundation of philosophical reflection. There are elements of *intuitionism*, *rationalism* or *asceticism*, and *eudæmonism* in his ethical doctrine, which are not reduced to a coherent unity. But still his voice is that of a prophet in this age of darkness.

Mahatma Gandhi holds that man has freedom of the will. He can choose between right and wrong. God has given man freedom. Conscience is the voice of God in man. It intuitively apprehends rightness or wrongness of actions. In complex situations God reveals the Truth to us through the intuition of conscience. Mahatma Gandhi is inclined to reduce rightness to *truth*, and wrongness to untruth. Here his doctrine seems to resemble the *Dianœtic* theory which regards the knowledge of the eternal moral principles as essential to morality. "Moral evil, according to Wollaston, is merely a practical denial of a true proposition, and moral good the affirmation of it. Every right action is the affirmation of a *truth* ; every wrong action is the denial of a truth." This is the element of *intuitionism* in his theory. Mahatma Gandhi's ethical doctrine suffers from the defects of the Dianœtic Theory.

Mahatma Gandhi offers almost an ascetic doctrine of morality. Suppression of instincts and desires and living the

* I am indebted to my colleague, Professor J. P. Suda's unpublished article on the subject.

life of pure reason constitute the moral life. Our wants should be reduced ; our desires should be suppressed ; pleasure should be shunned ; perfect equanimity and stoical indifference to pleasure and pain should be cultivated. The life of fearless and uncompromising pursuit of Truth, regardless of consequences, is the highest ideal. Sex instinct should not be gratified ; it is an evil, and, as such, should be eradicated. Violence or injury to others should be eschewed altogether. All these show that Gandhi's ethical doctrine contains elements of *asceticism, rigorism, rationalism,* or *moral purism,* and suffers from its defects.

Mahatma Gandhi believes in the existence of God. God is the Supreme Good. He is truth and love. He is the moral governor. Finite spirits are sparks of God. They are sparks of infinite Truth or God. They can realize *Truth* or perfection by *social service*—by identifying themselves with the whole creation—mankind and sentient creation, and realizing the *oneness of life. Ahimsa* or non-violence, in thought, word and deed, is the means to the realization of Truth. *Ahimsa* is love and good-will. It is active service. The world is rationally constituted. It is the sphere of moral life. It is not dead to moral values. This is the element of *eudæmonism* in Gandhi's ethical doctrine.

Truth and *Ahimsa* are the keystones of Mahatma Gandhi's ethics. He has not defined Truth. Truth refers to existing *facts* or *ideals* which do not exist. Truthfulness is agreement of ideas with words, and of words with *facts.* It is beyond doubt. But Mahatma Gandhi uses 'truthfulness' in the sense of fearless pursuit of *Truth* as an *ideal.* In the sense of ideals, different philosophers have different opinions as regards the highest ideal. Mahatma Gandhi does not clearly define the nature of Truth as an ideal which does not exist, but has to be brought into existence by our free actions. He makes too much of truth. He says "God is Truth". But it is more

correct to say, according to him, that "Truth is God". He does not clearly explain the meaning of the Infinite Truth which is the supreme good. His ethical doctrine is vague as to the nature and content of the Supreme Good.

Mahatma Gandhi makes too much of *reason*. Human nature is complex. It is a mixture of sensibility and reason. It will always continue to be so. Sensibility is not, in itself, irrational. It should not be suppressed. It should be regulated by reason. Even the sex instinct, which is dominant and irrepressible, is not necessarily irrational. Within its proper sphere, duly regulated and controlled by reason, it generates love and affection which bind man and woman closely together and develop their personality. Moral purism, rigorism, rationalism, or *asceticism* is a one-sided doctrine.

Mahatma Gandhi makes too much of *non-violence*. He holds that non-injury in thought, word and deed ought, under all circumstances, to be cultivated. But human nature is a mixture of good and evil. Sometimes the evil nature of an individual or a group of individuals becomes so predominant and upsets the moral order, that it is our clear duty to suppress it by coercion and *violence*. Moral persuasion cannot succeed in all cases. Violence is in human nature. The instinct to *fight* is innate. It serves the biological ends of self-preservation and race-preservation. It is not necessarily evil. The pugnacious instinct, duly regulated and controlled, helps to restore the equilibrium of society and moral order by keeping down and coercing aggression and infringement of moral rights. Non-violence, under all circumstances, is neither practicable nor justifiable. An individual or a nation ought to attack, injure, and thwart another individual or a nation in self-defence. Violence, under certain circumstances, is morally justified. Mahatma Gandhi exaggerates the importance of softer virtues such as humility, compassion, benevolence, self-sacrifice etc. But virile virtues such as courage, pride etc., have their proper place

in the moral life. He does not attach adequate importance to the virile virtues, though he preaches the cult of non-violence of the strong. Recently he has advised people to submit to mob fury, rather than to kill in self-defence. It is better to be killed than to kill in defence of one's life. This is a counsel of perfection. It is neither practicable nor justifiable.

3. Comparison of Nietzsche and Gandhi's ethical doctrines.

Nietzsche's ethics is based on a biological foundation, while Gandhi's ethics is based on a spiritual foundation. Nietzsche treats man as an animal subject to the biological law of survival of the fittest (or strongest). Gandhi treats man as a spiritual being, a spark of God, subject to the moral law of protection of the weak. Nietzsche regards the will-to-power and self-aggrandisement as the goal. Gandhi regards the will-to-service and self-sacrifice as the goal. Nietzsche regards 'good' as equivalent to 'power', and 'evil' as equivalent to 'weakness'. He treats 'good' and 'evil' as relative biological concepts. Gandhi regards 'good' as equivalent to 'truth', and 'evil' as equivalent to 'falsehood'. He treats 'good' and 'evil', 'right' and 'wrong' as eternal and absolute moral concepts. Nietzsche prefers virile virtues such as courage, pride, honour, violence, self-aggrandisement, etc., to soft virtues such as humility, compassion, benevolence, self-renunciation, etc. Gandhi prefers soft virtues to virile virtues. Virile virtues, according to Nietzsche, constitute the morality of the masters, and soft virtues constitute the morality of slaves. Gandhi regards soft virtues as moral, and virile virtues such as violence, exploitation of the weak, self-aggrandisement as immoral. Nietzsche is an apostle of war. Gandhi is an apostle of *Ahimsa* and condemns war. Nietzsche believes in the evolution of the Superman or a race of supermen who will govern the whole world by dint of power. Gandhi does not believe in such supermen. He believes in the evolution

of a spiritual commonwealth based on non-violence and love, devoid of exploitation of the weak. Nietzsche regards the world and life as amoral. Gandhi regards the world as the sphere of morality, rationally constituted, with a moral purpose. Nietzsche denies freedom of the will and the existence of God. Gandhi believes in human freedom and the existence of God as the Moral Governor. Thus Nietzche's ethics of Power is the antithesis of Gandhi's ethics of *Ahimsa*. Nietzche's ethics inspired the German people in the last Great War. It is the mainspring of the present Fascist philosophy. Gandhi's ethics has inspired the Indian people in the recent national regeneration. Gandhi's ethics of *Ahimsa* applied to social, economic, and political problems of the day is a great contribution to the ethical thought of humanity.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

1. (A) Individualism : Mechanical View of Society.

There are different views as to the relation of the individual to society. They are individualism, collectivism, and idealism. Some thinkers (*e. g.*, Hobbes, Rousseau and others) hold that society is a mechanical aggregate of isolated individuals. Individuals are independent of one another. They live independent lives. They enter into a contract with one another, and form society. Society is an accident of individual life. The individuals are self-sufficient and independent units without any reciprocal relation to one another. They lived apart from one another as independent units. They then entered into a contract and formed society for their mutual advantage.

This theory is called the *social contract* theory advocated by Rousseau and others.

The theory is unhistorical. Man is a social being. He is inconceivable apart from society. Family is the unit of society. And man always lived as a member of a family. We can never imagine a state of society when men lived as completely isolated individuals. We have no scrap of evidence to show that a contract was ever made by individuals to form the society.

The theory is illogical. "Social contract" presupposes a high degree of political consciousness among the individuals who lived an independent and isolated life, and entered into a contract. The very notion of contract was foreign to the minds of primitive men. Right to contract was conceded to individuals when there was a sufficient development of the society—when the individuals were disengaged from the community in which they had been formerly merged and asserted their rights.

2. (B) Collectivism : Organic View of Society.

The Evolutionists (*e. g.*, Leslie Stephen) hold that there is an organic relation between the individual and society. Society is an organism of interdependent individuals. Society is an organic unity of interdependent parts. They are necessary to one another. The individuals are members of unity. They share in the common life of society. They are permeated by the common social life. They are part and parcel of society. They are not isolated units. They are inconceivable apart from one another. Just as an organism is an organic unity of interdependent organs, so society is an organism of interdependent individuals. Society cannot exist apart from individuals. Individuals cannot exist apart from society. They are interdependent on each other. Man is a social being. We cannot conceive of men living in an unsocial condition. They live and grow in mutual contact and intercourse with one another. Men apart from society are mere

abstractions. They owe their knowledge, sentiments, habits, education, language, morality, etc., to society. They live, move, and have their being in society. They owe nine-tenths of their mental equipment to society. Society grows like an organism. Therefore, the organic view of society is more adequate than the mechanical view.

Society resembles an organism. In an organism there is interdependence among the organs. In society there is interdependence among the individuals. Society grows like an organism. But the analogy should not be pushed too far. There is an essential difference between them. In an organism the organs do not live independent lives ; they live the common life of the organism. But the individuals are different centres of consciousness whose personal life is not completely merged in the life of the society. It is the individuals who feel ; society does not feel. Society has no centre of consciousness apart from its individual members. Moreover, an organism dies, but the human society does not die. Therefore the conception of 'social organism' is only a suggestive metaphor.

3. (C) The Idealistic View of Society.

Society is an organization of free self-conscious spirits which live in co-operation with one another. Man is a social being. His rational, higher or ideal self is social self. It can be realized only through society. The true self is the social self. Every individual belongs to a society. We are members of the social whole. We are members one of another. Mackenzie says, "A human personality is never an isolated phenomenon. It is even inconceivable apart from certain relations to other personalities. The positive content of a man's moral life depends on these relationships. The whole of a man's moral life, all its purposes, all its meaning and value, receive their tone and colour from the ideals, the institutions, the moral habits, among which his life develops" (*Manual of*

Ethics, p. 270). Therefore the social universe is the necessary medium for the realization of ideal or social self.

John Caird beautifully describes the relation of the individual to society from the standpoint of idealism. "The abstract individual (apart from society) is not truly man, but only a fragment of humanity, a being devoid of moral and spiritual elements which are of the essence of man's life. The social relations are a necessary part of the being of the individual' He cannot realize himself within himself, but only in and through those who are other than himself, and it is only by the negation or surrender of his individual self, of his isolated being and life, to a larger or universal self, that he comes to realize the true meaning of his nature as a spiritual being. Here the universal (society) is the *prius* of the particular. Yet the universal must not be conceived as having any reality apart from the particulars any more than the body apart from its members. The true idea is reached only by holding both together in that higher unity which at once comprehends and transcends them, that organic unity which is the living integration of the individual members which compose it" (*Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 229-30). This view seems to be the correct view of the relation of the individual to society.

4. Criterion of Social Progress.

All the social institutions are continually changing in course of social evolution. "The ultimate standard by which all progress must be tested is the realization of the rational self. Material and social progress is valuable only in so far as it is a means to this" (*Ibid*, p. 299). We can determine the measure of social progress by its capacity to help all the individuals to realize their rational self. The more society conduces to the self-expression and self-realization of its individual members, the greater is its progress. Self-realization of all the members of society is the criterion of social progress. In an ideal

society all its members get equal opportunities for self-expression and self-development.

5. Individualism or Socialism ?

Individualists lay stress on the freedom of the individual. Socialists lay stress on the good of society as a whole. Individualists try to secure the maximum freedom of action for the individual citizens. Socialists try to regulate the liberty of individuals in order to secure the maximum good of all.

But in the growth of human society too much stress has been laid on the freedom of the individual. Now the necessity and importance of the regulation of the liberty of the individual by the state are gradually being recognized. Social progress should move in the socialistic direction at present to ensure an ideal arrangement of the society in which every individual will have the maximum opportunities to realize his highest personality and contribute to the social welfare. But the individual should never be reduced to a mechanical tool of the State devoid of freedom of thought and expression. The State should maintain the liberty of the individual and respect and promote his personality. The State should not *de-personalize,* mechanize and naturalize the individual. Any attempt to do so would spell disaster to humanity. The ideal arrangement of society should maintain the liberty of the individuals for the maximum good of all. It should be an ideal form of democracy.

There is no real conflict between the fundamental principles of Individualism and Socialism. If the liberty of the individuals is severely restricted, the maximum good of all cannot be secured. Again, an individual is granted liberty on condition that he will use it for the good of all. Absolute liberty cannot be granted to individuals. Again, individuals cannot be deprived of all liberty. There should be a compromise between liberty and state interference.

CHAPTER XIX

Moral Institutions

1. Social and Moral Institutions.—Self-realization is the highest good. It consists in the realization of the ideal, rational, or social self. Self-realization is possible only in and through society. Certain institutions have evolved in society which are the media for the realization of the moral ideal. These are called *social or moral institutions.* All social organisations which have been devised for the good of the individuals are called moral institutions. They are the following :—

(1) The Family.—The family is based on natural affection. It is based on natural affection of parents for children. It provides adequate protection for the helplessness of childhood. It is the sphere for the cultivation of civic virtues. It trains its members in sympathy, fellowship, and co-operation. It gives them adequate opportunities for cultivating the highest forms of friendship and love.

The children are protected by their natural guardians in a family. But still the control of parents should, to a certain extent, be limited. Proper education of children should be enforced. Child labour should be prevented. The relation of husband and wife should be one of equality based on love. The wife should not be subordinated to the husband. The family is the school of moral education. It evokes sympathy, love, and fellow-feeling. The attempt to destroy the family based on the sacred marriage tie between man and woman will sap the very foundation of the social and moral structure of humanity.

(2) Educational Institutions.—Schools, colleges, universities, etc., play a very important part in the development of the character of persons. They unfold their intellectual and

moral capabilities and help them rise to the height of their personality. Educational institutions are the training ground for the development of personality. They impart education to persons, which is indispensable for their self-expression and self-development. Education is indispensable for the formation of correct judgments.

(3) Workshop.—The family is based on natural affection. But the workshop is based on contract. Industrial relations are based on contract; they are not relations of equality but of subordination. The employees are subordinated to the employers. The State should intervene to secure fairness of contract between employers and employees, masters and servants. The State should prevent subordination of servants to masters from degenerating into slavery. Carlyle regrets that there is nothing but the "cash *nexus*" between masters and servants in the modern age. It is, indeed, true that their relation should be humanized, but in this mechanical age of industrialism it is very difficult to restore personal relations between masters and servants in a huge factory or a large business firm.

(4) The Civic Community.—Industrial relations are based on contract. Hence the most vital functions for the welfare of the society should be undertaken by the civic community as a whole. Provision for sanitary arrangements and educational institutions, prevention of adulterated food, care of the infirm and disabled should not be left to the care of individuals. The community as a whole should take upon itself these important functions of the society.

(5) The Church.—The paternal care of citizens cannot be fully provided by the civic community. It is more fully provided by the Church which provides ample opportunities for the cultivation of friendship and personal relations. Its function is to secure the carrying out of the highest moral ideal in human relationships. The work of the Church may be supplemented by unsectarian ethical institutions. At present, institutional

religions are losing their hold on humanity. Hence the greater importance of unsectarian institutions for cultivating spiritual fellowship and realizing the moral ideal in our social and political life.

(6) The State.—The State is the supreme controller of all associations. It enacts laws and enforces them on the people by threats of punishment. If protects life and property of individuals and thus makes their moral life possible. Moral life is possible only in a political organization. It looks after national defence, conducting of railways, conveyance of letters, currency, maintenance of law and order. It looks after those functions which affect the very existence and safety of individuals. Therefore the State is the most important social institution. Any attempt to destroy the State is to sap the very foundation of morality. Self-realization is possible only in a well-ordered political organization which can protect the person and property of the individual from the onslaught of others and give him maximum opportunities for self-development.

(7) Friendship.—Relationships between human beings through which the moral ideal is realized, are not exhausted by these. To these must be added personal friendship. It elevates us from our narrow individuality and liberates the essentially spiritual qualities of love, sympathy, and fellow-feeling in us. A person finds in his friends an alter ego, with whom he shares his joys and sorrows and through whom he expands the universe of his personality. Personal friendship has lost its charm in this scientific age when a person expands his social universe through books, travels, etc. But it is too valuable a blessing to be replaced by them.

CHAPTER XX

RIGHTS AND DUTIES

1. Rights and Duties.

Rights are moral *claims* of individuals recognized by society. *Duties* are moral *debts* or obligations of individuals recognized by society. "Rights are claims recognized by Society acting as ultimate authority, to the maintenance of conditions favourable to the best life" (*Bosanquet*). Rights reside in some individuals ; they have rights to certain things which are necessary for self-realization. Duties are moral obligations, on the part of other individuals, to respect those rights. The individuals also having certain rights are under moral obligation to use them well for the common good. Rights and duties are ultimately based upon the same moral laws and relations. The society grants certain rights to its individual members for their own good and the good of society. A man has no right to anything by himself. Society concedes certain rights to him, which are conducive to the social good. A person cannot claim anything for himself alone apart from society. Moral rights of individuals are protected by social conscience or public opinion. They are not necessarily enforced by the State like legal rights. Moral rights are conceded to individuals by the society for their self-realization. They are indispensable for the realization of the highest personal good and the common good.

Rights and duties are correlative to each other. Duties are moral obligations. Every right brings an obligation with it. When one man has a right, other men are under moral obligation to respect it, and he himself is under moral obligation to use it for the common good. *Moral* obligation is different from *legal* obligation. The former cannot be enforced by the State, while the latter can. Moral obligation depends

upon the approval of public opinion. Take, for instance, the right to property. An individual has been granted this right for the common good. So not only other persons are under moral obligation to respect his right, but he himself is under moral obligation to use it for the common good. Thus rights and duties are correlative to each other. We have a right to the means that are necessary for our self-realization and for the highest good of the society of which we are members. We are under moral obligation to use them in the best way for the highest good of the society.

The society is the ultimate authority which concedes moral rights to individuals, imposes duties or moral obligations on others to respect these rights, and enforces the observance of these duties. Thus rights and duties always have a reference to the society. They are maintained by the same moral laws and relations in society. They are conducive to the fulfilment of man's vocation as a moral being. They are favourable to the realization of the rational self in each member of the society. They are favourable to the realization of a rational universe in which each person will have realized a perfect character. Rights and duties are meaningless apart from the society. There are no rights antecedent to society. "No one can have a right except (1) as a member of society, and (2) of a society in which some common good is recognized by the members of the society as their own ideal good, as that which should be for each of them" (*Green*). Rights are conceded to individuals by the society on some conditions. The individuals must be capable of exercising the rights properly, and enjoying them without hindrance. They are given certain rights only when they acquire fitness for receiving them. Thus the rights are never unconditional.

2. The Rights of man.

(1) Life.—The first right of man is *the right to live.* Self-realization is the highest good, which requires the continuance

of life for its realization. The right to live is the primary right. The sacredness of life should be recognized.

But even this fundamental right was slowly recognized in the history of humanity. In earlier times, in some countries, children were frequently exposed, widows were burnt, heretics were killed, captives in war were put to death. Even now duelling is permitted, and man slaughter, on a huge scale, in the form of war is not condemned.

The right to live involves *the right to labour or work.* If a man does not get work, he cannot earn his livelihood.

The right of life brings a moral obligation to treat our own life and that of others as a sacred thing. We should not hinder or destroy our own life. We should not take the life of any other person. We should further our own life and that of others. He who takes the life of another may legitimately be deprived of his own life.

(2) **Freedom.**—The next right is that of *freedom.* Self-realization is the highest good. It is realized by a person's will. So he must be free to exercise his will in order to realize his supreme end. He should not be coerced by anybody. He should not be a slave to anybody. Freedom means restricted freedom. Absolute and unrestricted freedom amounts to licence. In a well-ordered community an individual should be allowed to realize his supreme end by the free exercise of his will in so far as it is consistent with the maintenance of the social order. Absolute freedom means anarchy and chaos. Freedom is granted in a well-ordered state.

The right of freedom brings with it the obligation of using one's freedom for the general good.

(3) **Property.**—The right of property necessarily follows from the right of freedom. Self-realization is the highest good. It can be realized by a person if he is allowed to live, work, and freely exercise his will. Freedom of the will can be effectively exercised by an individual, if he is allowed to use some property

earned by him freely. Personality and property go together. The sense of '*me*' cannot be developed without the sense of '*mine*'. Hence personality can be realized only through the free use of some property. Seth says, "The interests of property are part of the interests of security. The State (Society) must not merely secure to the individual the opportunity of exercising his powers of activity ; it must also secure to him the fruits of such activity. In other words, the State is the custodian not only of the 'personal', but also of the 'real' rights of the individual. For these real rights or rights of *property* are essentially, as Hegel shows, personal rights, rights of the *person* : *property* is the expression of *personality*. My will sets its stamp upon the thing (property), and makes it mine—makes it, as it were, part of me......Rights of property are essentially, like all rights, personal—the creation and expression of personality" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 305). Ownership is too deeply rooted in human nature to be eradicated. Only it should be limited by the State or the Society.

A person has a right to the means which he can freely use for the development of his personality. He cannot develop his personality without joint property. The right of property was conceded to an individual much later in the evolution of society when he became conscious of the dignity of his personality and asserted his right over against the family or the tribe in which he had formerly been merged.

The right of property should be granted by the society to its individual members on the basis of equity and justice for the highest good of the individuals and the society. The right of property brings a moral obligation to use it wisely for the good of the society.

Plato holds that in an ideal republic there should be a community of goods and no right to private property. Aristotle holds that in an ideal State every one should freely use his

property for the common good. Evils of the capitalistic structure of society are so rampart today that the general trend of the thought of humanity is inevitably towards abolition of the right of property. But deep-rooted sense of individuality in every man will compel humanity to accept a counsel of moderation. Socialistic structure of society requires complete transformation of human nature which does not seem to be practicable. So the right of property will have to be recognized in some form or other.

(4) **Contract.**—The right to the fulfilment of contracts is another important right. "Rights of property give rise to rights of contract. I have control over my property: it is mine, it is part of myself. My freedom has entered into, and characterizes it. The disposition of it is in my hands ; I have the right of use and exchange, as well as of possession" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 306). Thus rights of contract necessarily arise out of rights of property. If one man enters into a contract with another to render certain services to him, the latter has the right to receive these services. This right was not recognized in primitive societies in which the individual had no right of his own. The right of contract brings the moral obligation to enter into a fair contract which can be reasonably fulfilled. A man is not free to contract himself into slavery. The right of contract is possible only in a highly developed community which can guarantee its fairness.

(5) **Education.**—The last right is the right of education. Here right and obligation are closely connected with each other. Every person has a right to have the highest education he is capable of receiving. He is under moral obligation to receive the best education according to his capacity. In a well-developed society every person ought to be given the maximum opportunity to unfold his potentialities to the best advantage and contribute his share to the general good. Education develops the intellect, sharpens the understanding, and widens

the intellectual horizon. It is absolutely necessary for self-expression and self-development.

3. The Duties of Man.

Definite rights bring definite obligations along with them. Such moral obligations or duties may be expressed in the form of commandments. Just as there is a right corresponding to every duty, so there is a duty corresponding to every right. Rights and duties or moral obligations are correlative to each other. All duties may be deduced from the fundamental duty that every person ought to realize his rational self.

(1) Respect for Life.—Our first duty is to respect life in ourselves and in others. We should not commit suicide or kill others. "Thou shalt not kill." This is the first commandment. We should take care of our own life. We should not injure the life or physical well-being of other persons. *Ahimsa* literally means non-killing. It is included in this duty.

(2) Respect for Freedom.—Our second duty is to respect the freedom of ourselves and of others. We should not interfere with the free development of another person's life. This duty may be expressed in the form: "Treat every human being as a person, never as a mere thing" Kant's moral maxim is: "Treat humanity whether in thyself or in others always as an end and never as a means". This commandment forbids slavery, despotism, exploitation, and the like. We should not allow ourselves to be used as means by others and we should not use others as means.

(3) Respect for Character.—We should respect the character of persons. We should not only abstain from doing anything that will interfere with their free development, but we should try our best to further their development. We should try to help others in the realization of their highest good. Kant said: "Treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in any other person always as an end, and never as a means." Hegel said: "Be a person, and respect others

as persons." The first two commandments are negative while the third is positive.

(4) **Respect for Property.**—The next commandment is: "Thou shalt not steal". We should not appropriate the property of others. And we should not misuse our own property. We should not intrude upon the means of others' well-being including their time, reputation and the like. We should respect the right of property, and we should have regard for our own property and that of others We should not appropriate what rightly belongs to others.

(5) **Respect for Social Order.**—We should have respect for social institutions and various forms of the social order. The stability of the social order is an indispensable condition of the moral progress of individuals. So we should not unnecessarily interfere with any social institution. For instance, we should not try to destroy the family or the State. We should maintain the social system to which we belong.

(6) **Respect for Truth.**—The next commandment is: "Thou shalt not lie". We should speak the truth. We should keep our promise. We should say what we mean. We should conform our actions to our words. And we should conform our words to our thoughts. Truth means harmony between thoughts and words, and harmony between words and actions.

(7) **Respect for Progress.**—We should have firm faith in human progress and try our best to further it. We should contribute to the advancement of the world. This commandment is expressed in the form: "Thou shalt labour, within thy particular province, with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength and with all thy mind" (*Mackenzie*). "Work is Worship." Love of God is expressed in our faith in human progress and devotion to it.

4. Casuistry : Conflict of Duties.

Sometimes particular duties seem to come into conflict with one another. For instance, respect for life may conflict with

respect for truth. If a doctor tells his patient suffering from consumption about his disease he may hasten his death. Again, respect for life may come into conflict with respect for property. For instance, if we are to respect life we must take away the knife of a person about to commit murder. These are examples of the so-called conflict of duties.

To solve the difficulties in such cases of conflicts of duties we are advised by some to take tho aid of "Casuistry". It tells us under what particular circumstances we are justified in breaking particular moral rules. Casuistry tries to formulate rules for breaking moral laws under particular circumstances. It is a branch of Ethics which deals with cases of conscience.

There is no conflict of duties. Under particular circumstances we have *one* definite duty. It is due to our failure to grasp the real situation that wo speak of conflicts of duties. For instance, it is our clear duty to appropriate the knife of a person about to commit murder. Green says, "There is no such thing really as a conflict of duties. A man's duty under any particular set of circumstances is always one, though the conditions of the case may be so complicatod and obscure as to make it difficult to decide what the duty really is "(*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 355). There is conflict of duties, properly so called. In a concrete situation an individual has only one definite duty. He can know it with a clear moral insight, if he does not yield to passions and prejudices of the moment. The so-called 'conflict of duties' is due to lack of clear moral insight, warping of moral judgment by passions and narrow self-interest, confusion of issues, want of discrimination of the essential from the inessential factors in the moral situation.

"It is bad enough that we should require particular rules of conduct at all, but rules for the breaking of rules would be quite intolerable" (*Mackenzie*). Moreover, the application of casuistry to doubtful and complicated cases would lead to

laxity in morality. One would justify any action whatsoever, to one's own satisfaction.

"Casuistry tends to magnify the *letter* of morality at the expense of its spirit" (Dewey & Tufts : *Ethics*, p. 306). It fixes attention upon the conformity of an action with a particular rule. It does not take into account the agent's disposition, motive, intention, and attitude in an act, or the good that is achieved by the act, or the unique occasion on which the act is done.

"Casuistry tends in practice to a *legal* view of morality. In the legal view liability to blame and to punishment inflicted from without by some superior authority, is necessarily prominent. Conduct is regulated through specific injunctions and prohibitions. Do this. Do not do that."

"Casuistry tends to deprive moral life of *freedom* and *spontaneity* and to reduce it to a more or less anxious and servile conformity to externally imposed rules" (*Ibid*, p. 307).

Whenever there seems to be a conflict of duties we should fall back upon the supreme moral rule that we shoud realize our rational self and the values that are implied in this realization.

6. Duties of Perfect and Imperfect Obligations.

Kant distinguished between Duties of Perfect Obligation and Duties of Imperfect Obligation. The former are definite and precise and can be exacted from individuals. The latter are rather indefinite and cannot be exacted from individuals. The former are mostly negative. The latter are mostly positive, but cannot be formulated definitely and absolutely. For instance, our duties not to kill, or to steal, or to lie are duties of perfect obligation. But our duty of benevolence is relative to time, place, and circumstance, and greatly depends upon our discretion. It cannot be exacted from us.

This distinction drawn by Kant is a juristic distinction, rather than a moral one. Under particular circumstances our

duties are definite and can be definitely formulated. The question of exaction or coercion does not arise with regard to moral duties. From the moral standpoint, all duties are duties of perfect obligation.

7. Bradley's conception of "My Station and its Duties".

Every person is born with particular aptitudes in a particular social environment. His duties are strictly determined by his particular station in life, and he should perform these duties faithfully to realize his highest personal good and the general good. Carlyle said, "Do the Duty that lies nearest thee." "Know what thou canst work at, and work at it, like a Hercules." Thus the determination of a man's duties depends largely upon his individual insight. Every person ought to follow the bent of his own genius and determine his duties accordingly in conformity with his station in life. The individual's duties are determined by his station in society, or his place in the actual social relations; and even his steadfast devotion to an ideal must be regulated by the imperious claims of his moral station. An individual's duties are determined by his station in society. Thus the duties of a teacher, a pupil, a ruler, a subject, a judge, a lawyer, a merchant, a workman, a father, a mother, a child, etc., are different from those persons who belong to the opposite class.

Thus a person has three classes of duties. He has to perform some *common* duties described above, such as respect for life, freedom, property, etc. He has to perform some *specific* duties appropriate to his own station in society, relative to his peculiar circumstances. Again, he has to perform some new duties which depend upon his circumstances which change from time to time. A public leader becomes a minister. His specific duties change from those of a public leader to those of a minister.

8. One Supreme Duty.

We have one supreme duty: "Realize the ***rational self*** and the ***values*** that are implied in this realization". All other duties follow from this supreme duty. Particular duties are aspects of this absolute and ultimate duty. What is the supreme Moral Law? "It is the commandment that bids us realize the rational self and the values that are implied in this realization" (*Mackenzie*). It is so broad, that it should be supplemented by other particular rules of conduct. When these rules seem to conflict with each other, we should appeal to the supreme commandment: "Realize the rational self and the rational universe".

9. Classification of Duties.

Duties may be classified into three classes: (1) duties to self; (2) duties to others; (3) duties to God.

(1) **Duties to Self.**—These include (*i*) physical duty, (*ii*) economic duty, (*iii*) intellectual duty, (*iv*) æsthetic duty, and (*v*) moral duty. Self preservation, care for health and recreation constitute our duty to the body. We have no right to commit suicide. Our life is the joint property of our own and others. We should preserve and further our life, and enjoy sound health which is necessary for moral strength. We should cultivate bodily values because they are the basis of higher values. We should earn a decent living. We should acquire wealth, make a frugal use of it, so that we may enjoy higher values. Wealth is an enonomic value. It is an indispensable means to the attainment of higher values. Economic values should be cultivated as instrumental to higher intrinsic values. We should not treat wealth as an end in itself. We should treat it as a means. This is our economic duty. We should cultivate our intellect and acquire knowledge. We have no right to leave our intellect undeveloped because development of intellect is indispensable for development of personality. This is our intellectual duty. We should cultivate our æsthetic

taste by appreciating and creating beauty. This is our æsthetic duty. We should control our instincts, appetites, desires and passions. We should regulate sensibility by reason. We should respect our personality. Self-control and self-regard constitute our moral duty. We should aim at Truth and Beauty as elements of the Good. We should treat intellectual, æsthetic and moral values as intrinsic, absolute, and eternal. These are the duties to the self. These are *individual* duties.

(2) **Duties to Others.**—These include (*i*) duties to the family, (*ii*) duties to other persons in society, (*iii*) duties to the country, (*iv*) duties to humanity, (*v*) duties to animals, (*vi*) duties to plants. We should love and respect our parents. We should take care of them in their old age. We should love our children. We should take care of their health, education, and character. We should help them choose their proper avocations. Husbands and wives should love and respect each other. They should treat each other as friends and equals. Husbands should not treat their wives as subordinate to them. These are our duties to the family. Our duties to others in society include mainly (*i*) veracity, (*ii*) equity, (*iii*) benevolence. Veracity is truthfulness. We should speak the truth. We should say what we mean. We should do what we say. We should keep our promises. We should speak out our conviction. We should shun all hypocrisy and pretence. Equity means justice and fair dealing. We should do unto others as we would be done by. We should respect the personality of others. We should treat all persons as ends—not as means to self-enjoyment and self-aggrandizement. We should not interfere with others' freedom and property. We should not cast a slur on others' character, honour and reputation. We should not take away the life of others or interfere with others' earning their livelihood. We should cultivate good will towards all. We should not do them any harm by thought, word and deed. All these duties are included in equity. We

should have compassion for the distressed. We should do our very best to relieve their distress. This is benevolence. These are our duties to others in society. We should love our country, exert our utmost to improve its condition, and feel glory in its achievements. We should cultivate patriotism. These are our duties to the country. We should love all human beings, and treat them as our fellows. We should cast off narrow patriotism, jingoism, imperialism, colour prejudice, and racial superiority. We should have respect for social order and faith in human progress. We should cultivate broad humanitarianism. These are our duties to humanity. We should take care of domestic animals, give them proper food and shelter, and nurse them when they are sick. We should cultivate tenderness for animals. We should not ruthlessly kill them for our enjoyment. We should not be cruel to them. These are our duties to animals. We should take care of plants, water them, and give them proper nourishment. We should not be rude to Nature. These are our duties to plants.

(3) **Duties to God.**—We should daily pray to God, meditate on Him and have communion with Him. We should daily worship Him, revere Him, and seek His protection and care. We should resign our will to Him, dedicate our actions to Him, and love Him with a single-minded devotion. These are our duties to God. But our love of God must be expressed in love of mankind. It must find expression in service to humanity. Love of God without love of man is empty of content.

CHAPTER XXI

VIRTUES

1. Duties and Virtues.

The habitual performance of duties leads to a virtuous disposition. Duties are turned into virtues by habit. Virtues refer to acquired dispositions of mind. The virtuous man is one who has a steadfast habit of performing duties. Virtue denotes a good character. Duty denotes a particular action that we ought to perform. Thus a man *does* his duty ; but he *possesses* a virtue or *is* virtuous.

Virtue is excellence of character. Duty refers to outer conduct. Virtue is expressed in duty. Duties habitually performed lead to the formation of virtue. Virtue refers to the inner character. Duty refers to an overt action. Thus virtue is the excellence of the inner character, and duty is its expression in an overt action. Virtue is the habit of deliberate choice of right actions. Vice is the habit of deliberate choice of wrong actions. Virtue is the habit of controlling instincts and and impulses and realizing the good of the self as a whole. Vice is the habit of yielding to instincts and impulses and realizing the partial good of their satisfaction, to the detriment of the self as a whole. Virtue is the excellence of character. Vice is the taint of character. Virtue is expressed in the performance of duties. Vice is expressed in the commision of sins.

Virtue is acquired by the habitual performance of duties. Vice is acquired by the habitual commission of sins. Virtue is not an innate good disposition which is natural. It is an acquired disposition due to the habit of controlling and regulating impulses and instincts by reason. Duty leads to virtue through habit.

2. The Nature of Virtue.

"Virtue," says Aristotle, "is a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the will, and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life—an ideal fixed by reason." Virtue is a permanent acquired disposition or character in harmony with moral law. It is not a natural disposition. It is an acquired disposition. It is a settled habit of willing in conformity with moral law. It consists in living habitually in the universe of right actions. It is a quality of character, determined by the idea of the highest good of the self as a whole. It is excellence of character. A character which is not embodied in an activity is a mere potentiality. A virtue is expressed in duties. Excellence of character is expressed in the performance of particular acts which are duties. Virtue refers to inner character. Duty refers to outer conduct. Character is expressed in conduct. The habitual performance of duty leads to the formation of virtue. Virtue lives in the performance of duties. Thus virtue and duty are two aspects of the same thing. Virtue is the excellence of the inner character; duty is the external expression of a good character. Virtue is the settled habit of a good will; duty is an overt action in which the habit of good will is expressed. Virtue denotes a good habit of character. Duty denotes a particular kind of action that we ought to perform. A person is virtuous. He does his duties. Virtue apart from its expression in duty is a bare potentiality. It is always ready to express itself in duties. Therefore virtue is the quality of character as dynamical, or in action.

3. Virtue, Knowledge and Habit.

Virtue is the habit of good will. It is the habit of performing duties. It is the habit of deliberately choosing and performing right actions. But habit of deliberate choice and action presupposes knowledge of the good and duties in concrete situations. Habitual performance of duties depends upon

knowledge of duties on particular occasions, and knowledge of the ultimate good of the self which determines the duties. Therefore virtue implies knowledge or wisdom as well as habit. It is true that virtue is knowledge, as Socrates and Plato said. It is also true that virtue is habit, as Aristotle said. Mere knowledge of the good and duty in a concrete situation does not make for virtue. Knowledge must lead to actions. Knowledge of duties must lead to habitual performance of duties. Virtue without action is a bare potentiality ; it is as good as non-existent. Thus virtue implies both knowledge and habit. Mackenzie says, "Virtue is a kind of *knowledge*, as well as a kind of *habit*. The virtuous man is one who lives continuously in the universe which is constituted by duty. To live continuously in that universe is a habit ; but it is at the same time a species of insight. To be virtuous is to possess habitually a certain kind of knowledge or insight. Thus both Socrates and Aristotle were right. *Virtue is both a kind of knowledge and a kind of habit.* Habits is not mere custom. It is a *habit of willing.* Habits which have a moral significance are habits of deliberate choice. Now deliberate choice depends on *thought* or *reason.* In order to choose the right, we must know the right. Right willing, therefore, depends on true insight. Virtue is a kind of knowledge. It depends upon the occupation of a certain point of view, on the possession of a certain *rational insight.* At the same time, virtue is a *habit.* It is not merely a certain act of will, but a continuous state of character, a steadfast occupation of a definite universe" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 71-72). Thus virtue implies knowledge, wisdom or moral insight, and a habit of performing duties. It implies knowledge and a habit.

4. Virtue and Happiness.

Virtue is the habit of good will. It consists in living habitually in the universe of right actions. It consists in acquiring a type of character in harmony with the moral law.

Virtue is a life of harmony among the various elements in the self. It consists in the habit of regulating instincts and impulses by reason and subjecting them to the good of the self. Thus *virtue* is always accompanied by *happiness.* Virtue consists in achieving harmony between reason and impulses. And happiness is the feeling of this harmony. It is the feeling of *self-realizedness* Happiness springs from the systematization of desires. It is not transient pleasure due to the satisfaction of a single impulse or an isolated desire. It is a feeling which accompanies the harmonious adjustment of the various elements in the self in conformity with the ideal of the highest good. Happiness is an index of self-realization or realization of the total self—sentient and rational—the sentient self being subjected to the Moral Law by the rational self.

"A man is not good at all unless he takes pleasure in noble deeds. No one would call a man just who did not take pleasure in doing justice, nor generous, who took no pleasure in acts of generosity, and so on" (*Aristotle*). A virtuous man must be happy. Happiness for Aristotle is found in fulfilling the functions of man properly. For pleasure attends the proper exercise of functions. The characteristic function of man, which differentiates him from other animals is his reason. So happiness is to be found in the right exercise of reason. A life of reason implies a settled character, or the possession of virtue. Happiness is the bloom of a virtuous life. Virtue is always accompanied by happiness. Virtue is not, in itself, happiness. But happiness is the index of virtue. Virtue alone does not guarantee happiness, but without it happiness is not possible. Happiness depends upon virtue, and also upon external goods. The ideally happy man is one who leads a life of perfect virtue, and is adequately supplied with external goods. This is the view of Aristotle.

Modern Eudæmonism also holds that virtue is accompanied by happiness. Happiness springs from the harmony of desires.

It is the feeling which accompanies the systematization of desires by reason. It is the feeling of self-realization. "Since pleasure is the concomitant of activity, happiness depends upon the synthesis of activities, and ultimately upon the supreme activity of moral synthesis. We may, with Aristotle, regard pleasure as the bloom of the virtuous life, as the index and criterion of moral progress. But while self-realization brings self-satisfaction, the former is not to be regarded as instrumental to the latter. The end of life is neither to know nor to feel, but to do and to be. The life of man's total selfhood is its own end,—a doing which is the expression of being, and the medium of higher and fuller being, of a deeper and richer unity of thought (reason) and sensibility (desire). Although its satisfactoriness is not its *raison d'etre*, the life of *Self-realization* is, in its very essence, a *completely satisfying life*" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 204).

5. Virtues and Values.

The virtues bear a certain relationship to the values. But the lists of virtues and values are constructed on different principles. Virtues are the traits of human character, which are good. They are subjective. The values are all kinds of objects, which are good to the self in the environment and in itself. Thus the values are both subjective and objective.

"All virtues are values, both intrinsic and instrumental. Men intuitively approve of courage. honour, wisdom, and love ; like jewels that shine in their own light. All virtues are instrumental also : they promote the welfare of individuals and society.

To every value there is a corresponding virtue. For the continued pursuit of any value implies a habit or sentiment, and if the value is rationally pursued, the sentiment is a virtue. Thus the proper pursuit of economic goods is the virtue of economy. The cultivation of friends, devotion to wife, and tender care for children are manifestations of the

general virtue of love or benevolence. Corresponding to the intellectual and religious values are the virtues of wisdom and reverence. Cultivation of the bodily values comes under the head of the virtue of temperance" (*Wright : General Introduction to Ethics*, pp. 343-44). Thus the habitual pursuit of values or of different kinds of goods gives rise to different kinds of virtues.

6. The Socratic conception of Virtue as Knowledge.

Socrates holds that "virtue is knowledge." If a person fully understood the nature of the good, he could not fail to pursue it. On the other hand, if a person did not fully understand the nature of the good, he could not be moral except by accident. Knowledge is virtue. Ignorance is vice. To be temperate without knowledge is to be temperate by a kind of intemperance. To be courageous without knowledge is to be courageous by a kind of cowardice. Thus knowledge constitutes the essence of virtue according to Socrates. A person never knowingly commits wrong.

This view is wrong. In the first place, if virtue consists in the knowledge of the good, and if vice consists in the ignorance of the good, then a person is not accountable for his wrong actions because they are due to his ignorance and only voluntary actions involving the knowledge of the good are objects of moral judgment.

In the second place, a person often knows what is right, and yet does what is wrong. Knowledge of the good does not always lead to the choice of the good. Knowledge and action are very often at variance with each other. The will may go against reason under inducement of pleasure. Thus it is wiong to hold that no person commits a wrong action voluntarily or knowingly. Therefore knowledge does not constitute virtue, though it is an indispensable element of it. Virtue depends upon the knowledge of the good and a habit of willing the good.

7. Aristotle's conception of Virtue as the Choice of the Mean.

"Virtue", says Aristotle, "is the habit of choosing the *relative mean*, as it is determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine it." Virtue is a habit of choice, the character of which lies in moderation or observance of the *mean* relative to the abilities and circumstances of each person, as determined by reason by which the prudent man would determine it. And it is a moderation, firstly, inasmuch as it comes in the middle or *mean* between two vices, one on the side of excess, the other on the side of defect ; and secondly, inasmuch as, while these vices fall short of or exceed the due measure in feeling and in action, it finds and chooses the *mean*, middling, or moderate amount. Virtue is a moderation or middle state." Many virtues stand midway between two extremes (vices), one of which is an excess and the other a deficiency in the proper trait. The virtue of courage is a "golden mean" between rashness and cowardice ; the virtue of truthfulness about one's talents between boastfulness and self-depreciation ; the virtue of liberality between prodigality and miserliness. Virtue does not consist in the choice of the absolute Mean, but of the Mean relative to the individual's ability, temperament and circumstances. The Mean lies at different points for different individuals. The courage of a soldier is more inclined towards rashness than cowardice, and is excited by particular occasions. Vice consists in excess or defect of that which, in its due measure, is virtue.

There is a great deal of truth in Aristotle's view. The essence of virtue lies in moderation or subjection of instincts and impulses to the Moral Law of reason. It lies in harmony between reason and sensibility. It lies in a habit of willing the middle course. But this is a general statement. It requires modification to suit particular circumstances. Sometimes it is our clear duty to feel the intensity of an emotion (*e. g.*,

patriotism), for instance, when our country is invaded, and to summon utmost courage to ward off the enemy. Virtue cannot be adequately defined apart from the conception of the Highest Good. "Moderation in all things may be as much of a vice as immoderation in one and all. We must reject the idea of an abstract golden mean" (*Muirhead*).

8. The Unity of Virtues.

All virtues are aspects of one supreme virtue. It consists in the habit of controlling and regulating instincts, impulses and desires, and subjecting them to the law of reason with a view to realizing the Highest Good of the self as a whole. One supreme duty is that which unconditionally commands us to realize the ideal or rational self. By constant performance of this duty we acquire a habit of willing or acting in such a manner as to gradually realize the rational self. This habit is called the supreme virtue. All other virtues are fragmentary aspects of this supreme virtue. Plato says, "The virtues are not isolated, but one and whole." Green also says, "It is true that the end of all virtues is the same. They are all determined by relation to social well-being (which is included in the supreme good) as their final cause, and they all rest on a dominant interest in some form or other of that well-being." Therefore the virtues, which are means to the highest personal and social good, constitute a single system.

9. Virtues relative to States of Society.

"The virtues which it is desirable for human beings to cultivate vary considerably with different times and places" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 329). Virtues which are to be cultivated in modern times should be considered in relation to the structure and requirements of the modern society. In ancient Greece the virtue of courage meant valour in battle. But in the modern society it means not only physical courage but also moral courage. The kind of fortitude which was required in Greek society for valour in battle is somewhat different from

that fortitude which sustains the modern man of science, politician, or scholar who has to push himself through so many difficulties.

10. Virtues relative to Social Functions.

"Not only are the virtues relative to different times and different social conditions; they are also relative to the functions that different individuals have to fulfil in society" (*Ibid*, p. 332). It is wrong to say that a poor man cannot cultivate the virtue of liberality and a rich man need not cultivate the virtue of patience, because they ought to cultivate the habits of mind implied by these virtues. Yet the virtues of persons are relative to their functions in society. "The virtues of a man are not quite the same as those of a woman; those of the rich are not quite the same as those of the poor; those of an old man not quite the same as those of a young man; those of a parent are not quite the same as those of a child; those of a man in health not quite the same as those of one who is sick: those of a commercial man not quite the same as those of a man of science" (*Ibid*, p. 332). Thus the duties of a person are always determined by his functions in society. There are no abstract duties: they are always relative to time, place, circumstances, and functions in society.

11. The Cardinal Virtues.

Cardinal virtues are the fundamental virtues on which other virtues are based. They are basic virtues. Plato recognized four cardinal or fundamental virtues—*Wisdom*, *Courage*, *Temperance*, and *Justice*. Wisdom includes all other virtues, for every virtuous activity consists in acting wisely under particular circumstances. It is an all-embracing virtue. Courage and temperance are the two virtues that bear most directly on the life of the individual. Courage (or fortitude) should be taken in the sense of resistance to the fear of pain, and temperance in the sense of resistance to the allurements of pleasure. These two virtues include all forms of opposition to temptation

in the individual life. Temptation appears in the form of avoidance of some pain or attainment of some pleasure. Justice comprehends all social virtues. Thus Plato's classification of cardinal virtues may be accepted as the basis and adapted to the requirements of the modern society.

The cardinal virtues of Plato should be taken in a wider sense. Thus wisdom should include care, foresight, prudence, and decisiveness of choice. Courage should include both valour and fortitude. Valour is active courage which pursues its course in spite of the probability of pain. Fortitude is passive courage which bears inevitable suffering without flinching. Courage should also include decision, diligence, and perseverance. The Christian virtues of faith and hope are closely connected with valour and fortitude. Temperance includes resistance to all kinds of solicitation from pleasures, sensual or intellectual. Justice includes not merely the fulfilment of contracts, and the performance of duties enjoined by the laws of the community, but also perfect honesty and fidelity in one's relationships with others. Justice should include benevolence, love, courtesy, cheerfulness, and good humour. Justice must precede benevolence. These are the fundamental social virtues. All virtues are different forms of practical wisdom. Thus "by giving a broad interpretation to each of the terms used, we may accept the old Greek classification of the virtues with but slight modification" (*Ibid*, pp. 338-339).

12. Classification of Virtues.

Virtues have been grouped under three distinct classes, *viz.*, (*1*) *self-regarding*, (*2*) *other-regarding*, and (*3*) *ideal-regarding* virtues. The first are conducive to the agent's own good. The second are conducive to the good of others. The third are conducive to the realization of an ideal, *viz.*, Truth, Good, or Beauty.

This classification is misleading. There is no hard and fast distinction between the individual good and the social good.

The virtues which conduce to the individual good also conduce to the social good. "The individual has no life of his own independent of his social relations, and any virtue which has reference to the good of the individual, must have reference also to social well-being" (*Ibid*, p. 334). Thus it is misleading to distinguish between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. Still we must admit that some virtues bear specially on the individual life, and others on the social life. Likewise the distinction between self-regarding and ideal-regarding virtues is arbitrary. Pursuit of Truth, Good and Beauty, even for their own sake, is conducive to the good of the individual. But we must admit that these different kinds of virtues lay stress on different aspects of our moral life and therefore may be regarded as distinct from one another.

13. Virtues of Individual Life and Social Life.

Temperance and *Culture* are the virtues of individual life (*Seth*). The very essence of morality is the regulation of impulses by reason. This is temperance. It is the conquest of natural sensibility by the rational self. Temperance is self-discipline. Intemperance is self-gratification or self-indulgence. The virtue of temperance has a negative as well as a positive aspect. Negatively, it is self-denial, self-sacrifice, self-restraint, or the subjection of all impulses to rational choice. "Temperance is the rational control of all impulses in the interests of the whole self and the social good" (*Wright*). Positively, it is self-limitation, concentration or unity of purpose. The natural impulsive energy must be guided along a single path. It must be controlled and guided by one, single, dominant purpose in life. Thus temperance is self-discipline as well as single-minded devotion to one purpose. Culture is the cultivation of the inner excellence of character. "It is the total self that is to be developed,—the intellectual, the emotional, and the active or volitional elements, each in its perfection, and all in the harmony of a complete and single life. Culture means not merely the cultivation of the

several capacities, but the symmetrical development of all. In all spheres, the keynote of true culture is symmetrical self-development" (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 254-55). Physical culture is not an integral part of ethical culture. But it is the most important means to the realization of the end. A sound and healthy body is essential for ethical culture. Culture is self-development which means development of individuality into personality. "The moral life remains always a personal, and even an individual life ; it never becomes impersonal or 'selfless.' The unselfish life is not selfless or impersonal ; rather the life of the self is enlarged and enriched in direct proportion to the unselfishness of that life. Even the individuality is not, in such self-development any more than in self-discipline, negated or annihilated ; it is taken up into and interpreted by the larger social good" (*Ibid*, p. 271).

We should add *courage* and *honour* also to the virtues of individual life. *Courage* is resistance to the fear of pain. If temperance is resistance to the allurements of pleasure, courage is the power of resisting the diverting forces of pain and fear. If temperance is self-restraint, courage is inward energy. Courage exhibits itself in various forms. *Valour* is active courage which pursues its course in spite of the probability of pain. *Fortitude* is passive courage which bears inevitable suffering without flinching. It is endurance of pain. *Perseverance* is the power of carrying on a task under the persecution of pains and obstructions. *Physical courage* is the daring which launches on a dangerous enterprise. *Moral courage* is the courage of conviction in the face of abuse, ridicule, slander, and social persecution. These are different forms of courage.

Honour means self-respect. It is regard for one's own character. It implies loyalty to one's ideal, defending one's rights manfully, and resenting personal affront. Thus temperance, culture, courage and honour may be regarded as self-regarding virtues.

Justice and *Benevolence* are the virtues of social life. "Social virtue, on its negative side, we may call justice, with its corresponding duty of freedom or equality; on its positive side, we may call the virtue benevolence, and the duty fraternity or brotherliness" (*Ibid*, p. 279). Justice consists in not hindering the personal life of others. It is non-interference with the free development of other persons. As temperance is a prior condition of true culture, so is justice a prior condition of true benevolence. We must be just before we can be generous. Benevolence consists in helping and furthering the personal life of others. It means sympathy and fellow-feeling and love. It means identifying oneself with other persons. The highest culmination of benevolence is found in selfless devotion to the progress of humanity.

We should add *love*, *loyalty*, and *respect*, and *veracity* to the virtues of the social life. *Love* includes love for husband and wife, love for parents, love for children, love for relatives, love for friends, love for countrymen, and love for humanity. Love implies self-sacrifice and service to others. It is self-forgetful devotion to the good of others. It is instinctive, at first, but becomes enlightened by intelligence later. Justice consists in rendering to others in fairness and equity what makes for the general good. Love urges us to feel tenderness and comradeship for all mankind, and to render to them more than justice demands. Love is felt for individuals. Loyalty is felt for groups. A person feels loyalty for his family, college, profession, community, or nation. "The virtue of *loyalty* is the rational control and organisation of the sentiments felt towards the different groups with which a person is identified" (*Wright*). Loyalty tends to embrace in a common and coherent whole all the sentiments which a person feels for different groups. *Respect* for superiors is a social virtue. We feel humility in the presence of persons of superior qualities. We also feel wonder, admiration, fear, and awe for them on account of their superior

qualities. If a person feels admiration or awe towards another person, he acquires the sentiment of respect for him. "The virtue of *respect* is a rational sentiment in which regard for personality is wise, just, benevolent, and honourable. It is a duty to respect others and to respect oneself, to give praise and blame to others and to oneself in accordance with real worth and character" (*General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 247). *Veracity* is the habit of speaking the truth. It is the habit of truthfulness. It is harmony between thoughts and words, and harmony between words and actions. Equivocation, calumny, flattery, hypocrisy, perjury, etc., are various kinds of lying. Veracity implies service to others by communication of truth. Instruction, advice, admonition, correction as well as teaching and preaching are various kinds of veracity. Justice, benevolence, love, loyalty, respect, and veracity are *other-regarding* or *social* virtues.

Reverence is the virtue concerning God. It is respect for God, who excites in us complex emotions of humility, admiration, awe, love, gratitude, mystic rapture and devotion. God is one supreme object of religious reverence. God is the supreme moral person endowed with all the moral virtues in super-human excellence.

Intellectual virtue, æsthetic virtue, and moral virtue are the *ideal-regarding* virtues. We should cultivate the habits of pursuing *Truth*, *Beauty* and *Good*, which are absolute and eternal values.

14. The Ethos of a People.

Hegel says, "The child is suckled at the breast of the universal Ethos." "Wisdom and virtue consist in living agreeably to the Ethos of one's people." Bradley has made this conception popular. "The Ethos of a people constitutes the atmosphere in which the best members of a race habitually live. It constitutes the universe of their moral activities. It is the morality of our world; and, on the whole, the man

who conforms to the morality of that world is a good man, and the man who violates it is a bad man" (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 330-31). The Ethos of a people is partly expressed in definite rules and precepts, and partly in recognized habits of action and standards of judgment current among a people at a given time. It constitutes the moral point of view adopted by a people. The virtues of a person are determined, to a great extent, by the Ethos or moral habits of the people among whom he lives.

Bradley exaggerates the importance of the Ethos. He holds that the man who seeks to have a higher morality than that of his people is on the threshold of immorality. "But this is an exaggeration. For the Ethos of a people is not a stationary thing. It develops, like social life generally; and its development is brought about mainly by the constant effort of the best members of a race to reach a higher standard of life than that which they find current around them" (*Ibid*, p. 331). But we must admit that the bulk of people in a country do not come up to the level of the Ethos or moral habits of the people. They should first rise to the social standard of morality, and then think of transcending it.

CHAPTER XXII

CONSCIENCE : MORAL FACULTY

1. Conscience or Moral Faculty.

The *moral faculty* is the capacity of the self by which it apprehends the moral quality of an action or discriminates between rightness and wrongness. It is often called *conscience*. There is no distinction between conscience and moral faculty.

Hedonists deny the existence of conscience as a special faculty. Egoistic Hedonists identify it with *self-love* and *prudence*. Utilitarians identify it with *sympathy* acquired in the individual's life time. Evolutionary Hedonists identify it with *social instinct* or sympathy inherited from ancestors. Intuitionists regard it as an innate special faculty, either akin to sensibility or to reason. Some Intutionists regard it as the *moral sense*. Others regard it as the *æsthetic sense*. Others regard it as the *moral reason* which intuitively apprehends universal moral principles and applies them to particular actions. Kant (Rationalist) regards it as the *practical or moral reason* which intuitively apprehends the moral law or categorical imperative. Perfectionists hold that it is *reason* that intuitively reveals to us the moral ideal and then applies it to particular actions. They identify conscience with the *whole self* legislating for its parts or aspects. Conscience or moral faculty is original, intuitive, and universal ; it is the whole self discovering the moral end and moral laws.

2. The Hedonistic View of Conscience.

Hedonists deny the existence of conscience as a special faculty. Egoistic Hedonists regard each porson's own pleasure as the highest good. They identify conscience with *self-love*

and *prudence.* Self-love compels every person to seek his own pleasure. Prudence impels him to calculate what will conduce to his own greatest pleasure. Thus Egoistic Hedonists conceive of conscience as nothing but ordinary understanding, imagination, and inference. Utilitarians (*e. g.*, J. S. Mill) regard the general happiness as the highest good. They identify conscience with *sympathy* enlightened by understanding, imagination and inference. Sympathy is *acquired* by an individual in his own life time due to the law of association and the transference of interest. J. S. Mill says, "The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our own mind ; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, is the essence of conscience." Thus conscience is *emotional.* "Conscience", says Bain, "is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us." Thus conscience is a sentiment of regard for the political law which is imposed on a person for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Bentham regards conscience as "a thing of fictitious existence." Evolutionary Hedonists look upon conscience as a social *instinct* or sympathy *inherited* from ancestors. It is *innate* in the individual but *acquired* by the race. Conscience is the echo of the public voice in the individual. Leslie Stephen says, "Conscience is the utterence of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to fulfil the primary conditions of its welfare."

Conscience cannot be identified with *prudence.* Egoistic Hedonism identifies moral life with pursuit of one's own greatest pleasure, which is the very negation of morality. Conscience cannot be identified with *sympathy*, innate or acquired. Sympathy is a subjective and variable emotion. It cannot account for the peculiar characteristics of moral consciousness, *e. g.*, moral obligation, merit, demerit, responsibility, reward and punishment.

3. Conscience as the Moral Sense.

Some Intuitionists maintain that conscience is akin to sensibility ; it is the inner *moral sense.* Conscience intuitively apprehends rightness or wrongness of a particular action through the feeling of approval or the feeling of disapproval which it produces in it. It *intuitively* apprehends rightness or wrongness of *particular actions.* Conscience is *infallible.*

Martineau holds that conscience is akin to the moral sense ; it intuitively apprehends the relative moral worth of conflicting impulses which appear simultaneously.

This theory cannot account for diversity of moral judgments and moral progress. Men differ in their moral estimates. What is considered to be right by one is considered to be wrong by another. What is thought to be right in one age or place is thought to be wrong in another. The theory cannot account for detection of errors in moral judgments. It makes moral judgments depend on moral sentiments. But, in truth, moral sentiments depend upon moral judgments. Conscience cannot be regarded as akin to sense-perception. Martineau's theory of conscience has already been criticized in connection with intuitionism.

4. Conscience as the Æsthetic Sense

Some Intuitionists (*i. e.*, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, etc.) hold that conscience is the *æsthetic sense* which intuitively apprehends the beauty or deformity of actions. Rightness is beauty. Wrongness is deformity. So conscience is the æsthetic sense. It is *infallible.*

This theory misses the distinctive character of morality. The moral quality is *unique* and *sui generis.* It cannot be reduced to an æsthetic quality. The *subjective* and *variable* feeling of beauty cannot account for the *objective* and *uniform* standard of morality. It cannot also account for moral obligation, merit, demerit, remorse, responsibility, etc. It cannot account for diversity of moral judgments.

5. The Dianœtic View of Conscience.

Rational Intuitionists (*e. g.*, Cudworth, Clarke, etc.) maintain that conscience is an *intellectual* or *rational* faculty which intuitively apprehends universal, eternal and immutable moral principles. It never fails to grasp these moral principles. So far conscience is *infallible*. But reason may fail to apply them correctly to particular actions. Moral judgments are inferential in nature. Errors in moral judgments are more due to incorrect application of moral principles to particular actions, than to the apprehension of moral principles. So far conscience may be *educated*. It may be trained to apply moral principles correctly to particular actions and avoid errors. This is a more satisfactory theory of conscience.

6. Butler's View of Conscience.

Butler regards Self-love, Benevolence, and Conscience as the three elements in human nature organically connected with one another. They are *rational* principles. Conscience is superior to self-love and benevolence. It is the principle of *reflection* upon the law of rightness. It has right to govern the other elements in human nature. It is supreme and authoritative in human constitution. "Had it strength, as it has right, had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world" (*Butler*). Self-love regulates egoistic impulses. Benevolence regulates altruistic impulses. They are *rational* principles. Self-love and benevolence are regulated by conscience. It is the supreme *rational* principle in the human constitution.

7. Conscience as the Universal element in human nature.

Conscience is the *universal* element in human nature ; it is not the conscience of any particular individual, which may be tainted by some imperfection in his standard. Conscience is the *universal conscience* in each person. "When *conscience* is referred to as the fundamental principle in morals, we must

not understand it to mean *the conscience of this or that individual.* The conscience of any particular individual is simply the consciousness of the harmony or disharmony of his action with his own standard of right ; and if this standard is defective, the same defect will appear in the conscience. *His conscience may be, in Ruskin's phrase, 'the conscience of an ass'* " (*Mackenzie*).

8. Kant's View of Conscience as Moral Reason.

When Kant says that '*an erring conscience is a chimera*' he means by it the *universal conscience.* He regards conscience as the *moral reason* or *practical reason.* It is reason as willing and acting, as distinguished from pure reason or theoretical reason or reason as knowing. It is the ultimate *rational* faculty which recognizes moral principles,—common to all mankind. It is latent in all men, though it may be more developed in some men than in others. Kant regards conscience as *moral reason* which intuitively apprehends the Moral Law which is a categorical imperative. The moral law cannot tell us what the *matter* or content of our own actions ought to be ; it can tell us only about the *form.* Three universal *maxims* of morality can be deduced from the moral law.

9. The Eudæmonistic View of Conscience.

Eudæmonists or Perfectionists maintain that self-realization is the highest good, and it is *reason* that intuitively reveals to us this moral ideal, and the fundamental moral principles following from it. Reason applies these moral principles to particular actions and thus determines their moral worth. Reason is nothing but the *self* acting as a moral being. It is not a special faculty of the self. "Conscience is the whole or true self claiming to legislate for the parts." "Conscience is the whole self judging of its own acts" (*Muirhead*). It is not a special faculty, an inexplicable power of moral discrimination. This seems to be the correct view of conscience.

10. The Educability of Conscience.

Some Intuitionists hold that conscience is *infallible*. It intuitively and infallibly apprehends the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. This view cannot account for diversity of moral judgments, detection of errors in moral judgments, etc. Other Intuitionists hold that conscience is *infallible* in so far as it intuitively apprehends the moral principles. But reason may fail to apply them correctly to particular actions and commit mistakes. Conscience cannot be educated; but reason may be educated to apply moral principles correctly to particular actions. Other Intuitionists hold that Conscience is not fully developed from the very beginning; it admits of development and education. The conscience of an adult is more developed than that of a child.

Kant believes in the infallibility of conscience. He says, "There is no such thing as an erring conscience". "An erring conscience is a chimera." Calderwood says, "Conscience is a faculty which from its very nature cannot be educated." Conscience cannot be trained or educated to perceive self-evident moral laws. Still Calderwood believes that there is a scope for moral training in the practical subordination of other powers to the authority of Conscience, and in the application of moral laws to particular cases. Conscience is moral reason which is latent in every man. But it is developed by education and training. The human self is a developing principle, and as it becomes more developed, it acquires powers of grasping the moral ideal and principles more adequately.

11. Conscience and Moral Faculty.

Dugal Stewart distinguishes between conscience and the moral faculty. "Conscience," he says, "coincides exactly with the moral faculty, with this difference only, that the former refers to our own conduct alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others."

This view is wrong. We apprehend rightness or wrongness of our own actions and those of others by the same mental process. Conscience is the same as the moral faculty. It is the moral reason or the self which recognizes the moral worth of our own or others' actions.

J. S. Mill also distinguishes between conscience and the moral faculty. He holds that conscience is emotional, while the moral faculty is intellectual. "The internal sanction is a *pain*, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty. This feeling, when disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some peculiar form, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of conscience." Thus Mill regards conscience as *emotional* in nature. Moral sentiments constitute their essence. He regards the moral faculty as *intellectual* in nature. "Our moral faculty," he says, "is a branch of our *reason*, not of our sensitive faculty ; and must be looked to for *abstract doctrines of morality*, not for perception of it in the concrete." Reason gives us moral laws which are generalizations from experience. The moral faculty, which is 'a branch of reason', computes the balance of pleasure and pain and gives us moral laws. It is a calculating faculty preparing the balance-sheet of pleasure and pain.

This view is wrong. Conscience is identical with the moral faculty. It is *reason* or *the self* which intuitively apprehends the moral end or good, and infers rightness or wrongness of an action from its agreement or disagreement with it. Our knowledge of the moral *ideal* is *intuitive*, but our knowledge of rightness or wrongness of particular actions is *inferential*. Conscience is the moral faculty. It is reason which intuitively apprehends the moral ideal or good of the self and applies it to concrete cases.

12. Conscience and Prudence.

Conscience is the moral faculty. It apprehends the moral worth of actions and discriminates between right and wrong. It is concerned with the moral ideal or good, and duties and

virtues which are determined by it. But prudence is concerned with utility or expediency, gain or loss, pleasurable or painful consequences of actions. In the language of Martineau, conscience is an affair of insight, while prudence is an affair of foresight. Conscience gives an insight into duty, while prudence gives a forecast of pleasure or pain that will accrue from an action.

Conscience is altruistic, while prudence is egoistic. Conscience gives us an idea of the Highest Good, which is the highest personal good and the highest common or social good, while prudence gives a forecast of the greatest happiness of the individual, regardless of the happiness or good of others. Prudence recommends self-seeking and self-aggrandisement. Conscience recommends self-restraint and self-sacrifice.

Conscience asserts the claim of the higher self, while prudence asserts the claim of the lower self. Conscience recommends the control of impulses and desires by reason, while prudence recommends the yielding of reason to the gratification of impulses and desires. Thus conscience strengthens character and brings about harmony among the elements of the self, while prudence weakens character and brings about discord among the elements of the self. Thus conscience and prudence are in conflict with each other.

But 'prudence' is sometimes taken in the wider sense of 'wisdom'. Wisdom takes a comprehensive view of the wide interests of the self, and calculates the immediate and remote consequences of our actions. Wisdom takes into account the momentary pleasures as well as the total amount of happiness of the individual. It considers the effects on health, praise and blame of society, approbation and disapprobation of conscience. In the sense of wisdom, prudence does not come into conflict with conscience, because wisdom recognizes the superiority of reason, listens to the voice of conscience, and gives due weight to public opinion.

13. Conscience and Conscientiousness.

Conscience is the moral faculty. It apprehends the moral ideal, and discriminates between right and wrong with reference to it. "Conscientiousness ought to mean the habit of acting with regard to conscience, so that the conscientious man would, in general, mean the good man. There is a certain amount of disagreement about the definition of conscientiousness among ethical writers, arising from a variation in the common use of the word. In ordinary language, the conscientious man means sometimes the just, or righteous, man ; sometimes the man who is very careful to be exact in his conduct ; sometimes the man who is painfully anxious in the examination of his motives. It seems best to use the word in the sense of the habit of care in the estimation of the circumstances of action" (D'Arcy : *Short Study of Ethics*, pp. 154-55). Green takes *conscientiousness* in the sense of the habit of reflecting upon the motive of action. Mackenzie takes it in the sense of extreme care with regard to external conduct. D'Arcy takes it rightly in the sense of correct estimate of duty in a complex situation with due regard to the circumstances, and performance of duty. It should not be taken in the sense of morbid care for the purity of motives or scrupulousness for the details of actions. *Overconscientiousness* is over-analysis and subtle examination of motives and circumstances which result in indecision and inaction. D'Arcy says, "What the healthy conscientious man would decide in a moment, the morbidly conscientious man may find too hard for decision."

14. Conscience and Consciousness.

Consciousness, in a wide sense, means mental life. It comprises all kinds of knowing, feeling and willing. Conscience or moral consciousness is a part of consciousness. It is included in consciousness.

Consciousness, in a narrow sense, means knowledge or cognition. In this sense, 'consciousness' and 'conscience', though analogous, are distinct. Consciousness gives knowledge

of external objects. Conscience gives insight into duties in relation to the social environment. Consciousness functions in the field of knowledge. Conscience functions in the field of practice. Consciousness is concerned with the theoretical principles of knowledge. Conscience is concerned with the moral principles of action. Muirhead says, "Conscience is only another side of consciousness. It is our name in the field of practice for what consciousness is in the field of knowledge. Consciousness is the sense we have of ourselves, as realized in the mode of activity we call knowledge ; conscience is the sense we have of ourselves as realized in conduct" (*The Elements of Ethics*, p. 256).

Consciousness gives us knowledge of the external world. Conscience ascertains duties in relation to the social environment. "The objective world of human relations is to conscience what the external world of experience is to consciousness" (*Ibid*, p. 256). The human mind constructs the unity of the external world out of chaotic sensations through theoretical reason or consciousness. It constructs the unity of the moral world—a system of moral relations—through conscience or practical reason. Consciousness or theoretical reason interprets the meaning of external objects and relations among objects. Conscience interprets the moral meaning of the human relations and institutions of society.

Progress in knowledge is not due to mere action of the world upon the self, but also to the inner demand of the self for further realization of the ideal of unified knowledge. So progress in morality is not due to mere adjustment of the self to changing circumstances in the social environment, but to the interpreting power of conscience finding in new circumstances the occasion for new duties and further realization of its ideal of rationalized and unified conduct.

15. Relation of Conscience to Society.

Conscience intuitively recognizes the moral ideal or good

and the moral laws which follow from it. The moral ideal is the highest personal good. It is also the highest social good. The moral laws are conducive to the welfare of the individual and the society. The moral principles recognized by an individual through his conscience are determined by the social universe in which he lives. He imbibes the moral laws from his social environment. His conscience is determined largely by the society. The voice of conscience is the voice of public opinion in the individual. The *subjective* element in morality or conscience corresponds to the *objective* environment of human relations and social institutions. Apart from the social environment, conscience is liable to run into all kinds of caprice. Its moral principles should always be chequed by a reference to actual social requirements.

"But, while the social environment is thus an invaluable aid to the individual conscience in interpreting its own ideal, the conscience is always reacting on the environment" (*Muirhead*). Conscience determines a person's duties and virtues appropriate to his station and functions in society. And it goes further and gives him an insight into a higher moral ideal beyond his station, by virtue of which he finds new duties in new circumstances, which change and improve the social environment. Thus the society acts upon conscience, and conscience, in its turn, reacts upon society. The society is reflected in conscience and its moral laws, and conscience with a deeper moral insight is reflected in a better social order.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE MORAL AUTHORITY

1. Moral Obligation.

When we recognize an action to be right, we feel a sense of moral obligation to do it, and when we recognize an action to be wrong, we feel a sense of moral obligation not to do it. When we recognize a moral ideal, we feel bound to obey it or to act up to it. Moral obligation accompanies moral judgments. They are *authoritative* or *obligatory* in character. Moral obligation is not of the nature of physical compulsion. It is of the nature of "*ought*", and not of the nature of "*must*". Moral obligation is essentially *self-imposed*; it is not imposed on a person from without. Freedom of choice is the very essence of morality. So the source of moral obligation cannot be an external authority. The self itself is the source of moral obligation. The ideal or rational self imposes moral obligation upon the actual or sentient self. But opinions differ on this question. Let us consider them.

2. Legal Theories.

God is the source of moral obligation, if the law of God is conceived to be the moral law. The State is the source of moral obligation, if political laws are regarded as moral laws. The Socitey is the source of moral obligation, if social laws are considered to be moral laws. Hope of reward and fear of punishment constitute the essence of moral obligation which is of the nature of "*must*". Moral obligation is of the nature of *coerciveness*. An external authority invested with superior powers is the source of moral obligation.

This view is wrong. Moral obligation is of the nature of "*oughtness*". External authority with superior powers can create a *must*, but never an *ought*. So the legal theories cannot account for the sense of moral obligation (Chapter VIII).

3. Hedonistic Theories.

Egoistic Hedonism traces moral obligation to *self-love* that compels a person to seek his own greatest pleasure. This theory cannot account for moral obligation at all. A feeling of egoism cannot account for moral obligation which demands altruistic conduct and self-sacrifice. Self-love is a feeling. It is subjective and variable. So it cannot account for moral obligation.

Altruistic Hedonism traces moral obligation to *external sanctions*. Bentham enumerates four kinds of such sanctions, *physical*, *political*, *social*, and *religious*. Hope of reward and fear of punishment are motives of altruistic actions. Punishments by Nature, the State, the Society, and God are powerful incentives to benevolent actions. They account for the sense of moral obligation. This view is wrong. External sanctions can create a *must*, but never an *ought*.

J. S. Mill traces the sense of moral obligation to *external sanctions* and the *internal sanction* of conscience, *i. e.*, the pleasures and pains of the moral sentiments. "The ultimate source of all morality and ground of obligation is the *pain*, more or less violent, attendant on the violation of duty" (*Mill*). This is the internal sanction of conscience. Mill sometimes identifies conscience with *sympathy* or fellow-feeling. In some individuals who are lacking in sympathy *external sanctions* are necessary to restrain them from immoral deeds.

This view also is wrong. External sanctions can create a *must* or physical compulsion. Internal sanctions as mere feelings cannot create an *ought* or moral obligation.

Evolutionary Hedonism also traces moral obligation to external "control" or "sanctions" which generate the feeling of "coerciveness" in moral consciousness. "Because man learned his duty under the prescription of political, religious and social authorities, it is thought that fear of punishment is the real meaning of obligation." Herbert Spencer holds that the sense of moral obliga-

tion is transitory and due to mal-adjustment of the individuals to the society. Moral obligation will be completely transcended when the individuals will be completely adapted to the society.

This view is wrong. External controls can create a *must*. Moral obligation is of the nature of *ought* which can never be transcended. Man can never cease to be a moral being. Moral life can never merge in natural life (Chapter X).

4. The Intuitionist View.

The Intuitionists hold that *conscience* is the seat of moral authority. It has an authority which is independent of any external power. Some identify conscience with the moral sense. Butler holds that conscience is the supreme authority in human constitution. Moral obligation is imposed by conscience or reason which is the supreme authority. There is an analytical relation between rightness and moral obligation. Whatever is right is by its nature obligatory. The *obligatoriness* of an action arises from its inherent quality of *rightness*. The mere knowledge that an action is *right* convinces us that we are under *moral obligation* to perform it (Chapter XII).

But Martineau holds that there is a *synthetic* relation between rightness and obligatoriness. Moral obligation is imposed upon us by God. Rightness or wrongness is an inherent quality of an action. But yet what is right is made obligatory by God. Man is under moral obligation. God is the source of moral obligation. Moral obligation, like legal obligation, is a relation between two persons ; here man is one term, and God or the infinite Person is the other term of the relation (Chapter II). Though Martineau is an intuitionist, yet he holds this view. This view is wrong. Moral obligation is self-imposed. Moral authority is the *Ideal Self*, which is the reflection of God in man ; God, immanent in the finite self as the ideal self, is the source of moral obligation.

5. Kant's View.

Kant holds that morality consists in free obedience to the moral law. The authority of the moral law lies in its very nature. It is a *categorical imperative.* It is imposed by the *practical reason* upon itself. It is *self-imposed.* The *autonomy of the will* which is the only source of the moral law unconditionally commands us to do what is right and avoid what is wrong. Practical reason is the true source of moral obligation.

But the practical reason is a unique and inexplicable faculty in the self. The law of the practical reason is not the law of the total self. Therefore Kant's theory is not quite satisfatory, though it approaches the truth (Chapter XIII).

6. The Eudæmonist View.

The Eudæmonists or Perfectionists hold that moral obligation is *self-imposed*; it is imposed by the *ideal self* upon the actual self in a person. The *self* is the source of moral obligation. There in no element of coercivenss in moral obligation. It can never be traced to external or internal sanctions. Moral obligation is demanded by the self which seeks to realize itself. Green says, "It is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself. The moral duty to obey a positive law, whether a law of the state or of the church, is imposed not by the author or enforcer of the positive law, but by that spirit of man which sets before him the ideal of a perfect life and pronounces obedience to the positive law to be necessary to its realization" (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 354). The ultimate seat of moral authority is the *ideat self*—the reproduction of the Absolute Self in man—which realizes a perfect life through intercourse with society. The Moral Law is imposed by the ideal self upon the actual self. It is authoritative with conscience, because it is a deliverance of the eternal perfection to the finite spirit, imposed by the Infinite Spirit upon it. The finite self is the finite reproduction of the Absolute Self. The *ideal life,*—the *Absolute Self* immanent in the finite self,—is the source of moral obligation ;

it imposes moral obligation upon the *actual self*. "The inner demand is *absolute*, 'a categorical imperative'. Its unyielding 'thou shalt' is the voice of the ideal to the actual man ; and the ideal admits of no concession, no compromise with the actual" (*Seth*). "The authority, indeed, must come home to us with a far more aboslute power, when we recognize that it is our own law, than when we regard it as an alien force." "The *ought* of duty is not a command imposed upon us from without. It is the voice of the true self within us" (*Mackenzie*).

CHAPTER XXIV

Moral Sanctions

1. Moral Sanction.

A sanction is anything that makes a course of action binding upon us, by attaching reward to its observance, and punishment to its non-observance. A moral sanction refers to an authority which enforces a duty with reward, in the case of observance, and with penalty, in the case of violation. Generally, "moral sanctions" mean motives or persuasives to performance of duties and deterrents or dissuasives from violation of duties. They include "the *pleasures* which are the persuasives to conformity, as well as the *pains* which act as deterrents from disobedience to moral law".

2. External Sanctions.

The Altruistic Hedonists or Utilitarians try to account for altruistic conduct by the moral sanctions. Bentham says, "A sanction is a source of obligatory powers or *motives* : that is, of *pains* and *pleasures*, which are the only things which can

operate as *motives.*" He recognizes four external sanctions which are motives for altruistic conduct.

(1) *Physical* or *Natural Sanction* means the physical pains which follow upon the disregard of natural laws. Over-indulgence in the pleasures of eating or drinking brings on disease. Physical pains consequent on the violation of the laws of nature constitute the physical sanction. Intemperance is punished by Nature with disease.

(3) *Political Sanction* means the pains and penalties inflicted by the State on the violation of political laws, and the rewards and honours conferred by the State on the social benefactor. Theft, assault, murder, etc., are punished by the State with fines, imprisonment, transportation, or capital punishment.

(3) *Popular* or *Social Sanction* means pleasurable or painful experiences coming to a person from members of society, for moral or immoral conduct respectively. Good conduct is rewarded by social applause and respect. Bad conduct is punished by social disgrace, boycott, and excommunication.

(4) *Religious Sanction* means pleasurable or painful experiences coming to a person from God for moral or immoral conduct respectively. Good conduct is believed to be rewarded by God with pleasures in heaven. Bad conduct is believed to be punished by God with pains in hell. Thus hope of reward and fear of punishment in future life constitute the religious sanction.

Bentham regards these four external sanctions as moral sanctions. They are motives or persuasives for moral conduct, and deterrents or dissuasives from immoral conduct. All external sanctions are, to a large extent, "physical". Bentham says, "Of these four sanctions the physical is altogether the groundwork of the political and the social; so is it also of religious, in so far as the latter bears relation to the present life. It is included in each of those other three. This may

operate in any case independently of *them*; none of *them* can operate but by means of this. In a word, the powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the magistrate, nor men at large, *can* operate, nor is God *supposed* to operate, but through the powers of nature." Therefore the *physical* sanction is the basis of all external sanctions. These are the binding forces of moral or altruistic conduct.

3. Internal or Moral Sanction.

Internal or *Moral Sanction* means pleasures of conscience and pains of remorse. Good conduct is rewarded with approbation of conscience and self-complacence. Bad conduct is punished with disapprobation, remorse, compunction of conscience. These constitute the internal or moral sanction. It does not rest on physical conditions. It is purely *subjective.*

J. S. Mill adds the internal sanction to the external sanctions of Bentham. Both external and internal sanctions, according to him, constitute motives for altruistic or good conduct. He means by the internal sanction "feeling for the happiness of mankind," a feeling of "regard to the pleasures and pains of others," "the social feelings of mankind, the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures." "The ultimate sanction of all morality is a subjective feeling in our own minds" (*Mill*). "The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind; a *pain*, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of *duty*, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility" (*Mill*). Thus social feelings of sympathy and fellow-feeling, and moral sentiments of remorse consequent on a violation of duty constitute the internal sanction of morality. Those persons who are lacking in social feelings or moral sentiments are compelled to perform their duties under the pressure of the external sanctions. Thus the external and internal sanctions of morality are motives for altruistic or moral conduct.

4. Criticism of External and Internal Sanctions.

External sanctions are hope of reward and fear of punishment from Nature, the State, the Society, or God. They persuade us to do what is right and dissuade us from doing what is wrong. If these are the binding forces of morality, then virtue is reduced to prudence, and duty to pursuit of self-interest. The external sanctions can account for constraint or compulsion. But they can never account for the sense of duty or moral obligation. "Conduct which issues from regard for these sanctions is *not* morality, if by that we mean conduct which is morally approved. It may conform to a certain type and be externally indistinguishable from good conduct, but it is not *good*" (*Muirhead*). That action is morally good, which is done, for the sake of duty, or with a view to realizing the rational self, —not in the hope of reward or for fear of punishment. That action which is done under external pressure of an authority invested with physical powers has no moral value. Actions done under coercion are devoid of moral worth. Only actions done voluntarily with freedom of choice have moral quality.

Even the internal sanction of conscience, recognized by Mill cannot be regarded as the binding force of morality. Actions done for the sake of pleasures of conscience are not moral, since they are not done, for the sake of duty, or self-realization, but for the sake of a kind of satisfaction. They are superior to actions done under the pressure of the external sanctions. But they cannot be regarded as strictly *moral*, since they are done for the sake of *pleasure*, though it is the pleasure of conscience. Moreover, only disinterested actions, according to Mill, are moral ; they are approved by conscience, or produce agreeable feelings or pleasures of conscience. But how can *disinterested* actions be actuated by considerations of *self-interest* in the shape of pleasures of conscience ? Appeal to the internal sanction of *conscience*, really speaking, is an appeal to *reason*, rather than

to the sentient experience of pleasure and pain. It amounts to abandonment of hedonism.

The distinction between the 'external' sanctions and the 'internal' sanction is arbitrary. All external sanctions may be regarded as equally *internal*, since they operate on an individual through the experience of pleasure and pain which they produce in his mind. Again, all the sanctions may be regarded as *external*, since they are foreign to our moral nature. Even the so-called 'internal' sanction may be regarded as *external*, since it is only a concomitant of our moral nature—not its essence. Mackenzie rightly observers, "All may be called *internal*, since all involve the *subjective* experience of pain, actual or prospective. On the other hand, all are *external*, in the sense that the pain is connected with some law not definitely recognized as the law of our own being. If, however, conscience is definitely regarded as the law of our nature, it ceases to be merely of the nature of a sanction, and becomes a real moral authority' (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 251). The term 'moral sanction', is self-contradictory. 'Morality' does not require any sanction ; it implies freedom of the will. 'Sanction' implies penalty imposed by an external authority for a violation of the moral law. Thus sanction implies constraint, which takes away from the moral value of an act. Thus 'moral sanction' involves self-contradiction. We should not speak of 'moral sanctions'. We should recognize the *moral authority* of the *Ideal self* which imposes moral obligation on the actual self. We should regard the moral law as the law of our own being, which unconditionally commands us to fulfil our self.

CHAPTER XXV

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

1. Natural Evil.

Natural evil is physical evil. It is independent of human volition. It depends upon the operation of laws of nature. It frustrates the realization of our welfare. It is an obstacle to the peace or happiness of our life. Earthquakes, hurricanes, cyclones, famines, floods, locusts, pests, etc., which stand in the way of the fulfilment of our wants and desires are called natural evils. They bring misery and distress to mankind. They do not depend upon our volitions. But we can minimize them or their evil effects by controlling the forces of nature. But natural evil is not completely within our control.

2. Error.

Error is intellectual blunder. Error lies in deliberation or choice. The mind may choose a wrong course of action after deliberating on the merits and demerits of the different courses of action inaccurately or making an incorrect estimate of them. Thus an error may lie in deliberation or choice. Error may lie in moral judgment also. The mind may incorrectly apply a moral law to a particular action. Or it may wrongly think that an action will lead to self-realization. Thus moral judgments, which are inferential, may involve errors. Error is not a moral evil or sin. Errors committed voluntarily are not excusable. Wilfully distorted or perverted moral judgments are wrong, and as such objects of condemnation. Non-voluntary or unwitting intellectual errors are morally excusable.

3. Moral Evil.

It consists in voluntary violation of the moral law. It is different from physical or natural evil, and intellectual evil or error. Physical evil is a natural phenomenon

which is harmful to man. Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, etc., are physical evils. They are non-moral. Man is not morally responsible for either of these two kinds of evils. Error is an intellectual evil. It is due to lack of correct intellectual apprehension. It is not a deliberate act of will. Error is not a moral evil which consists in a deliberate breach of the moral law.

4. Vice.

Moral evils may be considered from the inner as well as from the outer side. They may be regarded as stains of character or as evil deeds. The former are called *vices*, while the latter are called *sins* and *crimes*. Just as virtue is an excellence of character, so vice is a stain of character. Both are characteristics of the inner life. Vice is a flaw of character acquired by habitually violating moral laws. The habit of wilful neglect or violation of duties results in vice. It issues in overt deeds called sins and crimes. Much of it may be concealed, and may not issue in evil deeds, though it may give a certain colour to our outer acts.

5. Sin.

Sin is a wrong overt action. Vice issues in evil deeds which are called sins. Vice is a trait of inner character. Sin is an evil deed. It is wilful violation or neglect of duties. It is either commission of wrong deeds or omission of right deeds. We are never lacking in good intentions. But we may not have the strength of will to convert them into overt acts. Bad intentions also are often frustrated by infirmity of purpose, and do not issue in evil deeds. And they are harboured in the mind and stain the inner character. If they issue in deeds, sometimes they exhaust themselves. Thus a good intention is not so good as a good act, while a bad intention is on the whole *worse* than a bad act.

6. Crime.

Formerly sin was regarded as an offence against God, and crime was regarded as an offence against society. Now, the

term *crime* is used in a narrower sense than sin. It is an offence against society which is recognized by the State and which is punished by it. All sins are not crimes. Those sins which are punishable by the State are called crimes. Stealing is a crime. It is punished by the State. But ingratitude is a sin. It cannot be punished by the State. But it is condemned by society.

7. Punishment.

A crime ought to be punished. One who suffers wrong is not degraded. His soul is not hurt by it. But one who does wrong lowers himself in the scale of moral perfection. A man is rewarded for his good deeds. Similarly a man should be punished for his evil deeds. "A wrong against social law *is* a wrong against humanity, and cannot be forgiven until the offended majesty of the law has been appeased, *i. e.*, until the wrongness and essential nullity of the act has been made apparent" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 374). This is the ethical justification of punishment.

8. Theories of Punishment.

Three principal theories have been put forward to justify punishment. They are known as the *preventive* (or deterrent) theory, the *Reformative* (or educative) theory, and the *Retributive* theory.

(1) The Preventive or Deterrent Theory.—According to this theory, the aim of punishment is to *prevent* others from committing similar offences. A criminal is punished to be made an example of to prevent others from committing the same crime. This aim of punishment is expressed in the familiar *dictum* of the judge—"you are not punished for stealing sheep, but in order that sheep may not be stolen" (*Ibid*, p. 374). This theory justifies *capital punishment* as an extreme form of punishment because of its deterrent effect.

Criticism.—A man is an end in himself. He is a *person*, and not a *thing*. He should not be used as a *means* for the

good of any other person. It is unjust to inflict pain on one man *merely* for the benefit of others. A person should not be treated as a *thing*, as a mere means for the good of others. A person should not be punished to prevent others from committing a crime. He should not be made an example of for the benefit of others. A person is an end in himself. It is not just that one man should suffer pain not for his own benefit, but for that of others who will refrain from committing similar offences.

(2) The Reformative Theory.—According to this theory, the aim of punishment is to *educate* or *reform* the offender himself. Punishment is inflicted on a criminal in order to reform or educate him. This theory is commonly accepted at the present time because it is in harmony with the humanitarian sentiments of the age. This theory does not involve treating a person as a thing. A criminal is punished for his own good,—not merely for the good of others.

(*a*) **Criminal Anthropology.**—The Reformative theory is supported by criminology. "The new science of criminology is founded upon the theory that crime is a pathological phenomenon, a form of insanity, an inherited or acquired degeneracy. It follows that the proper treatment of the criminal is that which seeks his cure, rather than his punishment. Prisons must be superseded by hospitals, asylums, and reformatories" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 320). Thus, according to criminology, crimes are not deliberate violations of the moral law. They are due to physiological peculiarities. Constitutional defects compel criminals to commit crimes. For example, in kleptomania a criminal is compelled to steal. Punishment, therefore, should take the form of detention in asylums and reformatories, or treatment in hospitals. The supporters of this view are called *criminal anthropologists.*

Criticism.—Every crime is not a case of insanity or due to physiological defect. "We distinguish cases of criminal

insanity from cases of crime proper. In the former, the man is treated as a patient, is confined or restrained, is managed by others. The kleptomaniac, for example, is not punished, but excused" (*Ibid*, p. 321). The crimes which are deliberate breaches of the moral law should be punished, because they are not caused by physiological defects. But in insanity the man is alienated from himself, and his acts are not his own. He ceases to be a person, and may therefore be treated as a thing. He loses self-control, and should therefore be controlled from without. "To reduce crime to a pathological phenomenon, is to sap the very foundations of our moral judgments ; merit as well as demerit, reward as well as punishment, are thereby undermined" (*Ibid*, p. 321). To resolve all crimes into insanity is not conducive to clear thinking.

(*b*) **Criminal Sociology**.—The Reformative theory is supported by criminal sociology. It regards crimes as outcomes of unfavourable social circumstances. Crimes are due to social inequalities, mal-adjustments, and corruptions. For example, theft is due to poverty. Therefore, repression of crimes without improving the social and economic conditions of criminals is useless and injurious. Crimes can be prevented only if the human society is reconstructed on the basis of justice and equity. The supporters of this view are called *criminal sociologists*.

Criticism.—Some crimes are due to social inequalities. For example, some thefts are due to poverty. But all crimes cannot be attributed to social mal-adjustments. Crimes are deliberately committed by persons who are not necessarily under adverse pecuniary or social conditions. To ascribe all crimes to social distempers is to miss the distinctive character of crimes.

If punishment can reform the offender, it serves its purpose well. But punishment does not always reform an offender ; sometimes it hardens a criminal in criminal habits. A kind treatment may sometimes produce a better effect than punishment ; it may be more favourable to the reformation of the

offender. Sometimes forgiveness may bring home to the criminal his guilt and lead him to repentance and reformation. It is evident that the reformative theory cannot justify *capital punishment*, because the hanged man is past a cure.

(*c*) **Psycho-analysis.**—Freud and his followers hold that unsocial human actions or crimes are often committed under the influence of *repressed complexes* or suppressed wishes,—sex wishes and spite wishes due to thwarted sex wishes. Therefore the treatment of such forms of crime should be medical or educational, rather than purely punitive.

In such cases, the remedy lies in unearthing the repressed unconscious complexes and bringing them to the level of consciousness, tracing them to their causes, and directing them to the socially acceptable channels. But we should bear in mind that all crimes are not brought about by repressed complexes. (1) Some crimes are due to insanity ; (2) some, due to physiological defects ; (3) some, due to some temporary obsession or 'complex' ; (4) some, due to wrong moral judgments involving errors ; (5) some, due to wilful violation of moral law.

Crimes of the first kind should be remedied by confinement and medical treatment in lunatic asylums and reformatories. Crimes of the second kind also should be remedied by modern methods of medical treatment. Crimes of the third kind should be remedied by psycho-analytic treatment. Crimes of the fourth kind should be remedied by correcting errors in the criminals' moral judgments and convincing them of their errors. Crimes of the fifth kind are true crimes and definitely call for punishment. Such criminals should be punished adequately to vindicate the authority of the moral law. Punishment convinces them of the righteousness of punishment. It makes them repent for their crimes and reform themselves. It prevents them and others from committing similar crimes.

(3) **The Retributive Theory.**—According to this theory, punishment is an act of justice. The aim of punishment is

to defend the supremacy and authority of the moral law and to do justice to a criminal. The moral law is broken by a criminal, and justice demands that he should be punished and the authority of the moral law should be established. The moral law is supreme and authoritative. If it is broken by a person, he ought to be punished. To appease the offended majesty of the moral law, punishment must be inflicted on the criminal as a vindication of the authority of the moral law. If the criminal is not punished, the moral law loses its dignity authority, and majesty. "Punishment is, in its essence, a rectification of the moral order of which crime is the notorious breach" (*Seth*). It justifies *capital punishment* under exceptional circumstances. Right to live is the fundamental right. If a person takes away the life of another, justice demands that he should be deprived of his life. But capital punishment seems to be a relic of the barbarous age.

Criticism.—It is objected by some that this theory is based on the unchristian passion of revenge. But this is wrong. Revenge is condemned by Christianity because it involves personal malevolence. But a court of justice in not moved by personal malevolence in inflicting punishment upon a criminal. "A court simply accords to a man what he has *earned*. He has done evil, and it is reasonable that the evil should return upon himself as the wages of his sin—the *negative value* which he has produced" (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 375).

Aristotle regards punishment as a *negative reward*. The man who deliberately breaks a moral law is entitled to a negative reward. "It is his right, and he ought to get it. The society that punishes him is not defrauding him of his due, but giving him what he deserves, what he has earned" (*Ibid*, pp. 380-81). Kant holds that punishment ought to be inflicted on the criminal because he has committed a crime, not as a means to his own good or that of others. He advocates the retributive theory of punishment. Hegel also

advocates this view. He also holds that punishment is *demanded* by the criminal. It is his *reward*. It is what he deserves,—what he has earned by breaking the moral law. It may be said to be his *negative reward*. This is why some criminals who escape punishment by the State impose upon themselves some form of penance. They feel that they have not got their deserts which they have earned by their evil deeds. Bradley also holds the same view. "We pay the penalty" he says, "because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever, than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice; punishment is inflicted for the sake of punishment." Punishment is an act of justice; it is a retribution for a breach of the moral law.

Thus the Retributive theory of punishment seems to be the correct view. It includes the two other theories. "If the aim of punishment is to vindicate the authority of the law, this will be partly done in so far as the offender is reformed, and in so far as similar acts are prevented. And indeed neither reformation nor prevention is likely to be effected by punishment *unless it is recognized that the punishment is a vindication of the law*" (*Ibid*, p. 376). It is only when a criminal realizes that he is punished to vindicate the authority of the law and it is his right to get his desert, that he repents and is reformed. Again, the recognition of this fact leads others also to recoil from crimes. The retributive theory, then, may be regarded as the most satisfactory of all the theries of punishment.

The Retributive theory assumes two forms: (1) *Rigoristic* and (2) *Mollified*.

According to the *Rigoristic* form of the Retributive theory, punishment is inflicted according to the character of the offence. If the offence is severe, the punishment should be severe; and if the offence is light, the punishment should be

light, irrespective of other circumstances. 'Eye for an eye',—'tooth for a tooth',—is the motto of this view. In inflicting punishment attendant circumstances should not be taken into account. For example, a man has killed a person ; therefore he should be hanged irrespective of any other circumstances.

According to the *mollified* form of the Retributive theory, punishment should be inflicted according to the character of the offence under praticular circumstances. Here the extenuating circumstances, *e. g.*, the age of the criminal, his intention, provoking circumstances, *etc.* should be taken into account.

The mollified form of the Retributive theory seems to be the most satisfactory theory of punishment.

CHAPTER XXVI

MORAL PROGRESS

1. The Moral Ideal and Moral Progress.

Moral progress consists in the gradual approximation to the moral ideal. The moral ideal is infinite and consequently cannot be completely realized. The greater is the moral progress, the greater is the moral ideal, and the deeper is the sense of moral obligation. We can never transcend the sense of moral obligation. (Contrast Herbert Spencer). Thus the moral ideal and moral progress react upon each other. The moral ideal can never cease to be ideal, and become actual. The moral process cannot merge in the cosmic process.

2. The Nature of Moral Progress.

"Moral progress is morality in progress, 'progressive morality' ; never at any stage a progress *to* morality, or a progress from the non-moral to the moral stage" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 326). Morality cannot arise out of non-moral

elements as Herbert Spencer seems to think. The ideal cannot be evolved from the actual; the '*ought*' cannot be derived from the '*is*'. Herbert Spencer put the cart before the horse when he explained the evolution of morality by the beginning (*e. g.*, animal conduct) rather than by the end. Hegel rightly explained it by the end.

3. The Law of Moral Progress : The discovery of the individual.

Seth sets forth the fundamental law of all moral progress as the gradual discovery of the individual. Sir Henry Maine has formulated the law of social progress as "a movement from status to contract." The individual was formerly merged in the family or a community. In course of social evolution, the individual came to his own and asserted his rights over against the rights of the family or the community; gradually the individual was disengaged from the family or the community and acquired rights for himself. "The fundamental law of moral progress, whether in the race or in the individual, may be stated in essentially the same form. That progress is, in sum and substance, *the gradual discovery of the individual.* The ethical unit of earlier times is the tribe or the family; later it becomes the State; later still perhaps, the caste or class; and, last of all, the individual" (*Ibid*, p. 331). "The trend of moral progress has been in the direction of a true individualism: it has meant the gradual discovery of the place of the individual in the body politic" (*Ibid*, p. 339).

4. Aspects of the Law of Moral Progress.

The growing appreciation of the dignity and worth of the individual as a moral person is manifested first, in the transition from an external to an internal view of morality; secondly, in the gradual subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues; and thirdly, in the wider scope of virtues.

(1) Transition from an external to an interal view of morality.—"First, we can trace in moral progress a

gradual transition from an *external* and utilitarian to an *internal* and spiritual estimate of action, from conduct and consequences to character and causes, from doing to being, from the action to the man. What the individual *does* counts for less and less; what he *is* counts for more and more" (*Ibid*, p. 341). At first, we pass moral judgments upon overt actions and consequences, then on inner motives and intentions, and then on character. First, we aim at purity of conduct; then we aim at purity of inner life.

(2) **Subordination of Sterner to Gentler Virtues.**—"A second manifestation of the law of moral progress is found in the gradual subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues, of the virtues of being or security to those of well-being or amenity. The transition from the sterner to the gentler virtues is the transition from an unsympathetic to a sympathetic, from an inconsiderate to a considerate attitude towards the individual" (*Ibid*, pp. 345-46). At first, stern and virile virtues of courage, valour, manliness, energy are given a high place. Then, in course of moral progress, gradually these are replaced by sympathy, benevolence, forgiveness, humility, obedience, patience, resignation and the like.

(3) **Wider Scope of Virtues.**—"We are led to notice a third phase of moral progress, its increasing scope, its growth from particularism to universalism, from patriotism or nationalism to humanism or cosmopolitanism. As the individual comes to self-discovery, he discovers his community of being and of life with his fellows, his citizenship in the city of humanity" (*Ibid*, p. 350). He discovers that the highest good is the common and universal good. As the moral life of mankind advances, the barriers that divide man from man, the barriers of nationality, race, birth and occupation, are broken down, and fellowship of mankind is gradually realized. But moral life is always a personal life. It is never an impersonal life. The true life of man is not a selfless or

impersonal life but the life of the true human self or personality. "Whether in his relations to others or to himself, the individual can never be called upon to negate himself as a moral personality. Sheer and absolute self-sacrifice can never be the path of virtue for a being, the supreme principles of whose life are self-knowledge and self-realization. The true life of man is not a selfless life, but the life of the true human self; 'the way of the blessed life' is the way of self discovery" (*Ibid*, pp. 356-57).

Green points out that moral progress is characterized by *deepening* of the moral insight. For example, the Greeks meant by courage only physical courage on the battle-field. But now it comprehends moral courage also. The Greeks meant by temperance only moderation in food, drink and animal enjoyment. But, in modern times, we apply it to various other forms of self-denial. Thus there is a gradual deepening of moral consciousness in course of moral progress.

There is also a gradual *extension* of the sphere of virtues in moral progress. At first, the virtues are applied to the family, then to community and nation, and at last, to humanity. Then we recognize our obligations even to the animal world and to Nature. Thus moral progress is characterized by gradual expansion of the scope of duties and virtues.

5. Conditions of Moral Progress.

The moral life of an individual is lived within a moral universe. Such a universe consists of a moral ideal generally recognized by the society. This ideal may be expressed in a series of injunctions, in definite social institutions, or in certain habitual modes of action. Sometimes there is a conflict among these three elements in the moral universe. The ideal of a people does not always agree with its institutions or habits. Sometimes even its habits are not in conformity with its institutions. Moral progress of a people largely consists in the

effort to adjust these three elements to one another. It also partly consists in the effort to elevate the moral ideal, and improve the institutions and habits.

Inner contradiction among the ideal, social institutions, and habits of the people inevitably leads to moral progress to adjust them to one another. Sometimes moral progress in habits, institutions, and ideals is brought about by the sense of incompleteness. This incompleteness is often first brought to clear consciousness by some moral reformer with a keen moral insight. He shows inconsistencies among the ideal, social institutions, and the habits of the people, and helps remove them by his lofty example and precepts.

Moral progress is due to a change in our moral consciousness and also to a change in the environment. It depends on the deeper moral insight of the moral reformers. It also depends on the novel conditions in the environment. New economic conditions helped the emancipation of women and abolition of slavery which also partly depended on the deeper moral consciousness of the reformers.

The spirit of man is infinite. It looks continuously, in its moral growth, for the City of God. It is continually yearning for an ideal order. It is never satisfied with the actual order, social, economic, or political. "It is dissatisfied with the habits and institutions actually established at any time and place, and even with the ideals that are customarily recognized, and presses forward a form of life that shall be more complete, consistent, and satisfying. Hence the perennial interest of Utopias and poetic dreams and anticipations of better modes of existence" (*Manual of Ethics* pp. 398-99). There is a danger in such dreams of Utopias. Sometimes these are impracticable and unrealizable ideals. The prophets come with fresh intuitions. But they are often blinded by the dazzling light of their lofty ideals. They cannot take into account hard realities. Their ideals or heavenly dreams are empty of content.

They have no contact with reality. Hence their intuitions have to be re-interpreted in the light of the common sense of mankind. "The world as a whole is wiser than its wisest men" (*Ibid*, p. 399).

6. Is Humanity progressing morally ?

There is a certain "increasing purpose through the ages." Man is always discontented. His unhappiness is due to his greatness. The idea of the Golden Age in the distant past has a certain natural fascination for the discontented spirit of man. But the Golden Age should be pushed to the future. Have we advanced or receded morally ? In earlier times the people lived simpler lives. Their sphere of action was limited. Their intellectual development was low. Their needs were few and were easily supplied. So they had fewer opportunities for vice. Our life is more complex ; our needs are many ; we have to deal with many more persons ; our struggle for existence is very great ; our intellectual development is great. So we have greater opportunities for vice. "If in some respects our actions seem more trustworthy and based on broader and more reasonable principles, in other respects we seem to have grown more selfish and dishonest than men ever were before" (*Ibid*, p. 386). There is a great progress in the *principles* of morality according to which men are expected to act, though there may not be a great progress in the actions of individual human beings. For example, in the modern age some people are inspired by humanitarianism, and others are expected to rise above narrow communalism, sectarianism, and patriotism and feel kinship with humanity. Moreover, growth of knowledge is a condition of moral progress, though knowledge is power for evil as well as for good. Morality based on ignorance is not creditable. There is at present a general improvement of the conditions of life and there is also a certain moral advance.

CHAPTER XXVII

Ethical Functions of the State

1. Society and the State.

Self-realization is the highest good. It is possible only through the society. The State is the most important social institution which is indispensable for the free development of the moral life of persons. "The total social organization may be called Society, and the most important of its social forms is the political organization, or the State" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 287). The State is the most important part of the society. It is an association which is the supreme controller of all other associations.

2. The State and the Individual.

The State is not an end-in-itself. It is a means to the realization of the highest good by individuals. It is a proper sphere for the development of the character of persons. The State should not suppress the freedom of the individual and reduce it to a machine. The individual should not be crushed by the State. It should always help him further and develop his personality for the common good of all. This fundamental truth must be remembered today when there is a terrible conflict of ideals in the reconstruction of the human society.

Seth rightly observes: "From an ethical standpoint the State must be regarded as a means, not as in itself an end. The State exists for the sake of the person, not the person for the sake of the State. The ethical unit is the person: and the function of the State is not to supersede the person, but to aid him in the development of his personality—to give him room and opportunity. It exists for him, not he for it; it is his sphere, the medium of his moral life" (*Ibid*, p. 298).

The State should interfere with the liberty of the individual so far as it is necessary for the development of his personality

in harmony with that of others. It should help the individual develop his personality out of his individuality. Individuality is the animal self. Personality is the rational self. The State may interfere only with the individual, not with the person, in order to save the person from the interference of other individuals. "Neither the State nor the individual, but the person, is the ultimate ethical end and unit" (*Ibid*, p. 295).

3. The Ethical Basis of the State.

Anarchism denies the necessity of State-control. Government is nothing but coercion. This is pure Individualism. It confuses liberty with license. Despotism allows no freedom to the individual. It deprives him of his ethical prerogative of self-government. Though autonomy is of the essence of the moral life, it is not inconsistent with the existence of the State. The State itself is the product of the human spirit. Man is by nature a social and political being and must necessarily live in some form of political organization. The moral life of a person is not lost in his political life. The State exists for the good of the individual. So the coercion of the State is justified in so far as it is a means to the self-realization of the ethical person. The ideal State is based on the *general will* of the individual citizens so that the seeming coercion of the State is imposition of the will of the better selves of the citizens. "The sovereign will represents the individual will, or rather the general will of the individual citizens. Here, in the general will of the people, in the common personality of the citizens, is the true seat of sovereignty....The supreme power in the State, whatever be the form of government, is therefore, truly regarded, the 'public person', and in obeying it, the citizens are really obeying their common personality....Obedience to the State is obedience to the citizen's own better self. The apparent heteronomy is really autonomy in disguise ; I am, after all, sovereign as well as subject, subject of my own legislation. The right of the

State is therefore supreme, being the right of personality itself.' (*Ibid*, pp. 299-300).

4. The Ethical Functions of the State.

The State is the most important social and moral institution. "The State, being the medium of the moral life of the individual, has two ethical functions : (1) the *negative* function of securing to the individual the opportunity of self-realization, by protecting him from the encroachments of other individuals or of nonpolitical forms of society—the function of *Justice* ; (2) the *positive* improvement of the conditions of the ethical life for each of its citizens—the function of *Benevolence*. In the exercise of the former function, the State cares for the interests of 'being', in the exercise of the latter it cares for the interests of 'well-being' ; and as the interests of being or security precede in imperativeness those of well-being or prosperity, so is the political duty of justice prior to that of benevolence" (*Ibid*, pp. 302-03).

The State should recognize and maintain the rights of individuals, *e g.*, rights of property, contract, *etc.* It should punish the individuals who violate the rights of individuals, and maintain the social order. This is the negative function of Justice.

But the State has a positive function as well. It may set itself to promote the material as well as the spiritual welfare of its citizens. The State, for example, should look after the education, health, employment and economic welfare of the citizens. It should provide them with all the amenities of civilization. This is the positive function of Benevolence.

"The State must maintain the life of the individual, not simply annex and take possession of it for itself ; it must not abolish, but establish, the life of the individual. If the individual apart from the State is not a moral individual, a State in which the individual is lost is no true State. The best State is that in whose citizenship the individual most fully lives his own individual life" (*Ibid*, p. 304).

5. The State is permanent.

The State is based on the general will of the people. This is the ethical basis of the State. The State is the supreme controller of all associations. It recognizes the rights of persons such as rights of life, property, contract, etc., and enforces them by threats of punishment. The State protects the life and property of its citizens. It guarantees a peaceful atmosphere, enforces law and order, and helps its citizens pursue their avocations, achieve self-development and self-perfection, and rise to the height of their personality. Hence the State should not be abolished.

Anarchism regards the State as a passing phase in the life of a people. All government is coercion. All coercion is immoral. Coercion of government should be abolished. The State should be superseded by a co-operative society.

This does not seem to be a correct view. Human nature is a mixture of good and evil. The evil element in human nature cannot be completely eradicated in any perfect social order. It will always require an external control. If the evil nature of an individual asserts itself against the rights of other individuals and disturbs the social order, it must be curbed and thwarted by the State. If it is allowed free play, it will bring about an utter chaos and confusion, and make moral life of individuals impossible. Hence the State is an indispensable social or moral institution, which is a necessary medium for the realization of moral values. Seth rightly observes: "It seems to me that, while the form of the State may continue to change, the State itself must remain as the great institution of moral life, unless that life undergoes a fundamental change. Peace may permanently supplant war, and harmony antagonism, in the relation of State to State. But the permanence of the State itself seems consistent with the highest development of the moral life" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 319).

The States should gradually surrender portion of their sovereignty to an international organization for maintenance of world peace and elimination of war and consequent misery and loss of human life and property. But they should not altogether lose their identity and integrity in one cosmopolitan Super-State. Cosmopolitanism is a vague abstraction. "Nationalism is as permanent a principle of the moral life as individualism." "Humanity is only a vague abstraction until we particularize it in the nation, as the latter itself also is until we still further particularize and individualize it" (*Ibid*, p. 319). The truly moral life is a personal life—'self-realization' by a self, and for a self, through the medium of the political life of a nation, moulded and influenced by the Ethos of the people, in the midst of an international order. The moral life of a 'person' is lived through the medium of nationalism which is enriched and deepened by humanitarianism. The State or the nation cannot be superseded by a vague and abstract cosmopolitanism, which often results in individualism and social disintegration. The moral life is a personal life sustained by nationalism with a humanitarian outlook.

CHAPTER XXVIII

INTERNATIONAL MORALITY

1. International Morality.

With the moral progress in the human race it is gradually being recognized that the moral laws which govern the relations of individuals to one another in society should also govern the relations of nations to one another. The same moral laws should apply to the behaviour of the different States with one another. In other words, the necessity of international morality is being increasingly recognized.

The world today has become physically one. The different countries and nations of the world have come into close contact with one another. Railways, ships, aeroplanes, radio, television, etc., have annihilated space and time, and have made the world one. Economic prosperity or depression of one country reacts upon all other countries. "Civilised nations are now so inter-independent that one nation cannot suffer without bringing suffering upon the rest ; and that one cannot rise much in the scale of culture unless the others also are raised" (*Stuart*).

2. Causes of low International Morality.

But though the world is fast becoming a closely knit unity, international morality is not advancing quickly. It is yet in an indeterminate condition. The biological Law of Natural Selection or Survival of the Fittest which applies to the animal world rules the international relations. The following conditions are responsible for the undeveloped condition of international morality :—

The *family* is the school of social virtues. Members of the same family are attracted to one another by bonds of natural affection. Their sympathy and love are evoked ; they learn self-sacrifice and mutual adjustment of tempers. The foundation of their moral life is laid in the family. But in the sphere of international morality there is no family which may develop the *world-conscience*.

There are many other *social institutions*, *e. g.*, educational institutions, workshop, civic community, church, and State, which help the growth of morality among individuals. But in the international sphere there are no such institutions which may help the growth of international morality. Though there are the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice, they have no authority to enforce their commands.

The *League of Nations* was not a league of all the States. Powerful States, like Japan, Germany, Italy and America were not its members. Moreover, there was a hegemony of some

States in the League of Nations. It was not a Federation of free nations. In spite of its shortcomings, it could do much useful work if it had physical sanctions. It had no international army, navy, and air force. Its economic sanctions proved ineffective against aggressive nations. It has been replaced by the United Nations Organization.

Nationalism has gripped the mind of mankind. This "complex" is at the root of many evils in the international sphere. Nationalism is good so far as it does not conflict with humanitarianism. It should pave the way for world-harmony and brotherhood of mankind. But nationalism has become a disease which brings untold sufferings upon humanity, and retards the growth of international morality.

Imperialism based on *capitalism* and *militarism* and backed by perverted nationalism is a standing block in the way of international morality. It acts on the principle—"Might is Right", exploits the weak, holds them in subjection, and demoralizes them. It perpetuates war, forges deadly weapons of destruction, and threatens the existence of the human race.

Public opinion in the world has not yet become sufficiently strong which may condemn inhuman acts of aggression and make them impossible by economic blockade and such other effective measures.

Weak and backward nations steeped in ignorance and poverty also are indirectly responsible for the undeveloped state of international morality. They naturally tempt the stronger nations to exploit them for their self-aggrandisement and self-expansion. They should be protected and trained in the art of self-government by an international commission.

Until a World-Federation is established international morality will continue to be in an amorphous condition. Kant rightly spoke of a Federation of Free Nations as an indispensable condition of perpetual peace. Such a Super-State should have an international army, navy, and air force

to enforce its commands, prevent war among nations, and ensure peace in the world. All weak and undeveloped countries should be directly governed by the World-Federation for their own benefit and helped to a state of self-reliance and self-government. The present trend of political forces in the world is unmistakably towards a World-Federation.

CHAPTER XXIX

POSTULATES OF MORALITY:

Metaphysical Implications of Morality

1. Ethics and Metaphysics.

Ethics is a normative science. It seeks to determine the nature of the moral *ideal*. It must also ascertain the *validity* of the moral ideal. It must ascertain the relation of the moral ideal to the ultimate *reality*. Thus it is inevitably led to metaphysical discussions. The ultimate nature of Morality and its relations to other aspects of Reality are questions which open up the most important metaphysical issues. Ethics assumes the existence of the moral consciousness, and analyses its contents. But it cannot be satisfied with this assumption. So long as the moral philosopher confines himself to this analysis of the moral consciousness, he is only forced to make metaphysical assumptions. But the validity of the moral consciousness with its contents is inconsistent with some metaphysical theories. Hence the moral philosopher must discard them. Materialism or naturalism, denial of the permanent self and its self-causality or freedom of the will, denial of immortality of the soul, and denial of the existence of God are inconsistent with the validity of the moral consciousness. Therefore these are discarded by Ethics. Metaphysics is not only based upon the validity of our theoretical conscious-

ness but also upon that of our moral consciousness. Metaphysics must be based upon physical sciences and the science of morality.

2. Postulates of Morality.

The following assumptions are the postulates of morality :—

(1) The soul or *self* must be real ; it must be a permanent self-conscious and self-determined agent ; it must be a *personality*. It must not be a series of fleeting sensations and feelings or a stream of consciousness.

(2) The self must have the power of self-activity, self-causality, self-determination, or *freedom of the will*. It must not be a creature of external circumstances. It must be a centre of energy and creative activity or power of initiation. It must have a power of creating and appreciating values. In other words, the self must have freedom of the will.

(3) *Reason* must be the essential element in the self. It has a theoretical function and a moral function. Reason can co-ordinate sensations into a system of knowledge. This is its intellectual function. Reason can organize feelings and impulses into a harmony of moral life. This is its moral function. "The task of the rational ego is, in the moral reference, the organization of sensibility, as, in the intellectual case, it is the organization of sensation. Impulses and feelings must, like sensations, be challenged by the self, criticized, measured, and co-ordinated or assigned their place in the ego's single life. As, in the construction of the percept out of the original sensation, the (rational) ego recognizes, discriminates between, selects from, and combines the sensations presented, and thus forms out of them an object of knowledge ; so, in the construction of the end out of the original impulse, we find the same recognition, discrimination, selection, and organization of the crude *data* of sensibility. Only through this (rational) synthesis of the manifold of sensibility, through this reduction of its several elements to the common measure

of a single rational life, can the (rational) ego constitute for itself moral ends and a supreme end or ideal of life" (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 195-96). Without reason the self or ego can have neither knowledge nor morality. Thus *personality*, freedom of the will or *self-determination*, and *reason* are the primary postulates of morality. These constitute the foundation of morality.

3. Personality.

The reality of the permanent self is the foundation of morality. The self or mind is not a mere adjunct or epiphenomenon of the material organism. It is not an occasional by-product of the friction of the brain-cells and ganglia as materialism holds. It is not a series of sensations, ideas and feelings or a stream of consciousness as empiricism or sensationalism holds. Each self is a *unique* centre of consciousness. It is not a mere mode or appearance of the one eternal universal consciousness as pantheism holds. It cannot be merged in other finite centres of consciousness or in the infinite and universal centre of consciousness. Each finite self is a *unique* centre or focus of consciousness,—a self-conscious and self-controlled agent or *personality* conscious of its end or destiny and capable of fulfilling its function in the universe, and realizing its ultimate destiny. "*Personality* is the basis of morality. Where there is no knowledge of Self, as the intelligent source of action, there is no discrimination of motive, act and end; and where such discrimination does not exist, there is no morality." "Self is known not merely as intelligence, but also as Power. I am a self-conscious, intelligent, self-determining power......Personality thus involves self-conscions being, self-regulated intelligence, and self-determined activity" (*Calderwood*).

4. Self-determination.

The permanent self is the foundation of morality. Its power of creative activity or free initiation is also presupposed by morality. It must have *freedom of the will*. Its actions

must be determined by the *self* from within,—not by circumstances from without. They must be *self-determined*. If they are determined by circumstances, they lose their moral value, and should be treated as non-moral physical events. "It is a presupposition of all Morality that the self is the cause of its own actions" (*Rashdall*). Freedom of the self or self-causality, self-activity or *self-determination* is the fundamental postulate of morality. Deny self-determination to the self, and it loses its moral life. Praise and blame, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, right and wrong, duty and virtue, responsibility and accountability—all lose their significance without freedom or self-determination. Morality presupposes the permanent reality of the self, its spiritual nature, and its self-causality, self-determined activity, or freedom.

5. **Reason.**

The self is sentient and rational. Sensibility and reason both are part and parcel of human nature But reason is the pre-eminent element in human nature. It is the prerogative of man to build up a system of knowledge out of the manifold of sensations by the intellectual synthesis of reason, and to build up harmonious moral life out of the manifold of sensibility by the moral synthesis of reason. The self controls, regulates and transforms feelings and desires, instincts and impulses, into a unity of rational life by the activity of reason. The self, as a moral being, is essentially *rational*.

Reason *intuitively* apprehends the moral end or good of the self. It applies the moral end or ideal to a particular action and *infers* it to be right or wrong according as it agrees or disagrees with the moral ideal. It *judges* an action to be right or wrong through inference. It *deliberates* on the merits and demerits of different lines of action, and *chooses* a particular course of action to the exclusion of others. Thus voluntary actions, which alone have moral worth, presuppose *reason*. We are morally responsible for our actions because we are endowed

with reason. Idiots, imbeciles, and insane persons are devoid of reason ; hence they cannot discriminate between right and wrong. They are, therefore, not held responsible for their actions.

Personality, self-determination and reason are the primary postulates of morality. Immortality of the soul, the existence of God, and the rational constitution of the universe are the secondary postulates of morality. Let us investigate the nature of human freedom, immortality of the human soul, the existence of God as the supreme Moral Person, and the rational constitution of the universe, and discuss the arguments which seek to prove their validity.

6. Freedom of the Will.

Man as a spiritual being is self determined or free. He determines his own activity. He is not determined by external forces. But he is not absolutely free. His freedom has limits. But he can transform even his limits into the means and materials of his self-development and self-realization. But this is not admitted by all.

The question of "freedom of the will" has raised a hot controversy among the philosophers of different ages. In ordinary usage, the expression, "freedom of the will" means freedom to do what we *will* to do, without any compulsion or restraint. But here the question is, whether we are *free to will what we will*, and how we come to will it ; whether we are free to choose between alternative possibilities, *i. e.*, possible lines of action, or whether we are compelled to choose one of them by something other than ourselves. In other words, does our willing a line of action depend essentially upon ourselves alone and is therefore *autonomous* or *self-determined ?* Or does it depend on any other things extraneous to the self and is thus heteronomous or other-determined ?

Some are advocates of the doctrine of freedom of the will. They are called *Libertarians*. Others deny freedom of the will. They are called *Necessarians* or *Determinists*.

The question of freedom of the will may be considered from different points of view—psychological, ethical, metaphysical and theological.

(1) **Necessarianism or Determinism** denies freedom of the will and puts forward the following arguments partly psychological, partly metaphysical, and partly theological in its defence :—

1. **Psychological Grounds** : (*a*) **Psychology of voluntary acts.**—Our volitions are determined by motives and desires. When there is a single motive (*e. g.*, in a simple action), this motive determines the volition and the consequent action. When several motives are simultaneously present (*e. g.*, in a complex action), there arises a conflict of motives and the *strongest* motive prevails, inhibits and represses the rival motives, and determines the volition.

In other words, volition is determined by the strength of the motive. The strength of a motive, again, is determined (1) partly by the environment or external circumstances influencing the individual from without ; (2) and partly by the mental character and constitution of the individual himself, which again is determined partly by inherited tendencies of his ancestors, and partly by the structure of his brain and organism. Thus our volitions are rigidly determined by a series or causes and antecedents, and if all the antecedents of the human volitions and actions were accurately known, the future actions of men could be predicted as unmistakably as the movements of the planets, the tide of rivers, etc.

(*b*) **Possibility of Prediction of human conduct.**—We can not only predict future physical events (*e. g.* eclipses, rainfall, famine, etc.) which are rigidly determined by their antecedent circumstances and inevitably follow from their natural causes, but we can also predict the future actions of men, if all their antecedent circumstances are known beforehand. And this possibility of prediction is confirmed by the statistics

of marriages, crimes and suicides, and other voluntary actions, upon which the civil and criminal legislation of a country greatly depends. So there can be no "freedom of the will."

II. Metaphysical Grounds.—First, the *law of causality* contradicts the doctrine of freedom of the will. A volition not determined by antecedent circumstances,—the so-called *free* volition,—would be an event without a cause which is impossible, for according to the law of causality, every event, physical as well as mental, must have a cause; there cannot be any *uncaused* phenomenon either in nature or in mind. *Indeterminism* flatly contradicts the law of causality. The will of man is made by this theory an exception to the law of causation. *Determinism*, on the other hand, stands in harmony with the postulate; the act of will is, like every other event in the world, enmeshed in the causal nexus.

Secondly, the law of *Conservation of Energy* also contradicts the doctrine of Freedom of the Will. By freedom of the will or free energizing of the mind we *create a new or fresh energy* in the body (brain) in the form of motor innervation, and through this energy of the body, produce a change in the external world. Thus by our free volitions we *add fresh energy* to the total amount of energy in the universe. But according to the law of Conservation of Energy the amount of energy in the world can never be either increased or diminished.

Thirdly, the *materialistic* and *naturalistic* conception of the world as a chance combination of material atoms operating according to the laws of matter and motion naturally leads to the denial of freedom of the will. According to materialism, mind is only a by-product or *epiphenomenon*, and as such it can have no causal power, and consequently there can be no freedom of the will.

Fourthly, *abstract monism* or *pantheism* necessarily leads to determinism. If God alone is real, the world and the mind become only illusory appearances. We think our volitions to

be free, Spinoza said, simply because we are conscious of the volitions without being conscious of the causes which determine them. Stones too might think themselves free in ignorance of their causes, when they are thrown by a person. Finite minds are the modes of God.

III. Theological Ground: Fore-knowledge of God.—Divine fore-knowledge is inconsistent with human freedom. God, to be God, must design and *foresee*, all things and all actions. God not only foresees the future phenomena of nature but also the *future actions* of men. And *prevision or fore-knowledge implies pre-determination.* God's foresight implies that God has *determined* beforehand the course of the world and the actions of men so that men have no power of determining their own actions.

Thus Necessarians or Determinists deny freedom of the will and appeal:—

1. *To the psychology of volition*, according to which volition is not free, but is determined by the strongest motive.

2. *To the possibility of prediction of human actions.*—If human actions were absolutely free without being determined by antecedent circumstances, they could not be predicted, as they generally are.

3. *To the law of Causality.*—As nothing can happen without a cause, there can be no uncaused phenomena in the world, hence no freedom of the will.

4. *To the law of Conservation of Energy.*—The amount of energy in the universe is constant, but freedom of the will implies creation of *new* physical energy and consequent increase of the total amount of energy in the world.

5. *To the materialistic theory of the world.*—Mind is a function, by-product or epiphenomenon of the brain and as such has no causal power and freedom.

6. *To the monistic and pantheistic theory* of the world, according to which God is the *only* reality and the human mind

has no independent reality of its own and consequently no freedom of the will.

7. *To the Fore-knowledge of God.*—God, in foreseeing the future actions of man, has determined them beforehand.

(2) The Doctrine of Free Will.—*(a)* **Criticism of Determinism or Necessarianism.**—Firstly, the *Psychology of Will* on which determinism is based is erroneous. Volition is, no doubt, determined by the strength of motives ; but the strength of motives depends on the *self* itself and not on antecedent circumstances. The strongest motive is that motive which is chosen by the self, and with which the self *identifies* itself. Motives are not external to the self ; they are elements in the self. Therefore, volition is determined from within by the self, and not by impulsion from without. It is not external determination by cause but *internal self-determination* according to reason.

Secondly, the possibility of *prediction* does not necessarily imply that volition is rigidly determined by antecedent circumstances. It is also consistent with freedom of the will ; for by freedom of the will we do not mean capriciousness of the will so that predictiou of human actions may become quite impossible. Repeated free volitions lead to the formation of a character which acts in the same way under the same circumstances. If different persons of the same nature be placed in the same circumstances, their wants will be very much the same. Hence their desires and motives also will be very much the same, and they will act in the same direction as they have the same reason for doing so. Thieves must steal whenever they get an opportunity. Thus freedom of the will too leads to the formation of a *uniform* character which may be predicted to a certain extent. Mackenzie says, "the moral life means the building up of character, *i. e.*, it means the forming of definite habits of actions. And if a habit of action be definite, it is *uniform and predictable*."

Thirdly, the *Law of Causality* is not inconsistent with freedom of the will. Freedom of the will does not imply that volition

is an event without a cause. The self itself *causes* it, and it does so *freely* without being determined to do so by anything external to it, but by the conception of its own good. Thus a volition is not an event without a cause : it is *caused* by the *self*.

Fourthly, the law of *Conservation of Energy* does not contradict freedom of the will if we take it in a wider sense and apply it also to mental energy. In that case, the loss of mental energy in volition would be compensated by the creation of its equivalent physical energy in motor innervation. Sometimes the answer is given that free volition does not create any *new* energy but only *changes the direction* of physical energy. So the law of conservation of energy does not contradict freedom of the will.

Lastly, the *fore-knowledge of God* is not inconsistent with human freedom. *Prevision or fore-knowledge does not necessarily mean pre-determination.* Some philosophers hold that God fore-knows the *possibilities* of our actions, but not their *actualities*.

(*b*) The Positive arguments in favour of Freedom of The Will.

The evidence of self-consciousness.—In willing we are always conscious of willing *freely*, or determining the course of our actions from within ourselves and for our own good, without being determined by anything antecedent to, or external to, ourselves. And the consciousness of freedom is especially distinct in the process of deliberation and resolution.

The evidence of moral consciousness.—Kant argues that Freedom of the Will is a postulate of morality. In moral judgments there is a sense of "*oughtness*" or moral obligation ; this moral obligation implies freedom of the will,—"*thou oughtest*, therefore thou *canst*." Duty and responsibility, justice, accountability, merit and demerit, virtue and vice would be quite meaningless if there were no freedom of the will.

A true and adequate metaphysical theory of the world (Absolute Idealism) confirms the doctrine of Free Will. According to it the world, the finite spirits, and God are real. The

world is the manifestation of the Divine Power. The finite spirits are finite reproductions of God and as such they share in the freedom or self-determining power of God. The human soul shares in the freedom of God, but the freedom of man is not absolute but *relative* ; it is limited, to a certain extent, by the physical forces of nature, by his relations to other men, and by the freedom of God.

Materialism is not a satisfactory theory of the universe. Mind can never be regarded as an occasional by-product or epiphenomenon of the brain, since it is conscious of its *causal* power of freedom in volition.

Pantheism also cannot be regarded as an adequate theory of the universe, since it denies the reality of the world and human mind.

(3) What is the nature of Freedom of the Will ? Indeterminism or Self-determinism ?—Freedom of the Will either means indeterminism or self-determinism. Indeterminism or libertarianism holds that the self can determine its own volitions without any cause, motive or reason. It can arbitrarily choose between alternative possibilities without being determined by any reason. Indeterminism is the view that man's will is free in the sense that it is *uncaused.* At the moment of action, the indeterminist holds, there are several alternatives before the will ; one or the other may be chosen *indifferently*. He finds freedom in a genuine spontaneity of the will that expresses itself in an *undetermined choice* within a limited field of possibilities.

But it is inconsistent with our rational nature. The self is *free* in the sense that it determines its volitions according to the conception of its good. A volition is determined not by anything external to it but by the self to realize its good. Thus Freedom of the Will does not mean indeterminism but self-determinism. The self determines its own volitions according to its ideal of its highest good ; but its highest good is its own highest self ; therefore, to be thus determined is to be self-determined.

7. Immortality of the Soul.

Martineau gives the following arguments :—

Death in its Physiological aspect—Death in its physiological aspect presents simply a case of *transformation* of energy. On death the forces of the organism are dissipated and consequently the organism is dissolved. But these forces are not totally lost according to the Law of Conservation of Energy.

Now the Law of Conservation of Energy either includes mental energy or excludes it. If it applies only to physical energy, then mind stands as something independent of matter, and hence the human soul may continue after death. If the law applies to physical as well as to mental energy, then just as physical energy is never absolutely lost but retained in some form or other, so mental energy is not absolutely lost after death, but continues in some form or other even after death. Thus the immortality of the human soul is not inconsistent with the law of Conservation of Energy.

Death in its Metaphysical aspect.—Every finite soul has its place and function as a factor in the evolution of the world. We may conclude, therefore, that the soul will continue to exist so long as it cannot perfectly fulfil its function for which it is needed as a factor in the world system ; and there is every reason for believing that the soul cannot exhaust its function and fulfil its purpose completely in the present life ; so it must continue to exist even after death and fulfil its function in the world.

Death in its Moral aspect.—In the very constitution of our self we find strong suggestions and unmistakable indications of our future life. Our intellectual and moral constitution gives us certain indications of the existence of a future life after death. These indications have been called by Dr. Martineau "vaticinations of the intellect," "vaticinations of the conscience," and "vaticinations in suspense." The rational nature of the human self guarantees its immortal life.

Vaticinations of the Intellect.—Our intellect is limited by time and space. The development of intellect consists in gradually transcending the limits of time and space. As the mind gradually develops its powers of remembering the past, anticipating the future, conceiving the distant, and discerning the inner causes and relations of things beyond the reach of the senses, it gradually oversteps the bounds of time and space. But in the present finite life, the mind cannot completely transcend the limitations of time and space. So we may reasonably hope that there is future life after death, when the intellect will attain its full development and completely transcend the limits of time and space.

Vaticinations of the Conscience.—The moral ideal is infinite. It cannot be fully realized in the present life. The greater is the moral progress, the higher is the moral ideal. The realization of the moral ideal, therefore, requires an immortal life. Kant puts it in this way : The conflict between desire and duty cannot be completely reconciled in the finite life. So there must be a future life continuous with the present life, where the personality of the human soul will persist and the conflict between desire and duty will be finally reconciled.

Vaticinations in Suspense.—Kant also argues that the demand of the conscience for justice and equity points to the existence of a future life. We have an ineradicable conviction that virtue must be rewarded with happiness and vice punished with pain. But the virtuous are seldom found to be happy in this world. So we believe that there is an after-life where there will be a perfect coincidence of virtue with happiness and vice with pain. The physical sufferings, the public opprobrium, and even punishment by the State are not sufficient punishment for the vicious ; they must have their proper retribution in a future life, where their sufferings will be exactly proportionate to their sins.

Seth gives Kant's argument thus: "The implication of immortality in a transcendental view of the moral life is most explicitly stated by Kant. The '*thou shalt*' of moral law implies '*thou canst*', and an infinite 'thou shalt' implies an infinite ability to fulfil it. But an infinite moral ideal cannot be realized in finite time; it follows that man, as the subject of such an ideal, must have infinite time for the task of its realization. A man is immortal till his work is done, and the work of man as a moral being is never done" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 456).

Seth argues that progress is the distinctive attribute of human life. "The present life, man feels to the end, is a probation, a school where his spirit is learning lessons which shall serve it after it has passed far beyond the limits of the school......There is no fruition and fulfilment, no perfect realization, in this life, of this life's purpose. Life is a preparation, a discipline, an education of the moral being. Is all this elaborate and painful work of moral education to be undone? Is death the consummation of our life?" (*Ibid*, P. 459).

"The problem of immortality is the problem of the opportunity of the moral life. No finite increase of time will suffice for the accomplishment of an infinite task. And the moral task is an infinite one; the capacity of the self which we are called upon to realize is an infinite capacity. The reality of the moral life implies the possibility of attaining its ideal; a potentiality that cannot be actualized is a contradiction in terms. But the opportunity is not given in this life, however well and wisely this life is used, for the full activity of all man's powers, intellectual, æsthetic, and volitional." (*Ibid*, p. 462). Therefore the human soul must be immortal. Personal immortality is implied by the moral life.

Hoffding enunciates the principle of *conservation of values*. The values that we achieve in this life must be conserved in the moral order. Therefore this principle also indicates the

immortality of the human soul. Personal immortality is a postulate of morality. Moral life is a personal life. The moral ideal is realized by a person in his personal life. If the moral self or person is merged in the universal spirit, the moral life ceases to exist. Impersonal immortality is the negation of morality. Moral life is always personal. It cannot merge in natural life. It cannot merge in divine life.

8. The Existence of God.

Martineau gives the following moral arguments for the Existence of God :—

Moral Obligation.—Moral obligation, like legal obligation, implies two persons,—a finite person under moral obligation and the Infinite Person or God who is the source of moral obligation. Moral obligation is not a relation between a finite person and a society, because the society cannot take cognizance of all his actions,—especially his inner motives and intentions. The State also cannot be the source of moral obligation for the same reason. Moral obligation, Martineau holds, cannot be imposed by the ideal self on the actual self. If I were the source of my moral obligation, I should be able to annul or abrogate it. But I can never annul my sense of moral obligation. Therefore, neither society nor the State nor the finite spirit is the source of moral obligation. Therefore, God is the source of moral obligation, who knows not only all our actions but also our inner motives and intentions.

Hierarchy of moral beings.—There is a *hierarchy of moral beings*. In the world we find that some persons are more perfect than others. The former are examples to the latter. We are always inspired and ennobled by the example of holy persons. Therefore we are led to believe that there is the most holy and perfect Person or God who is the culmination of all perfection. He is the holiest and most perfect.

Moral Law.—It is an unconditional or categorical imperative, in the language of Kant. We ought to follow the moral law.

But the moral law is not impersonal. It is the moral law because it is the expression of the perfection of God. The moral law is the voice of God in man. In other words, the moral law reaches its integral meaning, when seen as impersonated in a Perfect Mind, which communicates it to us and lends it power over our affections sufficient to draw us into divine communion. The constitution of our moral nature is unintelligible except as living in response to an objective "perfection pervading the universe with Holy Law."

Moral Government.—The virtuous are not sufficiently rewarded and the vicious are not sufficiently punished in this life. The physical, social and political sanctions are not sufficient punishments for vices. Therefore we believe that the virtuous and the vicious will get their merited rewards and punishments in after-life at the hands of God, the Moral Governor and Judge.

Kant gives the following moral argument for the existence of God :—

Conscience demands that virtue should be rewarded with happiness, and vice punished with pain. But virtue depends upon the inner will, while happiness depends upon outward circumstances. Our will is our own, and is within our control. Virtue therefore depends on our will ; but outward circumstances do not depend upon our will. Therefore, Kant argues that there must be a Supreme Power or Person, who will harmonize virtue with happiness, because He is the authority and controller of both the inner and the outer world.

The moral life is the life of gradual approximation to the moral ideal. Seth says, "The moral life is, in its essence, an ideal life—a life of aspiration after the realization of that which is not yet attained, determined by the unceasing antithesis of the '*is*' and the '*ought-to-be*.' What, then, is the source and warrant of this moral ideal, of this imperious

'*ought-to-be*'? To answer that it is entirely subjective, the moving shadow of our actual attainment, would be irrevocably to break the spell of the ideal, and to make it a mere foolish will-o'-the-wisp which, once discovered, could cheat us no longer out of our sensible satisfaction with the actual. An ideal with no foot-hold in the real would be the most unsubstantial of all illusions" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 430). The moral ideal is the everlasting real. It is the expression of the supreme reality of the Infinite Person or God. "The ideal is not simply the unreal, but the expression and exponent of the real; what on our side is the ideal, is, on its further side, the real; behind the '*ought*' lies the '*is*', behind our insistent '*ought-to-be*' the eternal '*I am*' of the divine righteousness" (*Ibid*, p. 431).

God is the Supreme Moral Person. "The whole drift of the argument tends to show that, in essence, God and man must be one, that God—the supreme moral source and principle, the alpha and omega of the moral as of the intellectual life—is the *eternally perfect Personality*, in whose image man has been created, and after the pattern of whose perfect nature, the archetypal essence of his own, he must unceasingly strive to shape his life. Since the moral ideal is an ideal of personality, must not the moral reality, the reality of which that ideal is the after-reflection as well as the prophetic hint, be the perfection of personality, the supreme Person whose image we, as persons, bear and are slowly and with effort inscribing on our natural individuality?......The moral law is the echo within our souls of the voice of the Eternal, whose offspring we are" (*Ibid*, p. 434). Thus God, as the Perfect Person, the embodiment of moral perfection, is implied by morality.

Rashdall says, "An absolute Moral Law or moral ideal cannot exist *in* material things. And it does not exist in the mind of this or that individual.. Only if we believe in the

existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real, a Mind which is the source of whatever is true in our moral judgments, can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself. Only so can we believe in absolute standard of right and wrong, which is as independent of this or that man's actual ideals and actual desires as the facts of material nature. The belief in God is the logical presupposition of an 'objective' or absolute Morality. A moral ideal can exist nowhere and nohow but in a mind ; an absolute moral ideal can exist only in a Mind from which all reality is derived. Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 212).

9. The Rational Constitution of the Universe.

The world or the universe is the proper sphere of moral life. It is not dead to moral values. It is the sphere which gives us opportunities for the realization of the moral ideal. It is the expression of the *Universal Reason* or *God*, who realizes a purpose in and through the universe. The moral ideal of man is a part of the purpose of God, which is being realized through the universe. The moral good of man is a part of the cosmic good. It is a real moment, an integral factor, a unique element, in the purpose of the cosmos. Thus the world is a *moral government* adapted to the cosmic good. It is rationally constituted. The universe is the embodiment of the purpose of God. The moral ideal of man is a moment in the divine purpose. Thus the universe is a moral order. Rashdall rightly observes : "If human Morality is a revelation, however imperfect, of the ultimate nature of Reality, it must represent, not merely an ideal existing in and for the Mind which is the ultimate source or ground of Reality, but also the nature of the end towards which that Reality is moving. The very idea of Morality implies action directed towards an

end which has value. If the value of 'good' has its counterpart in the Divine Mind, the course of events is itself governed by the same Mind which is the source of our moral ideas, and must be ultimately directed towards the end which the true moral ideal, disclosed however imperfectly in the moral consciousness of man, sets up as the goal and canon of human conduct. The Universe itself must have a purpose or rational end, a purpose which commends itself as reasonable to the Mind which wills it : and the nature of that end must be at least in part disclosed by our moral judgments. What valid human judgments pronounce to be good must be part of the divine end, and the rest of that end must be such as could, consistently with the principles governing these human judgments of value, be pronounced good. An objectively valid Morality implies belief in the fundamental rationality of the Universe" (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, pp. 213-14). "The course of events must itself be governed by the same Mind which is the source of our moral ideas, and be ultimately directed towards the ends which the moral ideal, disclosed, however imperfectly, in the moral consciousness of man, sets up as the goal and canon of human conduct. The Universe itself must have a purpose or rational end, a purpose which a perfect Reason would pronounce to be good. The end which our Reason sets before us as the true end of conduct must be the end likewise of the Mind from which that Reason is derived. ......Unless the Universe be rational, no course of conduct can be said to be wholly and absolutely rational. If it is to be in the true sense rational, it must be directed towards ends which a rational intelligence would pronounce good......The belief that the Universe has a rational end is speculatively a postulate of an absolute or unconditional Morality" (*Ibid*, pp. 219-20). Thus a theistic interpretation of the Universe is a postulate of morality.

CHAPTER XXX

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ETHICS

1. The Family.

The family is the primary social institution. It is the unit of the society. We cannot think of the state of society in which man was not a member of a family. Husband, wife, and children form a natural social unit. The earliest forms of group life were based upon the relation of kinship. Even the primitive hordes derived their moral judgments from their experiences of the relations between husband, wife, and children. The family based on monogamy is the most secure of social institutions among civilized nations today.

The family is based upon the natural affections of love and tender emotion. Husband and wife are united by the bond of love. Parents and children are united by the bond of tender emotion. These emotions are based on instincts. The children are protected by their natural guardians. Parents take care of them, give them food, clothing and protection, and provide for their physical, intellectual, and moral education. During the prolonged period of human childhood, the parents are the natural guardians.

The family is the school of moral education. Members of the family imbibe the social virtues of sympathy, fellow-feeling, love and co-operation. They imbibe the spirit of self-sacrifice which is the root of moral life, and apply it to wider and wider spheres. The home sentiment is the basis of all other social sentiments and virtues.

"The family ideally considered has one end, the common good of all its members. Marriage converts an attachment between man and woman, either of passion or of friendship, into a deliberate, intimate, permanent, responsible union for a

common end of mutual good. It is this common end, a good of a higher, broader, fuller sort than either could attain in isolation, which lifts passion from the impulsive or selfish to the moral plane. The family is the great social agency for the care and training of the race. This function reacts upon the character of the parents. Tenderness, sympathy, self-sacrifice, steadiness of purpose, responsiblity. and activity, are all demanded and usually evoked by children" (Dewy & Tufts : *Ethics*, p. 489).

"The ideal family is the most beautiful and most sacred human relationship. The words husband, wife, father, mother, and child are freighted with utmost meaning and value. In the ideal home, every member finds his highest joy in working with the others for the good of each individual. Husband and wife are free personalities, with equal rights, each expert in his own sphere, and secure of the help and support of the other. Each child accepts parental counsel and guidance with loving docility, and is assisted in gaining free expression in the development of his personality. All members of the family work together to enable each to realize his ambitions ; every one gladly makes sacrifices for the common good. The ideal family is seldom completely realized, but all thoughtful men and women marry with the will to attain it" (Wright : *General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 453).

But the family has also a cramping influence upon its members. It has a tendency to narrow their outlook, and circumscribe their affections to its limits. It may monopolize their loyalty to itself. It may damp their devotion to the State, and cramp their national consciousness. It may curb their humanitarian sentiment. So some eminent thinkers want to do away with the family. But this is a quack's remedy for the disease. The family cannot and should not be superseded by the State. The evils of the family can be remedied by a better order of the society.

But the State should, to a certain extent, control the family. It should regulate the control of parents over children. It should prevent child labour. It should enforce their proper education, at least, up to a certain limit. It should mitigate the inferiority of the wife to her husband, and ensure her economic freedom. It should not allow the husband's control over his wife to degenerate into tyranny. But the State should not supersede the family.

It is, indeed, true that the environment of home is too narrow, too strongly personal and emotional. The parents are often ignorant of the proper care of children's bodies, minds and especially their morals. And yet it does not logically follow that *impersonal* care by experts will be better, on the whole, than the *personal* care by parents. If childran are taken away from their parents just after birth, brought up in nurseries, given proper education in institutions, and provided with work, they will miss the sweet human touch of love of their parents, which is vital to their self-expression and self-realization ; they will be dwarfed in their moral education ; they will run the risk of being reduced to soulless machines under the impersonal care of institutions. And the parents also will lose the opportunity of transforming their natural 'sex' emotion into the ideal, selfless devotion to children. They will be deprived of the idealizing, socializing, and ennobling influence of children. Their life will lapse into narrow, selfish individualism. Hence any attempt to destroy the family will sap the very foundation of the moral structure of the society.

"It is not the family that ought to be abolished, but the rights of the family that must be reformed ; not education of parents that ought to be avoided, but education of parents that must be introduced ; not the home that ought to be done away with, but homelessness that must cease" (Ellen Key : *Love and Marriage*, p. 240).

2. Marriage.

The family is based upon the institution of marriage. Marriage converts instinctive sex attraction between man and woman into an intimate, permanent union. It is a means to the self-realization and self-development of each in loving union with the other. The sex is a biological instinct. It is imperious in human nature because it leads to the propagation and perpetuation of the species. "The primary values of sex are organic. As such they are primarily instrumental. But they are not wholly so, as in the case of economic values of property. Physical satisfaction is a condition of other values, but it has an intrinsic value of its own. With these organic values both instrumental and intrinsic, are then later associated hyper-organic values, chief among which are those of association" (Urban : *Fundamentals of Ethics*, pp. 291-92). The organic values of sex are instrumental to the values of association and character, *e. g.*, comradeship, friendship, love, tenderness, self-sacrifice, etc. The sex, functioning in a normal way, is a great integrating force in the life of man and woman. But if it becomes abnormal, it works as a great disintegrating force and disorganizes their life. Marriage transforms the natural sex emotion or lust into ideal love and fellowship. It sublimates an animal passion into a spiritual sentiment. It is a social institution. "It is the sex instinct functioning in a social individual in a social medium, and with social consent. It is a more or less permanent union of the sex sanctioned by the community" (*Urban*). It is a potent socializing and spiritualizing agency. It demands the realization of hyper-organic values by spiritualizing the conjugal relation.

Marriage is an important moral institution from the *individual* point of view. "In normal individuals the sex impulse, on the one hand, needs expression or satisfaction. and on the other, needs to be so refined and related to the indivi-

dual's total interests and emotional life as to remain in due perspective. Sex impulse thwarted or repressed may give rise to abnormality, to coldness and narrowness, or even to psychoses and neuroses. Sex impulse uncontrolled—or without the refining and intimate association with intellectual, æsthetic, and social interests and influences—may coarsen and distort personality. If women have suffered more from the first, men have suffered more from the second" (Dewy and Tufts : *Ethics*, p. 503).

Marriage is an important moral institution from the *social* point of view. Marriage affords the best kind of friendship between man and woman, which is more intimate, more beautiful, and more mutually helpful than any other. Sharing the common joys and sorrows, hopes and aspirations, and concern for the welfare of children build up a certain community of life which is found in no other relationship. Marriage gives us an opportunity for creative work which requires co-operation with others. We enter upon opportunities for achieving the common good in co-operation with others. Society has made human life what it is largely through language, tradition, mutual aid and co-operation. And of all its units kin and family have been the most closely knit and influential.

"The modern ideal in marriage is an ethical sacrament. It is something more sacred than an ordinary business contract. It is a tie in which a man and a woman are united in a life-long fidelity. Its emotional basis is a virtuous sentiment of love, in which impulses of tenderness, self-assertion, respect, sympathy, prudence, acquisitiveness, and constructiveness are perfectly combined with sexual attraction, all sublimated into a common interest and common will" (Wright : *General Introduction to Ethics*, pp. 452-53).

There are different forms of marriage : (1) *group marriage*, in which several men are married to several women ; (2) *polyandry*, in which one woman is married to several men ; (3)

polygamy, in which several women are married to one man; (4) *monogamy*, in which one woman is married to one man. Monogamy is the best form of marriage. It has been achieved in course of ages by society. It is best fitted to realize the moral ideal of marriage.

"From every point of view, the permanent monogamous relation appears to be the indispensable condition of the highest moral development as we know it. From the standpoint of the individual, it is the indispensable condition of self-realization. From the standpoint of society, it is the necessary form of good life" (Urban : *Fundamentals of Ethics*, p. 306). Hence any attempt to abolish the long-established moral institution of marriage and lapse into complete promiscuity is to revert to barbarism and beastly life.

3. Unsolemnized love Marriage.

Many modern writers eulogize love marriage and regard it as better than "conventional" marriage. They argue that love with mutual consent and with the intention or expectation of permanence approaches the ideal of marriage, though it is not sanctioned by society or the Church. They look upon it as a true marriage of kindred souls to which "conventional" marriage can add no sanctity.

It cannot be denied that many noble relationships may be established on this basis. But such relationships are founded too much on feeling and impulse, and too little on reason and volition. They are tainted by the anti-social element. They are infected by a sense of insecurity and fear of impermanence. They cannot, therefore, lead to the realization of the highest values in life. If they are based on physical satisfaction without love, they are all the more immoral and as good as animal matings. Marriage is a *social* institution. It should not be based upon feeling and impulse uncontrolled by reason and volition and unsolemnized by the society and the Church.

4. Trial Marriage.

The ideal in marriage is a permanent union of husband and wife who share in the richer and fuller life which their union affords. Marriage is a moral institution which contributes to the self-realization and self-development of the married couple united together permanently by the common bond of love and fellowship.

Therefore free love, trial and companionate marriages are highly objectionable. They are not entered into with the full expectation of a life-long union. They cannot fulfil the moral purpose of marriage Permanent monogamous relation between husband and wife has been established in society in course of ages. It has been achieved by social training for countless generations. Marriage can never prove permanent, unless it is entered into by man and woman with the sacred resolve that they will love and cherish each other so long as they live. Man and woman united by trial marriages cannot achieve the higher values of association and character. They cannot attain happiness. Their mental life is disintegrated by the sense of insecurity. Each partner wonders if he or she could not have a better match, and if it were yet too late. Each would be tortured by jealousy. They and their children cannot be happy. They cannot realize social and spiritual values. Trial marriages are individualistic and anti-social. They are based upon the biological instinct of sex. They cannot refine and elevate the conjugal relation to a spiritual plane. They cannot be ethically justified. They are advocated by radical individualists who want to pull down the age-long moral structure of society based on permanent monogamous relation between the sexes.

5. Divorce.

There are three views on this problem. (1) According to the *conservative* view, marriage is a *religious* sacrament. "The permanent monogamous family is the norm of sex rela-

tions because it is the indispensable condition of self-realization, both for the marital couple and for the children. Its rigorous maintenance by law is necessary for social coherence and welfare, but even more for its educational value" (*Fundamentals of Ethics*, p. 320). The rigorists hold that in the most aggravated cases there should be judicial separation of husband and wife, but none of them should be permitted to remarry. Hindu marrage is a religious sacrament. It cannot be dissolved under any circumstances. It does not permit divorce or even judicial separation.

But in this age of growing individualism man and woman cannot submit to the tyranny of an extremely incompatible and unhappy union solemnized by religion. In countries where divorce is forbidden altogether men and women cannot have constancy and fidelity, especially men try to seek consolation in extra-marital relations. In such countries illegitimacy is often frequent, and illegitimate children grow up under a stigma, without the love and care of their parents in a normal home; wives are taught that it is their duty to remain loyal to their husbands, even if they are cruel, drunken, adulterous, and syphilitic. Children who grow up under such conditions become physically, mentally, and morally abnormal. Therefore, it is very difficult to uphold the rigoristic view from the moral standpoint.

(2) According to the *radical* view, divorce should be granted on the mutual consent of husband and wife. It is argued that sex relations are primarily the business of the individual alone, and therefore divorce should be granted on mutual consent. If a marriage fails to fulfil its moral purpose,—if it makes home full of strife, jealousy, and ill-will, neither husband nor wife nor children can develop in character and happiness. Hence such a marriage out to be dissolved, and the man and the woman ought to have the right to marry again. Soviet Russia has legalized divorce on mutual consent.

But divorce by mutual consent cannot be ethically justified. If it were sanctioned by law everywhere, it would speedily degenerate into divorce at the desire of either husband or wife. For neither would like to hold the other to a marriage that he or she found disagreeable. The husband or wife no longer loved would have to allow the other to break the marriage tie. And if either of them could at any time force the other to a divorce, there would be no security and permanence in the marital relation. Successful husbands would be hunted by charming adventuresses, who would snare them away by their youth and beauty from their wives grown old and unattractive from child-bearing and economic privations in the years of struggle of the husband's early career. Many loving and faithful wives would be heart-broken. and their children would lose their fathers' loving care. Beautiful, selfish and ambitious women would look upon a present marriage as a stepping-stone to a more advantageous one. So divorce by mutual consent cannot be morally justified.

(3) According to the *liberal* view, divorce should be granted under exceptional circumstances. Divorce should be permitted if a spouse has been proved to have been guilty of such grave offences as habitual adultery, drunkenness, cruelty, desertion, serious crimes, impotence, or incurable insanity. Other grave offences may be added to the list. No wronged husband or wife is forced by law to ask for a divorce ; he or she may forgive and endure as long as there seems hope that conditions may improve. But when a person seeks relief in a court of justice, it should grant divorce on grave grounds.

The ultimate solution of the divorce problem depends on the elevation of the public moral conscience with regard to marriage. If all people can constantly remember the significance of the marriage tie as an ethical institution,—if all can be inspired with the will to lead pure lives in families bound together by ties of mutual love, the divorce question will take care of itself. "A divorce is not itself a disease ; it is rather a surgical operation

employed to remedy a disease. The cause of the disease is failure to appreciate the ethical values of the family itself" (*Wright*). (*General Introduction to Ethics*, pp. 456-62 ; *Fundamentals of Ethics*, pp. 318-24).

6. Enforced Widowhood.

Hindu marriage is a religious sacrament. It is indissoluble. Divorce, under no circumstances, is permitted by Hinduism. It permits the husband to remarry after the wife's death. But it does not permit the wife to remarry after the husband's death. Widowhood is enforced upon women on the death of their husbands to safeguard the purity of the marriage tie. It may be mentioned incidentally that Hinduism permits polygamy.

If a woman wants to remain faithful to the memory of her dead husband, she may do so and realize the lofty ideal of marriage. She may cultivate the noble virtue of chastity and constancy, and transform and sublimate her lower passions into spiritual emotions. But if she wants to remarry under the stress of unfavourable circumstances, nothing should stand in the way of her remarriage. Chastity cannot be enforced from without ; it should come voluntarily from within. Childless widows should be permitted to remarry, because motherhood is the fulfilment of womanhood. Their hunger for motherhood should be satisfied. Child widows should be permitted to remarry for the sake of their self-expression and self-realization. Young widows who cannot control their passions should be permitted to remarry, because otherwise they will fall into evil ways and degenerate themselves beyond redemption. Enforced widowhood often leads to illicit sexual relations, abductions, elopements, prostitution, illegitimacy, etc. Voluntary widowhood is a noble and lofty ideal. But enforced widowhood cannot be morally justified, because a person is an end in himself and cannot be treated as a means, and therefore a woman cannot be compelled to remain a widow against her will and rational conviction for the sake of an extrinsic good.

7. Child Marriage.

Marriage is a voluntary union between two persons, male and female, willing to enter into a life-long relationship with an intelligent understanding of the rights and duties of marrige, and its ethical purpose of mutual aid in self-realization and self-development. Hence children with immature and undeveloped minds, unable to appreciate the nature and responsibilities of marriage should not be allowed to marry. With undeveloped bodies children suffer badly from marital relations. They cannot attain healthy and normal, intellectual and moral development. They are weighed down with domestic worries and anxieties early in their lives, when they should prepare themselves thoroughly for useful careers. The health of young girls is shattered by early child-bearing and care of children. Hence child marriage ought to be abolished.

8. Prostitution.

Kant has rightly said : A person is an end in himself ; he should not be treated as a means. "Prostitution is wrong ; because in it a woman is treated as a mere means to man's pleasure at the cost of the degradation of her own personality. The fact that she consents to her own degradation only signifies that she also violates the moral law, since she does not respect her own personality" (*General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 306).

"Prostitution involves the deepest violation of the norms of sex life in the ethical sense. On the side of the prostitute, it is the basest of sales of self for gold. On the side of him who uses the prostitute, it is an extreme form of violation of the moral norm which tells us to treat the moral person always as an end and never as a means" (*Fundamentals of Ethics*, p. 317).

9. Carreer for Women.

Some radical thinkers hold that every adult woman should be employed in some kind of work or business. Only mothers

during pregnancy and lactation should be exempted from it; they should be financially supported by the State. No adult woman should be permitted to be financially dependent on a man for her support. Women are gradually acquiring full civic and political rights. They ought to have careers like men, with similar opportunities for productive work, self-realization, and happiness.

"Under modern conditions every healthy woman ought to have a vocation. Every unmarried woman whose services are not needed in the home should, like her brothers, enter a profession or business, as a matter of course. This is desirable for the development of her own character and happiness. No man or woman can gain the highest satisfactions in life, who does not have the opportunity for self-expression which creative work alone affords" (*General Introduction to Ethics*, p. 466).

Women may enter vocations like men. But home life should not be broken. It is morally good for a man to support his own wife and children; responsibility strengthens his character: he loves his family more dearly, and remains faithful to them. A happy home is good for children too. They develop intellectually and morally better under the personal care of their mother than under the impersonal care of public institutions.

Women may look upon home-making also as a vocation. Modern machinery minimizes the time necessary for routine tasks, and frees a woman for the larger activities of an intellectual and spiritual nature. A housewife who learns the chemistry of foods can keep the family healthy by properly balanced meals. She should have knowledge of hygiene as well as of medicines for simple ailments and nursing. She should know something of accounting to plan the family budget, and regulate the expenses of the family. She should acquire some knowledge of child psychology and educational theory and practice, which will be of great value to her in training children in the home and planning their education.

Women may specialize in some vocations best suited to their temperaments. They may serve as teachers in children's schools. They may work as teachers in girls' schools and colleges. They may specialize in female diseases, midwifery, nursing, etc. They may look after public health and sanitation. They may take care of the aged, the delinquent, and the retarded. They may look after insane women. They may reclaim the fallen women, and reform the slum life.

Women should not enter those vocations which may unsex them and deprive them of their natural tenderness. They should not give up the ideal of motherhood. They should not vie with men as athletes, explorers, hunters, warriors and adventurers. They should not try to imitate men in physical strength and valour and make themselves masculine.

10. Untouchability.

Hindu society recognizes untouchability of people of certain castes. There are innumerable castes in the Hindu society. Intermarriage and inter-dining among them are forbidden. But these castes are mainly divided into two classes, touchables and untouchables. The so-called superior castes are touchable. There are some so-called inferior castes who are untouchable. They are untouchable, not necessarily for their unclean and immoral habits, but for their birth. They are untouchable by heredity. Their touch is considered to be polluting. In southern India even their shadows are not touched by the Brahmins. They cannot use public tanks and wells. They cannot send their childeren to public schools.

This immoral institution is the blackest slur on Hinduism, which recognizes the divinity of each person theoretically. Each person is an end in himself. We should respect the dignity of every person. A person becomes unclean and untouchable by his personal uncleanliness, contagious disease, and habitual immorality. None can be untouchable by birth, in spite of his purity of body, mind, and soul. But many

so-called untouchables eat flesh of dead animals, are habitually drunken, adulterous, and criminal. They should give up these dirty and immoral habits and deserve equal treatment with others. We should reclaim them and reform their immoral habits.

11. Professional Begging.

Man has a right to work. His right to work follows from his right to live. And he has duty to work for his livelihood. He is under moral obligation to work. He cannot be a hanger-on on others. He has no right to live like a drone on society. He should contribute his quota to the good of the society by his work. Professional begging is derogatory to the dignity of man as a rational being, as an end-in-himself. It robs him of his self-respect, self-help, and self-reliance. It deprives him of opportunities for self-expression and self-realization. So it is a great *moral* evil.

Professional begging is a great *social* evil. Beggars who earn their living by begging do nothing for the society. They do no productive work. They perform no useful function in society. They serve as incentives to idlers. They are drones of society. They are misfits in society.

Professional beggars are the object of misplaced charity. Some unthinking persons of generous disposition satisfy their instinctive sympathy by helping them. They do not treat the beggars as persons or ends-in-themselves, but as mere means. They sap their moral fibre and reduce them to drones and slaves. Some able-bodied beggars become professional cheats and rogues. Hence professional begging is a great moral and social evil. It should be stopped by legislation. The State should see that all people are provided with employment, and disabled and old persons get financial support from it.

12. Is Charity an Evil ?

Benevolence is a social virtue. Charity is a kind of benevolence. It implies kindness, patience, and endurance, as well

as freedom from envy, jealousy, boastfulness, self-display, and malice. In the present order of society there are many poor and destitute people. They should be helped out of their distress. We ought to help them to stand on their own legs. Charity should be considerate and rational.

Indiscriminate charity is an evil. It creates a class of worthless parasites on society. It kills their initiative. It destroys their incentive to self-exertion. It robs them of their self-respect and self-reliance. Charity should always aim at making the recipient self-respecting. Unthinking charity satisfies the instinctive sympathy of the giver. It does not satisfy his rational benevolence. It makes him impulsive and emotional. Indiscriminate charity should not be regarded as a virtue. It must be regarded "as a particularly pernicious form of self-indulgence."

Discriminate charity is a virtue. It has led to much private benevolence, and done real good to many individuals. It has led to the establishment of hospitals, schools, orphanages, leper asylums, maternity homes, and philanthropic institutions of every kind.

Modern thinkers look upon charity as a relic of the mediæval conception of morality. "The theory which erects charity into a supreme excellence is a survival of a feudally stratified society, that is, of conditions wherein a superior class achieved merit by doing things gratuitously for an inferior class. The objection to this conception of charity is that it too readily becomes an excuse for maintaining laws and social arrangements which ought themselves to be changed in the interest of fair play and justice. 'Charity' may even be used as a means for administering a sop to one's social conscience while at the same time it buys off the resentment which might otherwise grow up in those who suffer from social injustice. Magnificent philanthrophy may be employed to cover up brutal economic exploitation. Gifts to libraries, hospitals, missions, schools may

be employed as a means of rendering existing institutions more tolerable, and of inducing immunity against social change" (Dewey and Tufts : *Ethics*, p. 334). Hence charity is not an unmixed good. We should aim at an ideal arrangement of the society in which poverty may be liquidated.

CHAPTER XXXI

PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL ETHICS

1. The State.

The State is the most important social and moral institution. "It is the supreme controller of social relations." It protects the life and property of its citizens. It prevents anarchy and lawlessness. It makes laws and enforces them. It has physical sanction behind it. It ensures peaceful life of the citizens. Its ethical functions are justice and benevolence. Its primary function is to award justice. Its secondary function is to do benevolent actions. It should punish the criminals who encroach upon the rights of others. And it should promote the material as well as spiritual welfare of its citizens.

Anarchism holds that human nature is essentially good. All artificial restrictions on human liberty should be withdrawn. No government is necessary. It is essentially an evil because it is based on coercion. The State should be abolished. The ideal social order will be a co-operative commonwealth based on love and sympathy.

This view is wrong. Human nature is not entirely good. It is a mixture of good and evil. The evil nature of man should be curbed by the State to ensure self-realization and self-development of its citizens by coercion. It should protect the life and property of each citizen from the onslaught of others

and give him maximum opportunities for self-expression. The anarchist's Utopia is impossible of realization. He confuses liberty with license. Any attempt to abolish the State will be subversive of the social order and disastrous to human welfare.

2. Can the State be based on Non-violence ?

The State should be based on the general will of the people, which is its ethical basis. But it should carry on government by force or coercion. It cannot execute functions of government by love and moral persuasion. It becomes inoperative and inefficient without physical sanction. It is the supreme controller of social relations. So it must have the power to enforce its laws on the citizens for their individual and common good. The seeming coercion of the State is ultimately the imposition of the will of the better selves of the citizens. "Obedience to the State is obedience to the citizen's own better self" (*Seth*). The State cannot be superseded by any other social order. And it cannot be based on *non-violence*. It must punish the criminals, quell riots and rebellion by physical force, and resist aggression by violence. To think of the practicability of a non-violent State is to forget the complex nature of man composed of good and evil.

3. Is the State an end in itself ?

The State is not an end in itself. It is a means to the realization of the highest good by individual citizens. Self-realization, or realization of personality, or realization of the supreme values is the highest personal and social good. The State should ensure a stable and peaceful state of society in which every person may realize the highest good. It should afford maximum opportunities to individuals for self-expression and self-realization. The State should not rob individuals of their liberty and reduce them to soulless machines. The State should not supersede the person. If it crushes his liberty, it will defeat its moral purpose.

4. Has an Individual a right to Revolution ?

The State is the supreme controller of social relations. It is the greatest association which comprehends other associations. It guarantees our life and property. So it is the duty of individual citizens to respect its authority. They should not light-heartedly tamper with its authority and bring about chaos and anarchy. They may criticize the political order and try to reform it, or improve upon it. They should not openly rebel against the State, so long as it keeps within its proper function.

The ideal State is based upon the *general will* of the people. This is its *ethical* basis. It ought to represent the general will of the people. But if, instead, it is based upon *brute force*, and ruthlessly thwarts the *general will* of the people, they have a moral right to revolt against it and set it right. The people have the right of revolutian only in exceptional circumstances. They have no right to tamper with the established political order and defy all constituted authorities for a paltry cause, and thus jeopardize the life and property of innumerable peaceful citizens. The people have a right to revolt against the State in uncommon circumstances under the guidance of an able and far-sighted leader. An isolated individual with no following has no right to do anything against the general will of the people. Thus, an individual has the right of revolution in grave emergencies.

5. War.

The State has sovereignty. If it is threatened by another State, it should be defended at all costs. The State, though based upon the general will of the people, maintains its authority by physical force. Hence it should resort to physical force in order to maintain its integrity and sovereignty. In the present state of society it is inconceivable that a State can effectively resist aggression by non-violence and moral persuasion. So war is morally justified for a righteous cause. For instance, war against an aggressor who threatens the sovereignty

of a State or its ally, or attacks a weak and defenceless people is right. War for achieving independence and freedom from slavery is right. War for the subjugation of other peoples is wrong. War for political or economic imperialism is wrong. Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam approve of war for a righteous cause, which has, therefore, a sanction of religion.

War has played an important role in moral and social evolution as a *socializing*, and *individualizing*, and *rationalizing* agency. (1) War *brings together* people of different classes even of conflicting interests, and unites them with a common bond. Men lay aside their vocations and pursuits, forget their jealousies, and sacrifice all, if need be, to work and to die for the common cause. Wars have given birth to nations. Wars have united smaller groups and brought them under a common rule.

(2) War has been an important *individualizing* agency. It evokes the best powers of all men concerned whether they are officers, common soldiers, engineers, ambulance drivers, surgeons, manufacturers of munitions, or producers of supplies that are directly or indirectly of aid in the common effort. It calls forth the best powers of women also, whether they serve as nurses, do various kinds of useful work at home to help the men at the front, or engage in those works which men would do at ordinary times. Under the stress of war many insignificant men suddenly spring into eminence by prodigies of valour.

(3) War has also been a *rationalizing* agency. Many scientific inventions have been made for the purpose of war. Aeroplanes, submarines, mines, tanks, parachutes, poison gas, synthetic food, etc., have been invented for the purpose of war. "Much of the progress in arts and crafts in all ages has been induced by the necessities of war. Military art and science call for the highest powers of reflection and ingenuity. Much that is great in literature, music, architecture, painting, and sculpture has been produced because of war" (*Wright*).

And yet war causes untold human suffering. It cripples, mutilates, and kills numberless youths who are the flowers of a nation. It causes intense suffering to their mothers, wives and children. It causes economic exhaustion of nations engaged in war. It causes dislocation of trade, commerce, industry, education, and other aspects of civil life. It robs weak peoples of their freedom. It brings on their economic exploitation, starvation, and consequent demoralization. It reacts upon the conquering nations and augments their national pride and arrogance, and gives rise to jingoism, chauvinism, and imperialism in them. It gradually makes them ease-loving, luxurious, and effiminate. It demoralizes both conquering and conquered nations. It breeds hatred and ill-will, rivalry and jealousy among nations.

Modern engines of warfare are terribly destructive of human life and property. Bombers, fighters, and other kinds of aeroplanes rain death upon civil population and raze towns and cities to the ground. They utterly destroy militray objectives, industrial areas, vital supplies, etc. Parachutists suddenly swoop down upon people, and paralyse their peaceful civil life. Modern war, with its paraphernalia of most destructive weapons, is the most terrific scourge that has afflicted the human race. Hence many great thinkers today are definitely against war, and hosts of people in every country are pacifists and war-resisters, but they do not guide the destiny of nations.

Attempts have been made from time to time to outlaw war and settle all international disputes by arbitration, negotiation, pacts, disarmament, establishment of international courts, and League of Nations. But these remedies have signally failed so far. The League of Nations raised very high expectations. But it has died a natural death. The League of Nations was not a league of all free peoples. It was an important organization set up and buttressed by the powerful imperialist nations in order to maintain the *status quo*. So gradually the young aspirant

nations who were discontented with the present order left the League and disturbed the *status quo*. The League could not prevent Italy from subjugating Abyssinia. It could not prevent Japan from conquering Manchuoko and devastating China. The present United Nations' Organization has just begun its career. It also aims at abolishing war. But it is haunted by the same old jealousies and rivalries.

The last Great War was fought to end war. It was said to be *the war to end war*. It was said to be the war to make the world safe for democracy. Even the second Great War is intended to save the democracies of Europe. But war cannot end war. War bred by violence, rivalry and jealousy will always breed war. War can be ended only by the establishment of a World-Federation, Federation of Free Nations, or Commonwealth of Mankind based on mutual good-will and understanding, mutual adjustment of economic needs, complete disarmament, and curtailment of the sovereignty of nations. Until the economic needs of different nations are satisfactorily adjusted to one another, and the causes of war are completely removed, the outlawry of war will be a cry in the wilderness. Until people shed aggressive nationalism and imperialism and submit to an international organization without sacrificing enlightened and rational patriotism and nationalism, war cannot be abolished. Continued conflicts among powerful imperialist nations with the consequent destruction may pave the way for complete disarmament and an international organization. The great stumbling block in the way of much coveted World-Federation is the existence of weak, defenceless, and illiterate peoples of Asia and Africa. None will give them freedom until they deserve it. They must be strong, educated, disciplined, organized, and politically conscious. Then only they will achieve independence and become self-respecting members of the comity of nations. The spirit of the times will quicken the process of their regeneration and arrest the greed of the

imperialist nations. But equality of strength, mutual good-will and understanding, spirit of fellowship and brotherhood which are pre-requisites for the establishment of a stable international organization are lacking, and the abolition of war is yet a far cry.

6. Conscription.

War for a just cause is right. There are times of grave emergency when a State can conscript all its able-bodied young men capable of fighting for a noble cause. For instance, if a country is threatened with invasion or is actually invaded by an aggressor, the State has every right to enact a law for conscription and compel all young men to fight, because the individual good should always be subordinated to the common good. Here coercion by the State ultimately contributes to the greater good of the individuals. It gives them a better scope for self-expression and self-realization. But exceptions should be made in some cases where people are by conviction against all war. Freedom of conscience may be granted in those cases only if it does not adversely affect the prosecution of the war. Sometimes it is very difficult for a small democratic State to grant freedom of conscience to pacifists and war-resisters, when it is engaged in a life and death struggle with a totalitarian State for its very existence. It is better for such a State to suppress the liberty of the individual than to lose sovereignty and independence. A lesser good should always be sacrified to a greater good.

7. Nationalism or Patriotism.

Patriotism is the virtuous form of the sentiment of nationalism. The emergence of national States has been accompanied by the development of a sentiment of patriotism. It is a state of mind in which loyalty to one's national State is considered to be superior to all other loyalities,—loyalty to the family, clan or community. Patriotism breaks down self-centredness, clanishness, communalism, and provincialism. It

widens the sense of social unity. It deepens the civic sense and generates public spirit. The patriot loves his country ; so he is faithful to his civil and political duties. He exercises his franchise conscientiously and intelligently. He pays his taxes and obeys the laws. He does what he can to promote the welfare and increase the happiness of fellow-citizens. He is proud of his country, and jealous of its honour. He is ready to serve his country in war time, and lay down even his life for it. The sentiment of patriotism evokes the best powers of the individual, and raises him to a higher level. It calls forth courage, valour, heroism, and self-sacrifice. A true patriot is not a braggart or a bully. He respects other free nations. He is sympathetic towards other weak and undeveloped nations. He is alive to the virtues of other nations. He never thinks of aggrandizement of his own nation at the cost of other nations. He does not nourish imperialism. He may extend his patriotism to the whole of humanity, and develop it into internationalism.

But perverted patriotism is a great evil. Opposed to virtuous nationalism or patriotism is vicious nationalism or chauvinism. Chauvinism or jingoism is the vice that prompts a man to glorify his nation by running down and condemning other nations. His alone is God's chosen nation, and other nations are inferior to it. This is his firm conviction. He develops imperialism, and thinks that his government should exploit other nations, and the exploited nations have no rights. Thus perverted patriotism degenerates into aggressive nationalism and imperialism. It stirs up hostility against other nations, and causes war and consequent human suffering. Patriotism of powerful imperialist and self-aggrandizing nations has brought on more evil than good. But when it will be refined by enlightened self-interest and due regard for the rights and welfare of other nations, and transformed by the sense of brotherhood of mankind, it will produce immense good and happiness of humanity.

8. Colour or Race Prejudice.

Aggressive nationalism stirs up colour and race prejudice. The white imperialist nations of Europe and America harbour ill-will and hatred against the backward coloured peoples. The lynching of Negroes and red Indians among freedom-loving Americans is well-known. The white colonists in Africa persecute the native inhabitants brutally. The white peoples of Europe look down upon the coloured peoples of Asia and Africa, and exploit them thoroughly. Anti-Jewish campaign in Natzi Germany is partly due to race prejudice. Perverted nationalism is fostered and nourished by colour and race prejudice. It is essentially a moral evil. A nation may adopt all possible measures to maintain its culture and civilization and the purity of its race or races. But it ought not to harbour ill-will and hatred against other nations and races. Persons are ends in themselves ; the dignity of their personality ought to be respected ; they ought not to be treated as mere means. If they are treated as mere instruments of others' self-aggrandizement, they are themselves demoralized and demoralize their masters as well. The moral guilt recoils upon the heads of its perpetrators and avenges itself upon them.

9. Nationalism and Internationalism.

Internationalism is a natural extension of patriotism or nationalism. The true patriot who loves his own nation does not hate other nations. He does not harbour ill-will and hatred for other nations. He seeks to understand other nations and help them to understand his own. He knows that the people of other nations love their countries and have equal rights with the people of his own country. He believes that all nations have equal rights, hopes and aspirations. He believes that national rivalries, ill-will and wars are largely due to lack of mutual understanding and good-will. He believes that if all men were inspired by intelligent and enlightened patriotism, they would realize that the ultimate interests of their own nations could

only be realized in a world of international security, justice, and good-will. Internationalism is the culmination of enlightened patriotism. It is not the negation of nationalism. It is the fulfilment and perfection of nationalism. A perverted form of internationalism is cosmopolitanism which looks upon national patriotism as an outworn parochialism. True internationalism does not deny the claims of nationalism but extends its boundary to the whole of humanity.

10. Democracy or Dictatorship ?

The second Great War is said to be an ideological war between democracy and dictatorship. Democracy stands for the liberty of the individual. Dictatorship stands for absolute authority of the State. Democracy aims at maximum liberty of the individual. Dictatorship curtails practically all liberty of the individual. Democracy gives the liberty of thought and expression to the individual. Dictatorship suppresses the individual's liberty of thought and speech. It stands for the total regulation and regimentation of the life of the individual. Both aim at the greatest good and happiness of the individual. The one seeks to achieve it by the maximum liberty of the individual. The other seeks to realize it by maximum State interference.

From the moral point of view, true democracy is a better ideal than dictatorship, because it recognizes the person as an end-in-himself and respects the dignity of his personality. Dictatorship thwarts the will of a person for self-expression and self-development by coercion. It regulates his total life and reduces him to a soulless machine. Ruthless suppression of liberty of thought and expression and regimentation of thought and conduct of persons is subversive of the realization of personality, though it may contribute to their material prosperity and happiness. If dictatorship is the embodiment of the general will of the people—if the dictator voices the inarticulate aspirations of the people, its moral evil is considerably mitigated. But if the dictator does not represent the will of the people and

ruthlessly imposes his will upon them, his dictatorship is the worst possible moral evil which breaks the will of the people and reduces them to slaves. But if dictatorship is a moral evil, plutocracy in the garb of democracy is no less an evil. True democracy represents the sovereignty of personality based on political and economic freedom of persons enlightened by education. It is not sustained by capitalism, militarism, and imperialism. Many ideological clashes in the world will ultimately give rise to true democracy. Capitalistic democracy and imperialistic, communistic, or Fascist dictatorship are passing phases in the social and moral evolution of humanity.

QUESTIONS

Chapter I. Definition and Scope of Ethics.

1. Indicate the Scope of Ethics (7). 2. Describe the distinctive character of Ethics showing how it differs from the natural sciences (3). 3. How do you distinguish Science from Philosophy ? Do you consider Ethics to be a Science or a branch of Philosophy ? What arguments will you advance to defend your position ? (4). 4. "Ethics is a science of the Good". "Ethics is a science of the Right." What different points of view do these definitions imply ? Can you reconcile them into a single definition of Ethics ? (1). 5. 'The distinction between natural and normative science is one of those convenient distinctions which requires to be drawn at the outest, but which may be gradually superseded' (*Seth*). Explain and discuss this statement showing how far it is true of the nature of Ethics as a science (3, 5). [Ethics can never be regarded as a natural science. It is a normative science *par excellence.*] 6. 'In morals the achievement cannot be distinguished from the inner activity by which it is brought about' (*Mackenzie*).

Explain this statement and discuss why Ethics cannot be regarded as an Art. If Ethics is a Science, is it natural or normative? 7. Explain the Method of Ethics, and distinguish it from the Psychological, the Historical, and the Metaphysical Method. 8. Discuss the value of the Historical Method as applied to Ethics. 9. Distinguish between Facts and Values. With which of them is Ethics concerned? Can an ethical theory be constructed on the basis of the mere study of facts? [Ethics is not a natural science and is not concerned with facts. It is a normative science and deals with values.] 10. Explain the terms *positive*, *normative*, and *practical* as applied to Ethics as a science. Discuss the suitability of each. 11. Discuss the question whether the Good or the Right constitutes the fundamental notion of Ethics. 12. Explain :—(*a*) 'Ethics is *par excellence* the science of the ought'; (*b*) 'Ethics is the science of the ideal involved in human life. 13. 'Ethics is more closely related to Philosophy than to the natural sciences'. Explain the statement. 14. 'What are the main problems which Ethics undertakes to solve? 15. What is the practical value of the study of Ethics? What is the end of Ethics? 16. Examine the view that Ethics, though a normative science, is not to be regarded as a practical science. 17. Give a clear idea of the subject-matter with which Ethics deals. What is the good of the study of Ethics? 18. Is it true to say that the method of Ethics is philosophical rather than scientific? 19. A science is admittedly a systematic investigation into some aspect of Nature. What, then, is exactly meant when we say that Ethics is a Science?

Chapter II. Relation of Ethics to other Sciences.

1. Discuss the relation of Ethics to Politics. Is Ethics a branch of Politics, or Politics a branch of Ethics? Bring out the points of difference between Ethics and Politics (5). 2. Discuss the relation of Ethics to Theology. Is Morality the source of Religion, or Religion the source of Morality? Discuss. 3. Discuss the relation of Ethics to Metaphysics. Is Ethics based on Metaphysics? Or is Metaphysics based on Ethics? 4. Discuss the relation of Ethics to (*a*) Psychology and (*b*) Metaphysics 5. Discuss the relation of Ethics to (*a*) Economics, (*b*) Metaphysics and (*c*) Politics. 6. Indicate the relation of Ethics to Psychology. Is Ethics a part of Psychology? Discuss 7. Explain

the relation of Ethics to Sociology and bring out the difference between them. Can Ethics be regarded as a branch of Sociology? Clearly distinguish the method of Ethics from that of Sociology. 8. "Ethics is the science of the conduct of man as a social being". Explain the statement. 9. Discuss briefly the view that Ethics must either be based on or perfect itself in Religion. 10. Is there any relation of Ethics to Physical Sciences and Biology? Discuss. 11. Explain the relation of Ethics to Psychology, and show how far ethical theory has been affected by the results of psychological investigations. 12. Discuss the relation of Ethics to Politics, and explain the statement: 'The foundation of true criticism of political institutions must be laid in Ethics'.

Chapter III. The Psychological Basis of Ethics.

1. Distinguish between Moral and Non-moral actions. If a person is coerced to do wrong, is he morally responsible for the action? 2. Distinguish between Motive and Intention. 3. 'Conduct is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations (*Herbert Spencer*). Discuss the statement 4. Explain the biological, and the ethical significance of conduct and indicate the relation of conduct to character. 5. Explain the relation of character to circumstances (18). Can conduct be said to be determined by character and circumstances as co-ordinate factors? 6. 'Virtue is a kind of knowledge, as well as a kind of habit' (*Mackenzie*). Explain the statement. 7. 'The essential difference between man as a moral being and a mere animal is that the former has *desire* which he can *will* to satisfy, and the latter has mere *want*'. Clearly elucidate the statement, and bring out the factors that are involved in the formation of a moral *will*. Would you regard an act as voluntary if it is done in obedience to the law of a 'must'? 8. 'Desires are always for objects, and these objects are always relative to a self for whom they have value'. Discuss the statement, showing its bearing on the controversy as to the freedom of the will. 9. 'Conduct consists of human actions, and these are always regarded as the expressions of the character of the man whose actions they are'. Describe fully the relation between character and conduct indicated in the above extract. 10. Explain 'the Universe of Desire' and show its bearing on moral life. 11. Analyse desire. Is desire always and necessarily directed to pleasure? 12. Distinguish between Desire and Motive; Motive and Inten-

tion Determine the meaning of Motive in Ethics. 13. Determine the character of Volition, indicating its relation to Desire and Motive. 14. Distinguish human *desires* from organic *wants* and animal *appetites*? 15. What are Habits? What is their moral significance? Do they imply moral responsibility? 16. Analyse conduct and character, and discuss their ethical significance. 17. How far can habitual actions come under the scope of moral judgment? 18. Explain and illustrate the different forms of non-moral action and trace the growth of a voluntary action through its different stages. 19. What place in Ethics would you assign to unconscious actions? [They are beyond the control of volition, and therefore non-moral.] Are actions done from habit to be judged morally? 20. What is a non-moral action? (1). Has the subconscious life any moral significance for the individual? Is there any difference between approving a wrong action and doing it? [Choice differs from an overt action.] 21. Explain the essential characteristics of a voluntary action.

Chapter IV. Moral Consciousness.

1. Analyse Moral Consciousness, indicating the relative function of the elements which constitute it. 2. Discuss the question whether the moral consciousness is original or derived. [It is unique and underived. Moral quality is *sui generis*; it is neither pleasure, nor utility, nor truth, nor beauty.] 3. Distinguish between the intellectual and the emotional elements of Moral Consciousness, and discuss their relative importance. 4. Indicate the character and function of the Moral Sentiment. How is it related to the Moral Judgment? Can the moral sentiment be always taken as a sure test of the moral quality of an action? 5. What are the characteristics of Moral Sentiments? What is their function in moral life? Discuss their relation of Moral Judgments.

Chapter V. Moral Judgment.

1. Distinguish the moral from the non-moral. Characterize the precise object of moral judgment. 2. Discuss the moral value of the following:—(*a*) A surgical operation that fails and kills the patient: (*b*) A murder that is committed in the belief that it will bring political freedom to

the country. 3. Distinguish between Desire, Motive and Intention. Which of them determines the moral quality of an action? Fully explain this with reference to a concrete example. 4. Is Moral Judgment intuitive or inferential? What do you consider to be the proper object of Moral Judgment? Give a reasoned answer. 5. What is the proper object of Moral Judgment? Do you agree with the view that the end justifies the means? 6. Does the moral quality of an act inhere in the act regarded objectively, or in the subjective willing of the act, or in both? Discuss the question with reference to a concrete example. [Discuss whether the moral quality of an action depends on Motive and Intention, or on consequenee, or on both.] 7. Give an account of the nature of moral judgment, showing wherein it differs from logical judgment and æsthetic judgment. What are the objects with which it may be said to be concerned and to what controversy has this led? 8. Was St. Crispin right when he stole leather from the rich to make shoes for the poor? [The end does not justify the means.] 9. 'The fully developed moral judgment is always pronounced, directly or indirectly, on the character of the agent. It is never simply on a *thing* done, but always on a *person* doing, that we pass moral judgment'. Explain the statement. 10. Explain clearly what you understand by "*Moral Judgment*". How will you distinguish it from a *Logical* or *Æsthetic* judgment? Does the morality of an agent depend on his *acts* or his *intentions*? 11. Distinguish between Motive and Intention. Which of them determines the moral quality of an action? 12. What is the distinctive character of Moral Judgment? Do we judge an act by its Intention or Consequences? 13. Does the moral value of an act depend on the Motive or the Intention? Discuss. 14. What is the object of moral judgment? Discuss the various views bearing on the subject. 15. Characterize the object and process of moral judgment, and distinguish it from the object and process of prudential judgment. [Both are inferential. But moral judgment is passed on motive and intention as well as overt action and its foreseen consequences, while prudential judgment is passed on overt action and its foreseen consequences. The moral ideal is the standard of the former, while utility is the standard of the latter.] 16. How far do moral judgments apply to 'resolutions'? Discuss. 17. 'The nature of an action has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the

agent'. 'The morality of an action depends entirely upon the intention' (*Mill*). Explain the statements. Explain critically the nature of the object of moral judgment. 18. What is meant by the Subject of Moral Judgment ? Whom do we judge first, ourselves or others ? 19. Give an analysis of the moral judgment bringing out its proper object.

Chapter VI. Moral Concepts.

1. Distinguish between Duty and Merit. How are degrees of merit to be estimated ? 2. Distinguish between Duty, Merit, and Virtue. Are they connected in any way ? 3. Determine the conditions and limits of moral responsibility ? 4. Discuss the question whether the Good or the Right constitutes the fundamental notion of Ethics. 5. Distinguish between Right and Duty. Duty and Virtue, Merit and Demerit, and Merit and Virtue. 6. Show how Freedom and Necessity both are essential to morals. 7. What is the nature of Freedom of the Will which is presupposed by Responsibility ? Is it liberty of indifference or self-determinism ? 8. Distinguish between Subjective Rightness and Objective Rightness. Is the Subjectively Right always Objectively Right ? Discuss. 9. Are all actions Subjectively Right or Objectively Right ? 10. Distinguish between the Right and the Good, the Good and the Highest Good. 11. Analyse the concept of moral responsibility. What are the circumstances that exempt a person from the fulfilment of normal social obligations ? 12. Analyse the consciousness of duty, and distinguish between 'obligation' and 'right', and 'virtue' and 'duty' as moral categories. 13. Write short notes on : Duty, Right, Virtue, Merit.

Chapter VII. Origin and Growth of Moral Consciousness.

1. What do you understand by the Evolution of Conduct ? Trace the development of Moral Consciousness through different stages. 2. What are the biological factors in the evolution of moral consciousness ? 3. What are the rationalizing factors in the growth of moral consciousness ? 4. What are the socializing factors in the growth of moral consciousness ? 5. Describe the nature of Custom and show how it governs the early group morality. Account for the origin of custom. Estimate the value of customary morality 6. Examine

the part played by custom in the development of the moral life of (*a*) an individual, and (*b*) a people. 7. Account for the transition from Group Morality to Personal morality. 8. How do we pass from Custom to Conscience as the standard of morality ?

Chapter VIII. External Law as the Moral Standard.

1. Estimate the relative values of the theories which take Divine Law and Political Law as the moral standard. 2. 'Moral obligation is founded on the belief that virtue is enjoyed by the command of God'. Explain and discuss. 3. Classify the legal theories of the standard of morality, and examine their validity. 4. What do you understand by moral standards ? Explain them briefly, and distinguish between Jural Ethics and Teleological Ethics. 5. Consider the significance of *Law* in Ethics, and explain the different forms in which it has been conceived as a standard of conduct. 6. Discuss the view of Morality in which Law is the dominant conception. What are its defects and their remedy ? 7. Give a brief account of the development of the moral law in the life of the individual, describing the various stages through which it passes. 8. Discuss the relative merits of the various conceptions of the Moral Law (as the Law of the Tribe, the Law of God, etc.).

Chapter IX. Hedonism.

1. How does Psychological Hedonism differ from Ethical Hedonism ? Is there any logical connection between them ? Give a critical estimate of Psychological Hedonism. 2. Explain clearly the respective claims of Egoistic and Altruistic Hedonism. Are the two capable of reconciliation ? 3. Give an outline of J. S. Mill's arguments for (*a*) Psychological Hedonism, (*b*) Ethical Hedonism, (*c*) Altruistic Hedonism, (*d*) Quality of Pleasures. Examine the soundness of his arguments. 4. In what respects is Mill's Utilitarianism an improvement on earlier forms of Hedonism ? 5. Critically consider the theory of Hedonism, emphasizing the chief distinction in the theories of Bentham and J. S. Mill. 6. Examine the doctrine of Psychological Hedonism. Does it necessarily lead to Ethical Hedonism ? What are the elements of truth in Psychological Hedonism ? 7. How did J. S. Mill attempt to make utilitarian Ethics consistent with hedonistic psychology ? [Show how Mill bases

his Ethical Hedonism and Altruistic Hedonism on Psychological Hedonism]. 8. What is the ultimate foundation of the Utilitarian Morality according to J. S. Mill? How does he differ from Bentham in this respect? 9. Briefly state J. S. Mill's position regarding qualitative differences in pleasures. Show the significance of this position. 10. Examine the difficulty of passing from the individual pleasure to the universal pleasure. Test the so-called proof of Utilitaranism. 11. How does the admission of J. S. Mill that some forms of pleasure are intrinsically preferable to others affect the doctrine of Utilitarianism? 12. Explain clearly what you understand by the expression "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". How far is the pursuit of this end consistent with the principle that every person desires his own happiness? 13. Discuss the various objections against Ethical Hedonism. 14. Is Hedonism identical with Utilitarianism? Give a critical estimate of the Utilitarianism of J. S. Mill. [Utilitarianism is Altruistic Hedonism. There is Egoistic Hedonism which is not Utilitarianism.] 15. Show how Bentham bases his Altruistic Hedonism on Psychological Hedonism. What does he understand by dimensions of pleasure? Critically examine Bentham's ethical doctrine. 16. Examine the psychological and metaphysical presuppositions on which Hedonism is based. Can an Altruistic system be erected on Hedonistic basis? 17. Write short notes on the following :—(a) Paradox of Hedonism; (b) Egoistic Hedonism; (c) Universalistic Hedonism; (d) Kinds of Pleasure; (e) External and Internal Sanctions of Morality; (f) 'The amount of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry'. 18. What are the External Sanctions of Morality? What is their function in moral life? Is J. S. Mill justified in introducing the Internal Sanction of Morality? 19. Discuss how far the principle of summation of pleasures is fundamental to Utilitarianism. [Discuss hedonistic calculus according to Bentham and J. S. Mill]. 20. What improvement is made by J. S. Mill upon Bentham's Utilitarianism? Mill's refined Utilitarianism is said to be a departure from the hedonistic standpoint. Discuss. 21. Show how Bentham and J. S. Mill attempt to pass from Egoism to Altruism. Is it possible to do so on the basis of Hedonism? 22. How does J. S. Mill defend Hedonism against the charges of (a) Selfishness, and (b) Sensuality? How far does he succeed in his attempt? 23. Examine critically Mill's doctrine of 'gradation of pleasure' in respect of quality. Is such gradation

consistent with his fundamental ethical position? 24. Explain and examine the theory that pleasure is the sole and ultimate end of action. [Give general criticism of Hedonism.] 25. Discuss the merits and demerits of Hedonism as a standard of moral life. 26. Distinguish between Egoistic and Altruistic Hedonism. Which of them seems to you to be the more consistent ethical theory? 27. Give a brief historical account of the development of the Utilitarianism in England. [Give the views of Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick.] 28. How does Mill pass from egoistic Hedonism to Utilitarianism? Is he justified in doing so? 29. Distinguish between Egoism and Altruism. Is it possible to effect a conciliation between the two attitudes from the hedonistic standpoint? 30. Would you distinguish between the greatest (quantity) and the highest (quality) pleasure? If so, on what grounds? 31. Are there 'kinds of pleasure? Discuss the question, with special reference to Mill's view. 32. Does Pleasure admit of qualitative distinction? Discuss the question. 33. Define Hedonism, and show the difficulties, if any, in passing from egoistic hedonism to altruistic hedonism. 34. Give your reasoned estimate of Hedonism as a moral theory. 35. Define Utilitarianism and give a comparative estimate of the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. 36. 'Altruism is only magnified Egoism'. A philanthropist is therefore to be denounced as an egoist.' Do you agree? Discuss.

Chapter X. Evolutionary Hedonism.

1. In what ways has the theory of evolution brought to bear on Ethical problems? Mention the chief points of the evolutionary theory of Ethics. 2. How far does evolutionary Ethics provide us with a moral standard? Is Herbert Spencer's standard of Absolute Ethics attainable? 3. What contributions has the theory of Evolution made towards the solution of Ethical problems? Estimate their value. 4. In what respects has the 'organic view of society' corrected and influenced Ethical ideals? 5. Discuss the relation of the Individual to Society. In what sense, and to what extent, is the conception of an organism applicable to human society? 6. What is the difference between the evolutionist criterion of morality, and the utilitarian? In what respects does the theory of evolution throw a new light on the nature of the moral law? 7. What are the main difficulties in applying the general theory of Evolution

to the problems of Ethics ? What ethical criterion does the evolutionist set up in place of utilitarianism ? 8. "Conduct is the continuous adjustment of the internal relations to external relations" (*Herbert Spencer*). Discuss this statement, pointing out the application of Evolution to morals. Is the theory of Evolution consistent in upholding *pleasure* as the criterion of good conduct. 9. What account does Evolutionary theory as applied to Ethics give of the genesis of conscience ? Do you think it possible to conserve the objective character of the authority of conscience on the basis of this theory ? [See the genesis of moral consciousness and] nature of conscience. 10. What explanation is given by Evolutional Hedonism of—(*a*) the sense of moral obligation ; (*b*) the relation between Egoism and Altruism ? 11. Write short notes on the following :—(*a*) Evolution as applied to morals ; (*b*) Absolute Ethics ; (*c*) Social organism ; (*d*) Natural selection in morals. 12. State and examine the ethical doctrine of Herbert Spencer. 13. How has the Utilitarianism of Bentham been modified by J. S. Mill and that of Mill by Herbert Spencer. 14. 'We may sum up the defects of Hedonism by saying that it has the opposite fault to that which we found in the system of Kant' (*Mackenzie*). Discuss this view. [Kant's Rationalism gives the mere *form* of morality or the moral law. But Hedonism gives the mere *matter* of morality or satisfaction of desires or pleasure. It does not give the *form* of morality.] 15. How does Evolutionary Hedonism differ from Empirical Hedonism ? Does it offer better solution of the ethical problem ?

Chapter XI. Rational Utilitarianism.

1. Compare the rational hedonism of Sidgwick with the empirical hedonism of Mill. How does the former avoid the faults of the latter ? 2. Show how Sidgwick combines Hedonism with Rationalism. How far does he succeed in reconciling the two with each other ? 3. State Sidgwick's doctrine of Rational Utilitarianism. Show how Sidgwick is influenced by Butler and Kant. Does Sidgwick undermine hedonism when he tries to establish it on the foundation of reason ? Discuss. 4. Trace the development of Hedonism from Bentham to Sidgwick. [Discuss Bentham and Mill's Utilitarianism, Spencer's Evolutionary Hedonism, and Sidgwick's Rational Utilitarianism.] 5. Discuss how the

progress of Hedonism through Bentham, Mill, Spencer, and Sidgwick is an illustration of the gradual surrender of the Hedonistic principle. 6. Can Hedonism rightly pass from Egoism to Altruism? Discuss. 7. Briefly trace the theory of Hedonism through the several stages of its growth.

Chapter XII. Intuitionism.

1. When conscience is referred to as the fundamental principle of morals, we must not understand it to mean the conscience of this or that individual. Explain what is your view of the proper attitude of the individual towards the rules of his community. 2. Is diversity of moral judgments compatible with Intuitionism, and is unanimity of such judgments consistent with Hedonism? 3. Discriminate between the psychological and ethical aspects of the Springs of Action, and expound the doctrine of their ethical gradation. 4. Classify the Springs of Action and determine their mutual relation. 5. Estimate the value of Intuitionism as a school of ethical thought. 6. Can the doctrine of Moral Sense provide an adequate basis for a standard of conduct which is universal and authoritative? 7. Give a critical exposition of the characteristic historical forms of Intuitionism. [Discuss (1) the Moral Sense theory, (2) the Æsthetic Sense theory (3) the Dianœtic theory. 8. Explain clearly what you mean by Intuition in Ethics. Discuss the statement: 'If every man cites his own conscience, it is futile to talk about Objective Morality.' [Intuitionism is inconsistent with divorsity of moral judgments.] 9. Give some account of the "Moral Sense" theory of Hutcheson and Shaftesbury. Is it possible to base morality on feeling? 10. Outline the leading features of Intuitionism as an ethical theory, noticing the difficulties involved in it. 11. Is diversity of moral judgments consistent with Intuitionism? Give reasons for your answer. 12. Give a classification of the springs of action on a psychological basis. Estimate the value of Martineau's ethical classification of the springs of action.

Chapter XIII. Rationalism.

1. Compare Kant's Categorical Imperative with the Utilitarian principle of conduct; and discuss Kant's conception of humanity as a 'kingdom of ends.' 2. Discuss the Categorical Imperative of Kant. How far does it help us in determination of our duties? 3. Discuss the principle of 'duty

for duty's sake'. 4. 'Formulate Kant's doctrine of the Categorical Imperative. Can particular duties be deduced from it? What are the elements of truth in Kant's doctrine? 5. 'There is nothing in this world or out of it that can be called good without qualification except a good will.' (Kant). Discuss this statement pointing out its logical implications in the ethics of Kant. Kant's Ethics has been described both as too *formal* and as too *stringent*. Critically consider this view and estimate the importance of the *Kantian principle* in moral life. 7. Kant's ethical theory has been criticized as being too *formal*. Discuss and illustrate this criticism. 8. State and explain Kant's Categorical Imperative. What is its practical value? 9. Explain the nature of the Moral Law. Distinguish it from the Law of Nature and the Political Law. Can the Moral Law be described as of the nature of a Categorical Imperative? 10. Give a critical exposition of the characteristic historical forms of extreme Rationalism. 11. Give a critical exposition of Kant's view of the Moral Reason. It has been said that 'the idea of a Categorical Imperative lands us in sheer emptiness'. Discuss this proposition. 12. What is the meaning of Kant's dictum 'you ought and therefore you can'? [See Postulates of Morality.(Ch. XXIX)]. 13. 'Kant's moral law is negative precept; it is a mere principle of self-consistency'. Explain the statement. 14. Write short notes on the following:—(*a*) Paradox of Asceticism (*b*)' Kant's composite theory of the End (Complete Good); (*c*) Kingdom of Ends; (*d*) Autonomy of Will; (*e*) Categorical Imperative; (*f*) Postulates of Morality; 15. 'Kant's moral theory does not justify any doctrine of the *good*: it is a theory of *duty* for duty's sake'. Elucidate the statement. 16. State briefly Kant's ethical theory. How far is the charge of Formalism levelled against Kant's theory valid? Do you agree with the statement: 'Kant may be taken, when somewhat liberally interpreted, is one of our safest guides in morals'? (*Mackenzie*). 17. Compare the ethical views of Mill (Ch. IX) and Kant. 18. Mention the different ways in which Kant formulated his Categorical Imperative and the aspects of moral life brought by them. Maxims of Morality).

Chapter XIV. Perfectionism: Eudæmonism: The Ethics of Personality.

1. Discuss 'Self-realization' as a conscious ethical end. Show that the ideals of self-realization and self-sacrifice are not

inconsistent, if the meaning of the 'Self' is correctly understood. 2. What is meant by self-realization as a moral end? Discuss the relation between self-realization and self-sacrifice. 3. How does the 'Ethics of Self-realization reconcile Hedonism with Rationalism, and Egoism with Altruism? 4. 'We can realize the true self or the complete good only by realizing social ends. We must realize ourselves by sacrificing ourselves.' (*Mackenzie*). Explain the above statement. 5. 'As the watchword of Hedonism may be said to be self-gratification, and as that of Rationalism is apt to be self-sacrifice, so the watchword of Eudæmonism may be said to be self-realization.' (*Seth*). Explain this fully. 6. What is Self-realization, and in what sense can it be described as synthesis of Rationalism and Hedonism? 7. What is the significance of the expressions (*a*) *Be a person* and (*b*) *Die to live?* Consider this in relation to the conception of self-realization as an ethical principle. 8. Are 'pleasure' and 'the moral life' antagonistic to each other? Show clearly the relation between the two, and indicate the mistaken views which have been held regarding their relationship. 9. 'Every action which promotes the general good also most promotes the agent's own good'. Discuss the statement with reference to the problem of self-realization. 10. 'Which self is to be realized? Hedonism answers: The sentient self; Rationalism answers: The rational self; Eudæmonism, the total self, rational and sentient' (*Seth*). Explain the statement. 11. How does Eudæmonism account for moral obligation? What is the nature of conscience according to the theory? 12. Write short notes on the following: (*a*) My Station and its Duties; (*b*) Aristotle's definition of Virtue; (*c*) Butler's theory of conscience and its relation to Self-love and Benevolence; (*d*) Plato's theory of Justice. 13. 'The realization of human personality means its realization in Society'. Fully explain this. 14. Distinguish between Hedonism and Eudæmonism, and estimate their relative values as moral theories. 15. Fully expound the moral theory according to which the highest good lies in the realization of the highest self. 16. Show how the question as to the nature of the Ethical End is connected with the question as to the nature of the Self. 17. 'Each of the various ethical theories has contributed some valuable element to the whole of ethical thought'. Discuss the statement. 18. 'Perfectionism embodies all the elements of truth contained in other systems of morality'. Explain the statement.

Define Personality, and give a simple exposition of the Ethics of Personality. 20. What did Green mean by the spiritual Principle in nature ? How did he relate it to the spiritual principle in man ? 21. State the main features of the ethical theory which looks upon the moral standard as Self-realization. 22. Discuss the leading ethical standards. Point out any special excellence that in your opinion characterizes them. 23. Explain the moral significance of the following :—'Know thyself' ; (*b*) 'Whosoever will seek to save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it.' 24. Write short notes on (*a*) Self-realization, (*b*) Eudæmonism, (*c*) Self-sacrifice. 25. Examine the merits of Eudæmonism as a moral theory. 26. Distinguish between Egoism and Altruism. Is it possible to effect a conciliation between their rival claims ?

Chapter XV. The Standard as Value.

1. Is Moral Value extrinsic or intrinsic in character ? Is it commensurate with other values ? 2. Expound the idea of Value in Ethics, and point out how all ethical judgments are judgments of value In this connection bring out fully the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values, and show how in all types of ethical theory the chief Good belongs to the former category. 3. Distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic values and show their relation to each other. what do you mean by commensurability of values ? What are the principles of the organization of values ? 4. Show how the Highest Good consists in the realization of extrinsic and intrinsic values in their proper relation to one another. Explain the relation of self-realization to realization of values. 5. What is meant by Intrinsic Value ? Examine the view that Pleasure is the sole constituent of Intrinsic Value. (Ch. IX). 6. Write short notes on the following :—(*a*) Intrinsic Value ; (*b*) Commensurability of Values ; (*c*) Standard as Value : (*d*) The Highest Good.

Chapter XVI. Nietzsche : Ethics of Will-to-power.

1. 'It is the function of philosophy to transform all values, to create new values, and a new civilization.' (*Nietzsche*). Estimate the truth of this statement through a brief and critical exposition of the *newness* in Nietzsche's ethical philosophy. Has he really built a new morality or only demolished the old ? 2. Explain the ethical significance of Nietzsche's ideal of

the Superman. 3. Comment on (*a*) the Superman ; (*b*) Trans-valuation of values ; (*c*) Morality of Masters ; (*d*) the will-to-Power. 4. Comment on the following :—'Man is to be surpassed. He is a bridge and not the goal'. (*Nietzsche*). [Discuss Nietzsche's ideal of the Superman].

Chapter XVII. Gandhi : Ethics of Ahimsa.

1. Explain the ethical significance of Gandhi's principles of *Ahimsa* (Non-violence) and fasting. 2. Discuss the moral aspect of Non-violence as a rule of conduct. Write a short note on Ahimsa. 3. Compare the ethical views of Nietzsche and Gandhi. 4. 'Gandhi's principles of *Satyagraha* and *Non-violence* are in spirit ethical.' Bring out the ethical significance of these two principles, and discuss their validity in the moral life of the individual and the society. How would you judge them in the light of the moral standards of Hedonism, Evolution, and self-realization ? [Gandhi's doctrine is anti-hedonistic and tends towards asceticism. It is against Evolutionary ethics of Naturalism. It is akin to ethics of self-realization.] 5. Discuss how far the good life must be a social life, with particular reference to the teachings of Gandhi and Nietzsche. Is there any purely *individual good* which rises far superior to the merely *social good ?* 6. Give your estimate of non-violence as a moral ideal.

Chapter XVIII. The Individual and Society.

1. In what respects has 'the organic view of society' corrected and influenced Ethical Ideas ? 2. 'While it is true that the life of an individual is relative throughout to the social unity to which he belongs, it is none the less true that it is in the personality of individuals that the social unity is realized' (*Mackenzie*). State the problem raised by the conflicting claims of Individualism and Socialism and indicate the lines on which you would attempt a solution of its difficulties. 3. Discuss the relation of the Individual to Society. In what sense and to what extent is the analogy of an organism applicable to human society ? 4. Dwell on the following points : (*a*) the relation between the Individual and Society ; (*b*) the facts supporting this conception ; (*c*) the sense in which the end is to be regarded as a personal one. 5. Discuss the relation between Society and Individual, and in the light of this discussion, examine the statement :

"The individual cannot be true to his own personality without being true to the personality of all whom his conduct in any way affects' (*Seth*). 6. How far does the conception of a social organism adjust the respective claims of the individual and society ? 7. What is your own view of the relation of the individual to society. How would you, according to this view, reconcile the conflicting claims of egoism and altruism ? 8. State the problem raised by the apparently conflicting claims of Individualism and Socialism, and indicate the lines on which you would attempt a solution of it. 9. As the individual apart from society is an unreal abstraction, so is society apart from the individual. Examine the position.

Chapter XIX. Moral Institutions.

1. Attempts have been made to destroy the family and the state. Discuss the ethical merits and demerits of such attempts. 2. Estimate the value of Social Institutions in the moral life of an individual. 3. Indicate the place of the family in individual and social morals, and discuss the view that family as an ethical institution should be abolished. (Ch. XXX). 4. Describe certain Social Institutions favouring the growth of morality.

Chapter XX. Rights and Duties.

1. What is the relation of rights to duties ? 2. Write short notes on the following :—(*a*) Casuistry ; (*b*) Duties of Perfect and Imperfect Obligation ; (*c*) Conflict of Duties ; (*d*) My Station and its Duties. (Ch. XIV.) 3. Briefly estimate the moral justification of Private Property. 4 Point out the place of rights and obligations in the relation of individual and society, and critically estimate the distinction between duties of perfect obligation and duties of imperfect obligation. 5 What do you understand by Conflict of Duties ? How should an individual act in such a case ? 6. What do you mean by a Conflict of Duties ? Give an example of it. Can each of the conflicting elements in such a case be properly called a duty ? What is the ethical solution for such a conflict ? 7. 'Casuistry consists in the effort to interpret the precise meaning of the commandments and to explain which is to give way when a conflict arises' (*Mackenzie*). Is Casuistry the goal of ethical investigation ? Discuss the question fully, mentioning what has been said for and against it. 8. Estimate the moral value of

(*a*) Suicide, (*b*) Private Property, (*c*) Untouchability. 9. How far is the possession of private property essential to man's moral development? Point out the moral losses that would result from the abolition of private ownership? 10. Distinguish between (*a*) legal right and moral right (*b*) legal obligation and moral obligation. It may not be always right to do what one has a right to do. Explain and discuss. 11. What is your view of the relation of rights to obligations? 12. Explain the meaning of the term 'right'. Would you concede Shylock's right to the pound of flesh according to the terms of his contract with Antonio? If not, why not? 13. Is a person justified in putting an end to his own life? Give reasons for your answer.

Chapter XXI. Virtues.

1. What is the relation of Duties to Virtues? Give your own estimate of the Platonic classification of Virtues 2. Discuss the statement:—'Virtue is a mean between two extremes. This mean, however, is no absolute and mathematical mean, the same for all individuals, but is relative to persons and circumstances. 3. What is meant by Cardinal Virtues? Discuss the statement. 'The theory of Cardinal Virtues grows out of the psychological analysis of human nature. 4. Write a brief essay on one of the so-called Cardinal Virtues, say Courage or Temperance showing what it originally meant and how its meaning has developed with the progress of morality. 5. Describe the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks. How far can these be harmonized? 6. Explain the nature of Virtue as relative to the commandments, the social functions, and the states of society. How can the old Greek classification of the virtues be acceptable with but slight modifications? 7. Discuss how far the maintenance of Justice is an ethical duty for the individual. 8. 'Duty' and 'Virtue' are terms which are often mentioned in connection with Ethics. What do they mean? What place have they in the system which is commonly called 'Idealism'? 9. Is it possible to classify the virtues from the ethical standpoint? What principles must be followed in attempting such a task? How far is the Platonic classification of virtues suitable to the circumstances of the modern times? 10. Indicate the relation of Virtue to Knowledge. 11. Explain the statement: 'Virtue is a kind of knowledge as well as a kind of habit' (*Mackenzie*). 12. Comment on the

following :—(a) 'Virtue is one, but the forms of vice are innumerable'. (b) 'The man who seeks to have a higher morality than that of his world is on the threshold of immorality' 13. Write short notes on the following :—(a) Aristotle's conception of Virtue ; (b) Cardinal virtues ; (c) Ethos : (d) Duty and Virtue ; (e) Socratic conception of Virtue. 14. Distinguish between Virtue and Prudence (Ch. XXII. Is Prudence the same as Wisdom ? (Ch. XXII.). 15. 'The virtues which it is desirable, for human beings to cultivate vary considerably with different times and places.' Explain and examine.

Chapter XXII. Conscience.

1. Analyse the nature of conscience. Is it present in ready-made form in all persons ? Give reasons for your answer. 2. Define conscience and consider how far it is reliable as a faculty of moral judgment. 3. Determine the nature of the moral faculty and its place in the human constitution. Is there any distinction between conscience and the moral faculty ? 4. 'An erring conscience is a chimera.' Discuss. Consider how far it is infallible as a faculty of moral judgment. 5. Discuss the different views of conscience, and give your own view with reasons. 6. Carefully distinguish the different functions attributed to conscience, when it is asserted by some that it is infallible, and by others that it can be educated. 7. Expound the genesis of Conscience from the standpoint of intuitional and utilitarian schools of thought, and discuss its validity as a standard of conduct. Is it true to say that 'an erring conscience is a chimera' ? 8. 'Ethical doctrine must tell why, if the devil's conscience approves of the devil's acts, as it well may do, the devil's conscience may nevertheless be in the wrong.' Discuss the statement. How does Butler's theory of conscience fare in the light of this criticism ? 9. 'We must hope that a state of sentiment will grow up, such that the very thought of cheating the community or performing public duties slackly will be abhorrent to the moral sense of the average man.' Discuss this statement, pointing out how the human conscience may be developed. Does such development mean that this standard is only a relative one ? 10. What is Conscience ? How is Conscience interpreted from the standpoint of evolutionary ethics ? 11. Distinguish between Conscience and Prudence, and determine their relative place in the human constitution. What theory identifies the two with each other ? 12. Discuss the relation of Conscience

to the Social System. 13. Is there any place for Conscience as distinguished from Prudence in a system of Hedonism? 14. What is Conscience? Explain the nature and place of Conscience in the human constitution according to Butler.

Chapter XXIII. Moral Authority.

1. Explain critically the different kinds of authority of the moral standard. Discuss the following :—'The authority, indeed, must come home to us with a far more absolute power, where we recognize that it is our own law, than when we regard it as an alien force' (*Mackenzie*). 2. Discuss carefully the theories which admit but mistake moral obligation. 3. Determine the nature and ground of Moral Obligation. Is it possible to transcend it? 4. Discuss how far Hedonism in any of its forms can be regarded as furnishing an adequate basis for moral obligation. 5. Discuss the various theories of the source of moral obligation. What do you think to be the real basis of moral obligation? 6. What is the explanation given of moral obligation by Evolutionary Hedonism? Is it sound? 7. What is meant by Moral Obligation? 'Moral obligation implies belief in a permanent spiritual self which is really the cause of its own actions'. Discuss the statement. 8. Compare Martineau's theory of Moral Obligation with the Perfectionist account of it. 9. What is your own theory of moral obligation? Why do you prefer it? 10. Why am I morally obliged to do what I perceive to be right? Briefly explain the different views held on the subject. 11. Analyse the consciousness of moral obligation. Do you agree with the view that the sense of obligation is an off-shoot of the experience of social discipline?

Chapter XXIV. Moral Sanctions.

1. What do you understand by 'Moral Sanction'? Explain Bentham's classification of Moral Sanctions, and the improvement introduced into it by Mill. 2. Which has a greater authority in morals, a 'must' or an 'ought'? In this connection explain Bentham's sanctions as forms of a 'must', and show how Mill tries to improve upon them. 3. Discuss the basis of moral obligation. (Ch. XXIII). Explain, in this connection, the values, if any, of external and internal sanctions. 4. What, according to Utilitarianism, is the Internal Sanction of Morality? Is Utilitarianism justified in setting up such a sanction? 5. What are the external Sanctions of

Morality ? What is their function in moral life ? Is Mill justified in introducing the internal Sanction of Morality ? 6. What are Moral Sanctions ? How is Moral Obligation related to Moral Sanctions ? Is moral obligation possible in isolation from society and independently of the mediation of an objective code of duties ? (Ch. XXIII). 7. What do you understand by Moral Sanctions ? Examine the views of Bentham and J. S. Mill in this connection, and explain the end served by these sanctions.

Chapter XXV. Theories of Punishment.

1. What is the ethical justification for the punishment of criminals ? 2 What is *moral evil*, and how can *sin* and *crime* be embraced under it ? Discuss the validity of the methods which have so far been suggested for the eradication of moral evil from human nature. Can forgiveness be one of these methods ? 3. What is the ethical basis of punishment ? Discuss the ethical merits and demerits of imprisonment and hanging as forms of punishment 4. Is it possible to justify the infliction of punishment on ethical grounds ? Explain the following statement fully : 'We may regard the retributive theory, then, when thus understood, as the most satisfactory of all theories of punishment' (*Mackenzie*). (8). 5. Is capital punishment in keeping with the moral ideal ? 6. Discuss the ethical justification of capital punishment 7. Critically examine the Deterrent, Reformative and Retributive theories of Punishment. Which of them is valid, and why ? 8. 'Punishment is the negation of the wrong by the assertion of the right'. Discuss What part has punishment played in the education of the human race ? 9. Do you agree with the view that the end justifies the means ? Discuss the question with special reference to the punishment of criminals. [See the Deterrent theory.] 10. Distinguish between Natural Evil and Moral Evil, and between Moral Evil and Error, giving examples of each. Can a person be morally responsible for his Errors ? Give your reason with examples. 11. Distinguish between Sin and Error. Is it a sin or an error on the part of a young man to neglect his education ? [It is a sin.] 12. Explain the meaning and purpose of punishment, and its relation to moral laws, giving differences of opinion and reasons for them. 13. Give a critical account of the retributive theory of punishment. 14. Discuss the retributive theory of punishment with special reference to the question of capital punishment.

Chapter XXVI. Moral Progress.

1. Can the moral be evolved out of the non-moral ? Discuss. Briefly indicate the chief directions in which there has been moral progress. 2. Indicate the character and course of moral progress. Is it consistent with the Intuitional theory of morals ? (Ch. XII). 3. Write a brief essay on the nature of Moral Progress and its relation to the moral ideal. 4. 'If in some respects our actions seem more trustworthy and based on broader and reasonable principles, in other respects we seem to have grown more selfish and dishonest than men were before' (*Mackenzie*). Show by a critical interpretation of this statement what measure of moral progress we have attained. 5. Have we any right to think that the world is getting morally better ? What ethical theory seems to be best fitted to account for moral progress ? [The theory of self-realization or realization of a rational universe can account for moral progress satisfactorily.] 6. What do you understand by Moral Progress ? Mention the criteria of Moral Progress. 7. Explain the statement : 'A manifestation of the law of moral progress is found in the gradual subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues' (*Seth*). 8. Explain the statement : The fundamental law of moral progress is the gradual discovery of the individual' (*Seth*). 9. What are the conditions of Moral Progress ? Is it determined by a development of moral consciousness or by a change in the social environment ? 10. How is moral progress related to changes in the economic life of a people ?

Chapter XXVII. Ethical Functions of the State.

1. 'The State exists for the sake of the person, not the person for the sake of the State (*Seth*). Explain the statement. How is the existence of the State justified ethically, and what are its ethical functions ? 2. Discuss the value of the State as an ethical institution (Ch. XIX). Herbert Spencer thinks that the only legitimate function of the State is the police function—protecting citizens from mutual aggression. Do you agree with him ?

Chapter XXVIII. International Morality

1. 'Civilized nations are now so interdependent that one nation cannot suffer without bringing suffering upon the rest ; and that one cannot rise in the scale of culture unless the others also are raised.' (*Stuart*). Discuss this statement from

the standpoint of international morality, pointing out whether the standards of judging conduct should vary when we pass from morals between individuals to those between nations. 2 Write short notes on International Morality. 3. What is meant by International Morality? Nations, it is affirmed, have no philanthropy; the only principle of action they recognize is the principle of self-interest. If this be so, can we talk of international morality at all?

Chapter XXIX. Postulates of Morality

1. 'In willing I am both free and determined; *determined* because my volition is not uncaused; *free* because the immediate causal determinants of my volition are within my own consciousness.' Discuss this, and consider how far freedom, in this sense, is of ethical importance. 2. 'Freedom of the will is a postulate of Moral Judgment.' Examine this view in the light of arguments advanced by Determinists against it, and show in what sense and to what extent moral conduct must be both free and determined. 3. 'Since a man of character is bound by the law of his character, a free man must be without character.' Examine this statement, bringing out the true meaning and relation of *character* and *freedom*. Can a man be ethically both *free* and *bound*? 4. What is the meaning of Kant's dictum 'you ought, and therefore you can'. It has been said that the idea of self-determination combines the Libertarian and Determinist theories. Examine this view. 5. Examine the validity of the arguments which are advanced by the Determinist against Freedom of the Will. 6. Show how Freedom and Necessity both are essential to morals. (Ch. VI. 7 Discuss the conflicting claims of Free Will and Determinism, and show how they can be reconciled. 8. Is Determinism or Indeterminism consistent with responsibility? Discuss, what kind of freedom is presupposed by responsibility? (Ch. VI.). 9. What arguments are advanced by Determinism, Indeterminism, Self-determinism in favour of their positions? Examine their validity, and give your view with reasons. 10. Explain the following:—(*a*) The Moral Law implies a law-giver; (*b*) 'Ought' implies 'Can'. 11. 'Some belief in God and Immortality is postulated by the moral attitude' (*Mackenzie*). Explain the statement. 12. Discuss the nature of God and Immortality of the finite self implied by morality. What are the moral arguments for the existence of God and Immortality of the Soul? 13. Show how morality implies a Theistic constitution of the Universe. Explain the

attitude of Nietzsche and Gandhi towards this problem. (Ch. XVI & XVII). 14. Show how the reality of evil and the possibility of moral progress through the conquest of evil are implied by morality. 15. Immortality is taken as one of the implications of moral life. What is meant by immortality here.

Chapter XXX. Problem of Social Ethics.

1. Discuss the following :—(a) Whether women should be allowed equal opportunities of service with men ; (b) Whether the existence of communal or sectarian institutions is morally justifiable ; (c) Whether an individual should co-operate with social groups with which he is not in complete agreement ; (d) Whether professional begging is an evil. 2. Write critical notes on the following :—Whether divorce is a moral evil or a cure of moral evils ; (b) Whether charity is essentially an evil ; (c) Whether woman should let careers interfere with motherhood. 3. Estimate the moral value of (a) Untouchability ; (b) Divorce ; (c) Compulsory Widowhood for the sake of sexual purity ; (d) Abolition of marriage. 4. Discuss the ethical merits and demerits of the attempt to abolish the family as a social institution. Can the State take adequate care of the children and give them proper education ? 5. Discuss the ethical value of marriage as a condition of the self-realization of man and woman.

Chapter XXXI. Problem of Political Ethics.

1. Can the State do without force ? Can it be based upon non-violence ? Can the State be superseded by a social organization ? Discuss. (XXVII). 3. Discuss the ethical value of (a) war, (b) racialism, (c) colour prejudice, (d) conscription. 4. Write critical notes on the following :—(a) Whether patriotism is capable of more evil than good ; (b) Whether colour and race prejudice is a moral evil ; (c) Whether war for defending the independence of one's country or liberating one's country from domination by a foreign power is morally justifiable. 5. Discuss the comparative merits and demerits of Democracy and Dictatorship as political ideals. 6. Is an individual morally justified in revolting against the State ? Discuss. 7. Discuss the ethical merits and demerits of (a) Imperialism ; (b) Cosmopolitanism ; (c) Patriotism ; (d) Pacifism ; (e) Militarism.

THE END